SOUTHERN  BRANCH, 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA, 

LIBRARY, 

lLOS  ANGELES,  CALIF. 


AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 
FROM  THE  PACIFIC 


BOOKS  BY  PUTNAM  WEALE 

Political 

Manchu  and  Muscovite. 

The  Re-Shaping  of  the  Far  East   (2  volumes). 

The  Truce  in  the  East  and  Its  Aftermath. 

The  Coming  Struggle  in  Eastern  Asia. 

The  Conflict  of  Colour. 

The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China. 

The  Truth  about  China  and  Japan. 

An  Indiscreet  Chronicle  from  the  Pacific. 

Romantic 

The  Forbidden  Boundary. 

The  Human  Cobweb. 

The  Unknown  God. 

The  Romance  of  a  Few  Days. 

The  Revolt. 

The  Eternal  Priestess. 

The  Altar  Fire. 

Wang  the  Ninth. 

Auto  biographical 

Indiscreet  Letters  from  Peking. 


AN 

INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 
FROM  THE  PACIFIC 


BY 

PUTNAM   WEALE 


Questions  are  never    indiscreet 
Answers  sometimes  are  .   .  ." 

OSCAB  WILDE 


NEW  YORK 

DOBD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 
1922 


COPYRIGHT,    1922, 

Bi  DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY,  INC. 


PRINTED    IN    THE    U.  S.  A.  BY 

VOit  ®uinn  &  jBoben  Compaup 


NOTE 

PUTNAM  WEALE  is  the  pen-name  of  Bertram  Lenox 
Simpson,  an  Englishman  in  the  political  section  of 
the  office  of  the  President  of  China.  Beginning  his 
official  career  twenty-six  years  ago,  under  the  late 
Sir  Robert  Hart,  the  famous  head  of  the  Revenue 
in  China,  he  resigned  after  the  siege  of  the  Legations 
and  began  writing  books  of  which  there  are  now 
nearly  twenty  to  his  credit.  Of  his  former  chief  he 
says,  "He  trained  me  with  a  rod  of  iron."  His  lit- 
erary method  discloses  this  early  training. 

After  the  Revolution  of  1911-12  he  received  offers 
to  re-enter  the  government  service.  But  it  was  not 
until  1916,  and  the  overthrow  and  death  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  that  he  resumed  official  work  in  the  political 
department.  Since  then  he  has  been  sent  on  many 
missions  and  is  mainly  responsible  for  the  Reports 
on  foreign  affairs. 

This  book  deals  with  steps  taken  to  bring  about  the 
demise  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  Treaty,  and 
is  in  many  ways  an  extraordinary  compilation. 

,  1922. 


CONTENTS 

PART 

I     THE  PROBLEM 

II  THE  INSTRUMENTALITY  OF  CANADA  ... 

III  THE  UNITED  STATES  TAKES  A  FIRST  STEP         . 

IV  THE  IMPERIAL  CONFERENCE  OF  1921         .         . 
V     CANOSSA 

VI     WASHINGTON  IN  NOVEMBER        .... 

VII     CLIMAX  AND  ANTI-CLIMAX 

VIII     THE  RECKONING 

APPENDIX.     THE  WASHINGTON  TREATIES  AND 

RESOLUTIONS  .     249 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

PAGE 

I     TERRITORY  OF  THE  FAR  EASTERN  REPUBLIC  .        34 

II     MAP  or  THE  NORTHERN  PACIFIC    ...       56 

III     RAILWAY  MAP  OF  CHINA          ...         .82 

IV  PACIFIC  POSSESSIONS  OF  VARIOUS  NATIONS 
CONCERNED  IN  THE  PROBLEMS  DISCUSSED 
AT  THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE  .  .  128 

V     THE  FAR  EAST  SHOWING  IRON  AND  OIL  DE- 
POSITS       182 

VI  MAP  ILLUSTRATING  CANALIZATION  OF  CHI- 
NESE WARFARE  BY  THE  RAILWAYS  .  .  200 


AN    INDISCREET    CHRONICLE 
FROM  THE    PACIFIC 


PART  I 

THE   PROBLEM 


I  HAVE  lately  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  funda- 
mental policy  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate  (which 
was  likewise  the  initial  policy  of  the  defunct  Manchu 
dynasty)  in  forbidding  in  the  Seventeenth  Century 
in  as  absolute  a  manner  as  possible  intercourse  with 
Western  countries  was  scientifically  correct. 

The  Japanese  were  more  thorough  in  their  policy 
than  the  Chinese  because  they  were  then  as  now  es- 
sentially a  maritime  people  understanding  the  im- 
portance of  the  sea,  and  much  given  to  the  pursuit 
of  ideas  to  their  logical  conclusion  without  regard 
for  the  ultimate  consequences.  They  had  for  hun- 
dreds of  years  prior  to  the  prohibition  wandered  in 
their  shipping  over  a  goodly  part  of  the  Eastern 
arms  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  captured  by  piratical 
assault  coast  towns  in  Northern  and  Central  China, 
harbours  in  the  Philippine  archipelago,  and  prahus 
in  the  Straits  of  Malacca.  Regulations  made  in  the 
Ming  dynasty  (Fourteenth  to  Seventeenth  Century) 


2         AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

prescribe  very  minutely  the  number  of  persons  who 
might  accompany  Japanese  embassies  to  Nanking, 
the  old  Southern  capital,  because  it  was  always 
feared  by  the  Court  that  bands  of  swordsmen  might 
be  concealed  in  such  corteges,  who  would  not  hesitate 
to  attempt  a  coup  de  main  if  the  odds  seemed  in 
their  favour.  It  is  an  interesting  historical  fact  that 
the  failure  of  the  Mongol  invasions  of  Japan  in  the 
Thirteenth  Century  led  to  a  great  outburst  of  piracy 
and  raiding  on  the  part  of  Japanese.  The  men  of 
five  centuries  ago  had  therefore  almost  precisely  the 
same  characteristics  as  to-day;  the  modifications 
which  have  taken  place  are  infinitesimal;  and  it  will 
be  interesting  to  watch  whether  they  will  in  the  end 
react  to  foreign  economic  pressure  much  as  they 
finally  did  to  foreign  cultural  and  military  supe- 
riority in  the  early  Tokugawa  period. 

The  Chinese  were  less  drastic  in  their  prohibition 
because  they  were  (and  still  are)  not  only  philo- 
sophic but  creatures  of  a  curiously  contradictory  com- 
pound. A  friend  from  the  southern  provinces  who 
has  reflected  long  on  the  matter,  constantly  declares 
to  me  that  their  nature  is  a  mixture  of  the  cynic  and 
epicurean;  they  have  a  contempt  for  human  nature 
and  yet  at  one  and  the  same  time  are  much  given  to 
sensual  enjoyment.  This  estimate  seems  to  me  just 
because  on  no  other  basis  can  their  marvellous  and 
splendid  art  be  reconciled  with  the  rather  sordid 
background  of  their  daily  lives.  It  was  not  in  them 
to  reject  the  West  in  the  manner  the  Japanese  did 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  3 

immediately  they  believed  that  that  gesture  was 
requisite  to  secure  their  own  institutions.  That 
seemed  too  extreme  for  them,  no  matter  how  ugly 
European  conquest  might  be.  European  historians 
have  been  much  given  to  describing  in  glowing  terms 
the  effects  which  the  Turkish  capture  of  Constanti- 
nople and  the  loss  of  the  old  land-routes  to  the  East 
had  on  the  progress  of  the  Western  races.  They 
have  never  ceased  proclaiming  that  the  white  man, 
victoriously  bursting  his  bonds  and  sailing  round 
Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Americas,  by  his  sea-mastery 
conquered  the  world  in  the  space  of  half  a  century, 
and  vastly  benefited  humanity.  How  the  cultured 
Asiatic  felt  about  the  assault  on  his  domains  is  a  mat- 
ter which  has  not  attracted  much  attention,  although 
Mr.  H.  G.  Wells  in  his  Outline  of  History  has  almost 
for  the  first  time  in  the  cast  of  any  Western  writer 
taken  more  adequate  views. 

The  Japanese  walled  themselves  in  against  Eu- 
rope, leaving  open  only  a  tiny  window  at  Deshima  in 
tihe  harbour  of  Nagasaki  to  which  Dutch  traders 
came  once  a  year,  because  fear  had  gained  them. 
Spanish  galleons,  wrecked  on  their  shores,  had  shown 
them  as  in  a  glass  darkly  what  the  famous  infantry 
of  Alva  might  mean  to  them,  and  how  impossible  it 
would  be  to  resist  a  great  expeditionary  force  if 
Western  cupidity  were  thoroughly  aroused.  There 
was  undoubtedly  in  the  Japanese  brain  a  memory 
of  the  great  Mongol  armadas  of  the.  Thirteenth 
Century,  which  had  succeeded  in  effecting  a  landing 


4         AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

on  Japanese  soil  and  had  only  been  destroyed,  much 
as  the  Spanish  Armada  to  England  was  destroyed, 
by  great  storms.  Other  points  which  must  have 
influenced  policy  were  the  success  of  the  Korean  ad- 
mirals in  burning  the  Japanese  fleets  during  the 
Hideyoshi  Expedition,  and  a  growing  conviction  that 
Western  firearms  (shown  them  by  the  Portuguese 
and  Spanish)  were  a  handicap  which  they  could  not 
surmount. 

But  allied  to  this  was  another  fear,  far  more 
insidious  since  it  postulated  the  war  of  ideas,  a  fear 
which  is  again  to-day  in  new  forms  heavily  assault- 
ing them.  Christianity,  in  the  person  of  those  im- 
mortals whose  accounts  of  early  Japan,  like  their  ac- 
counts of  early  China,  remain  delightful  prose  poems, 
had  not  only  knocked  at  the  doors  of  the  country, 
but  achieved  astonishing  success.  Great  daimyos 
had  listened  and  believed  and  had  been  baptized. 
The  wearing  of  the  scapula  was  beginning  to  be 
fashionable.  The  little-known  and  uncompleted  his- 
tory of  the  Japanese  people  by  Murdoch,  a  monu- 
mental work,  has  to  be  read  in  order  to  understand 
the  vast  commotion  in  Japanese  society.  The  Japan- 
ese nature,  always  dramatic  and  intense,  seemed  on 
the  point  of  achieving  something  new  and  remark- 
able in  a  manner  totally  unknown  in  the  East.  .  .  . 

The  closing  of  Japan  by  the  Shogunate  was  thus 
a  double  gesture:  there  was  the  outward  and  visible 
slam  of  the  door  to  keep  out  aliens,  and  the  inward 
secret  act  which  ironed  out  dissidents.  The  curi- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  5 

ous  Japanese  type,  created  by  a  racial  fusion  which 
is  by  no  means  yet  clear,  and  which  has  in  it  un- 
doubtedly very  contradictory  elements,  had  been 
temporarily  saved.  Japanese  culture,  obtained  from 
China  by  way  of  Korea  a  thousand  years  previously 
and  hammered  into  the  amalgam  of  race  by  slow 
processes,  became  even  more  stereotyped  than  be- 
fore. The  old  order  of  society,  based  on  monastic 
orders  and  feudalism  and  traditional  observances, 
was  such  a  nice  balance  that  to  hold  it  in  place  seclu- 
sion was  plainly  necessary.  Had  the  Shogunate 
been  cancelled  by  maintaining  the  open  door  and  per- 
mitting the  constant  entry  of  zealous  missionaries, 
not  to  speak  of  the  traders  with  their  arquebuses,  it 
is  almost  certain  that  Japanese  history  would  have 
resembled  the  history  of  Asia  Minor  before  Arab  and 
Turk  destroyed  the  Norman  kingdoms  on  the  Medi- 
terranean. The  Christian  daimyos,  who  fought  in 
the  Korean  expedition  of  1596  with  cries  of  "Maria" 
under  banners  adorned  with  the  Cross,  might  have 
been  the  founders  of  Catholic  principalities  on  the 
shores  of  the  Inland  Sea.  .  .  . 


n 

The  action  of  the  Chinese,  while  based  on  the  same 
general  principle,  was  curiously  different  in  its  de- 
tail. The  Manchus  had  inherited  most  of  their 
foreign  policy  from  the  Ming  dynasty,  just  as  the 
Republic  of  China  has  inherited  most  of  its  foreign 


6         AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

policy  from  the  Manchus.  The  Ming  dynasty  had 
no  very  settled  ideas  on  the  subject  of  foreigners 
until  Portuguese  mariners  in  the  Sixteenth  Century 
began  to  behave  atrociously  in  the  coast  towns  of 
Southern  China  and  sallied  forth  and  provided  them- 
selves with  virgins  whom  they  spirited  away  to  their 
ships.  This  led  to  fierce  reprisals  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  early  settlements.  Eventually  Macao — 
a  tiny  town  in  the  Canton  estuary — became  the  sole 
legal  residence;  and  it  is  a  curious  commentary  on 
the  vagueness  and  indifference  which  characterize 
foreign  affairs  that  even  to-day  the  Macao  question 
is  unsettled  in  certain  particulars. 

Meanwhile  the  Chinese,  being  essentially  com- 
mercial-minded, evolved  at  Canton  a  special  machin- 
ery based  on  the  close  corporation  idea,  which  stand- 
ardized the  exchange  of  goods  at  the  seasons  set  by 
the  trade  winds  and  allowed  fleets  of  vessels  to  come 
and  go.  Their  own  great  junks  still  sailed  down  to 
Singapore  as  they  had  done  in  Marco  Polo's  day, 
trans-shipping  their  cargo  and  getting  new  freight 
without  such  regard  for  Western  activities;  whereas 
the  Japanese  made  the  building  of  sea-going  vessels 
a  death  offence.  The  Chinese  had  the  same  religious 
problem  as  the  Japanese;  but  they  were  indifferent 
in  the  matter  until  a  clear  ruling  from  the  Pope  made 
the  authority  of  the  Church  override  the  authority  of 
the  emperors.  Then  it  was  that  by  Imperial  Edict 
the  custom  of  ancestor-worship  destroyed  the  power 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  7 

of  Propaganda;  and  that  the  religious  door  was 
slammed  to  as  in  Japan. 

With  the  Nineteenth  Century  the  chances  of  main- 
taining the  scientificially  correct  policy  of  exclusion 
diminished  to  vanishing  point  (scientifically  correct 
because  it  preserved  and  fostered  the  type  of  culture 
evolved  by  native  genius).  The  civilization  of  the 
extreme  East  was  at  last  to  meet  its  inevitable 
Nemesis  in  the  machine-made  civilization  of  the  ex- 
treme West.  There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  renown 
won  by  Commodore  Perry  for  his  so-called  opening 
of  Japan:  but  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  China 
had  been  "opened"  eleven  years  previously  and  that 
the  waters  of  the  Pacific  and  the  Yellow  Sea  were 
being  ploughed  by  countless  foreign  keels.  Sailing 
vessels  had  been  seen  passing  down  the  coast  of 
Japan  in  hundreds ;  many  had  been  wrecked  and  their 
crews  made  captive.  The  policy  of  seclusion  was 
failing,  sapped  by  the  sea-tides,  precisely  as  if  it  had 
been  a  castle  of  sand.  .  .  . 

The  motives  which  prompted  the  American  initi- 
ative in  this  matter  appear  to  have  been  mixed.  I 
have  discovered  nothing  in  any  published  account  of 
a  very  convincing  nature.  No  doubt  the  British 
Treaty  of  Nanking  made  with  China  in  1842  exerted 
a  great  deal  of  influence:  so  did  events  taking  place 
in  what  are  to-day  the  Pacific  Coast  States.  The 
cession  of  California  and  the  settlement  of  Oregon 
certainly  seemed  to  demand  a  more  vigorous  policy 
further  afield.  President  Wilson  with  his  doctrine 


8          AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  was  inventing  nothing  new ; 
for  there  is  at  the  back  of  American  consciousness  a 
sort  of  sea  instinct,  not  as  strong  as  the  English 
instinct,  yet  closely  resembling  it,  and  tending  always 
to  give  importance  to  maritime  action.  For  the  rea- 
son I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  advance  of 
British  traders  clear  round  Asia  to  the  very  mouth 
of  the  Yangtze  river — which  was  the  great  accom- 
plishment of  1842 — prompted  Perry's  action  more 
than  anything  else,  although  the  rescue  of  ship- 
wrecked crews  and  the  needs  of  the  Pacific  trade  were 
the  public  reasons.  Significally  enough,  Perry  used 
Hongkong  as  his  base,  American  foreign  policy  al- 
ways tending  to  use  England  as  its  starting- 
point.  .  .  . 

Presently  Korea  was  "opened"  and  soon  the  impact 
had  become  more  or  less  stereotyped.  The  Western 
world  could  now  dump  its  excess  production  on  the 
foreshores  of  a  large  number  of  open  ports  and  re- 
ceive back  quantities  of  raw  or  semi-raw  products. 
The  rest  was  more  or  less  on  the  knees  of  the  gods. 
What  effect  this  exchange  was  having  on  the  minds 
of  the  populations:  what  shape  destiny  would  give 
their  hopes  and  fears — above  all  their  fears — these 
things  were  not  for  officialdom. 

We  thus  reach  the  period  of  the  Nineties  and  the 
war  which  inevitably  came  between  the  two  "opened" 
countries,  China  and  Japan,  about  the  third  "opened" 
country,  Korea.  All  was  inevitable;  for  the  banish- 
ment of  seclusion  and  exclusion  brought  China  and 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  9 

Japan  back  to  precisely  the  same  point  where  they 
had  been  when  they  left  off  quarrelling  prior  to  the 
fall  of  the  Ming  dynasty. 

Japan  had  learnt  something  about  soldiers  and 
navies;  China  considerably  less.  The  result  was  a 
Japanese  victory. 

But  there  was  a  much  more  important  circum- 
stance. With  the  collapse  of  China  the  immense  cor- 
ruption of  Russian  imperialism  had  at  last  reached 
the  Far  East  in  force  by  the  land-route.  Russia  had 
been  nibbling  for  a  generation:  now  she  opened  her 
mouth  and  bit  hard.  The  balance  of  power  was  not 
only  changed  by  this  event,  but  history  inevitabfy 
took  a  new  road  far  away  from  the  sea-lanes  which 
had  until  now  monopolized  attention.  The  greatest 
importance  must  be  attached  to  this  dislocation 
which  has  no  parallel  in  the  annals  of  the  East,  and 
to  which  is  directly  due  practically  all  world  disturb- 
ance during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century. 

Of  all  Powers  the  United  States  was  the  one  which 
understood  the  implications  of  this  vast  modification 
the  least.  Placed  in  possession  of  the  Philippines  by 
chance  and  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  by  deliberate 
act,  she  still  maintained  the  fiction  of  the  aloofness 
practised  by  her  for  a  century.  Yet  of  all  the 
Powers  she  was  the  one  that  had  the  oldest  Pacific 
relations  with  Russia.  Books  written  sixty  and 
seventy  years  ago  are  filled  with  the  activities  of 
Americans  and  bear  witness  to  their  old-time  success. 
Long  before  there  was  any  question  of  the  Alaska 


10        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

purchase,  Russia  and  America  almost  joined  hands 
across  the  Northern  Pacific,  American  whalers  and 
schooners  being  the  vanguard  of  the  maritime  ad- 
vance. 

But  in  the  interval  between  the  Alaska  purchase 
(1867)  and  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  (1895)  a 
great  change  had  come.  The  sailing-ship  days  were 
over  and  in  the  first  age  of  steamers  Americans  did 
not  excel.  The  zone  of  interest  had  also  crept  south- 
wards. Hawaii  and  the  Philippines  had  become  the 
symbols  of  policy — not  Alaska  and  the  Aleutians. 
It  was  a  British  fleet  which  occupied  the  Korean  an- 
chorage, Port  Hamilton,  in  1885  because  Russia 
looked  like  moving  south,  although,  logically,  it 
should  have  been  an  American  fleet  since  America 
had  opened  Korea  in  the  Perry  style  only  three  years 
previously  and  had  proclaimed  unalterable  princi- 
ples. Even  in  China  American  policy  was  purely 
negative,  taking  the  form  of  altruistic  declarations. 
There  was  a  very  definite  pause  as  men  tried  to  take 
stock  of  the  vast  struggle  now  going  on  between  the 
century  old  maritime  policy  and  the  new  Russian 
policy  of  land  grab. 

The  signature  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  in 
1902  was  a  declaration  that  sea-power  tends  natu- 
rally to  work  along  certain  lines.  It  was  the  most 
important  event  in  China  since  1842  because  Japan 
was  still  essentially  a  sea-power,  not  yet  turned  by 
continentalism  into  something  harder  to  define.  The 
challenge  which  Russia  offered  was  so  obvious  that  it 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  11 

was  necessary  to  meet  it  or  else  the  sea-lanes  would 
be  closed. 

The  Russo-Japanese  war  put  Japan  back  where 
she  had  tentatively  been  in  1895,  with  the  valuable 
addition  of  railways.  It  is  from  this  moment  that 
the  modern  history  of  the  Far  East  commences.  All 
the  forces  which  are  still  working  were  then  set  in 
motion,  moving  with  a  steadfastness  which  is  a  fair 
promise  of  their  permanence.  The  problem  of 
integrating  Chinese  national  life  in  such  a  way  as  to 
be  an  effective  international  element  had  necessarily 
become  greatly  complicated.  It  was  only  men  of 
strong  minds  who  could  see  that  in  spite  of  vastly 
increased  detail  the  outline  remained  essentially  the 
same. 

in 

In  Peking,  long  before  the  world-war,  we  had 
reached  the  conclusion  that  there  were  only  two  coun- 
tries important  to  the  New  China.  They  were  im- 
portant not  so  much  because  of  what  they  might 
directly  do,  but  because  the  future  in  the  Far  East 
hinged  on  whether  or  not  their  views  were  identical 
and  their  influence  directed  along  the  same  channels 
towards  the  same  ends.  The  relationship  of  Eng- 
land to  America — that  indeed  was  the  supreme  fac- 
tor! No  matter  how  you  might  look  at  it  there  was 
not  one  of  the  other  Powers  that  had  any  true  liberty 
of  action  or  that  could  by  any  possible  combination 
radically  influence  the  march  of  events.  Russia  had 


12        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

compromised  her  whole  future  by  her  rashness  in  the 
post-Boxer  period.  Germany,  separated  by  ten 
thousand  miles  from  the  scene  of  action,  had  after  an 
initial  outburst  of  disruptive  energy  in  1898  and  1900 
settled  down  to  a  motherly  policy  which  had  won 
for  her  the  confidence  of  the  Chinese.  France  had 
interests  so  small  that  they  were  not  seriously  to  be 
counted.  Let  us  remember  that  it  was  these  three 
Powers  who  combined  together  in  1895  against 
Japan  in  the  Liaotung  intervention — Russia,  Ger- 
many, and  France. 

Remains  Japan. 

Japan,  in  spite  of  her  victories  in  1894-95  and 
1904-05,  still  possessed  little  that  made  for  perman- 
ent greatness.  Her  geographical  isolation  was  per- 
haps a  factor ;  but  internationally  that  had  a  negative 
as  well  as  a  positive  side;  for  it  put  her  out  of  com- 
munion with  the  world.  The  machine-made  age  had 
indeed  touched  her  and  enlisted  her  in  its  ranks;  yet 
essentially  she  remained  unchanged.  Her  national 
life  was  based  as  in  the  remote  past  on  primitive 
agriculture  and  the  fisheries  and  the  handicrafts :  and 
whenever  her  factories  were  idle  the  men  went  back 
to  the  land  and  the  coast  and  the  small  shops  and 
worked  as  if  the  Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Centuries 
had  brought  no  change.  Iron  and  steel  and  scientific 
accomplishment  had  increased  her  armaments;  but 
the  facade  of  Westernism  was  not  very  tough,  and  in 
a  true  conflict  of  exhaustion  the  same  things  would 
come  to  the  surface  as  in  the  earlier  centuries — fierce 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  13 

battle  valour,  a  posture  of  defence,  retirement.  .  .  . 
One  circumstance  and  one  only  qualified  this. 
This  was  the  existence  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance which  has  played  the  same  part  in  Japanese 
national  life  as  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in 
the  life  of  the  American  people.  So  immense  has 
been  its  influence  in  changing  Japan's  relationship 
with  the  world  that  exaggerated  as  the  sentence 
above  may  sound  it  is  hardly  the  whole  truth.  Japan 
had  not  possessed  independence  in  the  sense  that 
Western  Powers  understood  it  until  the  Alliance  gave 
it  to  her.  She  had  been  dispossessed  of  the  Liaotung 
by  a  mere  gesture  on  the  part  of  three  Powers  and 
she  had  been  intrigued  out  of  Korea  by  one  Power 
alone — Russia.  She  could  never  have  fought  this 
Power  without  the  protection  of  the  Alliance.  Even 
as  it  was  ruin  was  so  close  to  her  when  the  war  was 
stopped  that  it  was  calculated  to  be  exactly  five 
months  off.  The  real  instrument  of  peace  was  not 
the  treaty  signed  at  Portsmouth  on  the  2nd  Sep- 
tember, 1905,  but  the  second  Anglo- Japanese  Alli- 
ance of  the  12th  August  signed  in  London.  The 
whole  framework  of  her  Western  relationship,  being 
purely  artificial,  was  held  up  and  supported  not  by 
what  she  could  do  herself,  but  what  she  could  get 
others  to  assist  her  in  doing.  This  is  a  pregnant 
sentence  which  every  student  should  nail  to  his  desk. 
No  men  understood  this  better  than  Japanese  states- 
men; this  is  precisely  why  Japan's  future,  like 
China's,  hinges  on  how  England  and  America  act. 


14        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Japan's  Korean-Manchurian  policy,  with  its  curi- 
ous attempts  to  find  sanctions  which  would  meet  the 
approval  of  the  resident  populations  and  lead  them  to 
endorse  foreign-style  legal  agreements  entered  into 
for  international  reasons,  began  badly  to  frighten  the 
Far  East  long  before  the  world-war:  and  whilst 
it^  would  be  an  overstatement  to  declare  that  the 
Chinese  Revolution  of  1911  was  directly  due  to 
Japanese  policy  that  Revolution  would  have  been  im- 
possible without  the  humiliations  which  had  been  im- 
posed on  China  by  Japan. 

The  British,  being  like  the  Chinese  essentially  a 
commercial-minded  people,  were  troubled  by  the  rise 
of  a  commercial  rival.  But  policy  in  England  is 
conducted  on  the  plan  of  the  Insurance  Office. 
Good  risks,  when  they  have  been  willingly  written, 
are  continued  because  that  is  the  essence  of  sound 
business,  and  because  a  contrary  attitude  would  seem 
unconservative  and  rash.  Japan  had  carried  out  the 
letter  of  her  contract:  and  since  it  is  not  usual  for 
statesmen  to  inquire  about  things  of  the  spirit,  the 
rest  was  a  matter  which  could  only  be  unofficially 
condemned. 

In  1911  the  British  had  done  a  remarkable  thing — 
signed  the  third  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  four  years 
before  the  second  instrument  had  expired,  ostensibly 
because,  in  the  language  of  the  preamble,  changes 
had  occurred  necessitating  a  revision  of  the  text.  In 
reality  it  was  another  matter  which  forced  action. 
The  supreme  factor  in  the  Far  East  had  begun 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  15 

to  loom  up  in  a  new  way :  the  relationship  of  England 
to  America  was  troubling  statesmen.  The  move- 
ment towards  arbitration  treaties  was  a  symptom  of 
a  need  which  was  deeply  felt  in  order  to  eliminate 
risks  which  had  become  perilously  hazardous.  The 
insertion  of  the  arbitration  article  (Article  IV)  was 
agreed  upon,  although  not  at  all  popular  with  the 
Japanese.  But  .that  was  all.  The  old  insurance 
firm  would  not  yet  admit  the  existence  of  a  world 
in  which  a  complete  abandonment  of  an  established 
system  was  advisable.  The  proof  of  this  was  af- 
forded by  the  whole  action  which  began  in  1914  to 
which  very  close  attention  should  be  re-directed. 


British  policy  has  historically  thought  of  Asia  on 
a  strictly  mercantilist  basis.  Asia  is  a  region  where 
there  are  markets,  not  peoples.  This  connotes  the 
existence  of  certain  common  necessities  and  leads  to 
a  certain  kind  of  action,  but  nothing  else.  The 
markets  must  be  supplied  with  cloth,  iron,  machinery 
and  what-not ;  the  markets  must  send  back  their  raw 
and  semi-raw  products.  Nothing  must  be  allowed 
to  interfere  with  this  exchange  or  prejudice  it.  But 
that  ideas  should  penetrate  in  company  with  the 
cloth,  iron,  machinery  and  what-not  and  have  a  most 
powerful  repercussion,  leading  to  aspirations,  tempt- 
ations, irritations  and  aspersions,  is  if  not  an  irrever- 
ence at  least  not  in  accordance  with  precept. 


16        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

In  1914  there  was  a  document  in  existence — the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  It  was  destined  to  do  for 
China  the  greatest  disservice  any  foreign  agreement 
had  performed  at  any  time  in  her  history. 

Germany  in  the  Far  East,  as  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  was  popular  because  her  policy  for  a 
number  of  years  had  been  more  liberal  and  less  mer- 
cantilist than  the  policy  of  any  other  Power.  Sev- 
eral years  before  the  outbreak  of  war  her  action  in 
the  sphere  of  Chinese  railways  had  been  decisive  in 
breaking  down  a  persistent  and  malevolent  attempt 
to  alienate  control  from  the  Chinese  people  and  place 
it  in  the  hands  of  foreign  syndicates.  In  business 
and  diplomacy  she  was  accommodating  and  sympa- 
thetic, showing  that  she  understood  something  of  the 
psychological  problem  which  was  before  the  peoples 
of  the  East  from  the  necessity  of  scrapping  their  own 
civilization  and  substituting  alien  ideas.  Although 
she  was  a  member  of  the  Banking  consortium  she  had 
taken  little  or  no  part  in  the  politico-financial  action 
of  the  Legations  in  the  previous  year — 1913 — which 
by  means  of  an  international  loan  had  destroyed  the 
Parliament  of  the  Republic  to  which  they  were  ac- 
credited. 

President  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  actually  engaged  in 
conversations  having  for  object  the  surrender  of  the 
Kiaochow  Lease,  as  soon  as  the  German  cruisers  com- 
menced their  raiding  in  the  China  Seas.  But  the 
conversations  had  led  nowhere  not  so  much  because 
full  powers  were  not  possessed  by  the  German  rep- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  17 

resentatives,  but  because  of  the  advice  and  action  of 
the  British  Minister.  Had  Britain,  in  the  person  of 
the  British  Minister,  made  an  absolute  offer  to  sup- 
port China  if  she  turned  out  the  Germans  by  force 
unless  Kiaochow  was  immediately  surrendered,  there 
would  have  been  instant  action,  and  all  history  would 
have  been  different.  The  same  communication  should 
have  been  made  to  China  as  to  Japan.  I  have  the 
authority  of  all  the  secretaries  and  personnel  of  the 
late  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  for  the  statement  that 
China  was  dissuaded  from  either  quickly  completing 
her  negotiations  or  taking  the  necessary  military 
action  because  of  advice  tendered  her  under  the  guise 
of  friendship.  The  complete  failure  to  grasp  the 
great  possibilities  which  a  belligerent  China  held  out 
for  a  solution  of  the  Far  Eastern  question  in  1914 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  men  of  the  spot  were  not 
only  inadequate  but  did  not  deal  fairly  and  honour- 
ably with  a  friendly  power. 

Yet  England  was  represented  in  Peking  by  an  ex- 
emplary official  with  every  possible  qualification,  ex- 
cept imagination  and  a  knowledge  of  world  affairs. 
A  member  of  the  China  Consular  service  long  before 
he  had  been  made  British  Minister,  Sir  John  Jordan 
was  perfectly  acquainted  with  every  aspect  of 
Chinese  life  and  highly  sympathetic  with  the  Chinese 
people.  Liberal-minded  and  just,  he  had  completed 
in  the  last  years  of  his  service  a  piece  of  noble  work 
by  forcing  through  in  the  teeth  of  bitter  opposition 
the  total  abolition  of  the  Indian  opium  trade,  a  traffic 


18        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

which  had  been  a  source  of  disgrace  for  more  than 
a  century.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  these  qualities, 
he  was  totally  unsuited  for  the  crisis  which  arose. 
Deeply  occupied  with  routine  work,  he  could  not  con- 
ceive of  a  disorderly  issue  such  as  war  arising  sud- 
denly out  of  the  night.  What  stirred  and  occupied 
him  was  contraventions  of  the  commercial  Treaties 
which  he  looked  upon  as  more  important  than  the 
fate  of  nations.  Venerating  the  Foreign  Office,  in  a 
way  which  might  have  even  embarrassed  the  late 
George  Downing,  he  had  come  to  look  upon  any 
interruption  of  the  time-honoured  method  of  report- 
ing and  receiving  instructions  as  a  sign  of  Divine 
displeasure. 

Yet  he  had  the  situation  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand. 
Fate  had  willed  that  in  the  days  of  his  youth  he  had 
been  a  contemporary  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  in  Seoul, 
living  through  long  and  stormy  years  with  him  when 
Korea's  fate  was  at  stake.  His  influence  with  the 
man  was  very  great ;  there  was  nothing  that  he  could 
not  get  him  to  do.  The  establishment  of  the  Repub- 
lic in  China  had  largely  come  through  his  advocacy 
of  compromise  at  a  moment  when  decision  in  another 
sense  would  have  kept  the  Manchus  on  the  Throne. 
The  very  next  year,  without  ever  suspecting  that  he 
was  guilty  of  something  worse  than  inconsistency, 
he  had  assisted  the  virtual  overthrow  of  the  Republic 
and  the  rise  of  the  open  dictatorship  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 
by  forcing  through  a  foreign  loan  against  the  will  of 
Parliament.  Like  many  mild  men,  a  believer  in  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  19 

strong  man  theory  because  he  had  heard  so  many 
people  speak  approvingly  of  it,  he  nevertheless  had 
few  ideas  on  the  subject,  and  always  hoped  for  the 
best  even  when  his  actions  were  producing  the  worst. 

Such  was  the  man  on  the  spot  who  in  the  summer 
of  1914  was  called  upon  to  play  a  decisive  role  in  a 
matter  as  disorderly  as  a  world-war. 

What  did  he  do?  He  carefully  and  zealously 
watched  other  people  act  and  reported  the  facts  by 
telegraph  from  hour  to  hour.  The  one  important 
thing  was  to  get  a  firm  grasp  of  all  the  undertakings 
between  China  and  Germany;  to  watch  them  both; 
and  to  show  London  (by  telegraph)  how  the  Treaties 
might  affect  the  issue.  All  his  influence  with  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  all  his  friendship  for  China,  all  the  immense 
possibilities  of  the  situation  were  forgotten;  he 
merely  carried  out  his  duty  according  to  his  lights. 

What  took  place?  In  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon's  book 
on  the  Paris  Peace  negotiations  there  is  an  account 
which  has  been  checked  with  official  documents  and 
found  to  be  substantially  correct,  and  which  shows 
in  a  sufficiently  precise  way  the  information  and  ad- 
vice which  reached  London  from  Peking. 

Dr.  Dillon  says: 

"The  day  before  Britain  declared  war  against  Germany 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Tokyo  officially  inquired  whether 
his  Government  could  count  upon  the  active  co-operation  of 
the  Mikado's  forces  in  the  campaign  about  to  begin.  On 
August  4th  Baron  Kato,  having  in  the  meanwhile  consulted 
his  colleagues,  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Three  days  later 


20        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

another  communication  reached  Tokyo  from  London,  re- 
questing the  immediate  co-operation  of  Japan,  and  on  the 
following  day  it  was  promised.  The  motive  for  this  haste  was 
credibly  asserted  to  be  Britain's  apprehension  lest  Germany 
should  transfer  Kiao  Chow  to  China,  and  reserve  to  herself, 
in  virtue  of  Article  V  of  the  Convention  of  1898,  the  right  of 
securing  after  the  war  *a  more  suitable  territory'  in  the 
Middle  Empire  or  Republic.  Thereupon  they  began  opera- 
tions which  were  at  first  restricted  to  the  China  Seas,  but 
were  afterwards  extended  to  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans, 
and  finally  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  only  task  that  fell 
to  their  lot  on  land  was  that  of  capturing  Kiao  Chow." 

Here  you  have  in  all  its  nakedness  the  terrible 
error  of  August,  1914.  Not  the  fate  of  civilization, 
not  the  victory  of  one  group  of  Powers  devoted  to 
proclaimed  objects,  not  national  security  were  matters 
of  concern  in  China,  but  apprehension  concerning  the 
possibilities  contained  in  Article  V  of  the  Sino-Ger- 
man  Convention  of  1898 !  Never  has  official  stupid- 
ity shown  itself  so  glaringly.  China,  who  could  have 
been  brought  into  the  war  at  the  very  outset  with 
England  on  midnight  of  the  4th  August  1914,  and 
contributed  (after  the  occupation  of  Kiao  Chow)  a 
powerful  army  for  the  Mesopotamian  and  Near  East- 
ern campaigns  was  rebuffed  and  deliberately  kept 
out,  heing  almost  driven  into  the  opposite  camp 
through  the  action  of  Japan,  taken  at  the  request  of 
England,  advised  to  that  end  by  her  minister  in  Pe- 
king. Her  troops,  who  might  have  won  for  her  excel- 
lent renown  abroad,  were  left  to  fester  in  the  country 
so  that  they  could  gradually  destroy  all  unity.  Nor 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  21 

was  the  folly  confined  to  astounding  aberration  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war;  no  attempt  was  made  al- 
most until  the  end  to  utilize  Chinese  resources.  Al- 
though the  dockyards  of  Hongkong  and  Shanghai 
almost  all  belong  to  British  companies,  and  could 
have  turned  out  annually  200,000  tons  of  new  ship- 
ping, official  action  in  spite  of  every  effort  was  so 
supine  that  nothing  was  done  until  the  effort  was  of 
no  importance.  One  million  tons  of  new  vessels 
were  therefore  as  deliberately  thrown  away  as  if  the 
Germans  had  sunk  them.  Had  Germany  possessed 
England's  position  and  resources  in  China  it  would 
have  meant  for  her  the  difference  between  defeat  and 
victory.  That  a  heavy  responsibility  attaches  to 
every  one  who  participated  in  this  conspiracy  of  in- 
action is  to-day  not  disputed. 

Because  it  had  meant  for  them  a  secret  and  un- 
necessary betrayal,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  be- 
came enthroned  as  an  object  of  open  hatred  in  the 
hearts  of  the  Chinese  people.  After  having  been  in 
existence  twelve  years,  it  had  directly  meddled  with 
Chinese  affairs  in  a  most  disastrous  way  and  had 
directly  influenced  not  only  the  march  of  events 
throughout  the  world  but  the  chances  of  Chinese 
domestic  peace.  For  with  the  mandate  given  to 
Japan  over  the  matter  of  Shantung,  the  Japanese 
took  every  advantage,  from  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands of  1915  down  to  their  uncompromising  stand 
of  Paris  in  1919.  The  survival  of  the  wholly  in- 
correct idea  that  the  Chinese  cannot  be  utilized  in 


22        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

world  politics,  except  as  hewers  of  wood  and  carriers 
of  water  in  Labour  Corps,  was  at  the  bottom  of  a 
mistake  which  the  world  will  continue  to  pay  for  dur- 
ing long  and  painful  years. 


If  England  was  the  clumsy  sinner,  America  was 
the  really  romantic  sinner.  Her  policy  in  the  Far 
East  had  constantly  passed  beyond  the  limits  of  real 
life  because  she  had  no  vital  interest  at  stake.  She 
dreamed  great  dreams  which  ended  in  commonplace 
diplomatic  morasses  because  she  was  never  prepared 
to  do  more  than  throw  out  ideas  which  she  allowed 
others  to  stamp  out  of  existence.  From  the  enunci- 
ation of  the  Hay  doctrine  of  the  Open  Door  in  1899 
to  the  exchange  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes  in  1917 
she  accomplished  nothing  that  influenced  in  any  de- 
gree the  onward  march  of  the  peoples  of  the  East, 
while  contributing  a  great  deal  to  their  confusion  and 
unrest. 

What  was  she  aiming  at?  Peace,  perfect  peace; 
she  desired  to  enthrone  peace  and  make  all  men  love 
one  another.  But  her  method  was  by  proclamation 
rather  than  by  action,  by  abstention  rather  than  by 
participation.  The  supreme  irony  lay  in  the  fact 
that  her  dearest  measure  was  the  one  most  deeply 
resented  by  the  Chinese  people:  for  it  is  a  singular 
and  interesting  fact  that  the  only  way  you  can  trans- 
late the  open-door  is  by  the  phrase  "throw  open  the 


23 

portals  of  your  house,"  which  is  tantamount  to  a 
"sanction"  resembling  exploitation.  The  constant 
reiteration  of  the  open-door  policy  during  two  de- 
cades has  created  unnecessary  suspicion  and  is  one 
more  proof  that  it  is  unwise  to  think  up  means  to 
save  a  nation  until  you  have  satisfied  yourself  that 
your  language  is  comprehensible.  Even  when  great 
opportunities  lay  within  her  grasp  she  signally  failed 
because  her  proposals  were  inevitably  unbusinesslike. 
Thus  in  1901,  during  the  great  international  discus- 
sion which  settled  the  Boxer  peace,  the  late  William 
Rockhill,  American  Minister  to  Peking,  proposed 
at  the  last  moment  in  the  name  of  his  government 
that  all  the  Powers  should  cut  their  claims  in  half  as 
an  act  of  self-abnegation,  and  so  prevent  the  camel's 
back  from  breaking,  the  plan  was  promptly  rejected. 
Had  he  laid  down  the  doctrine  that  the  payment  in 
specie  of  the  sums  demanded  from  China  would  up- 
set the  markets  of  the  East,  debase  all  values  and 
ultimately  bring  revolution,  and  then  insisted  that  it 
was  equally  important  for  a  stabilizer  to  be  set  up 
by  each  Power  allocating  from  its  payments  a  de- 
finite percentage  to  a  Central  Bank  and  Currency 
fund,  the  plan  would  certainly  have  been  accepted, 
and  by  now,  after  twenty  years,  a  relatively  vast  mass 
of  white  metal  would  be  held  in  reserve  in  China  and 
the  outlook  entirely  different. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  war  there  was  almost 
the  same  folly.  No  one  now  doubts  that  President 
Roosevelt's  intervention  in  1905  was  dictated  by  an 


24        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

almost  feverish  desire  to  stop  a  sinister  development 
of  Japanese  power.  Yet  this  could  have  been  ar- 
rested only  by  precisely  the  opposite  method.  It 
would  have  been  far  better  to  have  declined  to  inter- 
vene (and  also  to  have  declined  to  allow  others  to 
intervene)  until  the  principle  of  Chinese  integrity 
had  been  definitely  established  by  a  pledge  of  evacu- 
ation of  Chinese  soil.  Had  that  been  done  and  the 
war  fought  to  its  normal  conclusion,  the  after-thought 
of  1909,  the  scheme  for  the  neutralization  of  Man- 
churian  railways,  would  have  been  part  of  the  peace 
settlement,  and  a  very  great  issue  would  not  be  still 
awaiting  solution.  Nor  would  it  have  been  necessary 
to  acquiesce  in  the  crucifixion  of  Korea,  which  re- 
mains a  standing  indictment  of  the  American- 
Korean  Treaty  of  1884  and  a  proof  that  it  was  a 
worthless  document. 

Policy  was  always  out  of  its  depth  directly  a  con- 
crete problem  arose.  The  retirement  in  1913  of  the 
American  banking  group  from  the  Consortium  of 
foreign  banks,  on  the  direct  instruction  of  President 
Wilson,  because  the  terms  of  the  loan  touched  very 
nearly  the  administrative  independence  of  China  was 
another  proof  that  elimination  is  the  normal  end  of 
those  who  will  not  force  their  participation  on  others 
at  their  own  price.  Great,  however,  as  were  the 
errors  of  policy  in  the  decade  following  the  Ports- 
mouth Treaty,  they  were  to  be  eclipsed  and  made  as 
nothing  compared  with  the  error  of  the  war. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  25 

VI 

It  can  be  said  that  just  as  the  greatest  error  in 
seventy  years  of  British  policy  in  China  was  invok- 
ing the  aid  of  Japan  in  1914  to  perform  a  piece  of 
work  which  was  legitimately  China's,  so  in  1917  was 
there  committed  the  greatest  error  the  United  States 
ever  made.  After  having  induced  China  to  break  off 
relations  with  Germany  and  pushed  her  to  declare 
war  by  promises  of  financial  support,  there  was  a 
complete  failure  to  produce  so  much  as  a  single  dol- 
lar. Although  it  would  have  been  the  richest 
moral  and  political  investment  conceivable  to  have 
made  modest  advances  to  the  Chinese  Exchequer, 
China  was  left  with  not  money  enough  to  execute  a 
single  measure.  Her  disastrous  loan  operations  with 
Japan  were  as  directly  due  to  the  action  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  as  the  seizure  of 
Shantung  and  the  Twenty-one  Demands  were  due 
to  the  action  of  England.  Precisely  the  same  moral 
responsibility  attached  to  both  Powers. 

Yet  like  England,  the  United  States  was  repre- 
sented in  Peking  by  a  lover  of  the  Chinese  people, 
which  makes  the  case  all  the  more  extraordinary.  In 
Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch  America  had  just  as  exemplary 
an  official.  Passionately  interested  in  the  problem  of 
the  Far  East,  he  had  brought  with  him  from  his 
university  professorship  a  degree  of  accurate  knowl- 
edge and  psychological  understanding  seldom  if  ever 
before  possessed  by  previous  occupants  of  his  post. 


26       AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

During  four  years  prior  to  1917  he  had  served  an 
arduous  apprenticeship  in  the  endless  political  strug- 
gle which  rages  in  the  Chinese  capital.  If  nothing 
very  tangible  had  come  out  of  it  all,  circumstances 
were  partially  to  blame.  A  certain  doctrinaire 
quality  of  mind  perhaps  rendered  fruition  of  schemes 
more  difficult  than  it  would  have  been  in  the  case  of 
a  more  practical  man.  Nevertheless,  in  restless 
energy  Dr.  Reinsch  made  up  for  everything  .else ;  and 
he  was  therefore  as  ripe  for  the  crisis  which  arose  in 
February  1917,  when  the  United  States  invited  China 
to  share  her  submarine  policy,  as  any  man  could  be.1 

He  threw  himself  with  as  much  zest  into  the  matter 
of  getting  China  to  the  war  as  if  the  subject  had  never 
been  broached  before.  And  he  succeeded  so  well  that 
he  entirely  lost  sight  of  the  central  fact — which  was 
not  what  China  was  going  to  do  for  the  world,  but 
what  America  was  going  to  do  for  China. 

China  did  not  forget  the  central  fact — she  pressed 
for  information  and  money.  Characteristically,  Dr. 
Reinsch  begged  the  issue.  Instead  of  making  cash 
the  touchstone  of  American  policy,  he  declared  that 
goodwill  would  do  as  well.  Had  he  bluntly  informed 
his  government  that  unless  they  were  prepared  to 
finance  China  as  a  belligerent  it  was  futile  to  proceed 
further  he  would  have  gone  down  in  history  as  the 
first  American  minister  to  Peking  who  had  under- 
stood how  to  handle  a  crisis  in  a  practical  way. 

1  See  the  volume  "An  American  Diplomat  in  China,"  one  of  the  most 
singular  "diplomatic"  accounts  recently  published,  for  further  details 
of  this  period. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  27 

This  is  how  he  wrote  to  the  Chinese  Government 
on  the  7th  February,  when  the  final  decision  came  up, 
as  has  been  disclosed  in  his  own  book: 

"EXCELLENCY, 

"In  our  recent  conversation  concerning  the  policy  of  your 
Government  in  associating  itself  with  the  United  States  in 
active  opposition  to  the  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  by 
which  Germany  is  indiscriminately  jeopardizing  the  lives  of 
neutral  citizens,  you  have  with  entire  frankness  pointed  out 
to  me  that,  whereas  the  Chinese  Government  is  in  principle 
disposed  to  adopt  the  suggestion  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  that  regard,  it  nevertheless  finds  itself  in  a 
position  in  which  it  would  not  feel  safe  in  so  doing  unless 
assured  that  it  could  obtain  from  American  sources  such 
financial  and  other  assistance  as  would  enable  it  to  take  the 
measures  appropriate  to  the  situation  which  would  thus  be 
created. 

"With  like  candour  I  have  stated  to  you  that  I  have 
recommended  to  my  Government  that  in  the  event  of  the 
Chinese  Government's  associating  itself  with  the  President's 
suggestion,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  should  take 
measures  to  put  at  its  disposition  the  sums  immediately  re- 
quired for  the  purposes  you  have  indicated,  and  should  take 
steps  with  a  view  to  such  a  funding  of  the  Boxer  Indemnity 
as  would  for  the  time  being  make  available  for  the  purpose 
of  the  Chinese  Government  at  least  the  major  portion  of  the 
current  indemnity  instalments :  and  I  have  indicated  to  you 
my  personal  conviction  that  my  Government  would  be  found 
just  and  liberal  in  effecting  this  or  other  such  arrangements 
to  enable  the  Chinese  Government  to  meet  the  responsibilities 
which  it  might  assume  upon  the  suggestion  of  the  President. 
I  should  not  be  wholly  frank  with  you,  however,  if  I  were  to 
fail  to  point  out  that  the  exact  nature  of  any  assistance  to 


he  given  or  any  measure  to  be  taken  must  be  determined 
through  consultation  of  various  administrative  organs,  in 
some  cases  including  reference  to  Congress,  in  order  to  make 
effective  such  arrangements  as  might  have  been  agreed  to  in 
principle  between  the  executive  authorities  of  the  two  coun- 
tries ;  and  I  therefore  could  not  in  good  faith  make  in  behalf 
of  my  Government  any  definite  commitments  upon  your  sug- 
gestions at  the  present  time. 

"I  do,  however,  feel  warranted  in  assuming  the  responsi- 
bility of  assuring  you  in  behalf  of  my  Government  that  by 
the  methods  you  have  suggested,  or  otherwise,  adequate  means 
will  be  devised  to  enable  China  to  fulfil  the  responsibilities 
consequent  upon  associating  herself  with  the  action  of  the 
United  States  Government,  without  any  impairment  of  her 
national  independence  and  of  her  control  of  her  military 
establishment  and  general  administration." 

As  a  result  of  the  assurance  contained  in  this  des- 
patch China  took  the  first  step  in  regard  to  Germany. 
On  the  9th  February  the  presence  of  the  German 
minister  was  requested  and  a  Note  was  read  to  him 
to  the  effect  that  China  would  break  off  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany  if  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare  was  persisted  in.  And  on  that  date,  Amer- 
ican influence,  so  far  as  Chinese  action  was  con- 
cerned, came  as  completely  to  an  end  as  if  the  United 
States  had  dropped  down  a  bottomless  hole.  Noth- 
ing tangible  ever  came  of  the  assurance  of  financial 
help;  and  if  one  is  to  accept  the  indications  in  his 
own  book,  Dr.  Reinsch  was  made  to  suffer  by  his 
own  government  for  his  zeal.  When  the  full  Chinese 
declaration  of  war  finally  matured  six  months  later, 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  29 

Japan  had  secretly  tied  her  Allies  in  such  tight  knots 
that  the  disposal  of  Shantung  and  the  Pacific  is- 
lands, north  of  the  equator  were  choses  jugees.  The 
whole  Chinese  action  subsequent  to  the  9th  February, 
indeed,  depended  on  Japan.  The  German  Minister  to 
Peking  was  handed  his  passports  on  the  14th  March, 
only  when  the  Japanese  Minister  on  secret  inform- 
ation from  Tokyo  pressed  for  war.  The  hoodwink- 
ing of  America  was  complete.  All  the  measures  of 
relief  granted  to  China,  when  her  belligerency  was 
officially  established,  were  general  measures  granted 
by  all  the  Powers  alike,  such  as  temporary  suspension 
of  the  Boxer  indemnities  and  Tariff  revision.  The 
one  Power  who  gave  her  special  consideration  for  her 
own  purposes  was  not  the  United  States  but  Japan, 
who  obtained  for  her  under  various  headings  during 
the  next  two  years  a  sum  equivalent  to  one  hundred 
million  gold  dollars.  The  United  States  contented 
herself  by  writing  an  epitaph  on  the  grave  which  she 
had  dug  for  herself  by  handing  China  a  note  on  the 
5th  June  which  declared  that  "the  entry  of  China  into 
war  with  Germany — or  the  continuance  of  the  status 
quo  of  her  relations  with  that  government  are  matters 
of  secondary  importance.  The  principal  necessity 
for  China  is  to  resume  and  continue  her  political 
entity,  to  proceed  along  the  road  of  national  develop- 
ment on  which  she  has  made  such  marked  progress." 
In  all  diplomatic  archives  there  is  nothing  quite 
similar. 


30        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

VII 

If  official  policy  was  erring  so  astoundingly,  there 
was  fortunately  another  factor  becoming  operative. 
Some  subtle  instinct  was  causing  a  profound  change 
in  the  relations  between  America  and  Britain  which 
showed  itself  in  many  small  ways.  Somehow  it 
seemed  clear  that  on  the  Pacific,  if  nowhere  else,  pru- 
dence demanded  a  revaluation  of  things.  Those 
whose  fundamental  principles  were  the  same  should 
surely  take  counsel  together.  The  history  of  the  Far 
East  began  to  be  re-read;  men  looked  back  to  the 
days  when  only  the  English-speaking  race  had  been 
important  in  China  and  Japan.  What  was  going  to 
happen  to  England  and  America  on  the  Pacific  if  a 
powerful  rival  secured  all  the  points  of  vantage? 
That  was  an  interrogation  which  the  Paris  Treaties 
left  unanswered.  But  so  long  as  the  fundamental 
element  governing  the  action  of  the  Powers  in  the 
Far  East  remained  unchanged,  nothing  beneficent 
was  to  be  hoped  for,  i.  e.,  so  long  as  the  relationship  of 
England  to  the  United  States  was  conditioned  by  the 
Japanese  Alliance  so  long  would  China  remain  a 
secondary  matter. 

As  early  as  the  spring  of  1920  we  had  decided  in 
Peking  that  no  reasonable  hope  could  be  entertained 
for  China's  salvation  with  this  treaty  in  the  way. 
The  agreement  of  1911  nominally  terminated  on  the 
13th  July,  1921 :  but  all  inquiries  and  notes  addressed 
to  London  had  produced  such  little  result  that  it  was 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  31 

clear  that  due  consideration  of  the  problem  was  being 
purposely  avoided. 

Consequently  the  time  seemed  to  have  arrived  in 
1921  for  forcing  the  issue,  forcing  it  in  such  a  way 
that  the  ultimate  consequences  could  no  longer  be 
shirked  or  the  dangers  masked.  The  Japanese  Al- 
liance was  the  greatest  matter  in  the  Far  East,  mak- 
ing even  finance  very  secondary.  Until  now  the 
problem  had  only  concerned  the  two  cabinets  of 
London  and  Tokyo.  But  with  the  new  orientation 
which  post-war  policy  had  brought,  it  was  possible  to 
interest  others.  Either  the  English-speaking  races 
must  be  brought  to  an  understanding  of  the  position 
in  which  they  were  placed,  or  else  they  would  become 
entangled  in  war. 


PART  II 

THE  INSTRUMENTALITY  OF   CANADA 


CANADA  is  perhaps  the  greatest  living  proof  that  a 
special  Providence  watches  over  the  destinies  of  the 
British  Empire.  Without  Canada  there  would  be 
constant  and  growing  rivalries  between  England  and 
America  both  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific:  with 
Canada  there  is  more  than  a  reasonable  chance  that 
unity  of  action  will  not  only  be  achieved  by  the 
English-speaking  peoples,  but  that  this  unity  will  be 
the  dominating  feature  in  world-politics. 

Geographically,  Canada  is  so  definitely  a  portion 
of  the  same  territory  as  the  United  States  that  there 
is  at  first  sight  no  reason  why  it  should  not  have  ad- 
hered to  the  same  government.  But  historically  there 
are  vital  differences  which  isolate  the  mood  of  1776 
from  this  vast  rich  belt  which  projects  itself  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  and  is  so  richly  furnished  with  rivers 
and  lakes  and  so  chained  with  railways  that  its  high- 
way qualities  almost  overtop  all  else. 

Canada  is  preeminently  the  child  of  the  Nineteenth 
and  Twentieth  Centuries  when  the  mercantile  theory 
is  no  more.  Its  older  portions,  inhabited  by  French 
and  English  squierarchies,  were  sufficiently  self-con- 
tained to  acquire  long  ago  essential  characteristics 

32 


AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE        33 

which  sharply  distinguish  them  from  the  Union  to 
the  South  and  which  still  form  the  bedrock  of  govern- 
ment. Newcomers,  particularly  the  Scottish,  have 
tended  to  accentuate  these  characteristics,  which  have 
created  an  autonomy  almost  precisely  modelled  on 
what  would  have  satisfied  all  colonists  prior  to  1776. 
The  British  North  America  act  of  1867,  having  been 
made  under  favourable  circumstances,  has  flexibility 
and  suitability  to  modern  conditions,  and  is  an  earnest 
that  be  the  difficulties  ever  so  great  the  future  will 
unroll  smoothly.  .  .  . 

Canada  has  an  equally  unique  position  in  her  rela- 
tion to  the  Far  East  which  has  always  been  well 
understood  in  China.  Canada  is  not  only  the  quick 
route  to  China  and  Japan  (the  distance  between 
Vancouver  and  Yokohama  being  not  much  more  than 
the  distance  between  Liverpool  and  Cuba),  but  by 
its  curious  mixture  of  British  methods  and  American 
ideas  it  has  been  possible  for  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment to  diminish,  if  not  entirely  to  escape  from  the 
fierce  racial  rivalries  which  have  embittered  men  in 
California.  Yet  Canada  has  the  same  Oriental 
problem,  and  withal  possesses  a  far  more  delicate 
strategical  problem  than  the  United  States.  The 
coast  region  is  an  El  Dorado  for  both  Chinese  and 
Japanese  because  of  the  richness  of  opportunity 
which  it  provides.  There  are  50,000  Chinese  and 
25,000  Japanese  in  British  Columbia  alone,  and  one 
of  the  difficult  questions  of  the  hour  is  how  to  limit 
this  invasion  without  making  the  cure  more  harmful 


34       AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

than  the  disease.  If  the  Chinese  were  eliminated, 
and  their  growing  sympathy  alienated,  such  grave 
losses  would  threaten  the  coast  province  that  the 
quick  route  would  he  cut  off.  They  do  much  to 
lighten  the  cost  of  living  and  to  make  shipping  profit- 
able; and  the  settlement  which  is  almost  certain  to 
be  made  is  a  gentlemen's  agreement  which  will  throw 
the  onus  of  stopping  the  invasion  on  China  herself. 
The  activities  of  the  Japanese  are  entirely  different 
from  those  of  the  Chinese  who  haunt  the  cities  and 
instinctively  direct  their  attack  on  the  stomach,  and 
who  are  interested  in  nothing  except  profit-earning. 
The  Japanese  are  primarily  fishermen;  they  have 
made  a  monopoly  of  the  salmon  fishing  and  canning 
industry ;  and  their  exploration  of  river  and  coast  has 
been  so  elaborate  that  they  are  believed  to  know  the 
richly  indented  Pacific  region  more  accurately  than 
any  one  else.  A  naval  writer  such  as  Mr.  Bywater, 
who  compiled  in  1921,  such  a  highly  interesting  book 
on  the  Pacific  at  the  moment  when  it  was  most  needed 
should  have  brought  more  fully  within  his  purview 
this  question  of  the  Northern  Pacific.  Had  he  done 
so,  far  from  insisting  on  the  overwhelming  importance 
of  the  Western  Pacific  and  seeing  in  Guam  the  key 
to  naval  mastery,  he  would  have  speedily  understood 
that  there  was  another  aspect  to  the  whole  Pacific 
problem  which  requires  to  be  studied  in  the  region 
immediately  adjoining  the  Behring  Sea.  Possession 
of  Saghalien  and  predominance  on  the  rich  promon- 
tories on  the  Asiatic  side,  such  as  the  Kamchatka 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  35 

Peninsula  which  Japan  is  aiming  at,  recalls  the  fact 
that  on  the  American  shores  there  have  long  been 
Japanese  activities  far  antedating  the  present  move- 
ment in  the  Southern  Pacific.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  destinies  of  the  continents  fronting  the 
Behring  Sea  are  indissolubly  linked,  and  that  the 
chain  of  the  Aleutian  islands  not  only  binds  them  to- 
gether but  gives  birth  to  problems  of  high  strategic 
importance.  The  recent  lease  of  the  Commander 
Islands  off  Kamchatka  brings  a  Japanese  outpost 
less  than  a  thousand  miles  away  from  the  principal 
American  station  in  the  Aleutians,  Dutch  Harbour, 
and  seems  to  be  part  of  a  general  plan  which  rec- 
ognizes the  political  opportunities  afforded  by  the 
mixture  and  possible  conflict  of  British  and  Amer- 
ican interests  in  the  zone  north  of  the  49th  parallel. 

For  many  years  both  the  Canadian  and  American 
coasts  north  of  the  Straits  of  Juan  de  Fueco  have 
been  exhaustively  explored  until  Japan  has  settled 
where  in  case  of  necessity  she  could  establish  an  im- 
pregnable naval  base  so  wedged  in  as  to  be  impreg- 
nable. 

Quatseno  Sound,  one  of  the  finest  anchorages  in 
the  world,  is  that  place.  It  is  the  key  to  the  vast 
densely  wooded  island  of  Vancouver  which  has  not 
yet  been  properly  explored,  and  is  strategically  of 
the  highest  importance  because  it  is  located  where 
there  is  practically  no  development.  The  seizure  of 
Quatseno  would  place  the  entire  line  of  Canadian  and 
American  Pacific  ports  at  the  mercy  of  the  raider. 


36        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Canada  and  the  United  States  are  deplorably  weak  on 
the  shores  of  the  Northern  Pacific,  weak  not  in  the 
subsidiary  matter  of  fortifications,  but  in  the  all-im- 
portant factors  of  modern  strength.  The  absence  of 
iron  and  steel  works  and  the  entire  dependence  of 
this  zone  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  for  many  essentials 
isolates  this  great  coast  region  and  makes  it  a  hostage 
in  the  hands  of  potential  enemies.  British  Columbia, 
the  Yukon  and  Alaska  have  been  deplorably  neglected 
by  the  two  governments  concerned  and  remain,  even 
to-day,  weak  settlements  which  a  strong  power  could 
easily  dominate.  The  ease  with  which  a  policy  of 
force  has  been  carried  out  on  the  Asiatic  shores  of 
the  Northern  Pacific,  where  there  are  settlements  of 
white  men  just  as  large  if  not  larger  than  the  settle- 
ments on  the  American  shores,  has  been  a  matter  of 
international  concern.  That  in  case  of  necessity  the 
same  policy  could  be  applied  to  Alaska  and  British 
Columbia  cannot  be  doubted  by  any  who  have  studied 
the  history  of  the  past  fifty  years.  The  submarine  and 
the  swift  cruiser  have  made  it  a  political  necessity  to 
do  something  to  remove  a  weakness  which  influences 
the  whole  problem  of  the  Northern  Pacific  and  gives 
it  a  doubtful  aspect.  While  Canada  has  been  as  re- 
miss as  the  United  States  she  has  less  of  a  defence. 
Having  expended  vast  sums  of  government  money  to 
give  her  trans-continental  railways  an  outlet  on  the 
Pacific,  prudence  required  long  ago  that  national 
measures,  inaugurated  and  guaranteed  by  the  State, 
should  quicken  the  development  and  opening-up  of 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  37 

Vancouver  island  and  the  British  Columbia  coast. 
As  a  counterblast  to  the  negative  policy  of  restrict- 
ing the  only  people  who  have  shown  willingness  or 
enterprise  in  this  Far  West — Orientals — that  was  es- 
sential before  the  world-war  and  is  doubly  essential 
now.  With  a  Prime  Minister  in  office  as  energetic  and 
as  well-grounded  in  the  problem  of  Eastern  Asia  as 
Mr.  Mackenzie  King  there  is  hope  that  the  matter 
will  at  last  attract  attention,  and  the  lack  of  initiative 
of  past  years  be  replaced  by  a  well-thought  out 
scheme. 

ii 

In  the  Spring  of  1921  the  question  of  Japan,  after 
slumbering  during  the  war-period,  had  become  acute 
again  in  Canada  not  because  of  any  growing  feeling 
against  the  Japanese,  but  because  Canadians  had  at 
length  realized  that  with  the  possibility  of  war  be- 
tween America  and  Japan  drawing  nearer  Canada 
could  not  but  be  directly  involved.  It  was  felt  that 
so  long  as  the  British  Empire  was  committed  to 
Japan  by  a  formal  Treaty  so  long  would  it  be  im- 
possible to  be  sure  of  the  consequences  no  matter 
what  reservations  might  have  been  made,  both  in 
the  Agreement  and  in  subsequent  communications. 
Vancouver  and  Victoria,  which  are  like  windows  look- 
ing out  on  the  vast  Pacific,  thoroughly  appreciated 
what  the  future  might  bring  and  showed  particular 
interest  in  the  facts  as  we  construed  them  in  China. 
Separated  as  British  Columbia  is  by  the  formidable 

59351 


38       AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

barrier  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  from  the  real 
Canada,  all  realize  that  a  coup  d&  main  could  be 
carried  out  here — and  that  there  would  be  no  means 
of  resisting  it.  There  were  other  matters  inviting  at- 
tention. The  imaginary  boundary  running  along  the 
49th  parallel  is  a  customs  frontier  but  not  a  racial 
one.  Popular  acts  would  soon  reduce  to  dust  all 
political  and  diplomatic  contrivances  if  any  occasion 
arose;  for  whilst  Canadians  are  first  and  last  Cana- 
dians and  are  immeasurably  proud  of  the  fact,  they 
are  also  Americans  and  would  flock  to  the  defence  of 
North  American  territory  no  matter  whether  the 
flag  floating  over  the  area  involved  happened  to 
be  the  Union  Jack  or  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  All 
the  discussion  which  had  raged  for  many  months  re- 
garding the  advisability  of  a  North  American  naval 
agreement  had  been  prompted  by  this  view  which  was 
so  widely  held  that  it  was  paramount;  and  although 
in  the  end  the  discussion  proved  abortive  it  was 
highly  valuable  as  a  sign  of  the  times. 

Three  months  off  lay  the  question  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  which  was  to  be  decided  at  the 
Imperial  Conference.  What  was  Canada  to  do? 
Would  it  be  possible  to  discover  a  formula  which 
would  neither  shelve  the  matter  nor  have  it  said  that 
Canadians  were  merely  blind  followers  of  American 
policy?  Moreover,  there  was  the  matter  of  China  to 
be  considered,  a  matter  of  great  future  importance 
to  the  Canadian  people — if  their  commerce  was  in  the 
future  to  flow  across  the  Pacific  as  it  flows  to-day 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  39 

across  the  Atlantic.  In  all  public  discussion  of  this 
matter  I  was  careful  to  have  it  understood  that  China 
was  not  inherently  a  foe  of  Japan's,  but  that  so  long 
as  the  old  position  taken  up  by  Britain  regarding  the 
Far  East  was  not  abandoned,  so  long  would  it  be  im- 
possible for  China  not  to  take  sides  with  whoever  was 
in  conflict  with  Japan.  In  such  circumstances  to 
construe  an  offensive  and  defensive  Treaty  as  a  guar- 
antee of  security,  when  it  ignored  this  prime  essential, 
was  deliberately  to  offend  against  the  political  wis- 
dom which  is  supposed  to  be  so  conspicuous  a  quality 
in  the  English-speaking  race.  If  war  ever  came  in 
the  Far  East,  the  inevitable  battle-ground  would  be 
China,  as  has  proved  the  case  in  every  clash  during 
and  since  the  Nineteenth  Century.  That  China 
would  strike  sooner  or  later  on  her  own  account,  and 
help  those  who  helped  her,  was  amply  evident  to  those 
whose  business  it  was  to  keep  their  fingers  on  the 
pulse  of  public  opinion.  There  was  a  great  out- 
standing account  to  be  settled.  It  was  madness  to 
trifle  with  the  issue  any  longer,  or  to  decline  to  be- 
lieve that  great  changes  of  sentiment  had  come.  .  .  . 
I  found  a  gratifying  response  to  these  arguments. 


m 

If  in  the  coast  region  the  matter  was  being  anxi- 
ously discussed  from  the  point  of  view  of  personal 
safety,  elsewhere  other  factors  entered  into  the  prob- 
lem. As  you  travel  away  through  the  majestic 


40       AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

scenery  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  past  glacier-fed, 
green  rivers,  and  dome-like  heights,  you  at  last  de- 
bouch on  the  illimitable  plain  where  that  is  a  wider 
point  of  view.  There  is  no  longer  the  restricted 
arithmetic  of  exposed  sea-ports :  here  now  is  the  home 
of  the  nation  in  the  making.  In  the  prairie  provinces 
and  Eastern  Canada  more  profound  considerations 
were  arresting  concern.  Men  were  debating  the  con- 
stitutional aspects  of  foreign  policy  and  the  impli- 
cations of  that  policy.  What  share  was  Canada  hence- 
forth to  have  in  British  Empire  matters?  Was  she 
to  be  treated  with  indifference,  her  acquiescence  being 
taken  as  a  matter  of  course;  or  was  she  to  enter  into 
full  partnership?  The  question  had  seemingly  been 
answered  by  the  events  of  the  war  and  in  the  making 
of  the  peace;  for  was  not  Canada  a  full  nation  from 
the  very  fact  that  she  had  signed  the  peace  treaties? 
Canadians,  however,  are  cool  men  and  not  easily  led 
astray.  They  had  already  concluded  that  nothing 
which  had  been  done  under  the  stress  and  glamour 
of  the  war  could  be  held  permanently  established. 
There  was  already  some  divergence  of  views  regard- 
ing the  nature  of  the  periodic  meetings  between  the 
British  Cabinet  and  the  Dominion  Prime  Ministers 
and  the  advisability  of  accepting  such  meetings  with- 
out a  clearer  definition  of  their  import.  Did  these 
gatherings  constitute  an  Imperial  Cabinet;  or  were 
they  merely  a  Conference  of  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
Empire,  who  met  as  a  preliminary  measure,  and 
whose  final  acts  would  have  to  seek  a  proper  sane- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  41 

tion?  In  other  words,  did  they  become  a  consoli- 
dated Executive,  or  was  each  Imperial  Conference 
merely  a  consultative  gathering  of  responsible  chiefs 
who  must  refer  back  to  their  own  Parliaments  all  de- 
cisions arrived  at?  The  question  of  centralization, 
so  dear  to  every  bureaucrat,  was  drawn  up  in  battle- 
array  against  the  principle  of  devolution  and  auton- 
omy which  is  the  people's  buckler.  And  since  Eng- 
lish-speaking men  will  not  long  waste  their  time  over 
political  theories  unless  an  immediate  application  is 
involved,  two  test  cases  were  before  the  Canadian 
Parliament, — the  question  of  separate  Canadian 
diplomatic  representation  at  Washington,  and  the 
precise  attitude  of  Canada  at  the  Imperial  Confer- 
ence in  regard  to  the  allied  subjects  of  foreign  policy 
and  defence. 

On  the  21st  April  the  first  matter  was  taken  up 
in  the  House  of  Commons  at  Ottawa  sitting  in  Com- 
mittee of  Supply  in  a  remarkable  debate  in  which 
the  constitutional  relationship  to  the  British  Crown 
was  examined  from  every  possible  point  of  view. 
Once  more,  was  Canada  a  "nation;"  if  so,  what  con- 
stituted a  nation;  and  how  was  nationhood  within  the 
empire  to  be  fitly  expressed?  The  Imperial  Govern- 
ment had  after  much  correspondence  agreed  that 
Canadian  business  with  the  United  States  had  as- 
sumed such  importance  as  to  necessitate  a  Canadian 
Plenipotentiary  in  Washington  who  would  be  as- 
sociated with  the  British  Ambassador,  and  in  his 
absence  assume  his  duties.  A  vote  had  been  duly 


42        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

sanctioned  the  previous  year  to  cover  the  necessary 
expenditure  but  there  had  been  no  appointment. 
Why?  The  official  answer,  that  the  office  had  not 
been  filled  because  the  government  had  not  decided 
who  was  the  best  person  to  fill  such  an  important 
position,  was  like  most  official  answers  not  more  than 
a  half-truth.  The  adroitness  of  the  British  (Im- 
perial) proposal  that  there  should  be  a  Canadian 
plenipotentiary  stationed  side  by  side  with  the  British 
Ambassador,  who  would  automatically  assume  his 
duties  and  responsibilities  whenever  necessary,  seemed 
the  main  stumbling-block;  but  the  position  of  the 
United  States,  confronted  by  such  a  double  repre- 
sentation, and  the  complications  which  might  very 
easily  arise,  was  also  plainly  a  matter  of  concern.1 
Nationhood  within  an  empire  clearly  meant  a  mul- 
titude of  knotty  points  outside  the  empire.  It  was 
not  the  relatively  unimportant  matter  of  a  single  ap- 
pointment which  loomed  up  ever  larger  as  the  dis- 
cussion proceeded;  it  was  the  colossally  difficult  mat- 
ter of  deciding  precisely  where  the  British  empire 
commences  and  where  it  ends.  Something  of  the 
problem  before  men  in  the  territory  to  the  South 
prior  to  1776  could  not  fail  to  rise  in  the  mind  of 
every  listener  of  this  debate.  .  .  . 

Interesting  as  was  this  discussion,  it  was  surpassed 
by  the  extraordinary  debate  which  followed  only  six 

1  It  is  significant  that  nothing  has  been  done  in  this  matter  yet — a 
year  and  a  half  after  Mr.  Mackenzie  King,  now  Prime  Minister,  then 
official  leader  of  the  Opposition,  declared:  "We  ought  to  have  something 
which  will  set  forth  in  precise  detail  what  are  the  rights,  duties  and 
functions  of  this  particular  appointee."  .  .  . 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  43 

days  later.  Then,  their  appetites  whetted  with  their 
previous  inquiry,  the  Commons  of  Canada  made  an 
analysis  of  the  nature  of  Imperial  Conferences  from 
the  historical  and  constitutional  viewpoint  far  more 
searching  than  anything  ever  attempted  in  England 
— a  discussion  designed  to  show  that  Canadians  would 
not  recede  an  inch  from  the  position  they  had  already 
taken  up.  Canada  must  retain  complete  control  of 
all  matters  affecting  her  welfare;  no  new  expendi- 
tures for  naval  or  military  purposes  could  be  con- 
templated; it  was  highly  undesirable  to  allow  any 
change  in  the  constitutional  relationship  between 
Canada  and  the  Mother  country.  Great  dicta 
emerged  that  day  clearly  and  without  contradiction. 
Every  word  said  in  Ottawa  had  an  important  bear- 
ing on  the  events  of  the  next  eight  months.  It  was 
Sir  Robert  Borden,  the  War  Prime  Minister,  who 
made  the  most  brilliant  contribution.  In  words 
which  summarized  the  problem  of  this  new  State  so 
well  that  they  were  like  an  endless  succession  of  his- 
torical pictures,  he  unfolded  the  politics  of  the  case. 

"It  may  be  worth  while,"  he  said,  "in  discussing 
the  approaching  conference  and  the  representation 
of  Canada,  at  that  conference,  to  consider  for  a  little 
the  conditions  out  of  which  our  present  status  has 
arisen." 

And  then  following  this  remarkable  analysis : 


IT 

"The  British  Empire  is,  after  all,  a  very  modern  organiza- 
tion in  respect  of  both  its  vast  possessions  and  the  methods 
by  which  it  is  governed.  I  am  informed  by  the  Dominion 
statistician  that  the  population  of  the  British  Empire,  at 
the  tune  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1814,  was  computed 
to  amount  to  62,558,650  persons,  and  that  at  the  present 
time  it  is  estimated  that  the  population  comprised  within 
the  boundaries  of  the  British  Empire  is  no  less  than  445,- 
388,500  persons.  I  do  not  offer  any  figures  as  to  the  area 
of  the  British  Empire,  but  I  believe  the  area  of  the  Empire 
during  that  period  has  increased  very  much  in  proportion 
to  the  increase  of  population. 

"But  it  is  as  to  the  constitutional  development  within  the 
Empire  that  I  wish  chiefly  to  speak,  and  I  desire  to  em- 
phasize the  point  that  constitutional  development  within  the 
United  Kingdom  itself  has  been  as  marked  since  the  beginning 
of  the  Eighteenth  Century  as  in  this  country.  During  the 
reign  of  the  Georges  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom 
was,  in  form,  but  not  in  reality,  based  upon  representative 
institutions.  Only  a  small  portion  of  the  people  were  repre- 
sented in  Parliament.  The  majority  of  the  seats  were  under 
the  control  of  an  oligarchy,  most  of  whom  had  seats  in  the 
House  of  Lords.  The  Government  was  indeed  responsible  to 
Parliament,  but  the  Parliament  was  not  representative  of  the 
people.  It  was  under  this  system  that  the  American  revolu- 
tion took  place,  and  I  hope  that  our  friends  of  the  great 
neighbouring  republic  will  sometimes  remember  that  the  Par- 
liament of  the  United  Kingdom  at  that  time  was  not  by  any 
means  representative  of  the  people.  It  is  a  tribute  to  the 
respect  of  the  British  people  for  law  and  authority  that  these 
conditions  continued  as  long  as  they  did :  and  doubtless  that 
continuance  was  in  some  measure  due  to  the  fact  that  from 
the  middle  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  to  1815  the  Empire  was 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  45 

very  frequently  involved  in  war.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  demo- 
cratic government  did  not  come  into  effect  in  Great  Britain 
until  after  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832.  It  was  followed  by  the 
reform  enactments  of  1867-1868,  by  those  of  1884-1885,  and 
finally  by  that  of  1918.  Up  till  1834  in  Great  Britain  min- 
isters were  regarded  rather  as  servants  of  the  Crown  than  of 
Parliament.  Peel  took  office  after  Melbourne,  in  1834,  in 
the  belief  that  Melbourne  had  been  dismissed,  and  thus  recog- 
nized his  acquiescence  in  the  constitutional  principle  that  the 
King  had  the  right  to  dismiss  his  ministers  at  pleasure.  The 
events  which  followed  Sir  Robert  Peel's  acceptance  of  office 
marked  a  new  departure  in  that  respect.  It  is  perfectly  clear 
that  the  King  has  the  constitutional  right  to  dismiss  his  min- 
isters, but  only  in  the  interests  of  the  State,  and  not  at 
pleasure,  and  only  when  the  grounds  for  dismissal  can  be  jus- 
tified to  Parliament,  or  to  a  new  Parliament  after  dissolution. 

"Now  from  1791  we  had  in  Canada,  for  more  than  fifty 
years,  representative  institutions  on  a  broader  basis  than 
those  of  Great  Britain,  as  the  franchise  was  wider  and  more 
evenly  distributed,  but  we  had  not  responsible  government. 
It  is  curious  that  the  struggle  in  Great  Britain  was  for 
representative  government  and  in  Canada  for  responsible 
government.  In  both  cases  the  reform  was  not  effected  with- 
out disorders.  From  1830  to  1832  there  were  serious  riots 
in  Great  Britain.  In  truth,  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  effected 
a  political  revolution  in  Great  Britain,  but,  fortunately, 
without  civil  war. 

"We  had  the  beginnings  of  responsible  government  in 
Canada  in  the  early  forties ;  Lord  Durham's  report  laid  the 
foundation,  but  some  limitations  which  he  advocated  were 
soon  swept  away.  The  task  was  not  accomplished  without 
difficulty.  British  statesmen  were  convinced  that  responsible 
government  was  entirely  unsuited  to  the  colonies,  and  could 
not  safely  be  applied  to  them.  They  freely  predicted,  and 
were  perfectly  sincere  in  their  belief,  that  the  grant  of  re- 


46        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

sponsible  government  to  the  North  American  colonies  marked 
the  first  stage  of  a  movement  which  would  speedily  and 
inevitably  bring  about  the  disintegration  of  the  Empire.  It 
has  had  precisely  the  contrary  effect,  and  the  reason  of  this 
seems  to  me  very  plain.  If  there  are  errors  in  an  adminis- 
tration controlled  by  the  people  of  a  country,  the  remedy 
lies  in  the  hands  of  the  people  themselves,  but  if  there  are 
errors  in  an  administration  by  a  government  controlled  by 
the  Governor  or  by  the  Colonial  Office,  the  criticism  turns 
upon  the  Governor,  as  an  Imperial  officer,  or  upon  the 
Colonial  Office  in  its  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the 
colony.  Naturally,  all  this  tends  to  weaken  the  tie  which 
binds  the  colony  to  the  Mother  Country. 

"I  should  like  to  emphasize  the  point  that  the  movement 
for  responsible  government  in  Canada  is  the  basis  of  the 
present  constitution  of  the  Empire.  A  group  of  free  democ- 
racies, enjoying  complete  powers  of  .self-government  in  their 
domestic  affairs,  and  acting  in  close  association  with  the 
Mother  Country,  has  proved  during  the  late  war  that  unity 
is  strongest  when  it  is  based  upon  freedom  and  autonomy. 
It  is  not  unworthy  of  remark  that  the  initiative  in  this  move- 
ment came  from  this  Dominion,  and  that  their  point  of  view 
has  been  fully  recognized  in  Great  Britain.  .  .  . 

"But  there  are,  of  course,  the  higher  questions  of  foreign 
relations  hitherto  determined  by  the  British  Government  as 
to  which  the  Dominions  in  the  future  must  have  a  recognized 
voice  and  influence.  To  that  question,  the  Constitutional 
Conference,  as  provided  by  the  resolution  of  1917,  must  ad- 
dress itself.  I  am  not  so  unwise  as  to  hazard  any  prediction 
as  to  the  method  which  will  be  adopted.  I  am,  however,  of 
those  who  believe  that  the  voice  of  the  Dominions  will  exer- 
cise an  important  influence  upon  the  great  questions  which 
affect  our  foreign  relations.  Moreover,  I  am  confident  that 
this  influence  will  be  so  exercised  as  to  assist  in  the  avoid- 
ance of  treaties  or  understandings  which  might  involve  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  4? 

Empire  in  war.  Indeed,  at  the  present  day,  I  think  Great 
Britain  might  hesitate  to  engage  in  war  against  a  strong 
public  opinion  in  either  Canada  or  Australia.  Further,  the 
voice  and  influence  of  the  Dominions  should  tend  more  and 
more  to  turn  the  attention  of  British  statesmen  to  the  enor- 
mous task  which  confronts  the  Empire  in  the  governance  and 
development  of  the  vast  possessions  which  are  included  within 
its  limits.  I  speak  entirely  for  myelf  in  the  observations 
which  I  am  addressing  to  the  House,  but  I  may  say  that  per- 
sonally I  should  regret  to  see  the  Empire  engage  in  difficult 
commitments,  whether  in  Eastern  Europe  or  Western  Asia, 
or  elsewhere.  We  have  quite  enough,  and  perhaps  more  than 
enough,  on  our  hands  at  present.  .  .  . 

"Honourable  Gentlemen  who  have  made  themselves  ac- 
quainted with  this  subject  will  recollect  that  at  the  Imperial 
Conference  of  1911  there  was  a  meeting  of  the  Committee  on 
Imperial  Defence  which  the  Dominion  Prime  Ministers  at- 
tended and  at  which  vital  questions  of  foreign  policy  were 
very  fully  discussed.  Mr.  Asquith,  in  the  concluding  stages 
of  the  conference,  spoke  of  the  Dominion  ministers  as  having 
been  admitted  to  the  Arcana  Imperii. 

"The  status  of  Canada  at  the  Peace  Conference,  and  after- 
wards in  the  Labour  Conference  at  Washington  and  in  the 
Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  at  Geneva,  has  already 
been  discussed,  and  I  shall  speak  of  it  only  for  a  moment. 
Much  ingenuity  and  logic  have  been  displayed  in  pointing 
out  the  anomalies  of  the  situation,  and  in  declaring  that 
nothing  has  been  accomplished  in  advancement  of  status. 
The  best  answer  can  be  given  by  reference  to  the  high  position 
which  Canada  took,  through  its  representatives,  at  Wash- 
ington in  1919  and  at  Geneva  during  recent  months.  There 
has  been  much  alarm  that  the  representatives  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  Dominions  did  not  on  these  occasions  always  see 
eye  to  eye  on  minor  questions.  There  would  be  much  ground 
for  criticism,  and  even  regret,  if  the  result  had  been  other- 


48        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

wise.  We  should  be  in  an  utterly  false  position  if  we  were 
expected  to  re-echo  on  all  occasions  the  opinions  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  Kingdom :  Our  points  of  view  are  not 
always  the  same  as  our  conditions  differ.  On  essential  ques- 
tions of  policy  I  agree  that  there  should  be  a  united  front — 
not  of  the  United  Kingdom  alone  but  of  the  whole  Empire — 
established  by  previous  conference  and  consultations.  There 
are  those  that  are  apprehensive  of  the  consequence  of  the 
exercise  of  wide  powers  not  by  the  Mother  Country  but  by 
the  Dominions,  and  they  would  do  well  to  remember  that  the 
constitution  of  the  British  Empire  (if  it  can  be  called  a  con- 
stitution) is  based  largely  upon  usage  and  convention.  It 
would  be  practically  impossible  in  any  of  the  five  democracies 
of  the  Empire  to  carry  on  Government  which  continually 
exercised  its  powers  to  the  utmost  extent.  .  .  ." 


In  this  frank  and  illuminating  way  did  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  war-period  state  his  case.  His  schol- 
arly remarks  were  not  meant  to  be  critical  but  in- 
troductory; and  they  in  fact  could  do  little  to  muffle 
the  thunder  of  the  rising  storm.  There  was  revolt 
in  the  air  on  that  cool  April  day,  a  revolt  due  both 
to  questions  of  general  policy  and  the  long  contin- 
uance of  a  coalition  government  which  no  longer  cor- 
responded to  the  will  of  the  electorate. 

At  an  early  stage  in  the  discussion  Mr.  Mackenzie 
King,  Leader  of  the  Opposition  (now  Prime  Min- 
ister), moved  the  following  amendment: 

"That  the  House  while  recognizing  the  propriety  of  Canada 
being  represented  at  any  Imperial  Conference  or  Conference 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  49 

of  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the  Empire  that  may  be  called, 
desires  to  record  its  opinion  that  at  the  coming  conference 
no  steps  should  be  taken  involving  any  change  in  the  rela- 
tions of  Canada  to  other  parts  of  the  empire:  and  that  in 
view  of  the  present  financial  position  of  Canada,  no  action 
should  be  taken  implying  any  obligation  on  the  part  of 
Canada  to  undertake  new  expenditures  for  naval  and  mili- 
tary purposes." 

Mr.  Meighen,  the  Prime  Minister,  the  net  of  op- 
position closing  round  him,  sought  to  extricate  him- 
self from  a  difficult  position  by  insisting  on  the  pre- 
cise and  limited  agenda  of  the  coming  Imperial  Con- 
ference, which,  in  his  opinion,  hy  no  means  justified 
the  remarks  made  and  only  included  preparation  for 
a  special  constitutional  conference,  a  general  review 
of  foreign  relations  so  as  to  fix  policy,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  "This  last  is 
a  subject  of  great  and  definite  moment,"  said  Mr. 
Meighen  in  sudden  solemnity  at  5  o'clock  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  27th  April,  perhaps  little  suspect- 
ing that  he  was  uttering  words  which  forecast  a 
definite  change  in  the  relations  of  the  English-speak- 
ing peoples.  Other  members  rose  to  the  remarks. 
"The  only  great  subject  taking  the  Prime  Minister 
to  London  was  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,"  they 
declared.  The  cat  was  out  of  the  bag  and  it  would 
be  impossible  ever  to  put  him  inside  again!  For  here 
a  member,  who  deserves  to  have  his  name  perma- 
nently recorded,  Mr.  Lapointe,  interjected  an  in- 
terrogation which  two  months  later  burst  like  a 


50        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

powerful  bomb  and  shattered  the  Imperial  Confer- 
ence and  all  its  plans. 

"May  I  ask,"  he  inquired  very  politely,  "before 
my  right  honourable  friend  leaves  the  question  of  the 
Japanese  Alliance,  if  it  is  his  intention  to  insist  that 
a  clause  be  inserted  in  the  Treaty,  if  renewed,  of  the 
nature  of  the  clause  which  was  embodied  in  the  Brit- 
ish-French War  Treaty — that  it  will  not  be  bind- 
ing upon  Canada  without  the  approval  of  the  Cana- 
dian Parliament?" 

His  right  honourable  friend,  too  expert  a  parlia- 
mentarian to  be  so  easily  trapped,  retreated,  boggled, 
advanced.  Here  are  the  exact  words  since  they  have 
permanent  importance: 

"ME.  MEIGHEN:  The  very  fact  that  we  are  called  to  a 
Conference  that  reviews  that  subject  indicates  that  Canada 
has  the  right  of  assent  or  non-assent.  As  to  the  extent  to 
which  we  are  bound  in  case  war  actually  takes  place,  that  is 
another  question.  We  have  the  power  of  approval  or  dis- 
approval. The  question  of  what  results  from  either  course 
I  do  not  propose  to  enter  upon  now. 

"MR.  LAPOINTE  :  The  treaty  will  not  be  binding  upon  us 
without  the  approval  of  the  Canadian  Parliament? 

"ME.  MEIGHEN  :  I  say  we  have  the  power  of  approval  or 
disapproval.  Anything  that  I  might  say  as  to  how  far  it  is 
binding  or  how  far  it  is  not  binding  if  we  do  not  approve 
would  be  very  easily  misconstrued,  because  there  are  in- 
numerable circumstances  that  may  follow.  But  the  general 
power  of  approval  or  disapproval  involves  that  if  we  do  not 
approve,  then  so  far  as  it  is  not  possible  to  be  bound  as  part 
of  the  Empire  we  are  not  bound. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  51 

"MR.  LAPOINTE:  Why  was  such  a  clause  inserted  in  the 
British-French  Treaty  if  it  was  not  necessary? 

"Ma.  MEIGHEN:  There  may  be  such  a  clause  in  that 
Treaty;  but  my  honourable  friend  seems  to  think  that  I 
should  be  prepared  to  make  a  statement  as  to  what  conclu- 
sions should  be  reached  after  the  conference.  I  presume  if 
there  is  such  a  clause  in  the  British-French  Treaty  it  might 
fre  appropriate  to  insert  one  if  a  similar  treaty  is  made  in 
this  case." 


So  did  the  passage-at-arms  abruptly  end.  The 
net  result  was,  however,  quite  plain.  The  Prime 
Minister  had  been  instructed,  in  spite  of  himself,  in 
the  subtle  parliamentary  way  which  has  no  counter- 
part in  other  walks  in  life;  for  here  was  the  senti- 
ment of  the  Canadian  people  disclosing  itself.  Soon 
another  member  from  Quebec,  speaking  in  French 
as  was  his  constitutional  right,  declared  in  unequiv- 
ocal language,  "Dans  les  hautes  spheres  britanniques 
on  pense  a  se  servir  du  Canada  partout  et  en  toute 
occasion  comme  materiel  de  guerre/'  Canada  mere 
war  material!  Then  he  added  in  prophetic  vein  that 
the  time  had  arrived  for  writing  a  corollary  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine, — a  man  must  be  found  who  would 
imitate  Canning  by  securing  a  consolidated  Ameri- 
can-Continent policy  towards  the  problem  of  the 
Pacific  and  of  Japan.  .  .  . 

The  debate  went  on,  lasting  far  into  the  night. 
In  the  small  hours  the  House  divided  on  the  amend- 
ment of  Mr.  Mackenzie  King  which  was  negatived 
by  96  votes  to  64.  But  that  was  only  the  parlia- 


52       AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

mentary  appearance  of  things.  In  reality  it  had 
been  carried — carried  not  only  here,  but  in  London 
and  throughout  the  Empire.  .  .  . 


VI 

Here  under  the  blue  skies  of  a  Canadian  Spring 
China  was  at  last  finding  the  ally  she  had  so  long 
searched  for.  The  great  and  growing  agitation  re- 
garding a  matter  which  had  such  a  vital  bearing  on 
Chinese  freedom  could  only  have  one  end,  if  matters 
were  pushed  to  their  logical  conclusion.  That  China 
could  no  longer  be  counted  on  as  a  passive  factor, 
but  would  on  her  own  account  find  ways  and  means 
to  take  action  against  those  who  derided  her,  was 
an  element  which  prudent  statesmanship  could  not 
ignore  whilst  there  was  yet  time  to  consider  it. 

In  a  personal  interview  with  the  troubled  Prime 
Minister  I  enlarged  in  great  detail  on  these  aspects 
— and  disclosed  what  we  already  knew  in  Peking, 
— that  tentative  drafts  of  a  renewed  Japanese  Alli- 
ance were  already  in  existence.  The  pale,  tired  face 
of  the  man  who  by  his  personal  integrity  broke  Eng- 
land's arrangement  with  Japan  quickened  with  in- 
terest. Faced  as  he  was  with  a  spirit  of  revolt  at 
home,  that  did  not  turn  him  an  instant  from  the 
true  quest  of  statesmanship, — national  security  based 
on  permanent  and  just  solutions.  Mr.  Meighen  was 
instantly  aware  that  here  was  a  matter  which  de- 
rived its  importance  from  its  many-sided  and  far- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  53 

reaching  implications  which  had  been  hitherto  ig- 
nored. The  wooded  heights  of  Ottawa  took  on  a 
new  aspect;  for  Canada  by  the  magic  of  destiny  was 
being  called  to  action  in  a  matter  which  concerned 
a  region  hitherto  as  unrelated  to  her  political  des- 
tinies as  the  Antipodes.  Mr.  Meighen,  his  keen 
mind  already  on  the  alert,  no  doubt  made  a  mo- 
mentous mental  decision.  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alli- 
ance and  what  it  had  done  to  China's  harm  acquired 
a  new  flavour.  It  was  not  enough  to  show  the  harsh 
military  results  of  the  Agreement:  it  was  essential 
to  dwell  on  the  political  and  fiscal  immorality  which 
reduced  China  to  poverty  and  governmental  weak- 
ness under  the  specious  plea  of  international  security. 
Being  invited  to  set  forth  the  facts  in  a  Memoran- 
dum, the  following  is  an  exact  copy : 

MEMORANDUM— CHINA  AND  THE  ANGLO- 
JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 

"The  steps  China  has  taken  in  regard  to  the  renewal  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  are  rehearsed  in  the  copy  of 
the  press  communique  she  issued  in  June  last  year,  which  is 
annexed  hereto.  China,  having  no  status  in  the  matter  ex- 
cept as  a  protestant,  could  not  raise  the  essential  point  in 
her  communication — that  any  renewal  of  the  Alliance  would 
be  considered  by  all  China  as  an  endorsement  by  Great  Brit- 
ain of  all  the  wrongs  Japan  inflicted  upon  her  during  the 
war,  and  also  a  deliberate  endorsement  of  the  admittedly  out- 
rageous Shantung  clauses  in  the  Versailles  Treaty. 

"It  is  well  at  the  very  start  to  grasp  these  points  thor- 
oughly, since  whatever  decisions  are  arrived  at  at  the  Imperial 


Conference  will  infallibly  be  measured  by  the  Government 
and  the  people  of  China  by  this  yardstick. 

"The  writer  is  unable  to  say  officially  whether  the  sketch 
of  the  four  modifications  in  the  Treaty,  copy  of  which  be 
handed  the  Prime  Minister,  is  accurate  or  not,  as  they  only 
reached  the  Peking  Government  as  a  confidential  communica- 
tion, reporting  informal  conversations.  But  the  probabili- 
ties are  that  they  are  accurate  in  the  main.  We  know  that 
a  London  Foreign  Office  Commission,  including  Sir  John 
Jordan,  recently  British  Minister  to  China,  has  been  sitting 
for  a  year  engaged  in  a  study  of  the  Treaty.  Obviously  by 
now  these  'studies'  must  be  embodied  in  a  draft,  and  this 
appears  to  be  the  document  of  which  we  have  received  a 
telegraphic  sketch. 

"So  far  as  the  ostensible  aim  of  the  Alliance  is  concerned — 
namely  to  guarantee  peace  and  security — the  proposed  new 
agreement  will  be  just  as  ineffective  as  the  three  preceding 
instruments.  In  fact  the  only  possible  character  it  can 
possess  is  that  of  a  fighting  compact,  a  military  document, 
to  be  invoked  when  it  suits  the  senior  partner,  Great  Britain. 
And  because  beneath  its  smooth  phrases  the  alliance  pos- 
sesses precisely  this  quality,  Britain  is  forced  to  allow  Japan 
to  recoup  herself  for  the  risk  involved  to  her  own  polity  by 
spoliations  carried  out  in  China. 

"This  point  is  thoroughly  realized  by  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment, who  know  that  their  principal  enemy  is  not  Japan,  but 
British  policy,  which  for  twenty  years  has  declined  to  infuse 
morality  into  its  consideration  of  China's  political  future. 

"The  chief  and  indeed  the  only  reason  for  the  Alliance  in 
the  past  has  been  the  weakness  and  ineffectiveness  of  China 
as  an  international  factor.  The  first  steps  which  would  be 
taken  were  China  a  European  country  instead  of  an  Asiatic 
country  would  be  to  find  the  seat  of  the  trouble.  And  be- 
cause of  the  importance  of  this  point  the  writer  would  ven- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  55 

ture  particularly  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  Prime  Minister 
what  he  is  quite  sure  is  the  source  of  China's  difficulties  which 
ought  to  be  considered  at  the  Imperial  Conference  if  that 
conference  desires  to  safeguard  peace  on  the  Pacific — and  to 
do  away  with  the  possibility  of  war  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States. 

"The  principal  weakness  of  the  Central  Government  in 
China  is  that  it  is  debarred  by  the  commercial  Treaties  from 
increasing  the  Customs  tariff,  indirect  taxation  being  the 
only  really  profitable  taxation  in  a  country  where  the 
standard  of  living  is  very  low  and  where  it  is  impossible  to 
make  other  levies  without  riot. 

"At  the  present  moment  the  Chinese  Customs  tariff  is  the 
same  as  it  has  been  for  80  years,  i.e.  based  on  a  nominal  5% 
levy  (which  in  practice,  owing  to  rise  in  values,  is  not  more 
than  3%  or  4%)  and  which  produces  annually  not  more 
than  $80  million  Mexican  or  say  Gold  $40  millions.  This 
ridiculous  sum,  which  is  exactly  one-quarter  of  what  Canada 
gets  from  her  tariff,  is  entirely  absorbed  by  the  service  of 
the  foreign  debt — nothing  is  left  for  the  government  which 
must  rely  on  the  salt  tax,  railway  surpluses,  stamps  and 
wine  and  tobacco  taxes  for  its  upkeep  and  existence. 

"No  attempt  has  been  made  for  20  years  to  deal  with  this 
matter. 

"The  continued  absence  of  funds  is  the  source  of  all 
trouble  in  China,  no  government  being  able  to  exercise  au- 
thority unless  it  disposes  of  adequate  revenues.  The  pallia- 
tive which  Western  nations  have  offered  is  entirely  wrong,  to 
form  a  banking  Consortium  which  will  lend  money  so  long 
as  it  is  granted  monopolistic  rights.  China  requires  to  be 
prevented  from  borrowings  not  assisted.  If  she  accepts 
bankers'  terms  she  would  to-day  be  given  money  in  quanti- 
ties and  another  Turkey  created.  That  is  the  position. 

"What  she  really  needs  is  an  emergency  Tariff,  which  will 


56        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

give  her  double  the  Customs  revenues  she  possesses  to-day. 
With  that  money  in  hand  a  commencement  would  at  least 
be  made  towards  consolidation  and  reform. 

"This  is  a  subject  which  can  be  fitly  considered  in  con- 
nection with  the  problem  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance; 
for  Japan  is  the  one  Power  that  would  certainly  block  such 
a  reform  indefinitely  unless  there  is  direct  British  pressure — 
and  the  only  time  Britain  can  exercise  effective  pressure  is 
at  a  moment  such  as  the  present  when  Japan  is  seeking 
renewal  of  her  British  understanding  in  any  form  that  Brit- 
ain will  grant. 

"The  second  point  which  can  be  equally  well  considered 
at  the  Imperial  Conference  is  the  settlement  of  the  Shantung 
question.  In  view  of  the  Chinese  contention  that  any  fresh 
understanding  with  Japan  this  summer  will  in  effect  be  a 
British  endorsement  of  all  Japan's  action  in  China  during  the 
war,  it  seems  elementary  prudence  to  solve  the  Shantung 
issue  and  thereby  get  China's  signature  to  the  Versailles 
Treaty.  What  will  satisfy  China  is  this : 

"(1)  Evacuation  of  all  Japanese  troops  from  Shantung, 
"(2)   Handing  back  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow, 
"(3)   Sale  of  the  Shantung  railway  to  China,  after  in- 
dependent valuation,  and  uniting  this  road  with 
the  Chinese  Government  railway  system,  Japanese 
being  retained  in  technical  posts  in  the  same  pro- 
portion as  on  the  British-built  railways  in  China 
(Peking-Moukden  railway,  Shanghai-Nanking), 
"(4)  Creation  of  a  port  authority  at  the  port  of  Tsing- 
tao,  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  local  com- 
missioner of  Customs,  with  all  docks,  piers,  etc., 
lately  German  Government  property,  paid  for  by 
bond  issue  as  in  case  of  Port  of  London  authority 
and  controlled  by  the  local  board. 

"These  four  points  will  solve  the  Shantung  question  and 
diminish  the  possibility  of  war  in  the  Far  East  to  a  very 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  57 

considerable  extent  by  removing  a  great  portion  of  the  pres- 
ent Chinese  passion. 

"In  the  opinion  of  the  writer  the  only  two  urgent  matters 
in  regard  to  China  are  the  tariff  and  Shantung,  and  a  just 
handling  of  them  at  such  a  juncture  as  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference will  give  an  entirely  new  colour  to  the  International 
situation,  and  check  the  disturbing  tendencies  which  are  rap- 
idly growing. 

"It  will  certainly  arrest  the  Turkification  of  China. 

"It  will  have  a  powerful  influence  on  American  opinion, 
which  unites  with  Chinese  opinion  in  nearly  all  matters  the 
writer  has  discussed. 

"Moreover,  if  instead  of  a  dangerous  document  such  as 
Alliance  Treaty,  any  commitments  Britain  and  Japan  care 
to  enter  into  on  the  subject  of  defence  are  covered  by  the 
exchange  of  notes,  which  can  be  voluminous  or  terse,  ex- 
plicit or  general  in  character,  then  the  precedent  made  by  the 
United  States  herself,  in  the  case  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  Notes 
of  1917  will  be  followed,  and  a  vast  amount  of  the  present 
American  suspicion  and  anger  done  away  with. 

"If,  on  the  other  hand,  stereotyped  diplomacy  wins  the 
day  and  a  new  Treaty  of  Alliance  is  signed  (modified  but 
still  retaining  its  old  character),  this  is  what  will  happen. 

"China  must  seek  a  rapprochement  with  the  United  States 
and  offer  her  naval  bases  on  her  coasts  together  with  any 
other  concessions  she  may  desire. 

"Already  there  is  a  naval  scheme  drawn  up  called  'The 
defence  of  the  Gulf  of  Pechili  scheme'  which  is  under  con- 
sideration, and  is  designed  to  protect  the  approaches  to  the 
capital,  Peking,  pending  American  mobilization.  This  docu- 
ment, which  is  strictly  confidential,  is  annexed  hereto. 

"A  new  Treaty  of  Alliance  between  Britain  and  Japan 
would  also  force  China  to  avail  herself  of  the  constant  offers 
of  help  she  is  receiving  from  Russia.  Such  a  Treaty  of 
alliance  would  tend  indeed  to  drive  China  in  the  direction  of 


58        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Persia  and  Afghanistan,  both  of  which  countries  have  found 
that  they  obtain  more  consideration  from  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment than  from  Britain. 

"Finally,  there  is  this  to  be  remembered.  No  treaty  can 
be  called  a  Treaty  of  Alliance  unless  it  can  be  invoked 
against  some  one.  Even  if  the  new  Treaty  is  so  worded  that 
it  exempts  Britain  specifically  and  absolutely  from  partici- 
pation in  an  American-Japanese  struggle,  it  will  have  to 
apply  ag&inst  China  if  she  throws  in  her  lot  with  the  United 
States.  And  thus  sooner  or  later  it  would  in  effect  bring 
Britain  and  the  United  States  into  collision  with  one  another, 
first  on  Chinese  soil  and  then  by  natural  processes  everywhere 
on  the  Pacific. 

"This  Memorandum,  though  written  hastily  and  without 
notes,  gives  a  true  view  of  the  situation  as  it  actually  exists." 

4th  May,  1921. 

VII 

The  interweaving  of  Canadian  and  Chinese  des- 
tinies proceeded  apace.  I  found  that  Mr.  Macken- 
zie King,  having  had  personal  contact  with  China, 
was  exceptionally  well  posted.  The  whole  question 
of  peace  on  the  Pacific  interested  him  profoundly; 
and  particularly  the  omission  of  China  from  all  con- 
sideration as  a  possible  war-factor. 

I  emphasized  in  a  new  way  how  the  matter 
would  work  out — if  there  was  no  change.  With  the 
map  as  a  background  we  considered  war. 

The  Preamble  of  the  Japanese  Alliance  stated 
clearly  that  the  object  of  the  Treaty  was: 

"(a)  The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  the  general 
peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India: 


59 

"(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  the 
Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  the  Chinese  empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportuni- 
ties for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China: 

"(c)  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and 
India  and  the  defence  of  their  special  interests  in  the  said 
regions." 

The  special  interests  of  Japan  in  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia  had  been  acknowledged  by  the  United 
States  four  years  before  in  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes 
by  the  hitherto  unknown  political  doctrine  that  geo- 
graphical propinquity  creates  special  interest. 

In  the  event  of  war  with  America  Japan  would 
certainly  act  with  a  high  hand  in  Chinese  territory 
in  order  to  provision  herself.  Thereby  she  would 
provoke  reprisals — certainly  in  Shantung  if  nowhere 
else.  Article  II  of  the  Alliance  could  then  be  in- 
voked by  Japan  against  China  just  as  it  had  been 
invoked  by  Britain  in  August,  1914,  against  Ger- 
many in  China,  namely: 

"If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive  action 
wherever  arising  on  the  part  of  any  Power  or  Powers  either 
high  contracting  party  should  be  involved  in  war  in  defence 
of  its  territorial  rights  or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the 
preamble  of  this  Agreement,  the  other  high  contracting 
party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and 
will  conduct  the  war  in  common  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  it." 

British  action  would  perforce  have  to  be  both  naval 
and  military.  How  could  she  continue  to  preserve 


60        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

peace  with  the  United  States,  as  she  was  entitled  to 
in  spite  of  the  Alliance  by  virtue  of  the  arbitration 
clause,  Article  IV,  of  which  the  so-called  Anglo- 
American  Peace  Commission  Treaty  of  15th  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  was  the  pendent,  having  been  construed 
as  an  arbitration  Treaty,  if  America  gave  aid  and 
comfort  to  China — and  officers  and  munitions  ?  And 
what  in  such  circumstances  would  be  the  fate  of 
Canadian  territory,  with  all  the  ex-soldiers  of  Canada 
influenced  by  geographical  and  racial  propinquity 
pouring  in  tens  of  thousands  into  the  United  States 
to  assist  her? 

There  was  only  one  answer. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  as  it  stood,  was  a 
symbol  of  the  break-up  of  the  British  empire.  Stand- 
ing half-way  between  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
Canada  in  peace-time  could  be  something  more  than 
a  mere  interpreter  of  the  sentiments  of  one  people 
to  the  other:  she  could  interpose  without  danger  in 
contentious  matters  because  she  could  speak  the  polit- 
ical dialects  of  both  countries  like  a  native.  But 
with  such  a  war,  begun  in  such  a  way,  with  such  a 
race  as  the  Japanese  as  Allies,  one  date  covered  the 
situation. 

1776. 


PART  III 

THE  UNITED  STATES  MAKES  A  FIRST  STEP 


IF  Canada  was  faced  by  a  dilemma,  the  United 
States  was  in  a  worse  quandary.  Here  was  a  coun- 
try at  the  political  cross-roads  with  nothing  to  assist 
her  but  a  dim  feeling  that  she  must  take  such  un- 
usual action  that  in  the  end  it  would  constitute  a 
clean  break  with  the  past  and  draw  her  towards  un- 
charted seas  and  monstrous  precipices.  Committed 
to  a  vast  expenditure  in  naval  construction  as  a 
heritage  from  the  war,  she  was  still  more  emphati- 
cally committed  by  the  will  of  the  people  to  a  new 
policy  of  peace  and  retrenchment.  How  were  the 
two  to  be  reconciled? 

It  was  possible  to  pick  up  in  the  United  States  a 
feeling  of  apprehension  absent  in  Canada.  In  the 
Spring  of  1921  Americans  who  followed  foreign 
affairs  were  overcome  by  those  vague  premonitions 
which  precede  the  birth  of  great  things.  That  some- 
thing must  be  done  to  prevent  navies  from  being 
piled  up  and  policies  blindly  persisted  in  until  the 
inevitable  crash  came  was  strongly  felt  throughout 
the  country.  Canadian  action  had  begun  to  be 
spoken  of  as  an  important  element,  but  there  was  still 

61 


62        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

no  means  of  knowing  whether  it  would  really  have 
a  decisive  character  or  merely  prove  a  palliative. 

It  was  the  affair  of  the  new  Secretary  of  State, 
Charles  Evans  Hughes,  to  make  up  his  mind  on  these 
issues,  so  that  the  Harding  Administration  would  at 
least  start  on  its  way  with  foreign  affairs  no  longer 
tied  in  a  Gordian  Knot.  Tall,  quick  and  intelligent, 
with  a  magnificent  head  and  still  more  magnificent 
teeth,  it  seemed  at  first  sight  as  if  here  was  the  very 
person  to  rend  all  enemies  like  a  mastiff.  But  Sec- 
retary Hughes,  standing  still,  with  his  arms  hang- 
ing loosely  beside  him,  disclosed  imperfect  knees,  and 
small  feet — two  dangerous  characteristics  in  a  man. 
They  mean  a  proneness  to  the  influence  of  others; 
a  tendency  to  accept  formulas  without  proper  in- 
quiry; an  absence  of  true  conviction.  Men's  legs 
are  more  important  as  a  political,  indication  than 
their  hands  and  heads,  and  should  always  be  atten- 
tively studied.  Although  there  was  no,  doubt  that 
the  new  Secretary  of  State  could  do  a  great  deal 
with  specific  facts.  Thanks  to  his  legal  training,  it 
seemed  doubtful  whether  he  could  push  along  aNyhole 
group  of  policies  unless  he  himself  were  propelled 
from  behind. 

There  was,  however,  one  good  point  already  clearly 
marked.  After  being  only  two  months  in  harness, 
he  had  already  discovered  that  so  far  from  being  able 
to  negotiate  on  any  matter  affecting  the  Far  East, 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  inevitably  proved  a 
hopeless  barrier.  The  reservations  and  qualifications 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  63 

which  he  constantly  came  across  had  made  him  un- 
derstand that  it  was  not  only  the  major  obstruction 
but  a  most  dangerous  weapon.  The  Pacific  question, 
vital  to  the  United  States  long  before  there  had  been 
any  question  of  naval  competition  with  Japan,  had 
been  immensely  complicated  by  the  events  of  the 
war.  The  position  in  the  Philippines  was  unsafe; 
the  position  in  the  Hawaiian  islands  was  weakened; 
and  as  for  the  policy  of  the  Open  Door  in  China  even 
a  tyro  could  recognize  that  it  was  merely  the  integu- 
ment of  a  moribund  hope. 

Washington  was  embarrassed.  There  was  embar- 
rassment at  the  White  House,  there  was  embarrass- 
ment at  the  State  Department,  there  was  embarrass- 
ment at  the  Capitol.  Highly  interesting  indeed  was 
this  perplexity  in  conjunction  with  the  impending 
stand  of  Canada.  Here  was  a  matter  vitally  affect- 
ing the  whole  future  of  the  United  States  coming 
up  for  decision  in  London,  and  yet  not  a  word  might 
be  publicly  said  about  it  without  outraging  the  diplo- 
matic conventions.  Never  had  there  been  a  greater 
political  irony  than  this:  that  after  years  of  most 
intimate  war-dealings  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  calling  for  complete  frankness  in 
naval  and  military  affairs,  the  major  commitment 
governing  the  relationship  of  the  two  throughout  the 
Pacific  was  to  be  reviewed  in  pseudo-secrecy. 

Fortunately  the  men  who  invented  the  United 
States  were  men  with  some  knowledge  of  the  neces- 
sity of  stiffening  government  and  pegging  out  its 


64        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

course  of  action  by  a  distribution  of  authority  so 
designed  that  no  person  would  carry  more  than  he 
was  fit  for.  The  Senate,  for  instance,  was  already 
highly  concerned.  The  Annual  Navy  Bill  was  be- 
fore it:  either  vast  increases  in  expenditure  must  be 
faced  or  else  some  new  contrivance  thought  out  to 
halt  the  onward  momentum  of  this  Juggernaut's 
Car.  .  .  . 

Senator  Borah  formed  at  that  moment  another 
illuminating  comment  on  the  nature  of  things  con- 
fronting the  new  administration,  and  of  the  machin- 
ery which^ad  to  be  set  in  motion  to  undo  the  harm 
of  the  old  administration.  Short,  massive,  his  hair 
brushed  back  ^fcn  a  leonine  energetic  mane  from  a 
clean-shaven  faceXthe  Senator  from  Idaho,  whether 
sitting  down  or  walking  hurriedly  away,  seems  a 
man  obsessed  with  the  necessity  for  action.  Placed 
at  the  head  of  the  Inter-Oceanic  Canal  Committee, 
he  was  giving  thought  for  the\niorrow  in  the  matter 
of  the  sea.  Here  he  was  in  the  huddle  of  May  with 
his  mind  made  up  that  the  Navy  Appropriation  Bill 
alone  afforded  the  opportunity  to  raise  the  issue 
of  the  Pacific  with  England  and  Japan. 

It  was  plainer  every  hour  that  the  elements  in  an 
involved  situation  were  being  gradually  marshalled 
in  such  a  fashion  as  to  preclude  evasion.  I  found 
in  discussion  with  Senators  a  curious  and  interesting 
viewpoint.  Whereas  Canadian  statesmen  were  afraid 
that  no  matter  what  care  might  be  taken  with  a  new 
Japanese  treaty,  it  would  sooner  or  later  lead  to  a 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  65 

violent  disturbance  of  a  century-old  peace  on  this 
North  American  Continent,  this  was  by  no  means 
the  main  concern  in  Washington.  American  states- 
men held  it  urgent  and  humiliating  that  the  Philip- 
pines, after  having  been  an  American  possession  for 
a  quarter  of  a  century,  virtually  lay  in  the  hollow  of 
Japan's  hand.  The  islands  north  of  the  Equator 
were  in  their  eyes  so  many  bases  to  destroy  their 
communications;  that  British  action  tended  to  en- 
dorse this  state  of  affairs  seemed  to  them  deeper  and 
more  sinister  than  anything  in  any  other  part  of 
the  world. 

The  Foreign  Relations  Committee  were  united 
about  this.  From  Senator  McCormick  I  received  in 
an  illuminating  sentence  a  true  definition  of  the 
matter.  "England  and  Japan  can  no  doubt  make 
a  Treaty  acceptable  to  the  American  Government," 
he  said  in  words  which  were  broadcasted  through  the 
agency  of  the  press,  "but  they  can  make  no  treaty 
acceptable  to  the  American  people;  and  as  it  is  the 
American  people  who  in  the  last  analysis  decide 
things  you  can  draw  your  own  conclusions." 

And  as  if  to  point  the  particular  moral,  Senator 
Lodge,  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee,  destined 
half  a  year  later  to  be  the  grave-digger  in  the  piece 
and  to  utter  the  public  lament  over  poor  Yorick's 
skull,  added:  "It  would  be  well  to  remember  that  if 
the  interests  of  a  great  empire  on  the  other  side  of 
the  water  are  involved  there  is  an  equally  great  em- 
pire on  this  side  to  be  considered." 


66        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

The  great  empire  of  the  New  World,  cut  off  by 
the  boundary  of  the  ocean  and  destined  no  man  knew 
how — !  These  senators  were  men  of  the  same  con- 
tinent as  the  right  honourable  Arthur  Meighen, 
Prime  Minister  of  Canada,  and  Mr.  Mackenzie  King, 
the  official  leader  of  the  Opposition ;  and  it  was  inevit- 
able that  in  many  situations  they  should  put  on  the 
same  spectacles. 

II 

There  was  another  matter  which  also  entered  into 
the  problem.  The  personality  of  the  new  President 
was  just  as  much  a  factor  as  his  campaign  pledges. 
He  was  pledged  not  so  much  to  destroy  the  policies 
of  his  predecessor  as  to  recover  the  norm  of  Amer- 
ican political  life.  Normalcy — that  was  the  word. 
In  actual  practice  the  solution  might  amount  to  much 
the  same  thing:  but  the  fiction  of  a  new  kind  of  con- 
structive action  had  at  least  to  be  preserved.  In  his 
first  message  to  Congress  spoken  only  two  months 
before  he  had  very  patently  hedged ;  for  if  he  would 
have  no  part  in  the  European  League  of  Nations 
what  was  his  association  of  nations  which  he  had  in 
mind  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  world  ?  The  signs 
of  disapproval  in  his  electorate  had  been  so  manifest 
that  the  problem  would  have  to  be  tackled  with  the 
utmost  caution. 

He  could  not  remain  blind  to  the  steady  drift  to- 
wards the  inevitable  solution.  That  the  naval  handle 
was  the  only  safe  one  to  grasp  was  increasingly  evi- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  67 

dent;  for  even  before  he  had  been  installed  as  Presi- 
dent there  had  been  a  Senate  recommendation  to  call 
a  meeting  with  Britain  and  Japan.  But  was  the 
navy  really  everything  and  did  not  an  American 
meeting  with  two  Powers  already  bound  by  an  iron- 
clad treaty  signify  entering  the  conference  room 
faced  by  an  insurmountable  handicap?  The  matter 
was  an  ever-increasing  source  of  worry  and  anxiety. 
A  false  move  at  the  beginning  of  the  term  was  the 
last  thing  to  contemplate.  To  the  wise  man  (and 
President  Harding  is  emphatically  wise  in  his  cau- 
tiousness) the  electorate  is  forever  there;  watchful, 
suspicious,  irrational  in  a  sense,  yet  with  the  mass 
instinct  for  safety  developed  beyond  every  other  in- 
stinct. Safety  first  is  not  merely  a  conventional 
slogan ;  it  is  the  command  of  the  people  everywhere — 
the  basis  of  the  modern  life,  the  very  groundwork  on 
which  we  stand.  To  place  safety  where  it  belonged 
in  this  very  involved  problem  was  no  light  matter. 

But  just  as  in  the  debates  in  the  Canadian  House 
of  Commons  I  had  somehow  received  the  impression 
that  in  some  undisclosed  way  Americans  were  luke- 
warm to  the  idea  of  a  Canada  which  would  treat  with 
them  on  terms  of  diplomatic  equality,  so  now  did  I 
perceive  that  the  role  Canada  might  play  was  meas- 
ured differently  from  what  one  might  have  expected. 
It  seemed  that  it  was  not  enough  that  one  section  of 
the  British  Empire  should  want  to  control  in  a 
reasonable  way  foreign  affairs,  even  though  the  par- 
ticular issue  might  be  handled  to  the  advantage  of  the 


68        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

United  States.  What  was  frankly  desired  was  the 
wholehearted  conversion  of  Britain — a  modification 
of  policy  so  profound  that  the  matter  of  Canada 
would  be  a  mere  detail,  the  great  thing  being  the 
frank  abandonment  by  Downing  Street  of  a  whole 
web  of  formulas  built  up  on  age-old  foundations. 

For  what  was  the  secret  behind  the  powerful  ad- 
vocacy of  Premier  Hughes  of  Australia  in  favour 
of  the  Japanese  ?  What  forces  impelled  him ;  was  he 
merely  the  mouthpiece  of  others  who  astutely  used 
him  to  mask  their  own  plans? 

I  found  in  every  one's  hands  printed  copies  of  the 
lengthy  and  very  carefully  considered  speech  made 
by  the  Australian  Premier  on  the  7th  April  in  the 
Federal  House  of  Representatives  at  Melbourne.  It 
had  been  distributed  thoroughly.  The  matter  had 
significance.  He  had  said,  "Our  idea  at  the  confer- 
ence is  a  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  in 
such  a  form,  modified  if  that  be  deemed  proper  as 
will  be  acceptable  to  Britain,  to  America,  to  Japan, 
to  ourselves." 

But  this  was  a  thing  beyond  human  ingenuity  even 
for  statesmen  in  the  antipodes:  incidentally  it  dis- 
regarded China  as  completely  as  if  that  country  did 
not  exist.  Perhaps  it  concealed  an  artifice  so  elabo- 
rate that  the  Washington  Monument  would  rock  to 
earth  with  its  glory  tarnished.  .  .  . 

The  Secretary  of  State  with  the  magnificent  head 
plodded  on  methodically  trying  to  disentangle  such 
matters  as  the  control  of  the  island  of  Yap  and  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  69 

right  of  America  to  put  up  wireless  stations  in  China 
on  terms  of  equality  with  the  corporations  of  other 
nationalities.  Conversation  with  him  showed  that 
he  was  fully  alive  to  all  the  possibilities  of  the  situ- 
ation. His  chief  weakness  was  what  he  had  inherited 
from  his  predecessor.  A  tradition  of  flabbiness  is 
the  hardest  of  all  traditions  to  banish.  The  State 
Department  was  still  as  flabby  as  a  wet  pancake. 

It  was  at  the  Senate  that  the  real  drive  was  to  be 
found.  The  man  with  the  leonine  mane  kept  his  eyes 
fixed  steadily  on  the  main  objective.  With  his 
powerful,  persistent,  sledge-hammer  oratory  Sen- 
ator Borah  beat  down  opposition  and  worked  towards 
his  formal  resolution.  One  trump  card  the  United 
States  held  so  admittedly  that  the  game  of  the  others 
was  in  her  hands.  The  dollar,  after  many  ups  and 
downs,  had  become  the  irresistible  factor  not  in  inter- 
national commerce  (because  here  the  right  tradition 
was  absent),  but  as  a  national  battering-ram  when 
others  wanted  to  batter.  For  every  dollar  spent  by 
other  nations  America  had  the  gold  which  would  en- 
able her  to  spend  a  hundred.  It  required  but  the 
simplest  calculation  to  show  that  the  naval  game  of 
beggar-my-neighbour  was  really  over.  This  fact 
having  been  admitted  by  the  premier  sea-power, 
Britain,  it  stood  to  reason  that  the  others  would  be 
dragged  along  directly  the  machinery  moved  and  the 
gears  enmeshed. 


70 


Definite,  however,  as  the  naval  plan  was  now  be- 
coming the  array  of  difficulties  so  far  as  China  was 
concerned  was  by  no  means  lessened,  nor  were  the 
prospects  materially  improved  unless  totally  new 
counsels  won  the  day. 

Difficulties — their  name  was  indeed  legion!  They 
had  been  accumulating  through  inept  diplomacy  at 
a  terrific  rate.  Like  float-ice  moving  endlessly  down 
a  river,  they  had  at  last  piled  up  in  a  solid  barrier 
which  was  constantly  being  added  to.  Heroic  meas- 
ures were  needed  to  free  the  stream  of  international 
relations  from  this  grave  peril.  Unfortunately  for 
China  the  age  of  heroes  had  seemingly  passed.  We 
live  in  a  prosaic  era  when  the  brightest  invention  is 
the  transparent  game  of  "passing  the  buck," — which 
means  avoiding  responsibilities  in  a  rather  cowardly 
way. 

The  United  States  had  so  recently  missed  one  of 
those  supreme  opportunities  which  a  statesman  of 
imagination  would  have  leaped  at  that  it  was  hard  to 
be  very  optimistic.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  the  Suez 
Canal  shares,  the  investment  of  a  relatively  speaking 
unimportant  sum  was  made  a  masterstroke,  so  could 
the  prestige  and  credit  of  the  United  States  in  China 
have  been  secured  forever  by  seventy-five  million 
dollars  in  cash.  The  amateurish  handling  of  the  in- 
vitation to  China  (among  other  neutral  Powers)  to 
associate  herself  with  American  action  in  the  war  was 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  71 

a  matter  which  had  piled  up  such  a  debit  that — in- 
dependently of  the  Japanese  issue — years  of  con- 
scientious effort  could  alone  work  it  off.     China,  still 
in  the  most  difficult  and  painful  stage  of  evolution 
from  a  provincial  barter  and  bullion  system  to  the 
cash  and  credit  system  of  the  West,  had  been  at  the 
mercy  of  the  world's  money  markets  for  twenty  years. 
The  yard-stick  with  which  everything  had  to  be  meas- 
ured, not  because  the  Chinese  were  corrupt  but  be- 
cause  they  were   rapidly   becoming   just   as   other 
nations,  was  cash  and  credit.     In  a  community  im- 
mobilized by  the  weight  of  the  economic  revolution, 
money  alone  could  produce  swift  results.     The  issue 
was  paramount  to  an  extent  which  can  be  understood 
by  referring  to  the  economic  history  of  the  world  at 
the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.     Here  in  a  capital 
stuffed  full  of  gold  and  silver  bullion,  lying  at  a 
stone's  throw  from  the  executive  offices,  it  seemed  in- 
credible that  this  essential  matter  had  never  been 
rightly  understood,  and  that  the  business  instinct  of 
Americans  should  have  so  profoundly  erred.     The 
breakdown  of  the  Chinese  Government  in  1917,  the 
temporary  ruin  of  President  Li  Yuan  Hung,  the  at- 
tempted restoration  of  the  Manchus,  counter-move- 
ments, confusion,  camarillas,  and  Japanese  predomi- 
nance, all  were  due  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  which  had  set  in  motion  by  its  deliberate  act 
forces  which  it  refused  to  control. 

Now  that  after  four  chequered  years  we  were  get- 
ting back  to  first  principles,  the  deadweight  of  the 


72        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

problem  seemed  very  great;  for  under  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  Notes  there  was  a  commitment  of  a  serious  char- 
acter which  existed  independently  of  everything  else. 
And  here  it  is  best  to  tell  the  true  story. 


In  Peking  I  had  often  discussed  with  President  Li 
Yuan  Hung  questions  of  foreign  policy  and  the  con- 
ception of  the  United  States  as  the  palladium  of 
Chinese  liberty.  The  gradual  strangulation  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  owing  to  the  American  failure, 
had  made  us  more  and  more  pessimistic.  The  coun- 
try became  prey  in  1917  to  violent  propaganda.  By 
May  of  that  year  we  had  obtained  secret  information 
that  Japan  had  determined  to  take  up  directly  with 
the  United  States  the  question  of  the  Pacific,  mak- 
ing a  desperate  effort  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of 
the  American  Asiatic  squadron  as  a  preliminary  to  es- 
tablishing the  so-called  Japanese  Monroe  doctrine  for 
Eastern  Asia.  I  was  asked  to  proceed  to  America  so 
as  to  convey  a  warning  and  get  consideration  of  the 
vital  facts. 

Unfortunately  Government  in  Peking  so  com- 
pletely collapsed  that  there  was  much  delay.  Fate 
willed  that  I  should  sail  from  Japan  on  the  very  same 
day  in  July  as  the  Ishii  Mission  which  was  expected 
to  complete  the  work  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
by  publicly  eliminating  the  United  States  from  the 
Far  East.  The  quick  Canadian  route  placed  me  in 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  73 

San  Francisco  days  before  this  fateful  mission  had 
arrived.  The  anxiety  of  a  government  that  had 
chained  itself  almost  completely  to  empty  formulas 
was  now  apparent.  There  was  an  official  reception 
Delegation  under  Assistant  Secretary  Breckenridge 
Long  waiting  anxiously  in  San  Francisco  for  the  first 
indications  of  what  might  be  expected.  Was  the 
real  object  of  the  Japanese  demarche  nothing  less 
than  American  naval  evacuation  of  the  Pacific  and 
the  acceptance  of  a  new  financial  formula  which 
would  place  the  financial  leadership  in  China  in 
Japan's  hands?  She  needed  these  two  last  things  to 
have  China  completely  at  her  mercy.  What  was  to 
be  done  to  ward  off  such  a  determined  assault? 

Two  days  later  the  Mission  arrived.  I  can  still 
see  the  surprised  faces  of  the  Japanese  officials  as 
they  arrived  at  their  hotel  after  the  official  reception. 
Soldiers  had  been  so  thick  on  the  ground  that  the 
Japanese  must  have  wondered  why  Homer  Lea  in 
his  remarkable  warning,  "The  Valour  of  Ignorance," 
which  was  than  still  being  read,  had  declared  that 
California  and  the  territory  west  of  the  Rockies  lay 
in  the  hollow  of  Japan's  hand.  Nothing  but  troops 
and  camps,  and  camps  and  troops.  America  was  not 
only  arming  but  showing  her  men.  The  official  re- 
ception committee  worked  without  ceasing;  and  any 
idea  of  getting  the  United  States  to  accept  the  gen- 
eral scheme  which  had  eliminated  the  British  fleet 
east  of  Singapore  must  in  face  of  this  demonstration 
have  been  quietly  dropped  by  the  Japanese  Mission 


74        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

into  the  bay  of  San  Francisco  twenty-four  hours 
after  they  landed. 

In  Washington,  a  month  later,  I  found  that  the 
situation  was  one  of  stalemate.  Viscount  Ishii  had 
been  there  for  several  weeks,  imprisoned  by  official 
dinners  and  receptions.  Some  of  which  had  been 
shocking  failures.  Curious  inspired  articles  were 
beginning  to  appear,  hinting  that  although  he  had 
specially  come  to  America  to  discuss  important  busi- 
ness no  opportunity  was  being  afforded  him  to  do  so. 
Japanese  discontent  was  plainly  rising  in  face  of  the 
tactics  adopted.  There  had  already  been  an  incident. 
Invitations  had  been  sent  to  attend  a  special  review 
of  the  American  fleet  in  honour  of  the  Mission.  As 
Viscount  Ishii  had  not  answered  the  invitation  a  State 
Department  official  was  sent  to  see  him  and  ask  him 
what  he  proposed  to  do.  He  found  Viscount  Ishii 
in  a  bad  humour.  The  meaning  of  this  excess  of 
entertainments  and  armament  displays  was  beginning 
to  penetrate  Japanese  consciousness.  "My  naval 
and  military  staff  will  go  with  pleasure,"  Viscount 
Ishii  declared,  "but  is  it  necessary  for  me  to  go?" 
"Certainly  not,"  urbanely  replied  the  Department 
official,  "but  the  Secretary  of  State  is  going."  Vis- 
count Ishii  paused,  and  then  quietly  accepted. 

At  the  naval  review  the  Japanese  were  shown 
capital  ships  in  battle  array  amounting  to  twice  their 
own  1917  fleet,  not  to  speak  of  many  other  vessels. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  apologized  for  the  com- 
parative absence  of  torpedo-craft,  as  there  were 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  75 

forty-five  destroyers  off  England  assisting  the 
British  navy, — quite  a  subtle  little  thrust  for  Secre- 
tary Daniels.  At  the  end  of  the  day  the  Secretary 
of  War  added  a  final  friendly  declaration  suitable 
to  allied  and  associated  Powers  in  the  form  of  a  warn- 
ing not  to  suppose  that  the  American  navy  was  going 
to  monopolize  all  American  attention.  During  fu- 
ture years  the  American  army  would  always  have  five 
million  trained  men  at  its  disposal  to  support  the  ac- 
tion of  the  fleet;  for  all  these  millions  being  called  out 
by  the  draft  would  be  available. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  this  byplay  the  position  was  not 
reassuring.  Secretary  Lansing  was  characteristic- 
ally more  concerned  with  the  position  in  Russia  than 
in  China — because  that  just  then  seemed  more  dis- 
tant. Both  he  and  President  Wilson  were  interested 
in  discovering  whether  the  Korniloff-Cossack  move- 
ment could  overthrow  the  Kerensky  regime — not 
whether  China  was  to  be  a  Japanese  enclave.  They 
had  remarkable  ideas  concerning  the  Cossacks,  whom 
they  looked  upon  as  an  enormous  military  force  be- 
longing to  a  race  entirely  different  from  the  ordinary 
Russian.  Europe  was  also  proving  very  annoying. 
The  Italian  Ambassador  wanted  one  hundred  million 
dollars  to  save  Italy  from  collapse.  He  was  refused. 
Less  than  two  months  later  I  had  the  ironical  satis- 
faction on  the  Pacific  to  listen  to  the  American  wire- 
less station  at  Dutch  Harbour  in  the  Aleutians  flash 
the  news  of  Caporetto:  with  the  further  information 
a  day  or  two  later  that  the  United  States  Govern- 


76        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ment  was  advancing  Italy  one  hundred  million  dol- 
lars. ...  If  it  needed  a  first-class  disaster  to  get 
common  sense  in  European  affairs,  it  can  be  left  to 
the  imagination  what  must  happen  to  China  before 
anything  is  done. — 

Viscount  Ishii  constantly  postponed  his  return  to 
Japan,  declaring  quite  openly  that  to  do  so  would 
place  the  Military  Party  at  the  head  of  affairs  and 
precipitate  the  gravest  occurrences.  He  went  to 
Philadelphia  and  made  a  speech  about  the  Liberty 
Bell — a  droll  subject  in  all  truth  for  a  bureaucratic 
Japanese.  Then  he  went  on  elsewhere,  always  be- 
coming gloomier  and  gloomier.  In  New  York  he 
finally  instructed  his  private  secretary  to  pay  a  cer- 
tain confidential  visit  with  very  confidential  words. 

President  Wilson  at  length  sent  for  him.  After 
three  drafts  of  the  proposed  agreement  had  been 
worked  over,  the  fourth  one  was  accepted  and  signed 
on  the  2nd  November,  Secretary  Lansing  weakly  ac- 
cepting the  Japanese  definition,  that  "special  interest" 
did  not  mean  paramount  interest,  and  not  troubling 
himself  about  the  essential  point — the  question  of 
interpretation.  As  neither  the  naval  nor  the  financial 
issue  had  come  up  openly,  and  the  doctrine  of  geogra- 
phical propinquity  had  been  balanced  against  the 
open-door  and  equal  opportunity  in  Manchuria,  the 
Wilson  administration  pretended  to  attach  no  im- 
portance to  the  notes  which  were  in  any  case  merely 
an  additional  postscript  to  the  old  and  well-estab- 
lished policy  of  evasion. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  77 

From  the  Asiatic  point  of  view  the  whole  transac- 
tion was  another  phase  of  that  year's  surrender. 


The  last  paragraph  to  this  business  was  written 
next  year — 1918.  Washington  at  last  became  dimly 
aware  from  the  flood  of  loans  Japan  was  pouring 
into  China  that  a  fearful  blunder  in  tactics  had  been 
committed.  The  administration  uttered  a  cry  of 
alarm  which  reached  the  cliffs  and  caverns  of  Wall 
Street.  Instead  of  rising  to  the  occasion,  New  York 
bankers,  after  profound  deliberations,  came  back 
with  precisely  the  same  formula  which  had  proved 
abortive  for  them  five  years  before,  and  which,  inci- 
dentally, was  the  formula  of  their  Chinese  currency 
Loan  of  1910  for  fifty  million  dollars  which  has  never 
been  anything  but  a  project.  The  international  Con- 
sortium, from  which  they  had  been  told  solemnly  to 
retire  in  1913  by  President  Wilson,  was  just  as 
solemnly  revived  by  them  in  what  they  were  pleased 
to  believe  was  a  new  and  convincing  form.  They 
believed  that  the  world-war  had  placed  financial 
hegemony  so  securely  in  their  hands  that  at  last  it 
would  be  possible  for  them  successfully  to  dictate  a 
China  policy.  The  date  of  the  first  conversation  in 
Washington  between  the  government  and  bankers 
appears  to  have  been  in  June.  On  the  8th  July  the 
bankers  expressed  themselves  in  the  following  writ- 


78        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ten  terms  on  the  suggestion  that  they  should  make  a 
loan  to  China:1 


".  .  .  An  arrangement  of  this  sort,  which  contemplates 
transactions  spread  over  a  considerable  period  of  time,  in 
our  opinion  should  be  made  on  the  broadest  basis  in  order  to 
give  the  best  protection  to  our  investors,  and,  with  the 
right  foundation  established,  confidence  would  follow  and 
anxiety  and  jealousy  disappear.  At  the  conference  held  in 
Washington  recently,  there  was  mentioned,  as  a  course  per- 
haps advisable,  that  Americans  and  Japanese  co-operate  in 
a  loan  to  China.  We  are  disposed  to  believe  that  it  would 
be  better  if  such  an  international  co-operation  were  to  be 
made  broader.  We  suggest,  therefore,  that  this  can  best  be 
accomplished  if  a  four-Power  group  be  constituted  consisting 
of  financial  members  to  be  recognized  by  the  respective  Gov- 
ernments of  Great  Britain,  France,  Japan,  and  the  United 
States;  our  Government  to  recognize  as  their  member  of 
such  group  the  American  banks  or  firms  which  may  become 
associated  for  this  purpose,  and  which  we  should  hope  to 
have  representative  of  the  whole  country.  Although,  under 
the  present  circumstances,  it  would  be  expected  that  Japan 
and  the  United  States  should  carry  England  and  France, 
such  carrying  should  not  diminish  the  vitality  of  their  mem- 
berships in  the  four-Power  group. 

"One  of  the  conditions  of  membership  in  such  a  four- 
Power  group  should  be  that  there  should  be  relinquishment 
by  the  members  of  the  group  either  to  China  or  to  the 

1  It  is  a  significant  and  remarkable  fact  that  the  direct  investment  of 
American  bankers  in  China  on  their  own  account  consisted  on  that 
date,  as  to-day,  of  two  loans — one  for  $5,500,000  and  the  second  also 
for  $5,500,000;  the  first  negotiated  in  1916  by  the  Continental  Bank  of 
Chicago  as  part  of  loan  of  $25,000,000  which  was  never  consummated; 
the  second  by  Pacific  Development  Company  as  first  instalment  of  a  loan 
of  $30,000,000  which  also  was  abandoned.  The  subsequent  remarkable 
developments  regarding  these  two  loans  is  dealt  with  in  Part  VI  of 
the  present  volume. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  79 

group  of  any  options  to  make  loans  which  they  now  hold, 
and  all  loans  to  China  by  any  of  them  should  be  considered 
as  a  four-Power  group  business.  Through  co-operation  of 
England,  France,  Japan  and  the  United  States  much  can  be 
accomplished  for  the  maintenance  of  Chinese  sovereignty  and 
the  preservation  of  the  'open-door';  and,  furthermore,  such 
co-operation  might  greatly  facilitate  the  full  development 
of  the  large  revenue  sources,  from  only  a  very  few  of  which 
China  at  present  realizes  a  satisfactory  income. 

"It  would  seem  to  be  necessary,  if  now  and  after  the  war 
we  are  successfully  to  carry  out  the  responsibilities  imposed 
upon  us  by  our  new  international  position,  that  our  Govern- 
ment should  be  prepared  in  principle  to  recognize  the  change 
in  our  international  relations,  both  diplomatic  and  com- 
mercial, brought  about  by  the  war." 

The  salient  facts  in  this  document  are  highly  inter- 
esting. The  State  Department,  true  to  traditional 
policy  of  avoiding  at  all  costs  direct  responsibilities, 
had  evidently  accepted  the  suggestion  which  Japan- 
ese had  been  busily  making  through  Baron  Shibusawa 
and  others: — that  the  United  States  should  invest 
their  capital  in  China  under  Japanese  auspices. 
New  York  bankers,  with  a  keener  knowledge  of 
profits,  not  only  differed,  but  made  straight  for  the 
big  prize — Chinese  railways.  The  meaning  of  the 
sentence  in  which  they  call  for  the  relinquishment  of 
options  held  by  others  lies  in  the  fact  that  American 
participation  in  railway  concessions  in  China  having 
been  of  a  most  modest  character,  other  Powers  would 
retain  all  the  Chinese  plums  unless  Americans  were 
assisted  to  a  share. 


80        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Thereupon  commenced  a  long  and  elaborate  negoti- 
ation lasting  two  years,  and  shifting  from  Washing- 
ton to  London  and  from  London  to  Paris,  and  finally 
ending  in  Tokyo  and  Peking.  The  original  purpose 
of  the  loan,  which  in  terms  of  the  State  Department's 
despatches  was  "to  strengthen  China  and  fit  her  for 
a  more  active  part  in  the  war  against  the  Central 
European  Powers,"  was  never  referred  to  again  for 
the  obvious  reason  that  the  war  was  over  long  before 
any  one  got  down  to  business.  It  took  one  year  of 
correspondence  and  meetings  to  force  the  other  mem- 
bers of  the  proposed  new  Consortium — England, 
France,  and  Japan — to  agree  to  the  principle  of  pool- 
ing their  Chinese  railway  concessions.  Mr.  Balfour, 
then  in  the  British  Foreign  Office,  pointed  out  in  a 
moving  despatch  that  the  old  Consortium  had  only 
commenced  to  work  in  1913  after  the  various  groups 
had  agreed  in  writing  to  exclude  industrial  and  rail- 
way loans  from  the  scope  of  their  enterprise  and  that 
the  new  policy  meant  a  complete  reversal.  To  dis- 
lodge these  dissidents  was  hard  work.  In  the  end 
they  gave  way  because  the  possibility  that  America, 
if  frustrated,  might  induce  China  to  cancel  all  options 
herself,  was  too  near  to  be  pleasant.  The  principle 
of  unification  of  the  railway  system  of  China  having 
been  definitely  adopted  as  the  basis  of  the  plan,  in 
May,  1919,  a  draft  Agreement  was  entered  into  in 
Paris,  almost  on  the  date  of  the  Shantung  surrender 
made  by  President  Wilson  during  the  Peace  negoti- 
ations. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  81 

But  although  British  and  French  interests  had  be- 
come pliable,  Japan  still  rigidly  maintained  her  stand 
that  the  special  interests  conceded  her  under  the 
Lansing-Ishii  Notes  meant  exclusive  privileges  in 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  In 
the  ensuing  correspondence  between  governments 
and  banking  groups  remarkable  facts  gradually 
emerged.  In  a  Japanese  Memorandum  of  the  14th 
April,  1920,  it  transpired,  for  instance,  that  the  net- 
work of  projected  railways  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  for  which  Japan  had  paid 
the  Peking  Government  twenty  million  Gold  Dollars 
in  the  form  of  advances  in  1918,  had  been  designed 
as  a  "means  of  common  defence  on  the  part  of  China 
and  Japan  against  foreign  invasion  coming  from  the 
the  direction  of  Urga."  It  was  only  then  understood 
in  the  chancelleries  concerned  that  the  action  taken 
on  the  initiative  of  the  United  States  in  the  Russian 
Far  East,  nominally  to  save  the  Czecho- Slovaks,  in 
which  Japan  had  so  unwillingly  concurred,  had  been 
deliberately  utilized  by  Japan  for  the  development  of 
her  Russo-Chinese  policy.  That  is,  whilst  others 
were  foolish  enough  still  to  consider  their  China 
policy  as  a  detached  matter,  bearing  no  relation  to 
the  general  political  problem  of  the  world,  Japan  was 
carefully  making  a  synthesis  in  which  every  factor 
(and  the  whims  of  every  chancellery)  had  its  allotted 
place.  The  temporary  "success"  of  this  policy,  im- 
moral as  were  the  motives,  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
it  was  scientifically  conceived,  being  based  on  the 


82        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

doctrines  of  Clausewitz :  its  ultimate  collapse  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  timidity  finally  intervened,  energy 
being  replaced  by  indecision  and  parsimony  invading 
a  sphere  where  large-handed  spending  and  unity  of 
action  was  the  essential  driving-force.  .  .  . 

By  way  of  reply  to  the  Japanese  Memorandum  the 
American  banking  group,  in  the  person  of  Mr. 
Thomas  A.  Lament,  of  Messrs.  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co., 
made  a  pilgrimage  to  Tokyo.  It  was  a  point  of 
honour  with  American  financiers  not  to  have  it  said 
that  in  the  case  of  Japan  they  had  acquiesced  in  the 
principle  of  spheres  of  influence  when  their  whole 
plan  of  railway  pooling  was  based  on  the  open  door 
and  equal  opportunity  for  all.  In  this  they  were 
very  materially  assisted  by  British  bankers  who 
through  their  own  Foreign  Office  brought  strong  and 
direct  pressure  on  Japan.  Mr.  Lamont  was  con- 
sequently able  to  perform  in  Tokyo  a  rather  remark- 
able feat  in  inducing  the  Japanese  Government  to 
accept  the  position  that  all  railways  which  could  not 
be  considered  as  feeder-lines  to  the  existing  South 
Manchuria  system  must  be  brought  into  the  common 
pool. 

With  this  moral  victory  in  his  pocket  he  came  to 
Peking  and  met  a  smarting  defeat — a  defeat  very 
largely  caused  by  a  subsidiary  and  relatively  unim- 
portant point.  The  issue  was  a  large  block  of  Ger- 
man-Chinese railway -bonds  (Hukwang  bonds)  which 
had  been  acquired  in  some  undisclosed  way  by  his 
firm,  either  during  or  immediately  after  the  war,  and 


a  •'• 

&  - 

~  u 

cq  a 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  83 

which  had  been  advertised  by  China  as  cancelled,  ex- 
cepting serial  numbers  acquired  prior  to  the  Chinese 
declaration  of  war  of  14th  August,  1917.  The  total 
amount  involved  was  under  four  million  dollars 
(gold) ;  and  although  the  Chinese  allegation  that 
some  of  the  bonds  belonged  to  the  Hohenzollern  fam- 
ily was  not  proved  one  block  appeared  to  have  been 
acquired  from  the  Grand  Duchess  of  Luxemburg. 
With  quite  extraordinary  tenacity  the  Chinese  held 
to  their  repudiation  of  these  "enemy  bonds"  and  the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange  ordered  them  off  the 
market.  Mr.  Lamont  admitted  that  he  had  not 
scrutinized  the  scrip  or  noticed  that  they  were  signed 
by  the  Chinese  Minister  to  Berlin;  but  he  took  the 
stand  that  the  Hukwang  Railway  Loan  of  thirty  mil- 
lion gold  dollars  was  a  single  obligation  of  the 
Chinese  Government  and  must  be  honoured  accord- 
ingly. 

Once  more,  as  in  the  case  of  the  East  India  Com- 
pany, this  insignificant  matter  illustrated  that  it  is 
not  sound  policy  to  allow  institutions  depending  on 
profit  to  be  responsible  agents  in  what  are  purely 
governmental  affairs.  In  spite  of  the  clever  piece 
of  work  in  Tokyo,  American  finance  again  registered 
a  failure,  which  was  bound  to  take  on  a  more  sombre 
character  from  year  to  year.  Nevertheless,  the  work 
of  completing  the  international  scheme  was  pushed 
on  with,  the  definitive  consortium  Agreement  being 
duly  completed  between  the  four  national  groups  on 


84        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

the  15th  October,  1920,  in  New  York  as  if  every  diffi- 
culty had  been  removed. 

The  agreement  has  remained  to  this  day  a  dead- 
letter. 

VI 

The  new  administration  which  had  come  in  Wash- 
ington understood  very  imperfectly  this  very  involved 
story,  which  indeed  requires  years  of  study  on  the  spot 
thoroughly  to  appreciate.  The  new  administration, 
though  working  towards  solutions  in  a  far  more  hope- 
ful way  than  had  ever  occurred  before,  was  too  in- 
clined to  believe  that  a  new  grouping  of  the  Powers 
in  the  Far  East  would  of  itself  cure  China's  ills. 
Therein  lay  the  great  danger.  That  a  modification 
of  that  grouping  was  a  first  essential  was  true.  But 
the  internal  Chinese  question  was  vastly  more  difficult 
than  the  external  one,  and  could  not  be  handled  in 
the  same  way.  That  American  money-power  had 
already  committed  itself  along  wrong  lines  was 
deeply  disturbing,  since  Asia  demands  a  technique 
entirely  different  from  that  which  is  employed  else- 
where. All  the  enthusiasm  and  altruism  in  the  world 
cannot  alter  such  a  decisive  fact.  Quick  returns  and 
efficiency,  in  the  way  the  West  understands  them,  are 
abhorred  as  nature  abhors  a  vacuum.  Energy  is 
thrice-cursed  and  always  suspect.  It  is  only  when 
you  have  suited  your  method  to  a  lackadaisical  and 
somewhat  slipshod  atmosphere,  and  are  content  to 
let  the  years  go  by  in  winning  confidence  that  you 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  85 

finally  triumph,  though  even  triumph  differs  from 
what  any  man  has  imagined  elsewhere  in  his 
dreams.  .  .  . 

Still  there  were  good  points  in  1921  which  had  pre- 
viously been  non-existent. 

The  greatest  stroke  since  Monroe's  days  had  been 
successfully  if  wastefully  carried  out.  After  being 
stranded  for  half  a  century  America  had  really  put 
to  sea  again.  The  creation  of  an  American  mercan- 
tile marine,  through  the  agency  of  the  United  States 
Shipping  Board,  had  become  the  basis  of  American 
policy  on  the  Pacific.  For  the  first  time  for  fifty 
years  there  was  a  tangible  stake  on  the  high  seas ;  and 
no  matter  how  it  might  be  looked  on  elsewhere,  on 
the  Pacific  that  stake  had  become  absolutely  essential 
to  give  meaning  and  reality  to  policy. 

The  sea  beckoned — it  was  sea-power  that  was  the 
issue.  The  entire  trend  of  men's  minds  was  in  that 
direction.  Secretary  Hughes'  persistence  in  the  mat- 
ter of  the  island  of  Yap  arose  from  a  due  appreci- 
ation of  the  fact.  For  if  the  sea  was  important,  of 
almost  equal  importance  was  what  lay  under  the  seas 
— submarine  cables.  The  United  States  was  badly 
placed  in  the  matter.  Instead  of  having  at  least  one 
cable  linking  her  to  the  continent  of  Asia  she  had 
none.  That  American  submarine  communication, 
giving  access  to  the  markets  of  China,  terminated 
and,  for  all  business  purposes,  died  in  an  office  of  the 
imperial  Japanese  telegraph  system  was  a  dismal 
conclusion. 


86        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Under  the  sea,  on  the  sea,  on  land,  the  difficulties 
seemed  to  multiply.  All  the  inaction  of  past  years, 
all  the  attempts  to  avert  responsibility  by  the  use  of 
fine  phrases,  were  like  Mother  Carey's  chickens  com- 
ing home  to  roost.  There  was  reason  for  the  anxiety 
of  the  hour ;  for  the  fear  that  unless  extreme  vigilance 
were  shown  an  ugly  and  unescapable  situation  might 
develop  overnight  necessitating  the  rude  and  detested 
arbitrament.  It  might  be  exaggerated  and  even  un- 
true to  proclaim,  as  Homer  Lea  had  done  in  "The 
Valour  of  Ignorance,"  that  swarms  of  khaki-clad 
Japanese  infantry  could  ever  invade  the  peaceful  val- 
leys of  California;  but  it  was  not  exaggerated  or 
untrue  to  suppose  that  the  Philippines  lay  in  the 
hollow  of  Japan's  hand  and  that  even  Hawaii  would 
be  menaced  if  there  was  stalemate  at  sea.  Looking 
at  the  possibilities  which  the  island-chains  and  the 
indented  coasts  afforded  in  the  Northern  Pacific,  as 
well  as  in  the  Western  and  Central  Pacific  (and  re- 
membering that  the  strategic  harbours  in  the  Alaskan 
Peninsula  were  equidistant  from  Japan  and  San 
Francisco),  there  was  no  limit  to  what  a  resourceful 
and  energetic  enemy  might  do.  Determination  and 
valour,  when  there  has  been  adequate  preparation,  are 
indeed  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  which  give 
license  to  pass  over  the  boundary  into  an  enemy's 
country  and  territorial  waters  and  set  no  term  to  am- 
bition. To  agree  on  points  by  trumpery  diplomatic 
methods,  when  there  was  this  prospect  in  the  offing, 
was  plainly  an  evasion. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  87 

Consequently,  on  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  this  im- 
portant month  of  May  the  Senate  duly  adopted  the 
formal  resolution  requesting  the  President  to  call  a 
conference  with  Great  Britain  and  Japan  on  naval 
reduction ;  and  after  weeks  of  conferences  between  the 
two  Houses  this  was  added  as  an  Amendment  to  the 
Naval  Bill  and  was  the  origin  of  the  Washington 
Conference. 


PART  IV 

THE  IMPERIAL  CONFERENCE  OF  1921 


THE  first  impression  of  the  observer  in  England  in 
the  summer  of  1921  was  that  no  one  outside  of  a 
narrow  official  and  parliamentary  circle  had  yet  taken 
cognizance  of  the  fact  that  an  elaborate  play  was 
about  to  be  staged.  Coming  from  Canada  and  the 
United  States,  where  the  problem  of  the  Pacific  was 
no  idle  matter  but  a  burning  issue  which  might  flame 
up  with  the  utmost  fierceness  at  any  moment  and  in- 
volve every  shore  washed  by  the  waters  of  that 
mighty  ocean,  it  was  extraordinary  to  note  the  indif- 
ference. England,  mother  of  nations,  was  immersed 
in  her  own  affairs.  The  Imperial  Conference,  with 
its  complicated  agenda,  was  plainly  an  unwelcome 
guest.  Here  were  not  only  routine  departmental 
matters  requiring  profound  peace  adequately  to 
discuss,  but  foreign  and  imperial  questions  the  details 
of  which  were  so  complicated  that  only  experts  could 
be  expected  to  work  their  way  through  the  maze  of 
facts  and  know  what  importance  to  give  them. 

The  machinery,  however,  commenced  to  work. 
The  Press,  still  with  something  of  the  old  war-res- 
traint, gradually  turned  its  attention  to  the  question 
of  the  hour.  It  was  noticeable,  however,  that  Japan 

88 


AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE        89 

was  always  mentioned  with  caution,  a  certain  vague- 
ness characterizing  all  references  to  the  Alliance  as 
though  a  too  precise  investigation  of  pending  issues 
was  out  of  place.  The  mot  d'ordre  having  been 
passed  round  to  avoid  hurting  susceptibilities,  editors 
were  doing  their  best  to  oblige.  Still  some  light  was 
thrown  on  dark  places.  Especially  valuable  was 
the  prominence  given  by  "The  Times"  to  the  brilliant 
articles  of  the  young  Australian  writer,  Mr.  Duncan 
Hall,  whose  views  expressed  in  his  "Horizons  of  Em- 
pire" depicted  accurately  and  admirably,  as  I  knew 
from  personal  contact,  what  the  men  of  the  Domin- 
ions and  the  outposts  were  anxiously  debating.  Nor 
would  it  be  fair  to  omit  mention  of  the  great  services 
rendered  to  the  cause  of  English-speaking  men  by 
Mr.  St.  Loe  Strachey.  His  brilliant,  persistent,  and 
logical  argumentation  in  "The  Spectator"  gave  that 
publication  a  special  niche  in  the  hearts  of  all  who 
understood  the  issues  and  were  determined  that  no 
folly  should  be  shown.  Still  on  the  whole  indiffer- 
ence remained  predominant,  and  had  it  not  been  for 
the  powerful  influences  already  at  work  across  the 
Atlantic  there  would  have  been  a  doubtful  and 
dangerous  conclusion  to  the  pending  discussions. 
"Before  the  war,"  proclaimed  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in 
his  best  oracular  vein,  "Downing  Street  was  in  charge 
of  the  Empire  but  now  the  Empire  is  in  charge  of 
Downing  Street."  That  epigrammatic  remark  might 
be  popular  as  a  trumpet-blast  to  herald  the  assem- 
bling delegates  but  it  was  not  easy  to  believe  all  its 


90        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

implications.  If  local  self-interest  had  really  taken 
the  place  of  the  old  centralized  system  it  meant  a  spec- 
tacular political  bonfire.  That  the  Empire  was,  how- 
ever, in  charge  of  Downing  Street  on  speech-days 
only  was  amply  proved  by  the  fact  that  although  the 
Dominions  termed  this  a  Conference  of  Prime  Min- 
isters of  the  Empire,  Hansard  and  other  authorities 
called  it  without  fail  the  "Imperial  Cabinet."  Oceans 
separate  the  two  ideas — the  oceans  of  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Pacific — not  to  speak  of  the  seven  seas. 


n 

What  information  was  possessed  prior  to  the  open- 
ing of  the  Conference  of  the  various  factors  behind 
the  scenes  which  I  have  already  dealt  with?  Was  it 
fully  realized  in  London  that  a  first-class  crisis  was 
imminent  unless  discretion  and  resourcefulness  were 
shown?  Yes — to  a  very  large  extent.  No  matter 
what  exception  may  be  taken  to  the  manner  in  which 
foreign  policy  is  still  conducted  by  old-fashioned 
Foreign  Offices,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  Lon- 
don enjoys  such  exceptional  advantages  owing  to  its 
early  and  accurate  information  that  it  is  seldom 
surprised.  The  error  lay  deeper.  There  was  no 
adequate  comprehension  of  the  psychology  of  the 
business.  That  Canada  and  the  United  States 
loomed  up  as  danger-spots  might  be  true;  but  much 
importance  was  given  to  the  results  which  skill  might 
win.  If  the  initiative  could  be  retained  not  only  in 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  91 

the  matter  of  the  Japanese  Alliance,  but  in  all  those 
more  general  issues  involving  defence,  it  was  still  be- 
lieved that  fertility  in  inventing  formulas  would  over- 
come objections.  To  prevent  the  raising  of  awkward 
and  unanswerable  questions  until  certain  definite 
stages  had  been  passed,  to  give  vagueness  and  polite- 
ness capital  places,  and  to  make  the  United  States  no 
less  than  Japan  aware  of  the  profoundly  friendly 
state  of  mind  into  which  governance  had  been  thrown 
— these  were  the  aspects  of  authoritative  policy.  If 
this  could  be  accomplished  all  would  be  well.  If  not, 
the  agenda  paper  might  as  well  be  scrapped. 

And  China?  China,  not  being  armed  and  united 
in  the  European  sense,  was  a  very  minor  matter. 
Questions  of  the  second  or  third  rank  could  not  be 
permitted  to  intrude  until  the  capital  issue  was  re- 
solved. True,  China  could  no  longer  be  so  com- 
pletely ignored  as  in  the  old  days  since  she  was  an 
official  member  of  an  official  League  with  a  place  on 
the  council.  But  so  far  as  being  considered  as  a  vital 
element,  there  was  little  likelihood  of  such  a  policy 
being  inaugurated  unless  her  strange  case  were 
brought  before  the  public  in  such  a  way  that  it  could 
not  be  ignored. 

Publication  was  what  was  needed — much  pub- 
lication— persistent  publication. 

Publication  of  the  facts,  with  the  central  conten- 
tion that  force  of  circumstances  had  now  forged  a 
nexus  between  the  opposite  shores  of  the  Pacific,  and 
therefore  conferred  on  China  a  new  international  rat- 


92        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ing,  at  once  awakened  interest.  It  was  not  an  easy 
matter,  however,  to  make  converts;  for  passionate 
loyalty  to  an  outworn  policy  is  one  of  the  most 
marked  characteristics  of  the  English  people.  Little 
or  nothing  had  been  heard  of  the  Far  East  for  seven 
long  years.  Although  Japan's  sins  had  been  oc- 
casionally trumpeted  as  far  abroad  as  this,  it  seemed 
a  little  incredible  that  a  small  nation  of  fifty  odd  mil- 
lions could  really  terrorize  a  giant  of  four  hundred 
millions  unless  there  was  something  congenitally 
wrong  with  the  giant.  The  constant  reiteration  that 
Australasia  at  least  was  convinced  that  Japanese 
friendship  could  only  be  secured  by  a  Japanese  Al- 
liance was  held  to  be  an  argument  of  more  than  pass- 
ing moment,  seeing  that  the  Dominions  in  the  anti- 
podes had  more  at  stake  than  any  one  else. 

The  outline  of  a  new  policy  for  the  Pacific  Ocean 
was,  nevertheless,  becoming  more  and  more  clearly 
traced.  For  months  the  discussion  had  been  proceed- 
ing in  a  fitful  way;  now  it  had  gathered  sufficient 
strength  to  make  it  a  vital  issue.  That  it  was  vital  I 
soon  had  adequate  proof :  for  being  fortunate  enough 
to  address  the  Coalition  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
in  the  House  of  Commons  two  days  prior  to  the 
formal  Debate  on  the  Imperial  Conference  of  the 
17th  June,  I  found  not  only  sound  information  but 
general  agreement  that  a  Pacific  Ocean  policy  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  old  Far  Eastern  policy  was  an 
urgent  requirement.  The  matter  had  indeed  taken 
such  immense  strides  that  it  was  the  question  of  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  93 

hour.  Members  were  also  agreed  that  something 
ought  to  be  done  for  China,  and  that  it  was  danger- 
ous as  well  as  useless  to  attempt  to  ignore  the  forces 
which  were  at  work  since  the  Republic  had  been 
founded.  It  was  on  this  date  (15th  June)  that  I 
learnt  that  a  request  had  been  officially  addressed  by 
Britain  to  Japan  at  the  end  of  May  (presumably  as 
soon  as  the  Borah  resolution  had  been  tacked  to  the 
Naval  appropriation  Bill  in  Washington)  for  an  ex- 
tension of  three  months  of  the  Alliance  Treaty  from 
its  date  of  termination,  13th  July,  which  would  carry 
it  to  the  13th  October.  No  answer  had  come  from 
Tokyo :  the  silence  of  Japan  was  creating  anxiety. 

The  matter  was  very  important  since  it  established 
beyond  question  the  fact  that  events  in  Washington 
were  being  very  carefully  watched,  and  that  every- 
thing done  there  not  only  found  an  immediate  echo 
in  Downing  Street  but  was  looked  upon  as  decisive. 
Plainly,  the  plan  in  mind  before  the  conference 
opened  was  to  win  dissidents  to  the  idea  that  if  the 
British  Empire  Delegates  would  only  stand  together 
and  be  reasonable,  all  would  be  well;  for  then,  im- 
mediately this  Conference  was  over  another  one  could 
take  place  attended  by  America  and  Japan,  when 
a  modified  Japanese  Agreement  could  be  tabled  and 
win  sanction. 

Nothing  showed  more  clearly  how  the  psychology 
of  the  issue  was  misunderstood.  Moreover,  no  mat- 
ter how  great  might  be  the  modifications  made  on  the 
Pacific  so  as  to  brine:  the  United  States  within  the 


94        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

circle  of  friendship,  China  stood  just  as  poor  a  chance 
of  fair  treatment.  Directly  to  include  her  in  inter- 
national arrangements  never  having  been  attempted 
(the  failure  of  the  United  States  in  this  matter  being 
every  whit  as  marked  as  the  failure  of  England),  it 
was  abundantly  plain  that  no  radical  change  could  be 
expected  at  such  a  juncture  unless  the  greatest  pres- 
sure were  exerted.  The  strength  of  the  Chinese 
people  was  still  held  to  be  capable  of  expression  only 
in  negative  forms,  i.  e.  by  their  usual  method  of  re- 
fusing to  buy  or  trade  when  their  interests  were 
menaced.  No  one  who  had  experienced  the  Chinese 
boycott  system,  applied  either  publicly  or  privately, 
had  any  wish  to  see  it  repeated.  But  that  was  held 
to  be  the  limit  of  their  action. 

The  British  Foreign  Office,  guided  in  most  of  its 
China  policy  by  mercantile  considerations,  relied  very 
greatly  on  what  it  was  told  by  British  interests  with 
China  connections.  These  interests  were  almost  en- 
tirely ignorant  of — and  incapable  of  understanding — 
the  fundamental  changes  in  the  country.  They  per- 
sisted in  believing,  as  so  many  believed  for  years  in 
the  case  of  Russia,  that  the  revolution  was  entirely  on 
the  surface;  and  that  whilst  in  such  a  flagrant  case 
as  Shantung,  their  own  interests  as  well  as  Chinese 
interests  demanded  a  reconsideration  of  the  Paris  de- 
cision, it  was  by  no  means  necessary  to  scrap  the  idea 
that  China  was  first  and  last  a  trade-area  inhabited  by 
individuals  to  be  measured  solely  by  their  purchas- 
ing-power and  to  be  guaranteed  against  the  creation 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  95 

of  political  enclaves  merely  because  that  would  mean 
a  restriction  of  the  import  and  export  market.  The 
dangers  arising  from  a  persistence  in  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  were  therefore  looked  upon  as  being 
not  military  but  mercantile;  unaccustomed  to  the 
study  of  politics,  the  vision  of  merchants  did  not  ex- 
tend beyond  the  entrepots  of  trade  which  their  enter- 
prise had  created  along  the  China  Coast.  That  we 
were  within  measurable  distance  of  a  conflict,  which 
from  its  resultant  complications  might  tear  asunder 
the  fabric  of  empire  unless  something  radical  were 
done,  was  beyond  their  philosophy. 

If  the  Foreign  Office  was  barricaded  against  new 
ideas,  there  was  at  least  something  to  be  hoped  from 
the  Prime  Minister's  office.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  no 
matter  what  his  detractors  may  say,  has  great  vision, 
and  takes  care  to  inform  himself  from  every  possible 
quarter. 

in 

I  was  fortunate,  in  these  circumstances,  to  be  able 
in  conversations  with  Lord  Riddell  to  bring  the  im- 
portance of  these  matters  forward  in  such  a  way  as  to 
be  convincing.  Lord  Riddell,  who  six  months  later 
in  Washington  was  to  prove  such  a  remarkable  suc- 
cess, has  Scottish  sound  common  sense  and  can  re- 
cognize new  facts  without  being  irremediably  upset 
by  them.  That  China  had  really  a  case  and  that  it 
was  not  common  sense  to  ignore  her,  or  to  treat  her  as 
negligible,  seemed  at  once  patent  to  him.  He  invited 


96        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

me  to  summarize  my  remarks  in  numbered  para- 
graphs in  the  simplest  and  clearest  way  so  that  what 
China  wanted  could  be  easily  grasped,  and  the  new 
problem  put  into  proper  focus. 

I  did  so  in  the  form  that  follows.  Bald  as  the 
document  is,  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  it  was 
read  and  digested  in  the  proper  quarter. — 

"MEMORANDUM 

"1.  I  have  been  sent  to  London  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  make  clear  China's  position,  which  does  not  seem  to 
be  at  all  understood  in  England. 

"£.  The  seven  years  since  the  outbreak  of  war  have  caused 
China  to  be  entirely  forgotten.  The  great  changes  which 
have  taken  place  there  are  unknown  in  England.  Practically 
the  only  news  published  regarding  China  is  bad  news.  This 
comes  perhaps  ten  or  fifteen  times  a  year,  but  the  fact  is  left 
entirely  unrecorded  that  during  the  other  350  days  life  is 
normal  and  uneventful. 

"3.  One  aspect  regarding  which  hardly  a  word  has  ap- 
peared in  the  English  press  is  the  vast  municipal  improve- 
ments all  over  the  country.  Modern  cities  have  arisen  with 
broad  well-metalled  thoroughfares,  thronged  with  motor  cars, 
lighted  with  electricity  and  furnished  with  telephones,  and 
water-works,  and  policed  by  well-trained  constabulary.  The 
old  city  walls  are  being  torn  down  and  boulevards  con- 
structed, the  general  tendency  under  the  Republic  being  to 
become  up-to-date  in  all  conveniences  of  polite  life.  China 
is  indeed  fast  losing  her  Oriental  character  and  resembles 
more  a  country  such  as  Brazil.  She  should  in  fact  be 
thought  of  more  as  a  new  country  than  an  old  one,  with  a 
new  country's  problems  and  a  new  country's  hopes  and  rough- 
nesses. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  97 

"4.  The  great  mass  of  people  involved  is  also  not  under- 
stood. In  the  21  years  since  the  Boxer  revolt  there  has 
been  a  net  increase  of  population  between  60  and  70  millions. 
Both  the  Post  Office  and  the  Customs  administrations,  which 
have  European  organization  and  general  management,  have 
this  year  independently  investigated  the  population  in  every 
district  and  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  total 
to-day  is  447  millions,  or  at  least  30  millions  more  than  the 
population  of  Europe.  The  biggest  province  (Szechuan) 
has  a  population  considerably  more  than  France's  and  ap- 
proaching that  of  Germany. 

"5.  Naturally  in  a  country  of  such  size  there  are  from 
time  to  time  serious  happenings,  but  life  is  nevertheless  safer 
in  China  than  in  Europe.  The  main  characteristic  of  the 
country  is  its  newslessness  and  commonplace  life. 

"6.  The  growth  of  public  opinion  is  an  enormous  factor 
to  be  reckoned  with  to-day.  There  are  2,000  newspapers, 
of  which  800  are  dailies.  At  least  20%  of  the  population 
read  newspapers  or  hear  what  they  have  said.  This  press  is 
strongly  nationalist  and  continually  preaching  nationalism. 
The  biggest  newspaper  has  a  circulation  of  50,000,  but 
there  are  many  with  10,000  and  20,000  serving  their 
localities. 

"7.  Foreign  news  and  politics  are  a  great  feature.  Great 
numbers  of  newspapers  publish  European  and  American 
telegrams.  The  big  names  in  politics  are  just  as  familiar  to 
Chinese  newspaper  readers  as  those  of  continental  or  Amer- 
ican newspapers.  The  political  issue  is  endlessly  discussed 
and  there  is  much  passion  being  displayed  regarding  Chinese 
rights. 

"8.  The  student  movement  is  another  great  feature. 
There  are  now  700,000  students  in  the  great  Students'  Union 
and  they  act  like  clockwork  from  one  end  of  the  country  to 
the  other  in  national  matters.  There  are  constant  agitations 
and  demonstrations;  and  such  is  the  antipathy  for  Japan 


98        AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

that  no  Cabinet  Minister's  life  would  be  worth  an  hour's 
purchase  if  he  dared  for  instance  to  discuss  the  possibility  of 
negotiating  with  Japan  on  such  an  issue  as  Shantung. 

"9.  The  trade  of  the  country  remains  small  on  a  per 
capita  basis  because  of  difficulties  and  disabilities  referred  to 
below.  China's  foreign  trade  is  under  £400,000,000  a  year, 
or  less  than  £1  per  head  of  population,  whereas  if  it  were 
pushed  to  the  Japanese  average  (£10  per  head)  it  would  be 
worth  £4,000,000,000  annually,  or  considerably  more  than 
that  of  any  modern  State.  The  commercial  possibilities  are 
indeed  so  gigantic  that  all  powers  covet  the  premier  place. 

"10.  Mediaeval  taxation  is  the  chief  cause  for  the  small 
total  which  is  only  about  the  value  of  the  trade  of  Italy, 
when  it  should  equal  if  not  surpass  the  trade  of  the  British 
Empire.  This  taxation,  i.e.,  Customs  duties,  is  controlled 
through  the  Commercial  Treaties  by  foreign  nations,  with- 
out whose  unanimous  consent  nothing  can  be  done.  China 
for  80  years  has  had  the  same  5%  tariff,  producing  not  more 
than  10  millions  sterling  in  revenue.  To  make  up  for  this, 
there  is  interprovincial  trade  taxation,  i.e.,  China  is  broken 
up  into  petty  states  and  trade  impeded  simply  because  no 
nation  has  had  sufficient  intelligence  to  see  that  a  Chinese 
customs  union  (Zollverein)  with  free  trade  within  the  limits 
of  her  own  territory  will  bring  such  a  vast  increase  of  profit 
that  all  nations  would  benefit. 

"The  entire  British  war  debt  could  be  paid  off  by  the  great 
increase  in  exports  to  China  which  would  automatically 
come  if  England  took  the  lead  in  this  matter  and  brought  it 
to  a  successful  conclusion,  as  she  easily  could  with  American 
co-operation. 

"11.  Japan  is  opposed  to  all  such  reforms  because  she 
does  not  wish  China  to  go  ahead  and  increase  in  wealth  and 
power  so  rapidly  that  the  present  position  is  reversed.  Her 
aim  and  object,  therefore,  is  to  impede  China's  real  progress 
until  she  can  entrench  herself  on  her  territory  so  strongly 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  99 

as  to  offset  China's  natural  advantage  in  numbers,  resources, 
and  extent  of  territory. 

"12.  The  real  role  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  has 
been  for  the  last  ten  years  to  impede  China.  Japan,  by 
representing  to  China  almost  daily  that  she  has  the  support 
of  Britain,  and  by  blocking  all  vital  matters,  is  making  a 
desperate  effort  to  prevent  the  restoration  of  the  natural 
equilibrium  in  the  Far  East  which  can  only  be  based  on  a 
balance  being  preserved  between  the  two  countries. 

"Every  child  in  China  knows  this  to-day.  The  native 
press  has  been  repeating  it  daily  for  years,  and  nothing  will 
ever  modify  the  Chinese  conviction  that  the  Alliance  is  an 
instrument  to  hold  them  down. 

"13.  It  is  not  generally  understood  that  Sinn  Fein  as  a 
method  has  been  absorbed  by  every  country  in  Asia.  In 
China  there  is  an  absolute  determination  to  begin  practising 
first  trade  boycott,  then  other  methods,  if  at  this  supreme 
opportunity  of  the  Imperial  Conference  China's  rights  are 
not  respected,  and  the  Alliance  as  a  military  agreement 
terminated. 

"14.  The  fears  expressed  that  the  termination  of  the  Al- 
liance would  be  followed  by  dangerous  Japanese  action  are 
based  on  ignorance  of  the  psychology  of  Asia — the  same 
ignorance,  for  instance,  as  was  displayed  in  the  post-war 
Anglo-Persian  Agreement. 

"If  the  Alliance  is  ended  nothing  will  happen  anywhere 
except  in  Japan.  There  the  more  liberal  elements  in  less 
than  a  year  will  gain  control;  there  will  be  a  collapse  of 
the  military  party ;  a  modification  of  the  constitution ;  friend- 
ship with  China  and  a  settlement  of  such  issues  as  Shantung." 

At  the  present  moment  the  British  are  looked  upon 
throughout  Asia  as  being  foolish,  if  not  actually  fools, 
because  they  have  not  been  able  to  see  that  the  win- 


100      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ning  side  is  the  nationalist  or  people's  side  in  each 
country.  The  writer  has  heard  the  expression  "fools" 
applied  to  them  in  three  Asiatic  languages.  The 
net  result  of  correct  action  in  the  Far  East  will  be 
not  the  creation  of  new  dangers,  but  simply  a  chorus 
passing  round  Asia  that  we  have  at  last  learnt  some- 
thing, and  are  admitting  the  existence  of  facts  which 
every  one  else  has  long  known. 
17th  June,  1921. 

rv 

On  the  17th  June,  the  Debate  on  the  Imperial 
Conference  took  place  before  a  thinly-attended 
House  of  Commons.  But  for  one  who  had  the  issues 
at  heart  it  was  a  supremely  interesting  occasion 
since  there  was  the  unique  opportunity  of  not  only 
listening  to  what  Britons  thought  of  the  Empire, 
but  what  the  Empire  thought  of  the  Britons  who 
were  speaking.1  Owing  to  the  condition  of  Irish 
affairs  the  galleries  were  closed,  but  in  the  special 
gallery  were  the  Dominion  Ministers  and  their  per- 
sonnel keenly  following  the  trend  of  a  discussion 
which  had  already  raged  in  their  own  legislatures. 
As  the  debate  proceeded  and  dropped  from  high- 
sounding  generalities  to  a  particular  consideration 

i  Although  modesty  makes  reference  difficult,  the  Hansard  Report  of 
this  date  contains  a  significant  entry,  dealing  with  some  personal  refer- 
ences made  by  that  most  courteous  parliamentary  veteran,  Mr.  T.  P. 
O'Connor.  By  an  extraordinary  mistake  of  the  official  reporters  I  was 
inadvertently  knighted  during  the  debate — thus  adding  to  the  comedy 
of  errors  which  the  Imperial  Conference  produced.  For  record  of  this 
honour,  which  is  purely  platonic,  since  it  has  never  been  confirmed,  see 
Official  Report,  Friday,  17th  June,  1921,  volume  143,  No.  79,  page  823, 
Mr.  T.  P.  O'Connor,  Liverpool,  Scotland  Division,  speaking. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  101 

of  the  matter  of  defence,  the  comments  in  the  gal- 
lery became  more  interesting  than  the  oratory;  for 
when  gallant  members  who  had  been  general  officers 
began  to  give  their  views  as  to  the  role  which  com- 
ponent parts  of  the  empire  could  play  in  times  of 
emergency,  the  instinctive  attitude  of  Dominion  rep- 
resentatives was  hostility, — hostility  to  ideas  which 
are  the  natural  outcome  of  European  power-politics 
and  which  are  directly  opposed  to  oversea  ideas  where 
the  starting-point  is  the  farm  and  the  mine.  Through 
the  long  hours  of  the  debate  the  fact  was  more  and 
more  patent  that  the  real  problem  of  the  British 
Empire  is  not  defence  or  alliances  or  commerce  or 
finance,  but  similarity  of  ideas.  The  resentment 
which  is  common  among  Canadians,  Australians, 
South  Africans  and  New  Zealanders,  because  of  the 
assumption  that  they  will  endorse  the  execution  of 
policies  over  which  they  have  no  control  and  in  which 
they  have  no  interest,  is  a  matter  which  may  pass 
unnoticed  for  a  number  of  years  but  which  in  the 
end  will  acquire  a  decisive  character.  The  tendency 
to  allow  foreign  affairs  to  be  excluded  from  the 
scope  of  the  post-war,  levelling  movement  is  one 
that  requires  checking — or  else  it  will  be  redressed 
in  a  far  more  drastic  way  than  was  the  case  with 
the  question  of  supporting  Polish  intervention  in 
Russian  affairs.  There  was  one  good  point,  however. 
That  the  bulk  of  opinion  had  already  swung  into 
line  on  the  subject  of  the  Pacific,  and  on  the  neces- 
sity of  reaching  a  proper  understanding  with  inter- 


csted  Powers  emerged  clearly  enough  in  this  debate: 
and  for  the  first  time  since  the  late  Lord  Salisbury 
took  up  the  cudgels  for  China  twenty-five  years  be- 
fore in  defending  the  cession  of  Weihaiwei  (declar- 
ing that  it  was  meant  to  hearten  the  Chinese  and 
prevent  them  from  giving  way  to  despair  at  the 
actions  of  Russia)  the  tone  of  the  House  was  almost 
uniformly  flattering  and  favourable  to  the  Chinese 
people. 

Unfortunately  there  was  no  large-minded  man 
like  the  late  Marquess  of  Salisbury  to  carry  the 
matter  further.  Too  much  hinged  on  the  person- 
ality of  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  his  natural  predi- 
lections. Fifty  years  ago,  when  men  were  still  asleep, 
Lord  Curzon  would  have  been  a  most  valuable  asset ; 
in  1921  he  was  a  danger.  Understanding  accurately 
virtually  every  problem  in  Asia,  author  of  brilliant 
books  on  each  phase  of  the  subject,  he  yet  possessed 
that  type  of  mind  which  has  been  largely  responsible 
for  the  amazing  unpopularity  of  England  beyond 
the  Suez  Canal  during  the  last  twenty  years.  That 
he  would  naturally  and  infallibly  favour  Japan  at 
the  expense  of  China,  and  remain  convinced  to  the 
bitter  end  that  nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  reversing 
policy,  was  as  certain  as  the  action  of  the  moon  on 
the  tides.  The  Bolshevists  have  been  right  in  one 
article  of  their  faith:  a  certain  type  of  mind  is  be- 
yond change  because  it  imagines  that  it  is  beyond 
good  and  evil.  That  it  was  not  possible  to  cure  a 
disease  if  you  perpetuated  the  conditions  which  had 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  103 

produced  the  disease,  seemed  too  elementary  a  prop- 
osition to  require  discussion.  That,  however,  was 
not  the  official  view.  Very  far  from  it  indeed.  Al- 
though the  precise  contrary  was  not  publicly  argued, 
it  was  secretly  loved,  making  it  seem  that  the  only 
way  of  dealing  with  professional  British  diplomacy 
is  to  get  rid  of  it. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th  June  the  Conference 
duly  opened.  "The  Daily  Telegraph,"  through  the 
friendly  interest  of  that  most  genial  of  all  men,  Lord 
Burnham,  was  good  enough  on  that  date  to  give 
prominence  to  my  diagnosis  of  the  main  problem. 
But  it  was  held  necessary  to  add  a  caveat  in  the 
form  of  an  editorial  note.  To  the  analysis  I  made 
of  a  situation  which  was  so  plain  to  us  who  lived 
in  the  Far  East  (that  it  was  the  condition  of  China, 
coupled  with  Britain's  Japanese  commitments  which 
formed  the  gravest  menace  on  the  Pacific  Ocean) 
there  was  the  rejoinder  that  many  factors  of  Im- 
perial concern  had  to  be  reckoned  with  in  a  full  con- 
sideration of  the  subject  and  not  solely  the  question 
of  China  and  Japan.  That,  indeed,  was  obvious  to 
all  of  us.  But  the  starting-point  of  all  the  factors 
of  Imperial  concern  was  Japan;  and  the  main  issue 
which  had  not  yet  been  publicly  approached — was 
whether  Japan  or  Canada  was  to  dominate  British 
Pacific  policy. 

The  general  statement  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  with 
which  the  conference  opened  was  amiable  enough. 
With  his  instinct  for  immediately  scenting  and  tack- 


104      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ling  the  decisive  issue,  he  declared  that  he  was  ready 
to  discuss  with  American  statesmen  any  proposal 
for  the  limitation  of  armaments  which  they  might 
wish  to  set  out.  Friendly  co-operation  with  the 
United  States  was  a  cardinal  principle  for  Britain, 
who  desired  to  work  with  her  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
England  desired  to  avoid  the  growth  of  armaments 
on  the  Pacific  as  elsewhere  and  England  rejoiced 
that  there  should  be  so  much  earnestness  in  America 
in  that  matter.  Sea-power,  however,  was  the  basis 
of  the  British  empire's  existence — sea  security,  there- 
fore, was  the  prime  consideration.  England,  he  de- 
clared, desired  to  preserve  the  well-tried  friendship 
of  Japan  in  order  to  apply  it  to  the  solution  of  all 
questions  in  the  Far  East  where  Japan  has  special 
interests  and  where  England  like  the  United  States 
desired  equal  opportunities  and  the  open  door.  Brit- 
ish foreign  policy  could  never  range  itself  upon  the 
difference  of  race  and  civilization  between  East  and 
West,  since  that  would  be  fatal  for  empire.  On  that 
note  he  finished — which  was  a  bad  piece  of  history. 
For  that  was  precisely  the  manner  in  which  foreign 
policy  had  ranged  itself  in  Asia  for  nearly  four 
centuries  in  the  case  of  all  nations  that  had  proved 
submissive.  Except  in  the  sense  that  this  observa- 
tion was  an  indirect  notice  that  Japan  could  not  be 
discriminated  against  even  to  please  the  United 
States  it  was  hardly  worth  being  so  inaccurate. 

London  aimed  at  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance,   pari  passu  with   conversations   with   the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  105 

United  States  and  Japan  on  the  subject  of  naval 
reductions, — that  was  now  publicly  the  official  posi- 
tion. That  renewal  was  out  of  the  question  until 
negotiation  had  definitely  removed  from  the  path- 
way of  the  three  nations  the  obstacles  to  peace  stand- 
ing there  was  an  equally  obvious  proposition;  but 
since  China  was  the  chief  obstacle,  and  since  she  had 
no  right  to  demand  that  foreign  policy  should  not 
range  itself  upon  the  difference  of  race  and  civiliza- 
tion between  East  and  West  because  of  the  mediocre 
quality  of  her  armed  forces,  it  seemed  that  the  Prime 
Minister  had  provided  himself  with  a  puzzle  which 
even  his  ingenuity  could  not  solve. 

Following  Mr.  Lloyd  George  came  the  speeches 
of  the  Dominion  Prime  Ministers.  Mr.  Meighen 
avoided  direct  references  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance, but  Mr.  Hughes,  who  was  plainly  working 
along  preconcerted  lines,  advocated  renewal.  On  the 
22nd  Lord  Curzon  gave  a  long  exposition  of  British 
foreign  policy  and  he  was  followed  by  Mr.  Winston 
Churchill,  with  a  similar  exposition  of  Colonial  pol- 
icy which  were  intended  to  show  these  men  from 
overseas  the  really  complicated  work  of  directing  a 
great  empire  and  the  need  for  tightening  up  the 
parts.  They  remained  unconvinced.  Further  dis- 
cussion, both  formal  and  informal,  rapidly  brought 
realization  of  the  fact  that  the  mood  of  the  Dominions 
was  averse  to  discussing  constitutional  relations  which 
they  held  completely  covered  by  existing  legislation. 
As  if  guided  by  an  irresistible  force  attention  became 


106      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

slowly  and  definitely  centred  on  the  Japanese  ques- 
tion, even  naval  defence  dropping  far  below  the  hori- 
zon of  the  conference  room  for  the  good  and  ample 
reason  that  all  the  Dominion  Governments  were  dis- 
inclined to  agree  to  any  departure  from  the  status 
quo. 


Just  then  the  conference  struck  the  first  snag — 
not  lightly,  but  hard  and  head-on,  in  such  a  way 
that  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  feeling  the  shock. 
It  has  never  been  disclosed  who  sent  the  inspired 
statements  at  this  stage  across  the  Atlantic,  declaring 
that  the  British  Government  was  keeping  the  Ameri- 
can Government  fully  informed  regarding  the  nego- 
tiations affecting  the  Japanese  Treaty;  but  that  it 
was  official  propaganda  there  is  every  reason  to  sus- 
pect. The  remarkable  step  at  once  taken  by  Sec- 
retary Hughes  of  issuing  in  Washington  an  official 
dementi  on  the  22nd  June,  in  which  he  stated  cate- 
gorically that  the  State  Department  was  not  in- 
formed regarding  the  plans  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, showed  that  uncustomary  vigilance  was  being 
displayed.  Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  published 
speeches  of  Secretary  Hughes,  that  the  cardinal 
principle  of  the  Harding  Administration  was  friend- 
ship among  the  English-speaking  nations,  the  action 
amounted  to  a  formal  notification  that  the  practi- 
cability of  bluffing  through  this  vital  issue  must  be 
abandoned. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  107 

The  mystery  deepened  and  public  attention  at  last 
was  fully  aroused.  After  five  days'  meeting  and 
debates  nothing  had  been  concluded.  Opinion  was 
still  sharply  divided  whether  the  Japanese  Alliance 
should  be  taken  up  alone,  or  in  conjunction  with 
naval  policy,  or  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  general 
question  of  relations  with  the  United  States.  On 
the  27th  June  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  impelled  to  do 
so  by  the  general  embarrassment  caused  by  the  state- 
ment of  Secretary  Hughes  in  Washington  (which 
Secretary  Hughes  took  occasion  to  reiterate),  re- 
turned to  the  charge  and  took  all  the  Prime  Minis- 
ters into  his  confidence.  In  an  attempt  to  preserve 
strict  secrecy,  even  secretaries  and  legal  advisers  were 
sent  out  of  the  room,  only  Prime  Ministers  remain- 
ing. Whether,  then,  a  detailed  account  was  given 
of  Japanese  proposals  regarding  Borneo  and  the 
Dutch  East  Indies  during  the  war,  and  also  of  her 
proposals  in  regard  to  Eastern  Siberia  must  remain 
a  matter  of  conjecture.  But  that  something  was 
said  of  the  trials  and  tribulations  of  British  diplo- 
macy during  the  war,  owing  to  Japanese  action,  and 
the  necessity  of  guarding  against  vengeance  if  the 
Alliance  were  abandoned,  may  be  reasonably  con- 
jectured. 

The  discussion  was  followed  by  fresh  arguments 
by  Lord  Curzon  and  Mr.  Balfour. 

On  the  29th  June  the  Canadian  Prime  Minister, 
so  far  from  being  convinced,  circulated  a  confidential 
memorandum  in  which  he  came  out  openly  and 


108      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

squarely  in  reply  to  all  these  arguments  with  the 
declaration  that  if  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  were 
renewed  it  would  not  be  binding  in  Canada  unless 
ratified  by  the  Dominion  Parliament;  and  that  in 
any  case  military  clauses  were  looked  upon  with  ex- 
treme disfavour  by  his  electorate. 

He  was  followed  by  the  other  Dominion  Premiers, 
General  Smuts  alone  contributing  anything  of  im- 
portance by  outlining  a  plan  for  a  general  Pacific 
conference  on  armaments  and  policy  by  the  inter- 
ested states  as  an  alternative  which  would  secure 
the  same  results  as  were  expected  from  the  Japanese 
Alliance.  Everything,  however,  was  overshadowed 
by  what  Mr.  Meighen  had  said  and  done.  Imme- 
diately the  rumour  spread  that  there  was  to  be  a 
national  referendum  in  Canada  and  Australia  on 
the  subject  of  the  Alliance,  both  countries  being 
given  a  chance  to  express  their  opinion  before  any- 
thing was  done,  this  being  the  real  reason  the  London 
Government  had  sought  a  three  months'  extension 
of  the  Alliance — an  odd  enough  explanation  which, 
however,  looked  as  well  as  any  other  in  the  neatly- 
printed  columns  of  the  evening  press. 

Downing  Street  was  openly  and  unmistakably  in 
a  more  desperately  embarrassed  position  than  ever 
before.  All  attempts  at  finding  a  common  formula 
had  failed,  and  opposition  to  the  Japanese  Treaty 
was  stiffening.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  with  his  acute- 
ness  for  adapting  his  policy  to  anything  that  comes 
in  handy,  would  not  have  hesitated  to  make  a  volte- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  109 

face  regarding  Japan  if  he  could  have  found  a  smooth 
way  of  doing  so.  But  there  were  no  such  means; 
all  roads  were  closed.  He  had  compromised  him- 
self— at  least  the  office  across  the  street  had  done 
that  for  him.  And,  moreover,  he  was  sufficiently  wise 
to  know  that  a  first-class  power  cannot  change  its 
policy  overnight  without  serious  discredit.  The 
error  committed  in  former  years  of  taking  too  much 
for  granted  regarding  the  Pacific  was  being  bitterly 
revenged:  for  to  the  British  request  for  a  three 
months'  treaty  extension  Japan  had  so  far  declined 
to  reply.  Consequently  on  the  tenth  day  of  the  con- 
ference the  amiable  assistance  of  the  highest  law 
officer  in  England,  the  Lord  Chancellor,  was  invoked 
by  private  arrangement.  He  stated  that  in  his 
opinion,  despite  the  ruling  made  the  previous  year 
by  the  two  competent  law  officers  of  the  Crown  ( Sir 
Gordon  Hewart  and  Sir  Ernest  Pollock)  the  noti- 
fication made  to  the  League  of  Nations  the  previous 
year  on  the  subject  of  the  Alliance  (that  if  it  were 
in  conflict  with  the  Covenant  of  the  League  it  would 
be  modified  before  its  expiry  on  the  13th  July,  1921) 
did  not  constitute  a  legal  denunciation  of  the  Alli- 
ance, which  would  therefore  continue  in  force  by  vir- 
tue of  clause  VI  until  formally  denounced. 
Great  is  the  flexibility  of  the  inflexible  law. 


110      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

VI 

It  was  natural  in  such  circumstances  that  severe 
public  criticism  of  the  Conference  should  appear. 
After  having  sat  two  weeks  in  secrecy  and  produced 
no  result,  there  was  this  singular  denouement,  which 
was  virtually  a  confession  that  a  trick  was  necessary 
to  save  the  government's  face.  July  opened  with 
nothing  definitely  decided  upon  excepting  the  neces- 
sity of  finding  an  avenue  of  escape, — preferably  by 
means  of  a  general  Pacific  Conference.  The  story 
began  to  circulate  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  con- 
fronted by  the  unbending  opposition  of  Mr.  Meighen, 
had  in  an  unguarded  moment  angrily  exclaimed,  "Sir, 
you  speak  like  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,"  re- 
vealing thereby  that  he  did  not  know  all  the  dialects 
of  the  British  Empire. 

Parliament  began  to  be  incensed.  The  stream 
of  questions  grew  from  day  to  day.  The  govern- 
ment could  no  longer  blind  itself  to  the  fact  that  it 
was  impossible  to  pursue  much  longer  the  ostrich- 
like  policy  which  had  been  such  a  remarkable  feature 
of  the  conference. 

On  the  30th  June  I  had  been  fortunate  enough 
to  address  the  Commercial  Committee  and  the  Lan- 
cashire Members  in  the  House  of  Commons.  I  was 
at  great  pains  to  lay  before  them  in  the  clearest 
possible  manner  the  fact  that  British  interest  in  the 
Far  East  was  first  and  last  commercial ;  that  co-oper- 
ation with  the  Chinese  people  was  a  sine  qua  non 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  111 

to  preserving  and  expanding  the  great  undertakings 
which  had  been  built  up  during  eighty  years  of  en- 
deavour; and  that  it  was  monstrous  nonsense  not 
to  see  that  England  would  attract  to  herself  pre- 
cisely the  same  odium  Japan  had  incurred  over  the 
Shantung  business  if  she  renewed  the  Alliance  in 
defiance  of  Chinese  opinion.  That  odium  would 
undoubtedly  express  itself  in  the  same  way  in  which 
it  had  been  expressed  in  the  case  of  Japan — by  boy- 
cott and  other  retaliatory  measures.  Far  better 
would  it  be  to  utilize  the  opportunity  to  secure  rem- 
edies. A  concerted  effort  should  be  made  to  win 
for  China  an  adequate  tariff  in  return  for  improved 
trading  conditions — for  instance  the  throwing-open 
of  all  railway  zones  to  foreign  trade  and  residence. 
This  might  easily  be  won,  if  China  were  given  a  quid 
pro  quo  in  the  Tariff  issue,  and  if  certain  police 
rights  were  conceded  to  her  in  abatement  of  extra- 
territorial jurisdiction.  On  the  6th  July  I  was  able 
to  add  to  this  array  of  argument  by  addressing  the 
Labour  Party  and  on  the  7th  the  Independent  Lib- 
eral Party.  The  pages  of  Hansard  bear  witness  to 
the  growth  of  interest  in  the  fate  of  China  in  the 
pending  negotiations;  questions  were  literally  rained 
on  ministers  who  declared  themselves  unable  to  sat- 
isfy the  general  curiosity,  insisting  that  the  interests 
of  all  the  Powers  concerned  were  being  paid  atten- 
tion to.  Though  honourable  members  were  assured 
that  ministers  deprecated  a  discussion  by  the  method 
of  question  and  answer  of  an  important  matter  of 


112      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

high  policy  that  was  engaging  the  earnest  attention 
of  His  Majesty's  government,  and  of  the  Prime  Min- 
isters and  othei  representatives  of  His  Majesty's 
Dominions,  the  House  showed  itself  impenitent. 
Commander  Kenworthy  had  not  only  squared  his 
jaw  but  was  following  up  his  adversaries  all  round 
the  ring.  Twenty  other  members  were  pressing  for 
information  in  a  manner  which  could  no  longer  be 
repelled.  On  Thursday,  the  7th  July,  no  less  than 
seven  questions  were  grouped  together  dealing  with 
the  position  of  the  Alliance  Treaty  and  the  action 
of  Japan.  Inasmuch  as  every  part  of  the  House  was 
concerned  in  the  matter,  the  Prime  Minister  declared 
that  he  hoped  to  be  in  a  position  within  four  days 
to  make  a  full  statement  but  that  premature  decla- 
rations would  interfere  with  the  success  of  negotia- 
tions then  proceeding.  And  at  the  end  of  his  re- 
marks he  made  curious  interjection  that  his  promised 
statement  was  dependent  on  the  receipt  of  replies 
from  the  United  States,  Japan  and  China.  These 
words,  although  not  in  the  Hansard  report,  were 
plainly  heard  in  the  Press  gallery  and  printed  in  the 
newspapers  and  telegraphed  to  America.  For  the 
third  time  since  the  Imperial  Conference  had  com- 
menced Secretary  Hughes  caused  a  swift  denial  to 
be  sent  from  Washington,  declaring  that  there  could 
be  no  reply  from  America  as  there  was  nothing  to 
answer. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  113 

VII 

The  cat  was  at  last  out  of  the  bag  here  as  well 
as  elsewhere.  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  twisted 
and  tugged  out  of  shape  by  united  effort  and  vir- 
tually thrown  on  the  scrap-heap,  was  the  subject  of 
a  bitter  rear-guard  action.  The  British  Foreign 
Office,  under  Lord  Curzon's  leadership,  was  still  des- 
perately trying  to  save  it.  Conversations  and  sound- 
ings regarding  a  possible  conference  had  been  con- 
ducted by  the  Foreign  Office  with  the  American  Am- 
bassador, the  Japanese  Ambassador,  and  the  Chinese 
Minister;  but  there  had  been  no  concrete  proposal — 
and  Secretary  Hughes  quite  rightly  declined  to  ac- 
cept as  adequate  these  side-door  negotiations  when 
a  definite  formal  programme  was  the  only  means  of 
atoning  for  the  obscurantism  which  had  been  prac- 
tised all  through  June.  That  China  was  to  be  given 
a  place  at  the  round-table  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
there  was  no  longer  any  means  of  avoiding  it,  not 
because  there  had  been  any  change  of  heart  in  those 
dim  halls  where  the  Far  East  is  merely  labelled  as 
a  geographical  division. 

But  the  problem  did  not  end  with  this  activity. 
Its  roots  were  deep  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
A  new  element  was  about  to  enter  into  play.  The 
Washington  Administration  held  quite  rightly  that 
so  long  as  there  was  any  question  of  the  Japanese 
Alliance  surviving,  no  matter  in  what  attenuated 
and  moribund  form,  disarmament  was  out  of  the 


114      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

question.  It  was  at  this  stage  that  President  Hard- 
ing determined  to  rely  upon  his  own  initiative.  The 
British  soundings  were  not  so  much  an  invitation 
as  a  warning  that  a  new  combination  was  being  built 
up.  Consequently,  immediately  the  reports  from 
London  of  the  7th  July  reached  Washington,  action 
was  decided  upon.  The  invitation  to  Britain  to  par- 
ticipate in  a  general  Pacific  Conference  left  Wash- 
ington by  wire  on  the  night  of  Saturday,  the  9th 
July,  having  been  worked  out  that  day. 

Chequers  Court  was  the  setting  for  an  unusual 
scene  on  Sunday,  the  10th  July.  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
like  Napoleon  at  Dresden  with  the  lesser  kings,  was 
sitting  surrounded  by  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
Dominions,  a  little  disconsolate  after  his  hectic  month, 
when  the  noise  of  a  motor-car  was  heard.  Enter 
Mr.  Harvey,  American  Ambassador,  with  the  cable 
in  his  hand.  "Read  it  to  me,"  exclaimed  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  anxious  to  hear  the  worst  at  once.  Mr. 
Harvey  read  the  invitation  to  a  Disarmament  and 
Pacific  Conference.  "Of  course  we  accept,"  shouted 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  his  enthusiastic  manner.  "We 
are  delighted  to  accept!"  The  way  out  had  been 
most  providentially  provided.  Whether  he  threw 
his  hat  in  the  air,  or  whether  he  was  wearing  his 
hat  at  all,  has  never  been  chronicled. 

On  the  very  next  day  in  Parliament  (llth  July) 
he  made  his  promised  statement,  which  in  the  light 
of  this  close  record  shows  itself  a  masterpiece  in  the 
concealment  of  awkward  facts  and  merits  reproduc- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  115 

tion  as  an  object-lesson  in  modern  political  method. 
It  was  also  noteworthy  because  he  stated  categori- 
cally that  President  Harding  favoured  a  preliminary 
meeting  on  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions,  a 
course  he  directly  opposed.1 

*s.  .  .  When  I  told  the  House  last  Thursday  that  I  hoped 
to  be  in  a  position  to  make  a  statement  on  Pacific  and  Far 
Eastern  questions  to-day,  I  was  awaiting,  as  I  explained  at 
the  time,  replies  to  conversations  which  had  taken  place 
between  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the 
representatives  of  the  Governments  of  the  United  States, 
Japan  and  China,  as  the  result  of  our  discussions  in  the 
Imperial  Cabinet. 

"I  am  very  glad  to  be  able  to  inform  the  House  to-day  that 
the  views  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  reached  me 
last  night,  and  are  extremely  satisfactory.  The  Chinese 
Government  is  also  favourable.  We  have  not  yet  had  a 
formal  reply  from  the  Government  of  Japan,  but  we  have 
good  reason  to  hope  that  it  will  be  in  the  same  sense.  Now 
that  these  views  have  been  received,  I  am  glad  to  be  at  liberty 

iThe  actual  language  used  in  the  announcement  made  by  the  White 
House  on  the  10th  July  is  worth  quoting: 

"The  President,  in  view  of  the  far-reaching  importance  of  the  ques- 
tion of  limitation  of  armaments,  has  approached  with  informal  but 
definite  inquiries  the  group  of  Powers  heretofore  known  as  the  Principal 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers — that  is,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy 
and  Japan — to  ascertain  whether  it  would  be  agreeable  to  them  to  take 
part  in  a  conference  on  this  subject  to  be  held  in  Washington  at  a  time 
to  be  mutually  agreed  upon. 

"If  the  proposal  is  found  to  be  acceptable,  formal  invitations  for 
such  a  conference  will  be  issued. 

"It  is  manifest  that  the  question  of  limitation  of  armaments  has  a 
close  relation  to  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems,  and  the  President 
has  suggested  that  the  Powers  especially  interested  in  these  problems 
should  undertake  in  connexion  with  this  conference  the  consideration 
of  all  matters  bearing  upon  their  solution,  with  a  view  to  reaching  a 
common  understanding  with  respect  to  principles  and  policies  in  the 
Far  East. 

"This  has  been  communicated  to  the  Powers  concerned,  and  China  has 
al?o  been  invited  to  take  part  in  the  discussion  relating  to  Far  Eastern 
problems." 


116      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

to  inform  the  House  of  Commons  fully  regarding  the  course 
which  our  discussions  in  the  Imperial  Cabinet  took.  I  do 
this  with  particular  satisfaction,  because  it  will  show  how 
very  valuable  a  step  forward  we  have  been  able  to  take  by 
common  consent  in  the  sphere  of  foreign  affairs. 

"The  broad  lines  of  Imperial  policy  in  the  Pacific  and 
the  Far  East  were  the  very  first  subjects  to  which  we  ad- 
dressed ourselves  at  the  meetings  of  the  Imperial  Cabinet, 
having  a  special  regard  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement, 
the  future  of  China  and  the  bearing  of  both  those  questions 
on  the  relations  of  the  British  Empire  with  the  United  States. 
We  were  guided  in  our  deliberations  by  three  main  considera- 
tions. In  Japan,  we  have  an  old  and  proved  Ally.  The 
agreement  of  20  years'  standing  between  us  has  been  of 
very  great  benefit,  not  only  to  ourselves  and  her,  but  to  the 
peace  of  the  Far  East.  In  China  there  is  a  very  numerous 
people,  with  great  potentialities,  who  esteem  our  friendship 
highly,  and  whose  interests  we,  on  our  side,  desire  to  assist 
and  advance.  In  the  United  States,  we  see  to-day,  as  we 
have  always  seen,  the  people  closest  to  our  own  aims  and 
ideals  with  whom  it  is  for  us,  not  merely  a  desire  and  an 
interest,  but  a  deeply-rooted  instinct  to  consult  and  co- 
operate. Those  were  the  main  considerations  in  our  meet- 
ings, and  upon  them  we  were  unanimous.  The  object  of  our 
discussion  was  to  find  a  method  combining  all  these  three 
factors  in  a  policy  which  would  remove  the  danger  of  heavy 
naval  expenditure  in  the  Pacific,  and  would  ensure  the  de- 
velopment of  all  legitimate  national  interests  of  the  Far 
East. 

"We  had,  in  the  first  place,  to  ascertain  our  exact  position 
with  regard  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement.  There  had 
been  much  doubt  as  to  whether  the  notification  to  the  League 
of  Nations  made  last  July  constituted  a  denunciation  of  the 
Agreement  in  the  sense  of  Clause  VI.  If  it  did,  it  would  have 
been  necessary  to  decide  upon  some  interim  measure  regard- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  117 

ing  the  Agreement  pending  fuller  discussions  with  the  other 
Pacific  Powers,  and  negotiations  with  this  object  in  view 
were,  in  point  of  fact,  already  in  progress.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  did  not,  the  Agreement  would  remain  in  force  until 
denounced,  whether  by  Japan  or  by  ourselves,  and  would  not 
be  actually  determined  until  12  months  from  the  date  when 
notice  of  denunciation  was  given.  The  Japanese  Government 
took  the  view  that  no  notice  of  denunciation  had  yet  been 
given.  This  view  was  shared  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs:  but,  as  considerable  doubt  existed,  we  de- 
cided, after  a  preliminary  discussion  in  the  Imperial  Cabinet, 
to  refer  it  to  the  Lord  Chancellor,  who  considered  it  with  the 
Law  Offices  of  the  Crown,  and  held  that  no  notice  of  denunci- 
ation had  yet  been  given. 

"It  follows  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  remains 
in  force  unless  it  is  denounced,  and  will  lapse  only  at  the 
expiration  of  12  months  from  the  time  when  notice  of  denun- 
ciation is  given.  It  is,  however,  the  desire  of  both  the  British 
Empire  and  Japan  that  the  Agreement  should  be  brought 
into  complete  harmony  with  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  that  wherever  the  Covenant  and  the  Agree- 
ment are  inconsistent,  the  terms  of  the  Covenant  shall  pre- 
vail. Notice  to  this  effect  has  now  been  given  to  the  League. 

"The  broader  discussion  of  Far  Eastern  and  Pacific  policy 
to  which  we  then  turned  showed  general  agreement  on  the 
main  lines  of  the  course  which  the  Imperial  Cabinet  desired 
to  pursue.  I  have  already  explained  that  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  our  policy  was  friendly  co-operation  with  the  United 
States.  We  are  all  convinced  that  upon  this,  more  than 
any  single  factor,  depends  the  peace  and  well-being  of  the 
world.  We  also  desire,  as  I  have  stated,  to  maintain  our 
close  friendship  and  co-operation  with  Japan.  The  great- 
est merit  of  that  valuable  friendship  is  that  it  harmonizes 
the  influence  and  activities  of  the  two  greatest  Asiatic  Powers, 
and  thus  constitutes  an  essential  safeguard  to  the  well-being 


118      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

of  the  British  Empire  and  peace  of  the  East.  We  also 
aim  at  preserving  the  open  door  in  China,  and  at  giving  the 
Chinese  people  every  opportunity  of  peaceful  progress  and 
development. 

"In  addition  to  these  considerations,  we  desire  to  safe- 
guard our  own  interests  in  the  Pacific,  and  to  preclude  any 
competition  in  naval  armaments  between  the  Pacific  Powers. 
All  the  representatives  of  the  Empire  agreed  that  our  stand- 
point on  these  questions  should  be  communicated  with  com- 
plete frankness  to  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  China,  with 
the  object  of  securing  an  exchange  of  views  which  might 
lead  to  more  formal  discussion  and  conference.  The  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  accordingly  held  con- 
versations last  week  with  the  American  and  Japanese  Am- 
bassadors and  the  Chinese  Minister,  at  which  he  communi- 
cated to  them  the  views  of  the  Imperial  Cabinet,  and  asked 
in  return  for  the  views  of  their  respective  Governments.  He 
expressed  at  these  conversations  a  very  strong  hope  that 
this  exchange  of  views  might,  if  their  Governments  shared 
our  desire  in  that  respect,  pave  the  way  for  a  conference  on 
the  problems  of  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East. 

"The  views  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  were 
made  public  by  the  American  Government  this  morning. 
It  is  known  to  the  House.  Mr.  Harding  has  taken  the  mo- 
mentous step  of  inviting  the  Powers  to  a  Conference  on  the 
limitation  of  armaments,  to  be  held  in  Washington  in  the 
near  future,  and  he  also  suggests  a  preliminary  meeting  on 
Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions  between  the  Powers  most 
directly  interested  in  the  peace  and  welfare  of  that  great  re- 
gion, which  is  assuming  the  first  importance  in  international 
affairs.  I  need  not  say  that  we  welcome  with  the  utmost  pleas- 
ure President  Harding's  wise  and  courteous  initiative.  In 
saying  this  I  know  that  I  speak  for  the  Empire  as  a  whole. 
The  world  has  been  looking  to  the  United  States  for  such 
a  lead.  I  am  confident  that  the  House  will  esteem  it  as  an 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  119 

act  of  far-seeing  statesmanship  and  will  whole-heartedly  wish 
it  success.  I  need  hardly  say  that  no  effort  will  be  lacking 
to  make  it  so  on  the  part  of  the  British  Empire,  which 
shares  to  the  full  the  liberal  and  progressive  spirit  inspir- 
ing it. 

"Let  me  add  only  one  word  as  to  the  part  played  in  these 
events  by  the  gathering  of  the  Imperial  Conference  in  Down- 
ing Street.  I  venture  to  say  that  the  action  that  we  have 
taken  could  not  have  been  in  so  prompt,  effective  and  unani- 
mous a  fashion  but  for  the  intimate  personal  consultation 
between  the  Prime  Ministers  of  the  Empire  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  India  which  this  gathering  has  enabled  us  to 
enjoy.  We  have  taken  counsel  together  without  reserve. 
With  this  result  before  us,  I  need  not  elaborate  the  in- 
estimable value  of  that  intimate  collaboration  in  the  conduct 
of  the  Empire's  affairs." 

At  the  end  of  this  speech  there  was  a  significant 
interpolation  by  Lieut.  Colonel  J.  Ward.  He  in- 
quired : 

"Would  the  right  honourable  gentleman  inform  the  House 
and  the  world  in  general  whether  in  these  negotiations  with 
reference  to  the  future  of  the  Pacific,  China  is  to  be  treated 
as  a  sovereign  state  and  her  representatives  left  to  give  the 
decision  of  the  Chinese  Government  without  the  interference 
of  any  other  Asiatic  Power?" 

To  which  the  Prime  Minister  replied: 

"China  will  be  treated  as  what  she  is,  an  independent 
Power.  We  made  the  same  communication  to  the  Chinese 
Government  as  to  the  other  governments." 


120      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

vm 

The  matter  was  apparently  at  an  end.  With  ut- 
most frankness  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain 
had,  so  it  seemed,  taken  the  whole  world  into  his  con- 
fidence and  shown  very  precisely  the  nature  of  the 
difficulties  which  had  been  encountered  and  so  suc- 
cessfully solved.  He  had  admitted  the  complex 
nature  of  the  problem,  adroitly  showing  each  facet 
only  for  a  fraction  of  time  so  that  in  the  end  the 
bright  diamond  in  his  hand  should  be  esteemed  a  fit 
jewel  for  the  crown  of  his  Imperial  endeavours. 

Yet  things  were  not  really  as  they  seemed.  Be- 
hind the  scenes  the  storm  raged  on.  It  was  quite 
evident  that  the  matter  of  initiative  was  causing  great 
heart-burning.  That  America  had  stolen  England's 
thunder  was  quite  plain.  That  Lord  Curzon  should 
give  in  without  a  waspish  struggle  was  too  good  to 
be  true.  The  first  fruits  were  in  all  good  faith  ex- 
tremely acid  in  spite  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  silver 
tongue;  and  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
this  project  of  a  general  Pacific  Conference  would 
have  fared  badly  had  it  not  been  for  the  royal  tact 
which  was  never  displayed  to  better  advantage  than 
in  a  little  conversation  with  the  American  ambassa- 
dor, as  was  duly  chronicled  at  the  time  in  responsible 
newspapers.  In  spite  of  vigorous  official  denials  that 
there  had  been  any  discussion  whatsoever,  the  con- 
trary is  the  truth.  The  crown  showed  the  same  good 
sense  as  was  displayed  just  then  in  the  Irish  settle- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  ;    121 

ment,  proving  that  there  are  times  when  Cabinet 
Ministers  need  instruction. 

The  result  was  that  the  idea  of  a  preliminary  con- 
ference in  London — to  precede  the  formal  conference 
at  Washington  and  settle  the  agenda — was  destroyed. 
Unwilling  to  admit  that  the  slovenly  handling  of  the 
question  of  the  Jap'anese  Treaty  had  brought  dis- 
credit, the  alternate  suggestion  was  put  forward  of 
a  preliminary  conference  in  Washington,  to  be  held 
immediately  the  Imperial  Conference  dispersed  so 
that  Dominion  Prime  Ministers  could  proceed  thither 
on  their  way  home,  and  in  company  with  the  Ambas- 
sadors of  invited  Powers,  settle  the  programme. 

From  Secretary  Hughes,  now  emphatically  the 
master  of  the  situation,  came  an  equally  emphatic 
"no."  He  had  got  the  thunder  securely  in  his  hands 
at  last;  and  he  was  not  prepared  to  allow  any  one 
to  steal  it  away  from  him.  He  let  it  be  known  that 
any  attempt  to  anticipate  deliberations  which  were 
planned  to  commence  on  Armistice  Day  were  looked 
upon  with  strong  disfavour. 

That  was  the  end.  The  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
Dominions  might  meet  in  strict  privacy  and  hold 
discussions  of  several  hours  regarding  the  Pacific 
Conference,  but  they  were  caught  on  the  barbed  wire 
of  the  Japanese  Alliance.  The  magnificent  last-hour 
opportunity  to  denounce  the  Treaty,  immediately 
President  Harding  had  issued  his  momentous  invi- 
tation, had  been  missed:  therefore  there  was  nothing 
left  to  discuss.  Had  Mr.  Lloyd  George  quickly  de- 


122      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

clared  that  he  regarded  Britain's  acceptance  of  the 
invitation  as  requiring  the  denunciation  of  the  Alli- 
ance in  order  that  England  might  go  into  the  Con- 
ference without  prejudice,  there  might  have  been  a 
different  American  attitude  on  the  subject  of  a  pre- 
liminary London  conference  which  was  in  many  ways 
a  desirable  meeting  since  certain  matters,  particu- 
larly financial  matters,  could  be  more  rapidly  at- 
tended to  in  London  than  in  Washington.  But  so 
long  as  the  Alliance  remained  undenounced,  the 
United  States  took  the  proper  and  reasonable  view 
that  precisely  the  same  crippling  assumptions  would 
be  visible  as  had  disclosed  themselves  in  previous 
negotiations  concerning  the  Far  East.  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  deep  in  the  throes  of  the  Irish  settlement, 
could  not  be  held  to  blame.  The  onus  was  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  Foreign  Secretary.  Though  it  might 
be  excessive  to  castigate  him  as  the  Times  did 
on  the  13th  July  regarding  his  business  incapacity 
as  exhibited  in  the  state  of  his  Department  which 
"unfitted  him  for  the  discharge  of  responsible 
duties,"  it  was  certainly  true  that  nothing  that  he 
did  during  the  Imperial  Conference  showed  any  re- 
alization of  the  new  problems  throughout  the  world. 
When  he  declared  in  Parliament  in  regard  to  Per- 
sia on  the  26th  July  and  his  efforts  in  that  country 
that  "he  viewed  the  situation  with  a  feeling  of  dis- 
appointment and  almost  of  despair,"  he  was  using 
language  which  corresponded  to  his  feelings  on  the 
problem  of  Japan.  Later  I  was  to  learn  in  all  its 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  123 

trivial  detail  the  efforts  his  Department  made 
throughout  this  conference  to  suppress  by  the  method 
of  diplomatic  pressure  on  the  Peking  Government, 
a  public  presentation  in  London  of  China's  case. 
One  instance  may  be  selected  as  an  illustration. 

In  pursuance  of  the  policy  that  the  Far  Eastern 
question  was  of  equal  importance  to  all  sections  of 
the  community,  because  of  trade,  I  furnished  the  La- 
bour organ,  "The  Daily*  Herald,"  as  I  furnished 
fifty  other  newspapers  and  reviews,  with  an  inter- 
view in  which  the  reasonable  statement  was  made 
that  China  was  a  nation  of  labourers  in  the  highest 
sense  of  the  term  and  that  friendly  assistance  by 
the  workers  of  Britain  would  be  looked  upon  as 
peculiarly  appropriate  in  the  crisis  which  had  come; 
that  China  provided  an  unlimited  field  for  British 
enterprise  and  industry;  but  that  should  the  treaty 
with  Japan  be  continued  a  vast  boycott  of  British 
goods  would  be  the  result. 

Each  one  of  these  statements  was  a  statement 
of  fact  beyond  dispute.  Not,  however,  for  Lord 
Curzon's  Department.  It  was  Bolshevism  which 
called  for  a  Wrangel.  Accordingly,  the  Chinese 
Government  was  advised  that  the  good  relations  sub- 
sisting between  England  and  China  would  be  seri- 
ously endangered  and  perhaps  permanently  cancelled 
if  such  "messages"  to  the  British  people  were  con- 
tinued; and  that  it  was  imperative  immediately  to 
carry  out  a  correction  by  drastic  steps. 

That  Mr.  Lloyd  George  should  have  been  driven 


124      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

to  build  up  in  his  own  office  a  foreign  department 
during  recent  years  is  not  only  understandable  but 
laudable.  Had  he  not  done  so  the  trivial  and  even 
childish  manner  in  which  foreign  affairs  are  attended 
to  in  the  office  opposite  No.  10  Downing  Street  would 
long  ago  have  vitally  wounded  England  where  she 
can  stand  no  more  wounds — in  her  commercial  and 
industrial  paunch. 


PART  V 

CANOSSA 


THE  preliminary  report  issued  on  the  evening  of 
the  5th  August  announced  the  end  of  what  had 
proved  one  of  the  most  singular  conferences  of 
modern  times.  Of  the  original  agenda  only  two 
items  had  been  seriously  considered:  the  Japanese 
Alliance  and  the  matter  of  a  future  constitutional 
conference.  The  first  had  shown  itself  a  hopeless 
stumbling-block ;  the  second  had  been  abandoned  with 
the  eminently  discreet  remark  that  no  advantage 
was  to  be  gained  by  considering  it.  As  for  the  other 
items  on  the  agenda  paper,  they  were  quietly  swal- 
lowed up  in  the  great  void  where  lie  most  official 
things.1  A  subtle  realization  of  their  meaningless- 

i  Since  the  White  Paper  makes  no  mention  of  the  principal  items  in 
the  agenda,  it  is  well  to  quote  the  list  given  in  the  Canadian  House  of 
Commons  during  the  historic  debate  of  the  27th  April  from  a  previous 
statement  of  the  Canadian  Prime  Minister: 

".  .  .  The  proposal  was  made  and  accepted  last  October  on  the  basis 
that  the  June  meeting  would  be  of  a  special  and  preliminary  character 
having  in  view  the  necessity  of  discussing 

"(1)  Preparation  for  the  special  Constitutional  Conference  con- 
templated in  Resolution  9  of  the  Imperial  War  Conference  of  1917  to 
be  held  at  a  later  date,  this  preparatory  discussion  to  include  such 
questions  as  the  meeting  place,  date,  composition  and  agenda. 

"At  the  same  time  it  was  considered  that  the  June  meeting  would 
afford  an  opportunity  for  discussing  certain  other  matters  of  common 
concern  which  are  of  an  urgent  or  important  nature,  such  as: 

"(2)  The  question  of  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance, 
which  is  indeed  only  a  part  of  the  general  subject  of  foreign  relations, 
but  which  is  especially  urgent  since  under  the  terms  of  the  Alliance 
a  decision  should  be  reached  this  year. 

125 


126      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

ness  in  the  face  of  the  unliquidated  business  was 
enough  to  despatch  them  to  this  congenial  limb. 
Foreign  policy,  Imperial  migration,  the  League  of 
Nations,  defence,  communications — what  did  they  all 
amount  to  when  no  unity  had  been  discovered  in 
matters  of  prime  importance?  The  requiem  mass  on 
the  conference  was  significantly  enough  contained  in 
the  resolution  on  naval  defence,  a  resolution  consti- 
tuting in  itself  a  very  important  footnote  on  British 
Constitutional  history  and  therefore  worthy  of  being 
preserved  in  a  more  popular  form  than  between  the 
covers  of  a  White  Book. 

"That  while  recognizing  the  necessity  of  co-operation 
among  the  various  portions  of  the  empire  to  provide  such 
naval  defence  as  may  prove  to  be  essential  for  security,  and 
while  holding  that  equality  with  the  naval  strength  of  any 
other  Power  is  a  minimum  standard  for  that  purpose,  this 
conference  is  of  opinion  that  the  method  and  expense  of 
such  co-operation  are  matters  for  the  final  determination 
of  the  several  Parliaments  concerned  and  that  any  recom- 
mendations thereon  should  be  deferred  until  after  the  coming 
conference  on  Disarmament." 

Of  all  the  members  of  the  British  Cabinet  one  and 
one  only  realized  that  the  failure  which  had  been  re- 
corded in  London  was  a  failure  due  to  lack  of  imagi- 

"(3)  A  general  review  of  the  main  features  of  foreign  relations, 
particularly  as  they  affect  the  Dominions. 

"(4)  Preliminary  consideration,  preparatory  for  the  proposed  Con- 
stitutional Conference,  of  some  working  method  for  arriving  at  a  com- 
mon understanding  as  to  policy  in  such  external  affairs  as  concern  all 
parts  of  the  Empire. 

"Since  that  time  various  other  subjects  have  been  suggested  for 
inclusion  in  the  agenda  of  the  June  meeting." 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  127 

native  understanding.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  in  1921 
as  in  previous  years,  stood  head  and  shoulders  above 
his  colleagues  in  grasping  that  the  oversea  is  differ- 
ent from  the  British  point  of  view.  That  Europe  was 
no  longer  the  immovable  pivot  of  world  events,  but 
that  the  countries  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  pivot  on  the 
North  American  Continent,  had  been  established  for 
him  as  an  indisputable  fact.  Quick  as  a  flash  to 
realize  a  new  development,  he  had  been  able  to  grasp, 
as  Canning  had  grasped  a  hundred  years  before  him, 
that  the  New  World  has  a  system  of  dynamics  and 
a  technique  of  its  own.  Flung  into  the  conference 
with  explosive  force  by  the  action  of  Canada,  that 
fact  had  closely  resembled  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells'  phan- 
tasy of  the  atomic  bomb  which  keeps  on  exploding 
for  days  and  weeks,  constantly  enlarging  the  area 
it  devastates  until  all  obstructions  are  swept  away. 
In  the  end  it  had  cleared  the  ground  so  thoroughly 
that  it  did  for  inter-British  relations  and  inter-British 
diplomacy  much  as  the  American  Revolution  had 
done  in  creating  British  oversea  governments.  After 
his  bitter  remark  to  the  Canadian  Premier,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  had  accepted  that  position;  and  by  his  vivid 
phrase  in  Parliament  on  the  9th  August  when  he 
said,  "You  are  defining  life  itself  when  you  are  de- 
fining the  British  Empire;  you  cannot  do  it";  he  had 
shown  that  his  presence  at  the  head  of  the  London 
Government  had  been  of  the  highest  importance  for 
the  future  of  the  English-speaking  race. 

Yet  that  Washington  was  Canossa  admitted  of  no 


128      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

discussion.  It  might  be  a  Canossa  without  the  snow 
and  cold  in  which  the  Emperor  Henry  II  stood  await- 
ing absolution.  But  that  something  of  the  power 
of  a  Hildebrand  had  been  given  to  President  Hard- 
ing was  plain  to  those  who  sat  with  a  naval  Annual 
in  their  hands  and  a  table  of  taxation  and  National 
Debts  beside  them. 

The  White  Book  on  the  Imperial  Conference  bears 
this  out.  A  visitor  from  another  planet  might  sup- 
pose from  a  perusal  of  this  document  that  airships 
and  the  provision  of  mooring  masts  had  been  one  of 
the  principal  anxieties  of  this  gathering;  and  that  in- 
ter-communication and  the  dissemination  of  news  had 
been  held  equally  important.  But  even  in  this  vital 
matter — inter-communication  and  the  dissemination 
of  news — the  vital  point  was  missed.  The  Depart- 
ment concerned  held  doggedly  to  the  Imperial  Wire- 
less scheme  which  every  authority  had  condemned  as 
ten  years  out-of-date.  The  passage  of  a  year  since 
this  discussion  has  fortunately  led  to  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  chain  of  toy  stations  which  then  seemed 
so  commendable.  The  adoption  of  maximum  stations 
places  England  on  a  parity  with  defeated  Germany. 
Even  Chinese  stations  have  been  receiving  from 
Nauen  for  five  years;  for  while  Hongkong  and  Sing- 
apore are  still  isolated  from  the  direct  communica- 
tion with  London,  as  if  they  bore  no  possible  rela- 
tion to  the  national  capital,  Berlin  has  been  flood- 
ing Asia  with  daily  gazettes. 

In  all  this  padded  report  only  one  section  is  in- 


JAPANESE      MANDATE 


East  from         106"        Greenwich          130  West  Wu,  .E,,g.Co..N.Y. 


PACIFIC  POSSESSIONS  OF  VARIOUS  NATIONS  CONCERNED  IN  THE  PROB- 
LEMS DISCUSSED  AT  THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE.  THE  MANDATES  OVER 
GERMANY'S  FORMER  PACIFIC  POSSESSIONS  ARE  INDICATED  BY  THE  BLACK 
OUTLINES. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  129 

teresting;  elsewhere  there  is  silence  and  secrecy. 
"Silence  and  secrecy,"  cries  Carlyle  in  his  extraordi- 
nary apostrophe.  "Altars  might  still  be  raised  to 
them  (were  this  an  altar-building  time)  for  universal 
worship.  Silence  is  the  element  in  which  great  things 
fashion  themselves  together  that  at  length  they  may 
emerge,  full-formed  and  majestic,  into  the  daylight 
of  Life,  which  they  are  henceforth  to  rule.  Silence, 
the  great  empire  of  silence,  higher  than  the  stars, 
deeper  than  the  kingdom  of  Death  .  .  ." 

Whether  the  sage  of  Chelsea  would  have  approved 
it  in  the  present  instance  is  doubtful;  certainly  he 
would  not  have  recommended  an  altar.  For  leaving 
aside  the  bad  history  and  the  extraordinary  reason- 
ing of  the  Delegates,  which  is  expressed  in  supposi- 
tions such  as  "if  Japan  had  been  an  enemy  in  1914- 
18,"  there  is  just  one  illuminating  statement  dealing 
with  Washington  which  runs  as  follows: 

"In  accordance  with  the  suggestion  which  was  believed 
to  have  been  made  by  the  American  Government,  that  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament  should  be  preceded  by  friendly 
conversations  or  consultations  between  the  Powers  who  were 
principally  concerned  in  the  future  of  the  Far  East  and  the 
Pacific,  the  Imperial  Conference,  anxious  that  for  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement  should  be  substituted  some  larger  ar- 
rangement between  the  three  Great  Powers  concerned,  namely, 
the  United  States  of  America,  Japan,  and  Great  Britain,  and 
holding  the  firm  conviction  that  the  later  discussions  on 
Disarmament,  to  which  they  attached  a  transcendent  im- 
portance, could  best  be  made  effective  by  a  previous  mutual 
understanding  on  Pacific  questions  between  those  Powers, 


130      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

devoted  many  hours  of  examination  to  the  question  how 
such  an  understanding  could  best  be  arrived  at,  where  the 
proposed  conversations  could  best  be  held,  in  what  manner 
the  representatives  of  the  British  Dominions,  who  were  so 
vitally  affected,  could  most  easily  participate  in  them,  and 
upon  what  broad  principles  of  policy  it  was  desirable  to 
proceed.  It  was  difficult  for  the  Dominion  Prime  Ministers, 
owing  to  the  exigencies  of  time  and  space,  to  attend  at  Wash- 
ington late  in  the  autumn.  On  the  other  hand,  advantage 
might  be  taken  of  their  presence  in  England  to  exchange 
views  with  representatives  of  the  other  Great  Powers  who 
had  been  invited  to  Washington  later  on.  It  was  in  these 
circumstances  that  the  idea  was  mooted  that  the  prelimi- 
nary conversations  or  consultations,  to  which  the  American 
Government  had  in  principle  agreed,  should  be  held  in  Lon- 
don. 

"When  it  transpired  a  little  later  that  there  was  some 
misunderstanding  as  to  the  nature  of  the  preliminary  con- 
versations which  had  been  suggested,  the  British  Govern- 
ment, in  the  earnest  desire  to  remove  any  possible  miscon- 
ception, and  to  meet  what  they  believed  to  be  the  American 
views  at  each  stage  of  the  impending  discussions,  volunteered 
to  attend  a  meeting  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  at 
which  the  agenda  of  the  forthcoming  conference  at  Wash- 
ington could  be  discussed,  and  a  friendly  interchange  of 
views  take  place  in  order  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the  main 
conference  later  on.  The  British  Prime  Minister  and  For- 
eign Secretary,  together  with  the  Dominion  Prime  Ministers, 
were  prepared  to  attend  such  a  meeting  if  invited  to  do 
so  by  the  American  Government. 

"The  Japanese  Government  signified  their  willingness,  if 
invited,  to  take  part  in  the  suggested  conversations. 

"The  American  Government,  however,  did  not  favour  the 
idea,  which  was  accordingly  dropped. 

"This  conclusion  was  viewed  with  the  utmost  regret  by 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  131 

the  members  of  the  Imperial  Conference,  who  had  devoted 
no  small  portion  of  time  to  the  working  out  of  an  arrange- 
ment, which  they  understood  would  be  equally  acceptable  to 
all  parties,  and  the  abandonment  of  which  could  not,  they 
feared,  be  otherwise  than  prejudicial  to  the  great  objects 
which  all  had  in  view.  At  no  stage  had  it  been  suggested  that 
the  results  of  such  a  consultation  as  was  contemplated  should 
either  anticipate  the  work  or  tie  the  hands  of  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  at  a  later  date.  On  the  contrary,  holding, 
as  they  do,  the  firm  belief  that  without  a  Pacific  understand- 
ing the  Conference  on  Disarmament  will  find  it  less  easy  to 
attain  the  supreme  results  that  are  hoped  for  by  all,  the 
Imperial  Conference  made  the  proposal  before  referred  to 
anxious  to  remove  every  possible  obstacle  from  the  path 
of  the  Washington  Meeting,  which  they  desire  to  see  at- 
tended with  complete  and  triumphant  success." 


n 

Although  it  had  been  the  10th  July  when  the  orig- 
inal American  proposal  was  communicated  to  the 
principal  Allied  Powers,  the  formal  invitation  was 
not  issued  until  thirty-one  days  later.  The  problem 
of  the  preliminary  conference,  regarding  which  Brit- 
ish diplomacy  had  been  so  concerned,  and  the  matter 
of  Japanese  participation  having  then  been  solved, 
it  was  held  auspicious  to  send  out  the  official  docu- 
ment of  the  llth  August,  which  read  in  conjunction 
with  the  British  Official  summary  of  the  Imperial 
Conference  of  the  6th  August  fills  in  the  gaps  and 
gives  a  clear  picture  of  the  new  orientation  which 
had  come.  The  careful  reader,  who  is  willing  to 


132      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

exercise  his  critical  faculties,  will  see  at  once  that 
across  the  blue  heavens  of  American  altruism  certain 
clouds  had  already  passed.  Contact  with  reality  was 
destined  further  to  modify  the  rhapsodies  which  had 
already  been  indulged  in. 

"The  President  is  deeply  gratified  at  the  cordial  response 
to  his  suggestion  that  there  should  be  a  conference  on  the 
subject  of  limitation  of  armament,  in  connection  with  which 
Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  questions  should  also  be  dis- 
cussed. 

"Productive  labour  is  staggering  under  an  economic  bur- 
den too  heavy  to  be  borne  unless  the  present  vast  public  ex- 
penditures are  greatly  reduced.  It  is  idle  to  look  for  sta- 
bility, or  the  assurance  of  social  justice,  or  the  security  of 
peace,  while  wasteful  and  unproductive  outlays  deprive  ef- 
fort of  its  just  reward  and  defeat  the  reasonable  expecta- 
tion of  progress.  The  enormous  disbursements  in  the  rival- 
ries of  armaments  manifestly  constitute  the  greater  part  of 
the  encumbrance  upon  enterprise  and  national  prosperity; 
and  avoidable  or  extravagant  expense  of  this  nature  is  not 
only  without  economic  justification,  but  is  a  constant  menace 
to  the  peace  of  the  world  rather  than  an  assurance  of  its 
preservation.  Yet  there  would  seem  to  be  no  ground  to  ex- 
pect the  halting  of  these  increasing  outlays  unless  tbe  Pow- 
ers most  largely  concerned  find  a  satisfactory  basis  for  an 
agreement  to  effect  their  limitation.  The  time  is  believed  to 
be  opportune  for  these  Powers  to  approach  this  subject  di- 
rectly and  in  conference;  and  while,  in  the  discussion  of 
armament,  the  question  of  naval  armament  may  naturally 
have  first  place,  it  has  been  thought  best  not  to  exclude  ques- 
tions pertaining  to  other  armament  to  the  end  that  all  prac- 
ticable measures  of  relief  may  have  appropriate  consider- 
ation. It  may  also  be  found  advisable  to  formulate  pro- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  133 

posals  by  which  in  the  interest  of  immunity  the  use  of  new 
agencies  of  warfare  may  be  suitably  controlled. 

"It  is,  however,  quite  clear  that  there  can  be  no  final  as- 
surance of  the  desire  for  peace,  and  the  prospect  of  reduced 
armaments  is  not  a  hopeful  one  unless  this  desire  finds  expres- 
sion in  a  practical  effort  to  remove  cause  of  misunderstanding 
and  to  seek  ground  for  agreement  as  to  the  principles  and 
their  application.  It  is  the  earnest  wish  of  this  Govern- 
ment that  through  an  interchange  of  views  with  the  facilities 
afforded  by  a  conference,  it  may  be  possible  to  find  a  solution 
of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems  of  unquestioned  im- 
portance at  this  time,  that  is,  such  common  misunderstand- 
ings with  respect  to  matters  which  have  been  and  are  of 
international  concern  as  may  serve  to  promote  enduring 
friendship  among  our  peoples. 

"It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  Government  to  attempt  to 
define  the  scope  of  the  discussion  in  relation  to  the  Pacific 
and  Far  East,  but  rather  to  leave  this  to  be  the  subject 
of  suggestions  to  be  exchanged  before  the  meeting  of  the  con- 
ference in  the  expectation  that  the  spirit  of  friendship  and  a 
cordial  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  the  elimination  of 
sources  of  controversy  will  govern  the  final  decision. 

"Accordingly,  in  pursuance  of  the  proposal  which  has  been 
made,  and  in  the  light  of  the  gracious  indication  of  its 
acceptance,  the  President  invites  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  to  participate  in  a  conference  on  the  subject  of  limi- 
tation of  armament,  in  connection  with  which  Pacific  and 
Far  Eastern  questions  will  also  be  discussed,  to  be  held  in 
Washington  on  the  llth  day  of  November, 


HI 

If  the  proposed  Conference  was  a  Canossa  for 
Britain,  it  was  a  full  and  complete  Sedan  for  Japan. 


134      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

The  Japanese  were  so  stupefied  that  they  could  not 
conceal  the  fact,  even  when  they  had  won  some  points 
regarding  the  agenda.  They  alone  had  known  thor- 
oughly and  perfectly  by  year-long  investigation,  that 
the  pivot  of  the  countries  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  was 
really  the  North  American  Continent:  but  they  had 
believed  that  the  fact  might  be  kept  concealed  for 
some  years,  if  astuteness  were  shown,  when  they 
would  be  in  a  better  position  to  accept  the  challenge 
which  public  recognition  must  entail.  The  British 
Alliance  had  been  for  them  a  screen  which  they  had 
imagined  no  one  would  be  able  to  pierce.  Now  the 
screen  was  on  the  ground,  a  discredited  piece  of 
camouflage!  It  was  a  far  more  tremendous  shock 
to  their  plans  than  the  Chinese  Revolution  of  1911 
had  been  with  the  tragic  disappearance  of  the  Man- 
chu  dynasty;  it  upset  to  an  incredible  extent  the  gen- 
eral balance  of  power  and  destroyed  at  one  blow  the 
value  of  the  steps  they  had  taken  so  painfully  and 
laboriously  throughout  the  war-years.  It  was  not 
merely  a  question  of  the  money  they  had  "invested" 
in  China  to  further  their  plan,  although  that  was  a 
serious  enough  issue  since  the  financial  stability  of 
three  semi-government  institutions  had  been  compro- 
mised: it  was  that  the  whole  account  was  going  to 
be  called,  and  the  strategical  as  well  as  the  financial 
balance  struck.  There  was  a  network  of  commit- 
ments so  finely  spun,  and  so  cunning  that  rough 
hands  might  ruin  in  hours  what  it  had  taken  years 
to  work  out. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  135 

In  self-defence  they  mechanically  accepted  the  dis- 
armament proposal  and  sought  to  defend  themselves 
against  the  menace  in  the  Far  East  by  gaining  time. 
Since  the  British  request  (made  in  May)  for  a  three 
months'  extension  of  the  Alliance  agreement  they 
had  been  filled  with  dark  suspicions,  which  the  sin- 
gular denouement  of  the  30th  June,  contrived  with 
the  gracious  assistance  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  of 
England,  had  done  little  to  abate.  The  idea  of  a 
Pacific  Conference  in  London  had  been  barely 
broached  when  the  informal  invitation  came  from 
the  United  States  for  precisely  the  same  purpose 
with  disarmament  added  to  it. 

Disarmament — when  arms  represented  the  founda- 
tion of  the  State  and  its  proudest  achievements.  .  .  . 

To  a  people  as  slow  to  adjust  themselves  to  un- 
expected developments  as  the  Japanese,  the  matter 
rapidly  took  on  the  aspect  of  a  conspiracy — a  con- 
spiracy of  silence  which  had  been  turned  into  a  con- 
spiracy of  action:  The  ultimate  punishment,  which 
some  had  seen  for  them  in  a  rigid  blockade  of  their 
coasts  by  an  Anglo-American  fleet,  seemed  to  have 
drawn  perceptibly  nearer.  For  many  weeks  after 
the  American  invitation  had  been  received  it  rained 
in  Japan — rained  as  it  can  only  rain  in  a  semi-trop- 
ical country.  Yet  that  did  not  interfere  for  one 
moment  with  a  discussion  which  never  ceased. 
Everything  turned  on  Britain.  If  she  endorsed 
American  action  in  all  matters,  it  was  the  end.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  was  possible  to  create  a  diver- 


136      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

sion,  there  was  still  some  hope  of  an  attenuated  pol- 
icy, no  matter  what  happened  to  the  Alliance.  The 
Japanese  relied  upon  the  fact  that  vested  interests 
would  automatically  work  for  them  because  such 
interests  are  always  hostile  to  fundamental  changes 
in  the  status  quo.  In  this  they  showed  great  com- 
mon sense. 

As  soon  as  possible — to  be  precise  on  the  13th  July 
— they  declared  their  intention  gladly  to  participate 
in  the  Conference  relating  to  the  discussion  of  the 
question  of  disarmament.  As  for  the  discussion  of 
Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  problems,  they  considered 
it  more  expedient  that  the  character  and  scope  of 
these  problems  should  be  first  defined  before  they 
expressed  their  views.  In  less  diplomatic  language, 
what  they  wished  understood  was  that  they  were  will- 
ing to  stop  a  race  in  armaments  which  in  the  end 
must  find  them  outclassed,  but  that  they  would  not 
tolerate  the  re-opening  of  matters  which  they  re- 
garded as  accomplished  facts. 

The  action  of  the  United  States  at  this  stage  be- 
comes less  clear  than  it  had  been  in  the  case  of  the 
London  negotiations.  Faced  with  something  ap- 
proaching open  Japanese  hostility  to  any  complete 
discussion  of  the  Far  East,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  implications  of  the  note  handed  on  the  23rd 
July  by  the  American  Government  to  the  Japanese 
Government  amounted  to  the  tacit  withdrawal  of  all 
matters  affected  by  the  Versailles  Treaty  from  the 
scope  of  the  discussion.  The  embarrassment  of  Sec- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  137 

retary  Hughes  in  November,  when  the  Washington 
Conference  was  under  way,  on  the  subject  of  China 
was  clearly  due  to  pledges  already  given :  for  in  July 
he  accepted  the  position  that  only  broad  subjects  were 
to  be  discussed  and  that  the  Delegates  should  settle 
among  themselves  the  nature  of  the  agenda  and  the 
manner  in  which  business  should  be  proceeded  with. 
Japan,  having  been  satisfied  on  these  points,  on  the 
27th  July  made  known  her  intention  "gladly  to  ac- 
cept an  invitation  for  a  conference  which  shall  em- 
brace a  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  ques- 
tions." 

She  had  scored  her  first  point.  Nevertheless  little 
was  to  be  expected  from  this  unless  she  received  aid 
and  comfort  from  other  quarters.  She  went  to 
Washington  in  November  in  much  the  same  mood 
she  had  been  in  July,  knowing  that  the  Anglo-Jap- 
anese Alliance  was  doomed  and  that  there  could  be 
nothing  adequately  to  replace  it. 


IV 

That  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  United 
States  by  more  astute  diplomacy  to  avoid  some  of 
the  other  difficulties  which  ultimately  cropped  up 
seems  certain.  When  we  examine  the  particular  case 
of  France  and  the  unfortunate  influence  she  exer- 
cised on  the  solution  of  a  number  of  questions,  it 
is  clear  that  a  further  capital  error  was  made  in  July. 

Prior  to  the  American  invitation,  the  French  Gov- 


eminent  had  been  watching  with  open  anxiety  the 
course  of  the  Imperial  Conference.  The  question 
of  the  Japanese  Treaty,  although  apparently  not 
of  direct  consequence  to  France,  closely  concerned 
her.  Everything  Russian  was  affected  by  the  Alli- 
ance— Siberia;  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway;  Rus- 
sian indebtedness.  Besides  it  gave  British  diplomacy 
a  preponderance  over  France  with  Japan  in  prac- 
tically every  debatable  matter.  If  the  Alliance  re- 
mained, it  would  mean  that  a  certain  number  of 
subjects  would  continue  to  be  forbidden;  if  it  dis- 
appeared there  would  be  greater  freedom.  In  fact 
French  agreement  with  Japan  on  many  issues  de- 
pended upon  whether  or  not  England  had  a  prior 
claim  on  Japanese  diplomacy.  This  was  a  matter 
of  no  small  moment. 

The  circumstances,  then,  offered  America  an  ex- 
ceptional opportunity.  But  unfortunately  President 
Harding,  still  in  love  with  his  idea  of  an  "association 
of  nations"  which  would  quietly  elbow  the  Geneva 
League  out  of  the  way,  had  persisted  too  far  in  his 
desire  to  have  the  kernel  of  the  League  (the  Prin- 
cipal Allied  and  Associated  Powers)  brought  to 
Washington,  and  abandoned  too  completely  the  orig- 
inal Borah  resolution.  More  adroitness  should  have 
been  shown  in  making  it  clear  that  it  was  not  a  diplo- 
matic meeting  to  which  the  Powers  had  been  invited, 
but  a  special  conference  in  which  diplomatic  prece- 
dents were  to  be  set  aside.  The  delay  and  embar- 
rassment caused  by  having  two  languages  used  at 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  139 

the  Conference — a  very  important  tactical  matter — 
should  have  been  avoided,  as  it  could  have  been 
avoided,  had  the  point  been  properly  considered. 
During  the  preliminary  negotiations  it  should  have 
been  clearly  laid  down  that  delegates  might  address 
the  conference  in  their  own  languages  if  they  wished 
on  the  penalty  of  being  misunderstood ;  but  no  inter- 
preting should  have  been  permitted,  or  no  special 
privileges  given  any  more  than  no  special  privileges 
are  given  in  the  Canadian  or  South  African  Parlia- 
ments where  more  than  one  language  is  used.  It  was 
folly  not  to  have  foreseen  that  once  weakness  was 
shown  in  this  question  there  would  inevitably  be  a 
sequel. 

Of  all  the  items  in  the  agenda  the  one  most  highly 
doubtful  was  land-armaments,  which  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  problem  of  the  Pacific  and  could  in  no  wise 
affect  it.  The  question  of  land-armament  primarily 
concerned  France;  had  the  United  States  been  kept 
properly  informed  she  would  not  have  attempted  to 
combine  issues  so  unrelated  as  the  European  land 
question  and  the  problem  of  the  Eastern  seas.  The 
main  question  was  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the 
Pacific,  with  which  the  European  question  had  little 
or  nothing  to  do.  It  was  seapower  which  was  being 
brought  to  the  bar — not  the  mixed-up  policies  of 
European  States.  All  who  were  well-informed  knew 
that  a  very  delicate  situation  actually  existed  between 
England  and  France  in  the  summer  of  1921  owing 
to  French  submarine  arrangements  having  been  so 


140      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

rapidly  advanced  that  they  had  virtually  closed  the 
English  channel.  It  was  very  generally  known  in 
London  that  a  great  deal  of  railway  work  had  been 
necessary  since  1919  to  secure  that  the  London  de- 
fence area  could  be  provisioned  even  if  all  the  chan- 
nel ports  were  closed.  These  facts  should  have  been 
within  the  knowledge  of  the  American  government. 
If  they  were  not  it  must  stand  as  a  serious  indict- 
ment of  their  system  of  intelligence.  If  they  were 
great  imprudence  was  shown.  To  properly  informed 
observers  it  was  as  clear  in  July  as  it  became  in 
December  that  Japan  would  not  be  the  only  com- 
plication at  Washington. 


The  one  country  that  lived  in  happy  anticipation 
of  what  was  to  transpire  was  China.  The  Chinese 
people,  harried  during  the  whole  period  of  the  world- 
war,  knew  little  or  nothing  of  the  complicated  web 
of  events  which  had  brought  about  the  proposed  con- 
ference and  innocently  imagined  that  the  world  was 
at  last  lending  an  ear  to  their  lamentations.  The 
Government  of  China,  it  is  true,  was  inclined  to  be 
more  dubious,  since  the  American  invitation  placed 
China  in  a  lower  category  than  the  others  in  a  man- 
ner which  was  quite  unnecessary.  It  was  certainly 
not  diplomatic  to  send  China  an  invitation  different 
from  the  invitation  sent  to  the  four  major  Powers 
only  in  so  far  as  deleting  sentences  which  had  more 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  141 

meaning  and  reality  for  the  Chinese  people  than  for 
others.  The  hand  which  made  the  sapient  shorten- 
ing did  not  notice  that  precisely  the  most  important 
matter — land  armaments — was  struck  out.  China 
had  certainly  an  army  as  numerous  as  that  of  Soviet 
Russia.  The  enormous  disbursements  in  the  rivalry 
of  armaments  manifestly  constituted  the  greater  part 
of  the  encumbrance  upon  enterprise  and  national 
prosperity  in  China;  and  avoidable  or  extravagant 
expense  of  this  nature  was  not  only  without  economic 
justification,  but  was  a  constant  menace  to  the  peace 
of  the  world  rather  than  an  assurance  of  its  preser- 
vation. Not,  however,  in  the  estimation  of  the  State 
Department.  For  this  language,  which  is  taken  text- 
ually  from  the  invitation  to  the  major  Powers,  finds 
no  place  in  the  communication  to  China.  The  British 
Prime  Minister  had  been  at  great  pains  to  state  in 
Parliament  in  the  matter  of  the  proposed  London 
Conference  that  precisely  the  same  invitation  had 
been  sent  to  China  as  to  the  other  Powers;  Secretary 
Hughes  should  have  taken  the  same  course.  A  more 
conscientious  statesman  would  not  have  used  methods 
which  disclosed  so  transparently  that  his  main  anxiety 
was  to  get  Japan  into  the  conference-room  and  then 
to  trust  to  the  march  of  events  to  find  her  yielding. 
The  great  nations  and  the  lesser  ones  affected  by  the 
issue  of  the  Pacific  were  to  be  gathered  together  pre- 
sumably in  a  spirit  of  frankness  and  equality;  but  to 
show  at  the  very  start  that  they  were  differently  es- 
teemed destroyed  at  one  blow  the  platform  on  which 


142      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

they  should  have  taken  their  stand  together.  China 
should  also  have  been  kept  more  closely  informed 
regarding  what  she  might  reasonably  expect  and 
what  she  had  best  leave  alone.  Throwing  her  head- 
long into  a  conference  without  a  proper  plan  was  an 
act  of  political  immaturity. 


VI 

The  Japanese  Alliance  was  the  ostensible  reason 
for  all  this  pother,  but  the  tap-root  of  trouble  was 
deeper  down.  Hidden  from  view  lay  the  ruins  of 
the  ancient  Chinese  economical  system  on  top  of 
which  it  was  proposed  to  build  a  condominium  which 
would  make  of  Western  capitalism  the  master  until 
such  time  as  the  Western  countries  judged  that  China 
was  too  turbulent  for  tutelage.  Washington  might 
be  Canossa  for  stereotyped  diplomacy,  but  it  was  just 
as  likely  to  perpetuate  the  vassalage  of  militarily 
inefficient  nations,  since  the  price  paid  by  Americans 
for  the  nominal  acceptance  of  their  schemes  is  nearly 
always  the  surrender  of  their  ideals  through  the 
legerdemain  of  diplomats.  That  the  ideals  are  often 
unworkable  in  practice  is  no  doubt  true ;  but  between 
modifications  honestly  worked  out  and  deliberate 
blocking  of  plans  until  an  opposite  policy  wins  there 
is  a  mighty  chasm.  To  keep  tight  hold  of  the  sub- 
stance no  matter  what  happened  to  the  shadow  was 
the  settled  determination  of  all  nations  who  possessed 
tangible  stakes  in  China.  That  they  were  firmly 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  143 

resolved  to  cede  nothing  for  which  they  could  produce 
a  contract  or  a  Treaty,  except  as  a  last  resort,  was 
amply  evident.  And  the  proof  could  be  found  in  the 
manoeuvring  of  financial  interests  which  now  com- 
menced behind  the  scenes. 


VII 

There  was  nothing  complex  in  the  reasons  which 
had  led  European  and  Japanese  concessionaires  ap- 
parently to  reverse  their  policy  and  fall  in  with 
American  proposals  regarding  the  unification  of  their 
outstanding  options  in  China.  Lack  of  capital  was 
one  cause ;  lack  of  popular  interest,  unless  some  fresh 
bait  was  held  out,  was  another.  But  the  chief  was 
that  it  was  judged  politic  to  utilize  America  to  secure 
a  monopoly.  The  monopoly  of  the  system  of  6,000 
miles  which  had  been  built  meant  nothing:  nor  did 
a  monopoly  of  the  projected  lines  amounting  in  all 
to  another  12,000  miles  mean  much.  But  something 
which  would  give  a  tight  and  permanent  hold  on 
a  railway  system  at  least  as  large  as  had  been  de- 
clared necessary  in  Indian  Government  Reports  in 
the  case  of  the  Indian  system — 100,000  miles — cost- 
ing $100,000  U.  S.  Gold  a  mile,  was  not  only  worth 
fighting  but  called  for  a  stupendous  effort.  The  cap- 
ital expenditure  involved  a  sum  which  would  ulti- 
mately approximate  the  total  war  indemnity  which 
Germany  is  said  to  be  capable  of  paying — between 
two  and  three  thousand  millions  sterling.  It  was 


144      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

therefore  a  subject  of  first-class  international  impor- 
tance. Difficulties,  which  would  undoubtedly  prove 
insuperable  for  any  one  Power  alone  to  overcome 
in  China,  were  capable  of  being  smoothed  away  when 
to  the  menace  of  Japanese  arms  was  united  the  sooth- 
ing sentimentalism  of  the  United  States.  The  vision 
of  a  four-Power  solidarity  could  indeed  be  made  so 
haunting,  if  there  was  persistent  unity  and  energy, 
that  the  Chinese  would  not  realize  until  too  late 
that  a  new  imperialism  had  successfully  passed 
through  their  open  door,  and  so  well  utilized  the 
opportunity  which  is  equal  for  all  that  there  was  no 
longer  any  incentive  for  others  to  compete. 

In  the  British  White  Paper  Miscellaneous  No.  9 
of  1921,  there  is  a  despatch  quoted  from  the  leader 
of  the  British  banking  group,  Sir  Charles  Addis,  to 
the  British  Foreign  Office,  dated  4th  June,  1919,  in 
which  are  laid  down  the  general  principles  of  this 
grand  policy.  After  dealing  with  the  question  of 
public  tenders  and  the  matter  of  obtaining  exclusive 
support  so  as  to  fall  in  with  the  American  proposal, 
the  despatch  states  categorically  in  paragraph  13 : 

"It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  remark  here,  in  paren- 
theses, that  the  arrangement  suggested  by  the  group  is  to 
be  regarded  in  its  industrial  aspect  as  a  transitory  prelimi- 
nary stage  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  main  object,  to  be 
kept  steadily  in  view,  of  the  establishment  at  Peking  of  a 
central  railway  board  to  consist  of  representatives  of  the 
Chinese  Government  on  the  one  hand  and  of  the  international 
consortium  on  the  other,  which  should  be  entrusted  with 
the  finance,  the  construction,  the  administration,  and  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  145 

control  of  the  Chinese  railway  system  as  a  whole;  the  con- 
sortium to  act  as  financial  and  industrial  agents  to  the  cen- 
tral railway  board  for  the  issue  of  specific  railway  loans, 
until  such  time  as  it  may  be  found  possible  to  issue  Chinese 
consolidated  stock,  and  for  the  preparation,  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  board,  of  specifications  and  tenders  for  the 
supply  of  railway  material  and  equipment — " 

A  central  railway  board  dominated  by  the  inter- 
national consortium,  which  would  be  entrusted  with 
the  finance,  the  construction,  the  administration  and 
the  control  of  the  Chinese  railway  system  as  a  whole, 
is  a  scheme  of  such  magnitude  and  such  far-reaching 
importance  that  one  may  ask  who  are  the  Napoleons 
who  have  conceived  it.  The  answer  is  that  they  are 
not  Napoleons,  but  very  unimaginative  men  who  have 
taken  the  ideas  current  regarding  Indian  railways, 
such  as  were  embodied  in  the  Report  of  the  Com- 
mittee appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India 
to  enquire  into  the  administration  and  working  of 
Indian  railways  (1920-1921)  and  applied  them  to 
China,  where  the  essential  condition — the  right  of 
eminent  domain — is  totally  lacking.  The  complete 
separation  of  the  railway  budget,  in  respect  of  both 
capital  and  revenue,  from  the  general  budget  of 
China,  and  the  earmarking  of  all  profits  irrespective 
of  national  needs,  for  the  continued  expansion  of  the 
system  which  are  laid  down  as  sine  qua  non,  take 
into  consideration  every  factor  except  the  dominat- 
ing one, — the  attitude,  feelings  and  possible  reprisals 
of  the  Chinese  people.  The  programme  also  disre- 


146      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

gards  the  remarkable  development  which  has  come 
under  the  Republic  on  Chinese  railways  owing  to 
the  fact  that  railways  all  the  world  over  infallibly 
attract  all  troops.  The  canalization  of  internal  war- 
fare— which  now  flows  almost  exclusively  along  the 
railway  embankments, — has  reached  such  a  point  that 
concentrations  of  100,000  men  are  common.  Twenty 
years  ago  a  force  of  6,000  foreign  troops  in  North 
China  was  a  dominating  influence;  to-day  they  are 
as  powerless  as  the  League  of  Nations.  How  would 
an  international  board  entrusted  with  the  finance, 
the  construction,  the  administration  and  the  control 
of  the  Chinese  railway  system  as  a  whole  act  when 
this  recurrent  provincial  warfare  breaks  out  and 
jeopardizes  property  worth  hundreds  of  millions? 
Would  the  legislatures  of  their  respective  countries 
sanction  the  mobilization  and  despatch  of  expedition- 
ary forces  to  secure  that  the  finance,  the  administra- 
tion and  the  control  of  the  railways  remained  in  ac- 
cordance with  bankers'  regulations?  The  matter  is 
too  farcical  to  be  seriously  answered.  The  central 
Chinese  railway  board  will  never  come ;  but  it  is  well 
to  understand  at  this  hour  precisely  what  this  proposal 
really  means.  Even  Lord  Curzon,  who  is  exclusive 
enough  in  most  matters,  declined  "exclusive  support" 
from  first  to  last  and  merely  committed  the  British 
Government  to  the  formula  of  "complete  support" 
which  is  probably  what  will  sink  the  whole  enterprise 
before  it  gets  into  harbour.  Exclusive  support  the 
British  Government  had  been  willing  to  give  in  1913 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  147 

when  industrial  undertakings  were  not  included.  But 
once  industry  entered  into  the  problem,  British  free 
trade  requirements  could  not  be  so  shackled.  The  ex- 
clusion from  the  British  group  of  great  clearing  Banks 
such  as  Lloyd's  Bank,  the  London  Joint  City  and 
Midland  Bank,  Barclay's,  and  the  National  Provin- 
cial and  Union  Bank  of  England,  not  to  speak  of 
other  concerns  that  had  asked  for  admittance,  such 
as  Brown  Shipley  &  Co.,  the  Eastern  Bank,  N.  Sam- 
uel &  Co.,  and  C.  Birch  Crisp  &  Co.,  has  led  to  a 
unique  situation,  which  had  it  been  understood  in 
Washington  by  Secretary  Hughes  would  have  been 
dealt  with.  For  this  exclusion,  combined  with  the 
formula  which  had  been  finally  adopted  by  the  four 
governments  concerned,  amounts  in  practice  to  a 
repudiation  of  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  in  the 
one  matter  vital  to  the  rehabilitation  of  China, — 
money.  The  precise  terms  of  the  declaration  of  the 
Four  Governments  should  be  read: 

"The  Governments  of  each  of  the  four  participating 
groups  undertake  to  give  their  complete  support  to  their 
respective  national  groups,  members  of  the  Consortium,  in  all 
operations  undertaken  pursuant  to  the  resolutions  and  agree- 
ments of  the  llth  and  12th  May,  1919,  respectively  entered 
into  by  the  bankers  at  Paris.  In  the  event  of  competition  in 
the  obtaining  of  any  specific  loan  contract  the  collective 
support  of  the  diplomatic  representatives  in  Peking  of  the 
four  Governments  will  be  assured  to  the  Consortium  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  such  contract." 

Was  there  ever  a  less  moral  bargain? 


148      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

VIII 

If  it  was  desired  really  to  give  effect  to  this  under- 
taking, Washington,  where  the  original  idea  of  co- 
operative action  had  been  born,  was  certainly  the 
place  for  that.  A  decision  had  to  be  arrived  at  in  one 
sense  or  another:  either  the  consortium  must  be  made 
successful — or  the  conference  would  have  its  folly 
disclosed  later  in  an  unpalatable  way.  That  was  evi- 
dent long  before  the  Delegates  assembled. 

To  men  accustomed  to  the  ordinary  commonplace 
operations  of  banking,  depending  on  established  sys- 
tems, the  long,  slow  process  of  economic  develop- 
ment through  which  China  must  necessarily  go  (and 
which  at  the  lowest  computation  will  last  sixty  years) , 
is  frankly  disliked.  Psychologically,  there  is  thus 
some  reason  for  the  international  scheme.  Experi- 
ence having  demonstrated  that  owing  to  the  very  dif- 
ferent conceptions  of  money  in  China,  particularly 
in  the  realm  of  State  finance,  financial  operations 
are  apt  to  be  wastefully  conducted  unless  attended  by 
supervision,  the  instinctive  thing  is  to  vote  for  super- 
vision. Irrespective  of  what  supervision  may  actu- 
ally amount  to  in  practice,  the  stand  is  taken  that  all 
will  be  well  so  long  as  the  theory  is  embodied  in  a 
legal  agreement.  Historically,  there  having  been  no 
such  thing  as  "finance"  in  China,  wealth  having  always 
been  real  and  visible,  and  the  idea  of  property  never 
having  extended  beyond  tangible  things,  it  seems  to 
stand  to  reason  that  when  "real  and  visible"  tokens 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  149 

of  wealth  reach  Chinese  Government  departments 
without  the  processes  which  have  produced  them  be- 
ing clear,  or  the  responsibilities  attached  to  their 
spending  appreciated,  the  strong  hand  of  friendly 
nations  should  secure  that  money  flows  into  the  right 
channels  and  becomes  reproductive. 

Yet  the  whole  argument  is  falsified  because  con- 
trol is  not  possible  at  the  bottom,  where  it  is  essential, 
but  only  at  the  top  where  it  is  illusory  and  purely  of 
the  window-dressing  order.  The  expense  entailed  by; 
a  real  system  of  foreign  control  would  be  greater 
than  the  resultant  benefit  and  would  defeat  its  own 
object,  because  in  China  the  minimum  subsistence 
wage  of  the  white  man  is  forty  times  higher  than 
the  minimum  wage  of  the  native-born  and  precludes 
the  putting  in  force  of  measures  demanding  the  pres- 
ence of  foreigners  at  every  spending-point.1  The 
enormous  discrepancy  between  the  standards  of  liv- 
ing is  not  only  a  gulf  but  a  bar  to  installing  efficiency 
in  the  sense  it  is  understood  elsewhere.  Therefore 
one  is  driven  by  the  logic  of  circumstances  to  seek- 
ing in  quite  a  different  way  the  desired  result,  and 
securing  its  popular  ratification  by  means  other  than 
diplomatic  pressure. 

The  method  to  be  followed  is  the  method  of  com- 
mon sense,  as  will  be  shown  later.  Lack  of  efficiency 
is  very  largely  compensated  for  in  China  by  cheap- 
ness of  operation.  In  any  case  international  action 

i  This  statement  is  absolutely  correct.  The  minimum  wage  of  a  white 
man  is  $200  silver  a  month:  the  minimum  of  a  Chinese  $5  silver, 
countless  millions  living  on  ten  gold  cents  a  day. 


150      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

in  such  classic  examples  as  Tangiers  and  Constanti- 
nople should  have  been  enough  to  teach  men  that 
national  salvation  is  not  to  be  found  that  way.1  For 
the  jealousies  in  China,  even  among  the  principal 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  are  not  only  acridly 
expressed,  but  lead  to  endless  actions  at  the  back 
doors.  It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  give  any 
clearer  indication  than  to  say  that  the  two  Powers 
which  are  supposed  to  love  each  other  best — the 
United  States  and  Britain — have  bickered  most  bit- 
terly on  all  subjects  connected  with  money  and  the 
investment  thereof.  When  you  have  added  thereto 
the  possibilities  lurking  in  latter-day  Chinese  nation- 
alism the  outlook  becomes  more  sinister.  With  all 
that  Bolshevism  has  taught  the  world,  it  would  be 
natural  to  suppose  that  caution  would  be  displayed 
where  passions  are  most  easily  aroused — in  matters 
affecting  the  pocket.  But  experience  has  demon- 

1  Tangiers  is  in  the  northwest  corner  of  Africa  allotted  to  Spain, 
but  it  does  not  belong  to  Spain.  France,  Spain  and  Great  Britain 
claim  rights  in  this  quasi-internationalized  section  of  Morocco,  which 
comprises  Tangiers  itself  and  140  square  miles  of  territory  surrounding 
it.  In  the  original  secret  treaties  of  1904  between  France,  Spain  and 
Great  Britain  partitioning  Morocco  between  France  and  Spain,  the 
exact  status  of  Tangiers  was  left  undecided.  After  the  Agadir  incident, 
which  almost  led  to  war  between  the  Kaiser  and  France  (1911),  a 
treaty  signed  at  the  end  of  1912  divided  Morocco  into  three  zones — a 
French  zone,  a  Spanish  zone,  and  Tangiers,  with  its  surrounding  terri- 
tory, under  a  "special  regime."  Supposedly  this  meant  a  triple  admin- 
istration under  the  three  Powers;  rivalries,  however,  have  prevented 
reform,  and  the  resultant  government  has  been  lax  and  inefficient  in 
the  extreme.  All  three  Powers  claim  economic  interests.  Great  Britain 
would  be  satisfied  politically  if  by  some  form  the  freedom  of  the  port 
and  the  non-fortification  of  the  territory  could  be  so  guaranteed  as  to 
remove  the  menace  to  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  But  since  the  allied 
triumph  in  the  great  war,  the  French  press  has  been  declaring  that  the 
present  status  of  Tangiers  is  intolerable  and  must  be  ended.  The  French 
plan  is  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  Mulai  Yusef,  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  151 

strated  that  no  lesson  learnt  in  one  country  is  ever 
applied  to  another;  and  only  by  cultivating  the  art 
of  making  themselves  disagreeable  have  Chinese  re- 
cently proved  that  they  are  no  longer  negligible. 

In  yet  another  matter  did  Washington  loom  up 
as  Canossa.  The  robes  of  repentance  would  have 
to  be  donned  not  only  by  those  who  had  actually 
erred,  but  by  those  who  had  expressed  by  written 
undertaking  their  desire  to  do  so.  Never  in  history 
had  there  been  such  a  curious  medley. 


PART  VI 

WASHINGTON    IN    NOVEMBER 


THAT  the  imagination  of  the  American  people  had 
been  captured  by  the  idea  of  the  Washington  Con- 
ference was  soon  made  plain  in  every  part  of  the 
United  States.  As  the  month  of  November  ap- 
proached and  the  hour  for  the  assembling  of  the  Del- 
egates drew  nearer,  interest  was  visibly  stimulated 
by  the  remarkable  manner  in  which  publicity  invaded 
every  organ  of  the  press.  It  was  not  so  much  a  Dis- 
armament Conference  as  an  Arms  Conference:  the 
world  in  arms  had  been  summoned  to  Washington. 
That  delighted  the  American  people  who  were  still 
ill  a  mood  which  had  long  since  disappeared  in  Eu- 
rope. The  distinction  between  the  way  Americans 
looked  upon  the  matter  and  the  way  the  others  con- 
sidered it  was  of  the  same  order  as  had  been  noted 
in  London  in  the  matter  of  the  Imperial  Conference. 
There  the  British  idea  of  an  Imperial  Cabinet  and 
the  Dominions'  idea  of  a  conference  of  Prime  Minis- 
ters had  meant  the  difference  between  action  and  dis- 
cussion. Action  was  certainly  demanded  by  the 
American  people  in  1921.  They  were  ready  for 
dramatic  moves;  and  there  seemed  no  limit  to  the 
amount  of  popular  support  these  would  win  if  care 

152 


AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE      153 

were  taken  to  explain  them  properly  and  to  act  with 
dignity  and  resolution. 

There  was,  however,  another  fact  which  should 
have  been  more  adequately  noticed  had  the  strategy 
of  the  Conference  been  a  subject  of  competent  in- 
quiry. Although  a  sense  of  the  dramatic  lies  dor- 
mant in  Americans  and  can  be  rapidly  invoked,  they 
are  a  people  of  swift  emotions  which  burn  themselves 
rapidly  out.  The  newspaper  world,  long  before  the 
Conference  had  opened,  had  set  to  estimate  precisely 
what  "the  news  value"  of  this  international  gathering 
would  be  to  them.  After  some  preliminary  hesi- 
tation the  unanimous  opinion  was  reached  that  that 
value  was  not  more  than  thirty  days.  In  other  words, 
the  attention  of  the  American  people  could  be  kept 
riveted  on  great  subjects  for  just  one  calendar 
month  and  no  more,  after  which  other  matters  would 
engage  their  interest.  This  estimate  was  extremely 
important  and  proved  very  accurate.  Had  the 
American  delegation  been  properly  advised,  they 
would  have  packed  into  the  compass  of  thirty  days 
all  essential  matters  so  that  the  main  objectives  would 
by  that  time  have  been  clearly  marked  out  and  the 
immense  deadweight  of  American  public  opinion  al- 
lowed to  crush  opposition  by  a  law  as  inexorable  as 
the  law  of  gravity. 

These  were  three  issues  and  the  only  three  impor- 
tant to  the  United  States: 


154      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

/ 

First:  Naval  reduction, 

y   Second:  Cancellation  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Al- 
liance, 

Third:  Restoration  of  China's  liberty  of  action  by 
a  complete  modification  of  crippling  international 
arrangements. 

All  the  rest  was  immaterial  so  far  as  the  security 
of  the  North-American  Continent  was  concerned. 
The  question  of  Siberia  largely  depended  on  the  lead 
given  in  these  three  major  matters,  which  should 
have  been  bracketed  together  and  worked  as  a  unit 
instead  of  being  broken  into  distinct  categories.  It 
was  stupidity  to  imagine  that  it  was  feasible  to  class 
purely  European  matters  with  problems  of  the  Paci- 
fic without  entangling  both  in  a  maze  of  difficulties. 
The  main  and  only  reason  why  the  Washington  Con- 
ference had  been  summoned  was  because  in  the  mid- 
Nineteenth  Century  England  had  opened  China  and 
the  United  States  Japan  to  the  commerce  and  indus- 
try of  the  world,  and  thereby  projected  into  the 
political  arena  elements  which  had  thrown  out  of 
balance  factors  hitherto  supreme.  That  was  the  posi- 
tion in  a  single  sentence.  What  had  taken  place  dur- 
ing the  seven  preceding  years  in  Europe  was  no 
doubt  related  through  the  Russo-Japanese  War  to 
the  problem  of  the  Far  East;  but  the  relationship 
was  too  remote  to  be  of  importance  and  in  any  case 
it  required  a  very  different  American  policy  in  Eu- 
ropean affairs  to  have  Asia  and  Europe  jointly  con- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  155 

sidered.  American  statesmen  should  at  least  have 
understood  that  there  is  an  inborn  antithesis,  a 
cultural  antimony,  between  Europe  and  Asia  and  all 
their  affairs.  President  Harding,  influenced  by  his 
desire  for  world  peace,  had  badly  mixed  up  unrelated 
questions ;  but  there  was  no  reason  why  the  American 
delegation  should  not  have  corrected  the  initial  cru- 
dity and  brought  things  to  the  point  where  evasions 
would  have  been  impossible  in  the  essential  prob- 
lem of  the  Pacific.  This,  however,  involved  a  totally 
new  orientation  of  American  policy  just  as  much  as  a 
change  of  heart  in  the  case  of  other  Powers.  Amer- 
ica had  already  committed  an  unforgivable  sin  in 
China  in  1917  which  required  public  expiation;  she 
possessed  neither  the  men  nor  the  resolution  to  wipe 
out  President  Wilson's  capital  error  in  the  way  in 
which  it  could  easily  have  been  done.  In  the  elders 
gathered  together  as  her  representatives  there  was 
no  trace  of  the  generosity  or  ardour  of  youth. 


ii 

Gargantuan  as  were  the  ramifications  of  the  main 
categories  of  the  agenda,  if  followed  to  the  end,  it  was 
the  details  rather  than  the  objectives  which  were  com- 
plex. That  is  no  doubt  true  of  almost  every  confer- 
ence. But  in  the  present  case  it  only  required  a  show 
of  firmness,  coupled  with  a  public  admission  that 
Japan  had  done  what  she  had  done  more  because  of 
the  volition  of  others  than  because  of  any  inherently 


156      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

different  ideals,  to  create  an  atmosphere  which  would 
have  permitted  the  formulation  of  true  solutions. 
That,  however,  required  inspired  personalities.  Sec- 
retary Hughes,  in  certain  respects,  was  inspired,  not, 
however,  regarding  the  part  that  China  could  play 
in  the  world's  affairs  provided  an  immense,  concerted 
effort  were  made  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  her  diffi- 
culties. As  the  agenda  plainly  shows,  what  was  to  be 
attacked  were  not  the  difficulties  but  the  by-product 
of  those  difficulties: 

"LIMITATION  OF  ARMAMENT 

"1.    Limitation  of  naval  armament — Basis  of  Limitation. 

Extent  of  limitation.     Fulfilment  of  conditions. 
"2.    Rules  for  control  of  new  agencies  of  warfare. 
"3.    Limitation  of  land  armament. 

PACIFIC  AND  FAR  EASTERN  QUESTIONS 

"1.  Questions  relating  to  China — Principles  to  be  applied. 
"2.  Application  to  subjects: 

A.  Territorial  integrity, 

B.  Administrative  integrity, 

C.  Open  door — equality  of  administrative  and  indus- 
trial opportunity, 

D.  Concessions:  Monopolies  and  other  economic  privi- 
leges, 

E.  Development  of  railways, 

F.  Preferential  railroad  rates. 

G.  Status  of  existing  commitments.     Questions  relating 

to  Siberia.     Similar  questions  relating  to  China. 
"3.    Mandated  islands." 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  157 

Over  the  question  of  armaments  there  were  certain 
perfectly  clear  points.  Navies  must  be  dealt  with 
drastically  and  the  new  agencies  of  welfare  subjected 
to  new  rules.  Armies  it  was  hoped  to  treat  in  the 
same  way.  There  were  certain  precedents  to  follow. 
But  the  sub-heads  in  the  agenda-paper  proved  that 
the  whole  problem  of  Chinese  reform  was  deliberately 
made  so  many-sided  that  there  was  virtually  no  end 
to  the  discussion. 

With  no  proper  starting-point  marked  out,  how 
could  there  be  an  end? 

Yet  there  was  no  reason  for  that.  Precisely  the 
same  phenomenon  had  to  be  dealt  with  in  China  as 
in  Rome  when  the  destruction  of  the  rigid  society 
which  had  come  down  from  the  early  days  of  the 
Roman  Republic,  was  brought  about  by  foreign  fac- 
tors and  the  vast  increase  in  currency  and  commercial 
credits.  The  great  revolutionist  in  China,  which  has 
upset  everything,  had  been  the  cash  and  credit  system 
of  the  West.  Money  should  have  been  the  measure 
of  everything — money  in  all  its  various  forms ;  money 
and  nothing  but  money.  Everything  under  that 
head  should  have  been  grouped  and  a  decision  reached 
regarding  the  policy  to  be  pursued.  It  would  have 
taken  time  to  work  out  the  details  just  as  it  had  taken 
time  to  work  out  the  naval  details.  There  had  been 
that  time.  Four  months  had  passed  since  July  and 
those  four  months  had  been  frittered  away.  Nothing 
had  been  done.  Experts  summoned  from  every  part 
of  the  Far  East  had  been  left  to  kick  their  heels  pre- 


158      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

cisely  as  President  Wilson  let  his  army  of  experts 
kick  their  heels  in  Paris  two  years  before.  No  com- 
missions had  been  formed  to  work  up  data — no  ex- 
pert evidence  taken.  Nothing.  Chance,  the  blind 
Madonna  of  the  Pagan,  was  the  goddess  who  was  to 
preside  over  China's  destiny. 

Consequently  eleven  days  before  the  conference 
opened  this  is  what  was  allowed  to  take  place.  An 
unseemly  wrangle  in  Peking  over  a  small  loan  of  5^/2 
million  gold  dollars,  which  fell  due  on  the  31st  Oc- 
tober, was  complicated  by  the  sudden  disposition  of 
the  American  banking  group  to  do  business.  They 
put  forward  a  proposition  whereby  under  certain 
terms  they  would  take  over  this  liability  and  another 
for  a  like  amount  which  fell  due  on  the  30th  Novem- 
ber. Their  terms  were  rejected  for  reasons  which 
are  still  obscure  but  into  which  personal  motives 
entered.  The  result  was  that  the  month  of  Novem- 
ber opened  with  the  news  trumpeted  throughout  the 
American  press  that  China  was  a  defaulter  in  the 
matter  of  the  interest  on  an  American  loan  of  5^2 
millions  and  'that  her  whole  position  was  so  com- 
promised that  withdrawal  of  recognition  of  her 
government  was  possible.  This  coupled  with  the 
ceaseless  propaganda  by  the  Southern  or  Canton 
government  tended  to  create  an  atmosphere  wholly 
unsatisfactory  to  a  realization  of  the  aims  and  ob- 
jects of  the  conference.  For  Secretary  Hughes  to 
have  allowed  such  developments  shows  that  his  time 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  159 

was  monopolized  by  other  matters,  and  that  he  was 
bereft  of  competent  help. 

With  the  main  portion  of  America's  China  policy 
— finance — effectively  alienated  from  the  control  of 
the  government  no  liberty  of  action  was  left. 


in 

Since  July  there  had  been  subtle  modifications  in 
other  directions.  The  attitude  of  the  British  empire 
bloc  had  changed,  partly  owing  to  the  fact  that 
British  Imperial  representation  was  very  different 
from  what  it  had  been  in  London,  and  partly  owing 
to  the  passing  of  the  mood  which  had  then  been  pre- 
dominant. The  absence  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  with 
his  phenomenal  quickness  and  political  intelligence, 
was  a  handicap  which  was  never  surmounted:  his 
leadership  would  have  made  all  the  difference  not 
only  in  the  conference  hall,  but  in  stimulating  and 
keeping  alive  the  interest  of  the  dominant  factor — 
the  American  people.  It  was  also  made  a  little  too 
plain  that  what  Secretary  Hughes  was  anxious  about 
was  Mr.  Balfour's  vote.  Easily  influenced  by  others, 
and  with  a  weak  Department  behind  him,  which  had 
never  known  how  to  utilize  the  great  stacks  of  infor- 
mation which  had  been  accumulated  throughout  the 
years,  Secretary  Hughes  needed  support  and  plainly 
showed  it.  The  men  associated  with  him  belonged  to 
bygone  days,  and  never  once  realized  how  far  even 


160      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

the  Eastern  world  had  swept  beyond  them.  Tied  to 
pre-war  formulas  they  could  lend  little  assistance  in 
framing  the  new  lexicon. 

All  these  considerations,  important  as  they  proved 
to  in  the  detailed  phases  of  the  discussion,  were  swept 
aside  by  the  immense  effect  produced  by  Secretary 
Hughes'  opening  speech  of  the  12th  November  on 
the  scrapping  of  capital  ships.  It  was  an  earnest 
example  of  what  America  can  really  do  when  she 
works  up  a  question;  grasps  every  detail,  and  puts 
into  it  her  granite  resolution.  It  was  as  if  a  salvo 
had  been  fired  over  the  conference  by  all  the  heavy 
guns  of  the  condemned  vessels!  Men  were  deafened 
and  stunned.  The  brilliance  of  the  stroke  was  height- 
ened by  the  circumstances  in  which  it  had  been  deliv- 
ered. The  Armistice  Day  ceremony  at  Arlington 
cemetery  hung  like  a  halo  over  the  assembly,  which 
was  in  the  main  a  gathering  of  delegates  who  knew 
in  its  bitterest  sense  the  meaning  of  war.  So  immense 
was  the  moral  effect  that  there  was  no  end  to  the 
roaring  echoes.  Nothing  since  the  enunciation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  had  equalled  it;  it  was  almost  the 
first  occasion  for  nearly  a  century  that  American  pol^ 
icy  had  boldly  gone  forward  without  frittering  away 
valuable  time.  That  as  in  the  case  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  the  ground  had  been  prepared  in  England 
was  a  significant  matter  tending  to  prove  that  there 
must  always  be  a  Canning  before  there  can  be  a 
Monroe.  .  .  .  Equality  between  the  British  and 
American  navies  having  already  been  accepted  as  a 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  161 

principle  in  London,  the  rest  was  merely  a  question 
of  calculation  and  accommodation. 

Yet  in  spite  of  this  happy  and  significant  opening 
the  first  ominous  circumstance  came  to  the  surface 
with  dramatic  swiftness.  It  was  a  circumstance 
which  would  not  have  been  deemed  ominous  by  any 
one  not  acquainted  with  human  nature.  Secretary 
Hughes,  the  man  on  whom  everything  hinged  as 
chairman  of  the  conference,  was  going  about  in  such 
an  exalted  mood  that  his  feet  hardly  touched  earth. 
Unaccustomed  to  such  scenes,  the  wine  had  mounted 
to  his  head  at  a  moment  when  the  real  struggle  had 
hardly  commenced. 

Two  days  later — on  the  14th  November — came  the 
formal  speeches  of  acceptance  of  the  American  plan 
by  Britain,  France,  Japan  and  Italy.  In  the  French 
speech  there  transpired  the  first  indication  that  land 
armaments  would  prove  a  fatal  issue.  "Gentlemen," 
said  Premier  Briand,  "when  it  comes  on  the  agenda, 
as  it  will  inevitably  come,  to  the  question  of  land 
armament,  a  question  particularly  delicate  for 
France,  as  you  are  all  aware,  we  have  no  intention  to 
eschew  it."  Fateful  words  indeed  which  should  have 
been  anticipated  in  July. 

The  very  next  day  thoughtfulness  had  invaded  the 
American  camp.  There  was  a  perceptible  slowing- 
down  whilst  the  question  of  Committees  and  sub- 
Committees  was  proceeded  with  by  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole.  The  deafness  from  the  great  salvo  of 


162      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

the  12th  November  was  wearing  off  and  diplomacy 
was  slowly  coming  to  lif  e  again. 


IV 

A  few  minutes  before  the  midnight  on  the  15th 
November  the  senior  Chinese  delegate  on  returning 
home  found  a  note  from  the  State  Department  in- 
forming him  that  China  would  be  required  to  state 
her  case  next  morning  at  10:30  o'clock  before  the 
Committee  of  the  Whole.  The  hour  was  already  so 
late  that  it  was  necessary  to  rouse  every  one  and  pre- 
pare for  an  all-night  sitting.  Not  that  the  Chinese 
delegation  had  not  already  fully  discussed  its  posi- 
tion and  its  problem.  Of  all  the  delegations  in 
Washington  the  Chinese  delegation  was  the  most 
numerous,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Japan.  It 
contained  many  capable  men.  The  dossier  of  China's 
griefs  drawn-up  in  Peking  comprised  some  thirty 
major  issues:  but  preliminary  examination  and  dis- 
cussion in  Washington  had  shown  that  condensation 
was  imperative.  That  had  already  been  done, — but 
faced  now  with  a  categorical  request  to  state  their 
case,  the  delegation  fell  back  on  the  sub-head  in  the 
Agenda  which  read — "Principles  to  be  observed." 
The  night  of  the  15-16th  November  was  consumed  in 
working  out  what  seemed  a  legalistic  presentation  of 
those  principles  for  the  morrow. 

Whether  the  Chinese  Delegation  can  be  blamed  for 
this  in  view  of  the  scant  help  they  received  from  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  163 

convening  Power  is  doubtful.  The  risks  of  a  diplo- 
matic career  among  oriental  nations  are  not  small. 
In  the  middle  ages,  if  an  ambassador  was  too  aggres- 
sive he  was  apt  to  be  executed  by  the  potentate  to 
whom  he  was  accredited,  but  if  he  was  not  aggressive 
enough  he  ran  a  chance  of  a  similar  fate  at  the  hands 
of  his  own  master.  While  it  is  true  that  these  days 
have  long  passed  in  the  East,  something  of  the  psy- 
chology remains.  This  factor  tends  to  promote  ob- 
scurantism and  an  avoidance  of  any  irrevocable  acts 
until  the  ground  is  well  mapped-out  and  reasonably 
safe.  Secretary  Hughes*  defence  of  his  action  was 
that  the  United  States  had  in  the  case  of  China  noth- 
ing comparable  to  her  naval  surrender  to  offer  to  the 
Powers.  Yet  this  does  not  accord  with  the  facts. 
The  United  States  had  a  large  number  of  things  to 
offer:  her  terrifically  strong  financial  position  placed 
all  the  others  at  her  mercy.  She  could  have  forced 
prompt  acquiescence  in  several  matters.  There  was, 
for  instance,  her  Tariff  treaty  with  China  of  1903 
which  had  never  been  executed  and  which  could  have 
been  made  the  excuse  for  a  remarkable  gesture  con- 
ceding to  China  a  new  freedom  and  calling  upon 
other  nations  to  follow  suit.  Had  she  made  any 
preliminary  inquiries  she  would  have  learnt  that  the 
Chinese  Delegation  was  in  possession  of  a  Memo- 
randum by  the  competent  British  officials  in  the 
Chinese  Customs  headquarters  recommending,  in  re- 
turn for  abolition  of  export  and  coast  trade  duties, 
the  12%%  Import  Tariff,  which  she  in  company  with 


164      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

England  and  Japan  had  agreed  to  20  years  before. 
That  would  have  solved  at  one  stroke  most  of  China's 
financial  difficulties.  There  was  also  the  general 
financial  question  which  could  have  been  immeasur- 
ably simplified  by  the  announcement  of  an  American 
funding  plan  for  all  the  Chinese  unfunded  debt. 
Had  that  been  done  opposition  would  have  been 
speedily  overcome,  since  it  would  have  been  impos- 
sible for  nations  similarly  placed  in  the  matter  of 
their  debt  to  the  United  States  to  have  refused  to 
acquiesce  in  a  policy  for  China  which  they  sought  for 
themselves.  An  open  session  devoted  to  Chinese  is- 
sues, permitting  the  Chinese  delegates  to  give  the 
world  a  proper  view  of  their  national  dilemma,  and 
allowing  the  United  States  to  take  the  lead  in  accept- 
ing far-reaching  modifications  in  fiscal-financial  mat- 
ters would  have  registered  an  advance  as  far-reach- 
ing in  Chinese  reform  as  the  naval  advance. 

It  is  my  belief  that  the  Chinese  Delegation  should 
have  declined  to  make  any  initial  statement  except  in 
public  session.  That  they  would  have  been  sup- 
ported by  American  opinion  and  won  their  point  is 
absolutely  certain.  That  even  a  conference  of  men 
of  genius  would  have  been  puzzled  by  the  precise 
value  of  the  memorandum  which  they  actually  pre- 
sented is  certain  when  the  unfamiliar  nature  of  the 
subject-matter  is  remembered.  When  the  news- 
papers added  the  next  day  that  China  had  had  the 
advantage  of  the  advice  of  the  retired  American  offi- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  165 

cials  who  had  been  most  prominent  in  the  China  de- 
bacle of  1917  they  had  said  more  than  they  knew. 


The  Memorandum  read  by  the  Senior  Chinese  De- 
legate on  the  morning  of  the  16th  November  was  as 
follows : 

"In  view  of  the  fact  that  China  must  necessarily  play  an 
important  part  in  the  deliberation  of  this  Conference  with 
reference  to  the  political  situation  in  the  Far  East,  the  Chi- 
nese Delegation  has  thought  it  proper  that  they  should  take 
the  first  possible  opportunity  to  state  certain  General  Prin- 
ciples which,  in  their  opinion,  should  guide  the  Conference 
in  the  determinations  which  it  is  to  make.  Certain  of  the 
specific  applications  of  the  Principles  which  it  is  expected 
that  the  Conference  will  make,  it  is  our  intention  later  to 
bring  forward,  but  at  the  present  time  it  is  deemed  sufficient 
simply  to  propose  the  principles  which  I  shall  presently  read. 
In  formulating  these  principles,  the  purpose  has  been  kept 
steadily  in  view  of  obtaining  rules  in  accordance  with  which 
existing  and  possible  future  political  and  economic  prob- 
lems in  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific  may  be  most  justly 
settled  and  with  due  regard  to  the  rights  and  legitimate 
interests  of  all  the  Powers  concerned.  Thus  it  has  been 
sought  to  harmonize  the  particular  interests  of  China  with 
the  general  interests  of  all  the  world.  China  is  anxious 
to  play  her  part  not  only  in  maintaining  peace,  but  in  pro- 
moting the  material  advancement  and  the  cultural  develop- 
ment of  all  the  nations.  She  wishes  to  make  her  vast  natural 
resources  available  to  all  peoples  who  need  them,  and  in  re- 
turn to  receive  the  benefits  of  free  and  equal  intercourse  with 


166      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

them  In  order  that  she  may  do  this,  it  is  necessary  that 
she  should  have  every  possible  opportunity  to  develop  her 
political  institution"  in  accordance  with  the  genius  and  needs 
of  her  own  people,  China  is  now  contending  with  certain 
difficult  problems  which  necessarily  arise,  when  any  country 
makes  a  radical  change  in  her  form  of  Government. 

"These  problems  she  will  be  able  to  solve  if  given  the  op- 
portunity to  do  so.  This  means  not  only  that  she  should 
be  freed  from  the  danger  or  threat  of  foreign  aggression, 
but  that,  so  far  as  circumstances  will  possibly  permit,  she 
be  relieved  from  limitations  which  now  deprive  her  of  autono- 
mous administrative  action  and  prevent  her  from  securing 
adequate  public  revenues. 

"In  conformity  with  the  agenda  of  the  Conference,  the 
Chinese  Government  proposes  for  the  consideration  of  and 
adoption  by  the  Conference  the  following  General  Principles 
to  be  applied  in  the  determination  of  the  questions  relat- 
ing to  China: 

"1.    (a)   The  Powers  engage  to  respect  and  observe  the 
territorial  integrity  and  political  and  adminis- 
trative independence  of  the  Chinese  Republic. 
(b)   China  upon  her  part  is  prepared  to  give  an  un- 
dertaking not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  portion 
of  her  territory  or  littoral  to  any  Power. 
"2.    China,  being  in  full  accord  with  the  principle  of  the 
so-called  open  door  or  equal  opportunity  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  having  treaty  re- 
lations with  China,  is  prepared  to  accept  and  apply 
it  in  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Republic  without  ex- 
ception. 

"3.  With  a  view  to  strengthening  mutual  confidence  and 
maintaining  peace  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,  the 
Powers  agree  not  to  conclude  between  themselves  any 
treaty  or  agreement  directly  affecting  China  or  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  167 

general  peace  in  these  regions  without  previously  noti- 
fying China  and  giving  to  her  an  opportunity  to  par- 
ticipate. 

"4.  All  special  rights,  privileges,  immunities  or  com- 
mitments, whatever  their  character  or  contractual 
basis,  claimed  by  any  of  the  Powers  in  or  relating  to 
China  are  to  be  declared,  and  all  such  or  future  claims 
not  so  made  known  are  to  be  deemed  null  and  void. 
The  rights,  privileges,  immunities  and  commitments 
now  known  or  to  be  declared  are  to  be  examined  with 
a  view  to  determining  their  scope  and  validity  and,  if 
valid,  to  harmonizing  them  with  one  another  and  with 
the  principles  declared  by  this  Conference. 

"5.  Immediately  or  as  soon  as  circumstances  will  permit, 
existing  limitations  upon  China's  political  jurisdic- 
tional  and  administrative  freedom  of  action  are  to 
be  removed. 

"6.  Reasonable,  definite  terms  of  duration  are  to  be  at- 
tached to  China's  present  commitments  which  are 
without  time  limits. 

"7.  In  the  interpretation  of  instruments  granting  special 
rights  or  privileges,  the  well  established  principle  of 
construction  that  such  grants  shall  be  strictly  con- 
strued in  favour  of  the  grantors,  is  to  be  observed. 

"8.  China's  rights  as  a  neutral  are  to  be  fully  respected 
in  future  wars  to  which  she  is  not  a  party. 

"9.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
international  disputes  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far 
East. 

'10.  Provision  is  to  be  made  for  future  conferences  to  be 
held  from  time  to  time  for  the  discussion  of  inter- 
national questions  relative  to  the  Pacific  and  the 
Far  East,  as  a  basis  for  the  determination  of  common 
policies  of  the  Signatory  Powers  in  relation  thereto." 


168      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

VI 

The  Memorandum  made  no  great  impression  on 
the  public,  which  began  to  believe  that  the  Far  East- 
ern question  was  really  an  insoluble  Chinese  puzzle.  It 
seemed  to  assume  that  the  Conference  proposed  to  sit 
indefinitely;  that  alone  was  enough  to  produce  an 
undercurrent  of  hostility.  Did  the  men  of  the  Far 
East  not  realize  that  the  world  had  no  time  to  waste 
on  fine  points?  The  Chinese  attitude  was  judged 
defensive  and  doctrinaire;  and  a  Far  Eastern  Com- 
mittee was  organized  to  classify  the  subjects  to  be 
considered. 

On  the  19th  November  the  various  delegations  ad- 
dressed the  Committee  but  the  only  remarks  of  im- 
portance came  from  Japan.  The  Japanese  spokes- 
man significantly  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Confer- 
ence would  not  go  into  many  details.  "We  should 
regret  undue  protraction  of  the  discussions  by  de- 
tailed examination  of  innumerable  minor  matters. 
All  this  Conference  can  achieve,  it  seems  to  us,  is  to 
adjust  China's  foreign  relations,  leaving  her  domestic 
situation  to  be  worked  out  by  the  Chinese  them- 
selves." 

Clever  remarks  in  all  truth  since  the  domestic  situ- 
ation was  very  largely  the  product  of  China's  deeply 
entangled  foreign  relations.  Everything  internally 
hinged  on  a  change  in  China's  international  commit- 
ments. The  less  you  changed  the  international  com- 
mitments the  more  you  intensified  the  factors  work- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  169 

ing  against  an  improvement  of  the  domestic  situ- 
ation: it  was  like  a  proposition  in  elementary  geo- 
metry. The  American  delegation  became  gradually 
aware  of  their  tactical  error.  It  was  realized  once 
more  that  Japan,  and  what  she  stood  for,  had  really 
brought  about  the  Conference.  It  was  necessary  to 
show  a  little  more  directness.  But  how?  In  less 
than  a  week  the  sunny  situation  had  been  radically 
altered.  Anxious  to  make  a  clear  starting-point,  on 
the  21st  November  the  following  four  Resolutions  by 
Mr.  Elihu  Root  were  framed  and  finally  adopted: 

"It  is  the  firm  intention  of  the  Powers  attending  this  Con- 
ference hereinafter  mentioned,  to  wit,  the  United  States  of 
America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  Japan, 
the  Netherlands  and  Portugal: 

"(1)  To  respect  the  sovereignty,  the  independence  and 
the  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China. 

"(2)  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unembarrassed  op- 
portunity to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  ef- 
fective and  stable  government. 

"(3)  To  use  their  influence  for  the  purpose  of  effectually 
establishing  and  maintaining  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  through- 
out the  territory  of  China. 

"(4)  To  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of  the  present 
conditions  in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or  privileges  which 
would  abridge  the  rights  of  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly 
States  and  from  countenancing  action  inimical  to  the  se- 
curity of  such  States." 

That  was  all.  In  one  leap  the  United  States  had 
got  back  to  John  Hay  and  the  Open  Door,  plus  the 


170      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

accretions  which  had  come  naturally  enough  with  the 
passage  of  twenty  years ;  and  with  another  leap  vested 
interests  jumped  joyfully  after  them.  A  British 
official  spokesman  let  it  be  promptly  known  that  the 
four  accepted  principles  in  British  opinion  meant  ac- 
cepting of  rajlroad  concessions  held  by  the  Powers; 
and  continued  supervision  of  China's  Customs. 

The  Chinese  Delegation  was  deeply  aroused. 
Were  these  marble  halls  in  which  they  were  meeting 
merely  a  handsome  sarcophagus  for  a  spirit  that  was 
dead?  They  hastened  in  committee  to  bring  up  all 
the  old  stalking-horses,  tariff  autonomy,  extra-ter- 
ritoriality,  foreign  post-offices,  foreign  railway- 
guards  and  police,  leased  territories,  wireless  instal- 
lations, hoping  that  this  would  restore  the  balance. 
But  it  was  too  late.  The  die  had  been  cast.  Having 
leaned  on  principles,  the  principles  (as  Mr.  Viviani 
had  wittily  remarked  on  another  occasion)  were 
giving  way  in  the  manner  inevitable  when  generalities 
are  involved. 

But  China  on  the  particular  date  when  the  Root 
Resolutions  were  made  public  (21st  November)  was 
already  out  of  the  limelight.  France,  in  the  person 
of  Mr.  Briand,  occupied  the  centre  of  the  stage  and 
the  folly  of  introducing  the  question  of  land-arma- 
ments was  made  clear. 

vn 

If  Russia,  Poland,  Rumania,  Greece,  Czecho- 
slovakia and  Jugo-Slavia  had  been  represented  it 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  171 

would  have  been  reasonable  and  prudent  to  discuss 
armies;  for  then  some  such  plan  as  the  League  of 
Nations  has  elaborated  could  have  been  seriously 
taken  up.  Without  them,  France's  stand  was  so  ob- 
vious that  it  was  hardly  worth  while  encountering  an 
open  rebuff.  If  the  French  had  been  more  astute, 
instead  of  basing  their  refusal  to  consider  the  matter 
on  the  evidences  that  German  militarism  was  merely 
dormant,  and  that  Russian  militarism  was  an  actual 
menace,  they  would  have  accepted  land  disarmament 
"in  principle"  and  asked  for  a  plan  to  cover  all  Eu- 
rope; then  what  would  the  United  States  have  done? 
Would  she  have  worked  out  schedules  after  the  capital 
ship  manner  and  asked  Powers  not  invited  to  attend 
to  give  their  adhesion  by  telegraph?  What  would 
her  method  have  been  in  regard  to  Russia;  and  how 
would  she  have  considered  a  reply  from  Poland, — 
that  she  was  perfectly  willing  to  demobilize  com- 
pletely if  guarantees  could  be  obtained  from  the 
Soviet  Government?  And  how  in  such  circumstances 
could  America  have  continued  to  decline  to  treat  with 
the  Soviet  Government  even  indirectly,  if  she  inter- 
vened in  Russia's  domestic  affairs  to  the  extent  of  fix- 
ing the  standard  of  her  army?  The  serious  error  of 
bringing  forward  a  proposition  which  could  be  pro- 
perly considered  only  with  an  attendance  of  nations 
as  representative  of  land-strength  as  the  conference 
was  of  sea-strength  cannot  be  better  exemplified  than 
by  these  few  unanswerable  questions.  For  once,  let 
it  be  confessed,  the  French  were  trop  simpliste. 


172      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

They  went  straight  to  the  point  and  gave  their 
honest  and  direct  opinion.  They  should  not  have 
done  this!  They  should  have  transfixed  Secretary 
Hughes  with  a  complete,  whole-hearted,  brilliantly- 
worded  acceptance.  That  would  have  sent  him  run- 
ning to  President  Harding,  tearing  his  hair  as  soon 
as  he  had  realized  the  implications,  and  asking  for  his 
draft  of  his  association  of  nations.  For  it  would 
have  meant  not  only  Geneva  and  The  Hague  for 
the  United  States  but  a  permanent  entanglement 
across  the  Atlantic  of  a  far  worse  nature  than  Presi- 
dent Wilson  ever  wrought.  America  should  bless 
Premier  Briand.  The  presence  of  the  French  Prime 
Minister  did  much  to  embarrass  matters  and  nothing 
to  assist  them  according  to  the  popular  view  and  M. 
Briand  gave  the  conference  such  a  perfect  cold  douche 
on  the  morning  of  the  21st  November  that  it  was 
never  forgotten.  As  a  matter  of  fact  his  honesty 
saved  the  United  States  and  ruined  his  political  fu- 
ture,— a  conclusion  which  in  a  year  or  two  Amer- 
icans will  be  willing  to  admit. 

In  regard  to  the  Conference  agenda  the  matter 
had  particular  significance.  It  cancelled  the  entire 
European  portion,  and  in  doing  so  left  such  bad 
blood  that  the  settlement  of  the  submarine  ratio  was 
out  of  the  question. 

VIII 

Meanwhile  China  was  pegging  along  in  committee 
more  or  less  methodically  with  her  own  affairs.  The 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  178 

tariff  question  was  quite  rightly  made  the  centre  of 
her  case.  That  it  could  have  been  made  dramatic 
and  popular,  had  the  matter  been  presented  in  a 
public  session,  is  certain.  Here  was  a  matter  suf- 
ficiently familiar  to  the  mass  of  people  throughout 
the  world  as  a  general  issue  to  have  the  particular  in- 
iquity of  this  instance  arrest  their  concern.  China 
eighty  years  ago  had  had  a  perpetual  5%  tariff  im- 
posed upon  her  at  the  cannon's  mouth:  that  was  a 
splendid  beginning.  Every  effort  to  escape  from 
this  iron  mould  had  failed,  and  her  public  finances 
had  been  reduced  to  a  state  of  terrific  disorder  ap- 
proaching bankruptcy  because  the  civilized  world, 
through  the  commercial  treaties,  held  her  in  mort- 
main. Even  the  5%  Tariff  had  not  been  observed 
owing  to  the  refusal  of  various  Powers  to  revise  the 
specific  duties  on  the  basis  of  values,  the  loss  owing 
to  a  non-effective  tariff  (which  in  practice  amounted 
to  only  3%%)  having  been  in  the  twenty  years  since 
the  Boxer  indemnities  $300,000,000  gross.  An  in- 
demnity should  have  been  asked  from  the  Conference 
of  this  amount — three  hundred  million  dollars  to  be 
divided  on  the  averages  of  the  import  and  export 
trade. 

With  such  an  introduction  the  ground  would  have 
been  cleared  for  a  precise  examination  of  the  future. 
The  world  needed  raw  materials.  It  was  the  insist- 
ent cry  of  Japan  that  only  in  the  Chinese  provinces 
could  she  find  the  surplus  she  so  badly  needed. 
China  was  prepared  to  accept  this  position  and  do 


174      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

everything  to  facilitate  exports.  Inasmuch  as  the 
abolition  of  internal  trade  taxation  (likin)  was  diffi- 
cult and  cumbersome  until  the  Republic  was  better 
organized,  she  should  have  offered  in  lieu  thereof 
the  total  abolition  of  all  export  and  coast  trade 
duties  in  return  for  the  12%%  tariff  which  had  been 
agreed  upon  after  the  Boxer  settlement  and  never 
enforced  because  of  the  conditions  attached  to  it. 
To  Japan  she  could  have  held  out  the  additional  bait 
that  the  whole  of  the  borrowings  made  during  the 
war-period  would  be' 'inscribed"  in  the  gilt-edged  list 
secured  on  Customs  receipts. 

Why  was  something  like  this  not  done?  No  one 
knows.  The  Customs  Administration  in  China,  as 
I  have  already  said,  not  only  advocated  this  plan,  but 
had  written  a  strong  memorandum  on  the  subject 
which  was  never  produced.  Inasmuch  as  the  issue 
was  one  primarily  affecting  the  business  community 
it  should  have  been  argued  not  from  the  juridical  but 
from  the  purely  commercial  standpoint.  The  failure 
to  hold  out  an  immediate  tangible  gain  to  the  com- 
mercial community  meant  the  failure  of  the  whole 
proposal. 

The  discussion  was  continued  in  ensuing  days  in 
the  same  vein  and  with  much  the  same  results,  the 
general  unfamiliarity  of  the  American  delegation 
with  the  technical  details  rendering  progress  difficult, 
and  fortifying  the  arguments  of  the  last  ditchers  who 
declared  that  additional  revenue  raised  from  this 
source  would  shackle  trade  and  be  wasted.  A  con- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  175 

sideration  of  extraterritoriality  resulted  in  its  shelv- 
ing by  the  method  of  appointing  an  International 
Commission  of  Jurists  who  would  visit  China  and  re- 
port to  their  respective  governments  as  to  the  ability 
of  the  Chinese  authorities  to  take  over  the  full  admin- 
istration of  justice  exercised  by  foreign  tribunals 
under  the  extraterritorial  privileges.  No  attempt 
was  made  to  consider  the  possibility  of  building  up  a 
new  practice  suited  to  the  transitory  conditions- — 
such  as  conceding  China  full  police-authority  in  new 
areas  opened  to  trade  and  industry,  with  police- 
power  of  fining  and  expulsion  but  not  of  imprison- 
ment. In  presenting  the  case  for  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  troops  from  Chinese  soil,  the  same  procedure 
was  scrupulously  followed.  China  placed  the  whole 
dossier  on  the  table  and  the  assembled  Powers  drop- 
ped it  sheet  by  sheet  into  the  waste-paper  basket. 
The  case  of  the  garrisons  maintained  in  North  China 
under  the  Boxer  Protocol  of  1901  was  mixed  up  in 
the  mind  of  the  conference  with  the  entirely  differ- 
ent problem  of  Japanese  railway  guards  in  Man- 
churia and  Shantung  and  the  system  of  police-boxes. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  disentangle  the  issues. 
Foreign  post-offices  in  China  fared  better  since  this 
was  a  trumpery  issue  and  withdrawal  of  them  was 
promised.  But  even  here  over  the  matter  of  the 
date  of  the  withdrawal,  the  Japanese  contrived  to  de- 
lay a  decision  for  several  weeks  on  the  plea  that  the 
matter  had  to  be  referred  to  Tokyo,  and  that  Tokyo 
did  not  reply. 


176      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Leased  territories  were  similarly  presented  en  bloc, 
a  serious  error  in  tactics  since  the  case  of  various 
leased  territories  was  different.  Had  the  story,  for 
instance,  been  simply  told  of  how  the  Kowloon  leased 
territory  had  been  extended  in  1899  far  beyond  what 
the  British  military  authorities  had  asked  for  it  could 
not  have  failed  to  create  a  profound  impression. 
Kowloon,  a  strip  of  territory  on  the  mainland  op- 
posite Hongkong,  was  ceded  to  Britain  in  1860  after 
being  held  on  a  personal  lease  by  Sir  Harry  Parkes 
(an  early  empire-builder)  from  the  time  of  the  ces- 
sion of  Hongkong  Island  ( 1842) .  In  1898  the  ques- 
tion of  obtaining  more  territory  as  a  military  protec- 
tion for  Hongkong  harbour  arose.  The  British 
General  Officer  Commanding  asked  for  the  hilly 
ground  of  the  mainland  to  the  skyline  as  a  military 
measure  to  secure  that  hostile  artillery  could  not 
dominate  the  shipping,  but  Peking  diplomacy  con- 
sidered this  a  very  mild  and  unintelligent  request  and 
put  in  an  application  for  a  lease  of  300  square  miles 
consisting  of  the  whole  peninsula  south  of  a  line 
drawn  between  Deep  Bay  and  Mirs  Bay,  together 
with  the  islands  of  Lantao  and  the  Lammas.  A  re- 
turn of  territory  superfluous  both  from  the  military 
and  commercial  viewpoint  could  have  been  reasonably 
asked  for;  since  Britain  is  not  in  China  as  a  coloniz- 
ing power  but  merely  as  a  trader. 

Nothing  of  this  transpired. 

Nor  in  the  case  of  the  Port  Arthur  lease — which 
according  to  the  original  agreement  expires  on  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  177 

23rd  March,  1923 — were  the  facts  made  plain,  as  will 
be  shown  later.  It  is  true  that  the  words  having  an 
evil  omen,  the  three  Powers  with  territorial  leases — 
England,  France  and  Japan — were  anxious  to  dis- 
play an  accommodating  spirit.  Japan  reiterated,  as 
she  had  declared  times  without  number,  that  she 
would  return  the  Kiaochow  lease  as  soon  as  negoti- 
ations had  settled  the  details.  France  announced 
that  she  was  prepared  to  abandon  Kwangchow  Wan 
and  England  declared  that  she  was  ready  to  do  the 
same  with  Weihaiwei.  That  was  all.  Then  the  dis- 
cussion passed  hastily  to  wireless  installations  and 
led  to  tedious  scenes  with  delegates  talking  about 
wave-lengths  to  show  their  familiarity  with  the  ether 
of  space. 

But  this  sort  of  thing  could  not  go  on  much  longer. 
The  arrival  of  a  number  of  independent  represent- 
atives from  China,  who  wanted  to  know  more  and 
more  insistently  when  it  was  proposed  to  bring  up 
what  was  essential  to  the  peace  and  happiness  of  the 
Chinese  people — Shantung  and  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands— gave  an  ugly  tone  to  proceedings  and  made 
more  drastic  action  imperative.  There  was  such 
open  disappointment  among  all  classes  in  every 
part  of  the  disturbed  Republic  that  explosions  seemed 
likely.  America,  which  had  been  the  most  popular 
country  on  earth,  was  rapidly  falling  under  the  same 
ban  as  the  others.  It  was  openly  declared  that  she 
had  convoked  this  gathering  for  her  own  selfish  ends, 
and  was  deliberately  keeping  China  in  a  subordinate 


178      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

and  humiliating  position  so  as  to  placate  Japan. 

Violence  was  becoming  possible.  .  .  . 

The  Chinese  Delegation  communicated  their  fears 
to  the  Chairman  of  the  Conference,  who  invoked  Mr. 
Balfour's  help.  It  began  to  dawn  on  all  that  some- 
thing had  to  be  done  rapidly  if  the  Conference  was 
not  to  break  down.  Conversations  on  Shantung  be- 
tween Japan  and  China  outside  the  Conference,  but 
with  British  and  American  official  observers  present, 
were  rapidly  agreed  upon. 

After  three  weeks'  delay,  due  to  lack  of  prepa- 
ration and  lack  of  expert  advice,  the  Conference  was 
beginning  to  see  where  the  essentials  lay. 

NOTE:  See  Appendix,  p.  308. 


PART  VII 

CLIMAX    AND    ANTI-CLIMAX 


ON  the  1st  December  in  the  presence  of  Secretary 
Hughes  and  Mr.  Balfour,  the  Japanese  and  Chinese 
Delegates  met  and  began  their  Shantung  conversa- 
tions, which  lasted  nearly  two  months,  and  required 
in  the  end  the  personal  intervention  of  President 
Harding  in  the  one  matter  of  importance  (the  owner- 
ship and  control  of  the  Shantung  railway).  The 
Chinese  Delegates,  on  leaving  their  official  quarters, 
were  greeted  with  angry  cries  from  fellow-country- 
men who  were  enraged  by  what  they  deemed  was  a 
surrender.  Conversations  with  Japan  meant  what 
had  been  utterly  opposed — direct  negotiations.  It 
seemed  to  these  bystanders,  who  represented  a  patri- 
otic emotion  which  had  been  boiling  and  bubbling  for 
years,  that  for  their  officials  to  go  into  a  room  and 
privately  discuss  the  matter  with  Japanese  officials, 
instead  of  declaring  the  truth  publicly,  was  a  dread- 
ful piece  of  blacksliding.  Yet  it  was  a  sound  and 
sensible  procedure.  Direct  negotiations  between 
China  and  Japan,  with  American  and  British  observ- 
ers present,  was  what  the  Far  East  needed  to  solve 
most  of  its  difficulties.  There  were  indeed  only  four 
factors  of  importance  in  the  Far  East  and  they  were 

179 


180      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

all  in  the  room  when  Japan  met  China,  and  England 
and  America  were  present.  In  any  case  the  time  for 
heroics  was  over:  it  was  a  question  of  making  up  as 
quickly  as  possible  for  the  loss  of  time  and  the  decline 
in  public  interest  which  had  been  brought  about  by 
the  initial  incompetence.  Throughout  these  separate 
negotiations  Japan  showed  herself  meticulous  but 
reasonable  as  she  naturally  is  once  she  is  convinced 
that  unfair  advantage  is  not  being  taken  of  her,  the 
Shantung  railway  impasse  being  solely  due  to  the 
wrong-headed  policy  which  postponed  considering  the 
essential  matter  until  the  end.  Regarding  all  mat- 
ters Japan  was  indeed  breathing  more  easily.  If  she 
still  delayed,  bargained  and  sometimes  showed  stub- 
bornness, it  was  largely  due  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  conference  had  gone  to  work  and  the  necessity  to 
secure  that  no  one  should  afterwards  say  that  a  public 
reckoning  had  been  called  and  that  she  had  been 
found  wanting. 

ii 

Whilst  the  issue  which  had  brought  President  Wil- 
son to  the  ground  was  quietly  debated  in  English 
from  day  to  day  in  a  room  full  of  Japanese  and 
Chinese — over  whose  shoulders  looked  wonderingly 
American  and  British  observers — elsewhere  the  gen- 
eral play  proceeded.  In  the  Committee  on  Far 
Eastern  and  Pacific  Affairs  the  first  week  in  Decem- 
ber was  made  noteworthy  by  a  renewed  attempt  to 
find  a  formula  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  181 

troops  from  Chinese  territory — including  Japan's 
railway  guards  in  South  Manchuria — and  the  ren- 
dition of  the  leased  territories. 

Both  matters  fared  badly.  It  was  not  so  much 
that  there  was  undue  haste,  as  an  undue  desire  to 
curtail  discussion  and  not  to  explore  all  the  possibili- 
ties of  a  situation  which  was  by  no  means  complex. 
Simple  solutions  were  available.  The  absence  of 
quick-witted  negotiators  was  never  worse  felt  than 
at  this  point.  Had  Mr.  Lloyd  George  been  present 
it  is  quite  certain  that  he  would  have  found  acceptable 
solutions.  The  American  delegation,  overwhelmed  by 
the  multiplicity  of  issues  and  their  unfamiliarity  with 
the  practical  aspects,  were  too  easily  led  into  by-paths 
and  too  plainly  anxious  to  avoid  deadlocks.  Any- 
thing remotely  resembling  Paris  would  have  shocked 
them  beyond  recovery:  thus  they  were  daily  placed 
between  Scylla  and  Charybdis.  In  any  case,  they 
were  far  more  deeply  interested  in  the  private  con- 
versations now  proceeding  on  the  second  great  sub- 
ject of  the  conference — the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance 
— than  in  the  question  of  skeleton  garrisons  in  remote 
spots  in  China,  or  in  the  disputed  authority  over  strips 
of  territory  through  which  ran  strangely-named  rail- 
ways. That  in  such  circumstances  the  conviction 
should  have  grown  even  among  the  members  of  the 
Chinese  Delegation  that  they  were  mere  catspaws 
was  not  very  strange.  The  chiefs  of  the  Delegations 
remained  diplomatically  silent,  the  others  were  more 
vocal.  Resignations  were  the  order  of  the  day  and 


182      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

matters  came  to  a  head  when  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  Delegation  resigned  and  coolly  published  the 
following  remarkable  explanation  of  his  action,  which 
merits  permanent  record  as  a  useful  footnote  on 
conference  tactics: 

"The  Washington  Conference  enters  to-day  its  fourth 
week.  So  far  as  China  is  concerned,  the  results  are  so  com- 
pletely negative  as  to  suggest  that  China  was  only  sum- 
moned to  provide  the  necessary  background  for  the  naval 
disarmament  proposals  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  rehabili- 
tating her  as  a  sovereign  nation.  In  no  single  proposal  laid 
before  the  Conference  by  her  has  anything  but  a  stalemate 
been  produced.  In  the  questions  affecting  the  tariff,  the  post- 
office,  extraterritoriality,  wireless  installations,  foreign 
troops,  foreign  police  and  leased  territories,  the  delegates  of 
the  Powers  assembled  in  Washington  have  displayed  no  dis- 
position as  a  body  to  accede  to  reasonable  demands,  or  to  dis- 
tinguish between  what  are  violations  of  Chinese  sovereignty, 
without  a  vestige  of  sanction  in  the  treaties  made  between 
China  and  foreign  nations,  which  should  be  immediately 
redressed,  and  what  are  matters  sanctioned  by  treaty  which 
China  requires  amended  or  modified. 

"In  the  first  category  fall  post  offices,  wireless  installa- 
tions, foreign  garrisons  other  than  those  covered  by  the 
protocol  of  1901,  and  all  foreign  police.  Had  there  been 
any  desire  to  do  China  justice,  all  these  flagrant  violations 
would  have  been  dealt  with,  particularly  such  a  matter  as  the 
foreign  post-offices,  for  which  she  has  asked  no  compensation. 
In  the  crucial  matter  of  the  customs  tariff  China  has  suffered 
since  the  year  1902,  when  all  the  powers  solemnly  agreed  to 
secure  for  her  an  effective  5  per  cent  by  constant  revision 
a  gross  loss  estimated  to  amount  to  no  less  than  $300,000,000 
in  the  aggregate,  which  alone  accounts  for  the  present  dis- 


MAP  OP 

THE  FAR  EAST 

Showing  the  proved  Iron  Deposits 

of  Commercial  Value  in  Red 

and  Oil  in  Blue 


•Wul..JjNg.Co.,N.Y 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  183 

ordered  state  of  her  national  finances.  China  has  filed  no 
demand  for  an  indemnity  amounting  to  the  difference  in  the 
tariff  levy  between  what  has  been  stipulated  for  by  the  treaties 
and  what  has  been  actually  collected.  She  has  limited  her- 
self to  asking  for  the  I&y2%  rate  provided  for  under  certain 
stipulations  by  treaties  nearly  twenty  years  old. 

"The  indications  are  at  present  that  there  is  no  likelihood 
at  all  of  even  a  substantial  increase  being  agreed  to  although 
every  country  in  the  world  has  made  enormous  tariff  in- 
creases since  the  war,  even  India  having  raised  an  11% 
tariff  against  British  goods.  The  course  consistently  fol- 
lowed by  the  conference  has  been  after  perfunctory  discus- 
sion and  agreement  in  principle,  to  relegate  each  matter  to 
a  committee  which  has  buried  it  by  adopting  a  meaningless 
formula  apparently  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  cynical  disbelief 
in  China's  bona  fides. 

"The  very  latest  discussions  have  disclosed  the  fact  that 
although  the  new  consortium  of  foreign  banks  has  ever  since 
its  formation  declared  in  categorical  terms  that  the  inclu- 
sion of  Japan  within  the  banking  group  had  been  accom- 
panied by  an  abandonment  by  her  of  her  claims  to  special 
privileges  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia, 
the  very  opposite  is  the  case,  Japan  insisting  on  certain  rights 
in  these  regions  which  prove  that  the  statements  of  the  con- 
sortium to  China  are  meaningless  and  untrue. 

"Meanwhile,  the  newspapers,  supplied  with  official  com- 
muniques and  statements  from  day  to  day,  have  contributed 
largely  to  building  up  in  the  mind  of  the  public,  particularly 
the  American  public,  the  idea  that  not  only  was  substantial 
progress  being  registered,  but  that  China  was  being  delivered 
from  the  bondage  and  restraint  in  which  she  has  languished 
for  so  many  years  and  that  her  dearest  hopes  were  being 
realized.  Thus  the  valuable  support  of  American  public 
opinion  on  which  China  has  counted  so  much  in  the  past  and 
on  which  she  relies  so  much  in  the  future  has  not  been  avail- 


184      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

able  to  aid  in  the  great  work  of  liberation  and  regenera- 
tion which  is  so  stubbornly  opposed  by  Governments  and 
vested  interests  because  a  bound  and  captive  China  is  easier 
to  exploit." 

m 

These  signs  and  portents  were  by  no  means  ig- 
nored: for  up  on  the  hill,  not  more  than  a  mile  or 
two  away,  the  ratifying  body  sat  silently  observing 
what  was  going  on.  Almost  ironically  the  very  next 
day  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  voted  a  resolution 
establishing  China's  right  to  remain  a  neutral  in  fu- 
ture wars  to  which  she  was  not  a  party,  which  had 
been  established  for  the  civilized  world  for  over  200 
years  but  which  no  one  had  so  far  admitted  should 
extend  to  Eastern  Asia,  unless,  of  course,  there  were 
armaments  to  back  up  international  law  as  in  the 
case  of  Japan. 

But  this  was  by-play.  The  burial  garment  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  was  the  matter  engaging 
attention  and  provoking  as  many  whispers  as  if  this 
had  been  a  congress  of  modistes.  It  was  necessary 
to  get  on  with  things.  But  how?  Mr.  Elihu  Root 
went  to  Mr.  Balfour  and  talked  very  confidentially; 
then  Mr.  Balfour  went  to  Prince  Tokugawa;  and 
Secretary  Hughes  visited  them  all.  Monsieur  Vivi- 
ani,  left  behind  by  Premier  Briand,  nodded  his  head 
and  affirmed  France's  readiness  to  do  anything  that 
contributed  to  French  prestige.  Telegrams  passed 
rapidly  between  Tokyo  and  Washington.  It  was 
felt  only  right  that  Japan  should  have,  as  it  were, 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  185 

the  initiative  in  the  matter  as  the  course  of  events  had 
indeed  been  devious  and  somewhat  humiliating  for 
her.  A  rough  draft  of  the  agreement  had  been 
brought  from  London.  But  in  the  British  draft 
Clause  IV  was  missing.  The  whole  point  was  to  al- 
low Japan  to  write  in  Clause  IV,  which  definitely  ter- 
minated the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  as  well  as  her 
own  liberty  of  action,  and  brought  things  back  to 
where  they  had  been  before  1902. 

At  last  it  was  done — more  quickly  than  any  one 
had  supposed  possible.  An  open  session  of  the  Con- 
ference was  arranged  for  the  very  minute  the  neces- 
sary confirmatory  telegrams  came  through  from 
Tokyo — an  open  session  rushed  through  so  quickly 
that  there  was  hardly  time  to  get  the  tickets  out. 

On  the  10th  December,  with  the  galleries  crowded, 
the  public  ceremony  of  announcing  what  had  been 
done  was  carried  out  in  a  form  suitable  to  the  Senate 
and  people  of  the  United  States,  who  appeared  every 
whit  as  hard  to  handle  as  the  Senate  and  people  of 
Rome.  To  Senator  Lodge  was  confided  the  task  of 
making  an  oration  in  which  the  glamour  of  the  Isles 
of  the  Pacific  would  be  made  so  alluring  that  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  arrangement  being  regarded  as  that 
dreadful  thing,  an  Alliance,  would  be  banished.  Sen- 
ator Lodge,  in  accents  childlike  and  bland,  exposed 
the  geographical  factors.  This  vast  Pacific  Ocean, 
these  many  nations  grouped  on  its  shores,  these  blessed 
isles — who  could  resist  the  feeling  that  a  Treaty  was 
precisely  what  they  needed  to  round  them  off  and 


186      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

make  them  content?  In  all  history  there  never  was 
such  a  case  calling  so  urgently  for  a  Treaty;  some- 
thing which  would  assuage  all  evil  passions  and  make 
Guam  feel  sisterly  towards  the  Carolines ;  something 
which  would  prove  more  clearly  than  spoken  words 
that  it  was  no  longer  a  crime  within  the  meaning  of 
the  act  to  be  a  Pacific.  .  .  . 

Thus  his  general  argument — more  or  less.  Then 
the  actual  document,  the  reading  of  which  he  made 
appropriately  enough  like  the  reading  of  a  will. 
The  galaxy  of  names  of  the  plenipotentiaries  was  an 
enthralling  introduction :  how  many  notable  ones  were 
actually  sitting  round  the  green  baize  table!  Then 
article  one  and  article  two  and  article  three — all 
sounding  oddly  like  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  arti- 
cles, fumigated,  sterilized,  deodorized.  Last  of  all 
Article  IV:  "This  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as 
possible  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional  methods 
of  the  high  contracting  parties,  and  shall  take  effect 
on  the  deposit  of  ratification  which  shall  take  place 
at  Washington  and  whereupon  the  agreement  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Japan  which  was  concluded 
in  London  on  July  13,  1911,  shall  terminate." 

It  was  only  the  last  clause  that  was  interesting  and 
important.  The  rest  was  padding.  Through  the 
forest  of  black  coats  and  white  collars  I  could  see  in 
profile,  motionless  and  sober,  the  distinguished  head 
of  Mr.  Balfour.  As  the  last  sentence  sounded  and 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  publicly  perished,  his 
head  fell  forward  on  his  chest  exactly  as  if  the  spinal 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  187 

chord  had  been  severed.  It  was  an  amazing  reve- 
lation of  what  the  Japanese  Treaty  had  meant  to  the 
men  of  a  vanished  age.  It  was  the  spinal  chord  that 
had  been  severed.  The  last  time  I  had  seen  it  done 
in  precisely  the  same  way  (by  a  single  shot)  was 
twenty-one  years  before  in  the  forgotten  siege  of  the 
Peking  Legations,  when  through  a  loophole  the  same 
fate  sped  forward  and  overtook  a  man  as  uneasy 
dawn  came  after  a  rather  dreadful  night.  Dawn  had 
come  here,  too,  after  a  dreadful  night.  The  head  of 
stereotyped  diplomacy  had  fallen  forward — the  vital 
chord  severed — and  new  figures  hereafter  would 
monopolize  the  scene. 

As  Senator  Lodge  sat  down  the  nearest  ladies  of 
the  Advisory  Committee,  sitting  in  a  double  row  of 
twenty-one,  symbolizing  the  eternal  vigilance  of  the 
American  people,  had  become  so  excited  that  they 
rose  and  patted  the  Senator  approvingly  and  whis- 
pered words  to  him.  It  had  been  done  so  beautifully. 
The  nerve  was  out;  there  had  been  no  pain  to  speak 
of;  really  modern  surgery  was  wonderful.  For  a 
few  fleeting  minutes  the  magnificence  of  the  opening 
session  was  duplicated. 

But  already  Mr.  Balfour  had  risen  on  the  invi- 
tation of  the  chairman  and  commenced  speaking. 
It  was  the  new  Mr.  Balfour,  accepting  the  position 
like  a  gentleman,  and  justifying  the  corpse  lying  be- 
side him  in  well-chosen  words.  It  was  done  smoothly 
in  the  style  of  the  adept  parliamentarian,  and  when 
it  was  ended  the  great  applause  signified  that  every 


188      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

one  had  understood  not  what  he  had  said  but  what 
had  been  left  out.  His  had  been  the  hand  that  had 
signed  the  original  Alliance  twenty  years  before; 
and  no  doubt  it  had  been  bitter  and  painful  to  see 
policy  pass  far  beyond  into  new  and  strange  fields. 


rv 

The  infinite  pains  made  to  present  a  perfectly  in- 
ocuous  document  to  the  public,  so  that  the  bugbear  of 
entangling  alliances  should  not  be  raised,  was  not  as 
successful  as  had  been  hoped.1  Within  forty-eight 
hours,  the  man  who  would  have  been  a  Prime  Min- 
ister, had  he  been  born  in  England  instead  of  Idaho, 
got  to  work.  Senator  Borah's  remarks  in  the  first 
Senate  debate  on  the  Treaty  were  as  remarkable  and 
as  much  to  the  point  as  his  previous  argumentation 
had  been.  The  legislator  whose  tenacity  and  in- 
tegrity had  been  solely  responsible  for  the  convening 
of  this  remarkable  conference — which  would  have 
been  still  more  remarkable  had  his  plan  of  a  tripartite 
naval  conference  (plus  a  consideration  of  the  Pacific 
and  Far  Eastern  problems)  been  followed — was  ask- 
ing some  plain  questions  which  were  plainly  unan- 
swerable. The  Conference  had  been  in  session  a 
month,  he  said,<  and  in  all  probability  would  shortly 
close.  Although  the  cessation  of  the  building  of  capi- 

iThe  Four-Power  Treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  on  24th  March, 
1922,  with  this  important  Reservation: 

"The  United  States  understands  that  under  the  statement  in  the 
preamble,  or  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  there  is  no  commitment  to 
armed  force,  no  alliance,  no  obligation  to  join  in  any  defence." 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  189 

tal  ships  was  in  a  fair  way  towards  becoming  an  ac- 
complished fact,  that  only  covered  the  question  of 
national  economy.  What  promise  was  there  that  the 
real  weapons  of  war — those  instruments  which  all  ex- 
perts were  agreed  would  be  the  instruments  with 
which  the  next  war  would  be  carried  out — would  be 
dealt  with?  Incautious  Mr.  Borah,  always  going 
straight  for  the  main  point,  when  even  open  diplo- 
macy goes  round  every  possible  corner  and  so  ostenta- 
tiously sits  down  to  think  whenever  the  "brass  tacks" 
stage  is  reached.  Here  was  the  submarine  poking 
its  periscope  up  under  the  very  dome  of  the  Capitol! 
And  then  he  aptly  pointed  out  that  as  in  the  case  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  so  now  the  new  instru- 
ment embodied  principles  to  which  China  was  not 
considered  worthy  to  be  asked  to  subscribe. 

The  next  day  the  Conference  was  not  so  optimistic 
about  ratification.  The  Senator  from  Idaho  was  al- 
ways pulling  things  up  by  the  roots  to  see  how  they 
were  growing.  The  habit  just  now  appeared  politi- 
cally atrocious.  Still  that  day  (13th  December)  the 
Treaty  was  duly  signed  by  the  four  Powers,  with  the 
American  reservation  regarding  the  mandated  islands 
tacked  to  it,  and  a  growing  conviction  that  there 
would  be  a  far  stiffer  reservation  attached  by  the 
Senate.  And  as  if  encouraged  to  action  by  these 
events,  the  Chinese  Delegation  delivered  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  subject  of  the  famous  Twenty-one  De- 
mands and  the  abolition  of  spheres  of  influence — sub- 


190      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

jects  which  should  have  been  the  head  and  front  of 
their  first  assault  a  month  before. 

It  was  not  for  nothing  that  Secretary  Hughes  was 
a  lawyer:  he  abruptly  adjourned  the  meeting  so  that 
something  more  pleasant  could  be  dealt  with.  How 
indeed  could  he  risk  a  rupture  with  Japan  at  this 
stage  when  the  5:5:3  ratio  had  just  been  settled — 
after  one  month's  acrimonious  expert  debate — by  the 
retention  of  the  superdreadnought  "Mutsu"  and  a 
corresponding  modification  all  round?  Besides  was 
not  work  on  the  Nine-Power  Treaty — that  marvel- 
lously cheerful  and  vague  document  which  was  to  be 
the  apotheosis  of  the  Four  Root  Principles — so  ac- 
tively proceeding  that  it  was  almost  ready  ?  America 
could  not  be  expected  to  force  Japan  out  of  Man- 
churia as  well  as  out  of  Shantung.  Caution  not 
audacity  was  necessary,  especially  as  Japan  was  hold- 
ing up  Shantung  over  the  railway  question  just  as 
she  had  held  up  the  capital  ship  ratio  over  the 
"Mutsu." 

There  were  other  anxious  matters.  England  had 
at  last  brought  up  submarines,  and  without  directly 
revealing  what  had  taken  place  in  regard  to  the  clos- 
ing of  the  English  Channel  was  forging  closer  and 
closer  to  that  revelation.  A  "compromise"  plan  on 
the  basis  of  the  capital  ship  ratio  which  would  take 
existing  tonnage  as  the  model,  was  defeated.  Christ- 
mas had  almost  arrived  and  the  season  of  peace  and 
goodwill  found  every  one  bitter.  The  Shantung 
deadlock  was  held  firm  by  Japan  so  as  to  block  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  191 

Manchurian  issue.  Every  one  remained  officially 
hopeful — with  that  official  hopefulness  which  comes 
from  a  complete  absence  of  convictions.  Yet  noth- 
ing had  been  done  about  Manchuria  or  the  Chinese 
tariff  or  the  open  door  and  the  short  January  days 
would  soon  pass  away. 


With  the  coming  of  a  new  year  and  the  dropping 
of  the  vexed  question  of  armaments  Secretary 
Hughes  began  to  work  with  the  truly  volcanic  energy 
of  which  he  is  capable  on  a  typical  "American  plan" 
for  all  China's  difficulties,  past,  present,  and  future. 

It  was  high  time.  The  failure  recorded  in  the  sub- 
marine question,  as  well  as  in  the  matter  of  auxiliary 
ships,  had  seriously  weakened  the  final  value  of  the 
naval  accord.  The  errors  of  November  were  fast 
coming  home  to  roost.  Significant  articles,  declar- 
ing that  there  was  only  "one  inch  between  Wilson 
and  Hughes"  and  that  "the  Wilsonization  of  the 
Secretary  of  State"  would  live  as  one  of  the  most 
curious  products  of  the  Conference,  were  by  no  means 
to  be  ignored.  Nor  was  the  growing  irritation  in  the 
Senate  a  matter  to  be  lightly  treated.  In  spite  of 
unabated  official  optimism  there  was  still  no  means  of 
knowing  whether  the  two-thirds  ratification  majority 
could  be  really  counted  upon  against  the  tempestuous 
oratory  of  the  irreconcilables. 

Pressure  in  the  main  committee  and  the  sub-com- 
mittees consequently  increased  and  there  was  much 


192      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

plain  speaking.  Why  not  an  international  board  of 
reference  to  maintain  the  open  door  in  China — with 
a  retroactive  clause?  The  Secretary  of  State  sud- 
denly brought  forward  a  complete  plan  in  four 
clauses.  The  Japanese,  French,  and  British,  for 
once  uniting  in  a  queer  company  because  they  ap- 
prehended that  vested  interests  were  at  stake,  de- 
clared that  they  were  ready  for  any  kind  of  action 
except  retroaction.  Could  you  ever  really  go  back- 
wards even  in  China — unless,  of  course,  you  happened 
to  be  Chinese?  Sideways  was  a  possible  method — in- 
action another,  which  had  been  highly  popular 
throughout  the  years ;  but  retroaction  never ! 

Two  days  were  devoted  to  a  debate  in  which  these 
Powers  explained  their  honesty  of  purpose  and  their 
resolve  to  support  the  proposals  fully  and  entirely 
except  in  this  one  matter.  The  French  were  par- 
ticularly concerned  regarding  the  principle  of  upset- 
ting commitments  already  registered  by  Treaty;  for 
if  there  was  a  retroactive  clause  in  Chinese  affairs 
might  not  the  principle  be  extended,  as  some  very 
ardently  desired,  to  European  treaties?  Everybody 
spoke,  the  Japanese  more  economically  than  any  one 
else  but  with  telling  irony. 

Retroactivity,  which  now  began  to  sound  in  the 
ears  of  the  tired  delegates  as  if  Einstein  had  slipped 
in  amongst  them,  was  openly  abandoned.  Secretary 
Hughes  fired  a  heavy  ear-guard  salvo  by  suddenly 
proposing  that  all  nations  must  file  their  commit- 
ments in  China,  secret  and  otherwise.  This  was 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  193 

finally  accepted  with  the  tacit  understanding  that  the 
contracts  of  private  individuals  must  stand  outside, 
but  that  all  new  commitments  under  the  agreement 
would  be  communicated  to  signatory  powers  within 
sixty  days.  China  took  the  first  and  only  action  in 
this  matter  by  solemnly  communicating  to  the  con- 
ference the  official  text  (obtained  by  telegraph)  of  the 
forgotten  secret  treaty  made  thirty-one  years  before 
in  Petrograd  between  the  Tsars  of  Muscovy  and  the 
Manchus  after  the  Sino- Japanese  war.  Those  who 
had  already  read  Count  Witte's  Memoirs  learnt 
nothing  new.  Those  whose  reading  does  not  carry 
them  to  books  exclaimed  at  the  commonplace  nature 
of  the  secret — not  knowing  that  all  secret  diplomacy 
when  it  is  unbared  resembles  remarkably  the  empty 
cupboard  which  Mother  Hubbard  once  opened  to  the 
confusion  of  her  poor  dog.  .  .  . 

Still  full  official  publication  of  the  Treaty  was  im- 
portant, if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  prove  how 
faulty  Russian  imperial  policy  had  been,  and  how 
differently  history  might  have  unrolled  had  advan- 
tage been  taken  in  1905  during  the  Russo-Japanese 
War  of  rights  freely  conceded  by  China.  The  docu- 
ment is  worthy  of  being  recorded. 

"TREATY  OF  ALLIANCE  BETWEEN  CHINA  AND 
RUSSIA— MAY,  1896 

"Article  1.  The  high  contracting  parties  engage  to  sup- 
port each  other  reciprocally  by  all  their  land  and  sea  forces 
in  case  of  any  aggression  directed  by  Japan  against  Russian 
territory  in  Eastern  Asia,  China  or  Korea. 


194      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

"Article  2.  No  treaty  of  peace  with  an  adverse  party  can 
be  concluded  by  either  of  them  without  the  consent  of  the 
other. 

"Article  3.  During  military  operations  all  Chinese  ports 
shall  be  open  to  Russian  vessels. 

"Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  to  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  across  the  Province  of  Amur  and 
Kirin  in  the  direction  of  Vladivostock.  The  construction 
and  exploitation  of  this  railway  shall  be  accorded  to  the 
Russo-Chinese  Bank.  The  contract  shall  be  concluded  be- 
tween the  Chinese  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank. 

"Article  5.  In  time  of  war  Russia  shall  have  free  use  of 
the  railway  for  the  transport  and  provisioning  of  her  troops. 
In  time  of  peace  Russia  shall  have  the  same  right  for  the 
transit  of  her  troops  and  provisions. 

"Article  6.  The  present  treaty  shall  come  into  force  from 
the  day  on  which  the  contract  stipulated  in  Article  4  shall 
have  been  confirmed.  It  shall  have  force  for  fifteen  years." 

It  is  true  that  the  events  of  1898  and  1900  compli- 
cated the  effective  use  of  this  instrument  (which  only 
expired  in  1911)  by  Russia  in  her  supreme  hour  in 
1905.  But  in  spite  of  the  forced  lease  of  Port  Ar- 
thur, which  Count  Witte  had  so  bitterly  opposed  in 
1898,  and  in  spite  of  the  military  operations  during 
the  Boxer  rising,  there  was  ample  evidence  during 
1900  to  observers  on  the  spot  that  both  China  and 
Russia  were  acting  in  terms  of  this  secret  understand- 
ing, several  clauses  of  which  had  been  duly  executed. 
Had  the  Baltic  fleet  in  1905  invoked  article  3  and 
occupied  and  fortified  for  five  months  an  anchorage 
in  South  China,  preferably  Foochow,  which  has  a 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  195 

naval  arsenal,  after  leaving  the  waters  of  Indo-China 
as  could  easily  have  been  done,  it  would  probably 
have  meant  for  Russia  the  difference  between  defeat 
and  stalemate, — the  prolongation  of  the  war  into 
1906  being  the  sole  means  of  exhausting  Japan. 
Those  among  the  delegates  of  the  Washington  Con- 
ference who  had  personal  knowledge  of  the  Far  East 
were  impressed  by  this  little  flash  of  lightning  into 
the  murky  past.  And  as  if  in  obedience  to  a  subcon- 
scious impulse  the  agenda-paper  was  referred  to 
again.  And  before  there  was  time  to  catch  your 
breath,  Siberia  had  slipped  on  to  the  green  baize 
table. 

VI 

Siberia — the  land  of  ice  and  snow,  the  vast  land  of 
knouts  and  exiles,  about  which  no  one  knew  very 
much  excepting  that  it  was  very  big  and  very  wild — 
was  it  this  that  had  come  up  for  solution  at  the  close 
of  an  exhausting  session?  No!  It  was  just  that 
portion  beyond  Lake  Baikal  erected  into  an  in- 
dependent Far  Eastern  Republic  in  1920,  as  a  guar- 
antee against  pure  Bolshevism  fouling  the  Pacific, 
which  is  entirely  composed  of  Chinese  territory 
wrested  piece  by  piece  from  Peking  between  the  years 
1689  and  1860.  It  was  therefore  a  semi-Chinese  issue. 
The  Russian  Far  East,  being  economically  dependent 
on  Manchuria  and  inexorably  tied  to  it  by  the  thou- 
sand-mile section  of  the  grand  trans-Siberian  called 
the  Chinese  Eastern  railway,  was  as  much  part  and 


196      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

parcel  of  the  problem  before  the  conference  as  Shan- 
tung or  the  question  of  Pacific  islands. 

Yet  for  America  to  try  her  hand  at  solving  it  was 
puerile.  The  folly  displayed  during  the  previous 
Administration  had  compromised  the  position  so 
badly  that  all  liberty  of  action  had  been  lost.  As 
had  been  the  case  with  China's  entry  into  the  war, 
after  a  brilliant  preliminary  gesture  in  1918,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  been  content  in  1920  to  fold  his 
hands  and  let  everything  drop  in  his  Paris  manner. 
It  was  as  if  some  evil  destiny  prompted  him  to  magni- 
ficent beginnings  so  that  the  endings  might  be  all  the 
more  miserable. 

The  story  merits  re-telling.  In  1918  the  Bol- 
sheviks were  not  only  in  power  in  Siberia  but  Brest- 
Litovsk  had  forever  humiliated  them  with  the  world. 
The  Czecho-Slovak  legionaries,  who  had  acquired  a 
legendary  name  from  the  manner  in  which  they  had 
fought  throughout  the  war,  were  trying  vainly  to  dis- 
entangle themselves  from  the  fastnesses  of  Siberia, 
where  strange  disruptive  movements  were  constantly 
breaking  out  due  to  the  enormous  Austro-German 
prison-camps  and  the  popularity  of  communism  as  a 
doctrine  of  revolt.  The  Siberian  railway,  without 
which  Asiatic  Russia  was  a  lifeless  torso,  had  slowed 
down  almost  to  inanition.  Japan,  having  already 
written  with  China  so-called  "War-participating 
treaties,"  which  enabled  her  to  utilize  Chinese  terri- 
tory without  having  to  face  a  storm  of  public  con- 
demnation, was  nibbling  at  Vladivostok.  But  she 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  197 

had  not  yet  landed,  being  dissuaded  from  definitely 
committing  herself  owing  to  the  coldness  with  which 
her  "plan"  to  give  military  aid  to  Russia  during  the 
Kerensky  regime  had  been  received  by  the  British 
Government.  President  Wilson,  about  to  be  con- 
fronted with  an  accomplished  fact,  and  no  doubt  irri- 
tated by  the  amount  of  money  which  had  already  been 
vainly  advanced  to  the  fallen  Kerensky  government, 
invited  all  the  Allies  to  participate  in  a  joint  military 
expedition  to  save  and  evacuate  the  60,000  Czecho- 
slovak troops. 

The  invitation  was  promptly  accepted.  Six 
Powers  were  involved : — the  United  States,  England, 
France,  Italy,  Japan  and  China:  and  in  order  that 
American  policy  should  be  made  crystal  clear  the  fol- 
lowing declaration  was  issued  (in  July,  1918) : 

"In  the  judgment  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
a  judgment  arrived  at  after  repeated  and  very  searching 
considerations  of  the  whole  situation,  military  intervention 
in  Russia  would  be  more  likely  to  add  to  the  present  sad  con- 
fusion there  than  to  cure  it  and  would  injure  Russia  rather 
than  help  her  out  of  her  distress.  Such  military  interven- 
tion as  has  been  most  frequently  proposed,  even  supposing  it 
to  be  efficacious  in  its  immediate  object  of  delivering  an 
attack  upon  Germany  from  the  East,  would,  in  its  judg- 
ment, be  more  likely  to  turn  out  to  be  merely  a  method  of 
making  use  of  Russia  than  to  be  a  method  of  serving  her. 
Her  people,  if  they  profited  by  it  at  all,  could  not  profit 
by  it  in  time  to  deliver  them  from  their  present  desperate 
difficulties  and  their  substance  would  meantime  be  used  to 
maintain  foreign  armies,  not  to  reconstitute  their  own,  or  to 


198     AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

feed  their  own  men,  women  and  children.  We  are  bending 
all  our  energies  now  to  the  purpose  of  winning  on  the  west- 
ern front,  and  it  would,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  be  most  unwise  to  divide  or 
dissipate  our  forces.  As  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  sees  the  present  circumstances,  therefore,  military 
action  is  admissible  in  Russia  now  only  to  render  such  pro- 
tection and  help  as  is  possible  to  the  Czecho-Slovaks  against 
the  armed  Austrian  and  German  prisoners  who  are  attack- 
ing them  and  to  steady  any  efforts  at  self-government  or 
self-defence  in  which  the  Russians  themselves  may  be  willing 
to  accept  assistance.  Whether  from  Vladivostok  or  from 
Murmansk  and  Archangel,  the  only  present  object  for  which 
American  troops  will  be  employed  will  be  to  guard  military 
stores  which  may  subsequently  be  needed  by  Russian  forces 
in  the  organization  of  their  own  self-defence.  With  such 
object  in  view  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  now 
co-operating  with  the  Governments  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Murmansk  and  Archangel. 
The  United  States  and  Japan  are  the  only  Powers  which 
are  just  now  in  position  to  act  in  Siberia  in  sufficient  force 
to  accomplish  even  such  modest  objects  as  those  that  have 
been  outlined.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  has 
therefore  proposed  to  the  Government  of  Japan  that  each 
of  the  two  Governments  send  a  force  of  a  few  thousand  men 
to  Vladivostok  with  the  purpose  of  co-operating  as  a  single 
force  in  the  occupation  of  Vladivostok  and  in  safe-guarding 
so  far  as  it  may  the  country  to  the  rear  of  the  westward 
moving  Czecho-Slovaks;  and  the  Japanese  Government  has 
consented.  In  taking  this  action,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  wishes  to  announce  to  the  people  of  Russia  in 
the  most  public  and  solemn  manner  that  it  contemplates  no 
interference  with  the  political  sovereignty  of  Russia,  no  in- 
tervention in  her  internal  affairs,  not  even  in  the  local  affairs 
of  the  limited  areas  which  her  military  force  may  be  obliged 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  199 

to  occupy,  and  no  impairment  of  Russian  territory  integ- 
rity, either  now  or  hereafter ;  but  that  what  we  are  about  to 
do  has  as  its  single  and  only  object  the  rendering  of  such  aid 
as  shall  be  acceptable  to  the  Russian  people  themselves  in  their 
endeavours  to  regain  control  of  their  own  affairs,  their  own 
territory  and  their  own  destiny.  The  Japanese  Government, 
it  is  understood,  will  issue  a  similar  assurance.  These  plans 
and  purposes  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  have 
been  communicated  to  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Italy,  and  those  Governments  have  advised  the 
Department  of  State  that  they  assent  to  them  in  principle. 
No  conclusion  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  arrived  at  in  this  important  matter  is  intended,  how- 
ever, as  an  effort  to  restrict  the  actions  or  interfere  with 
the  independent  judgment  of  the  Governments  with  which 
we  are  now  associated  in  the  war.  It  is  also  the  hope  and 
purpose  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  take 
advantage  of  the  earliest  opportunity  to  send  to  Siberia 
a  commission  of  merchants,  agricultural  experts,  labour  ad- 
visers, Red  Cross  representatives,  and  agents  of  the  Young 
Men's  Christian  Association,  accustomed  to  organizing  the 
best  methods  of  spreading  useful  information  and  rendering 
educational  help  of  a  modest  kind  in  order  in  some  sympa- 
thetic way  to  relieve  the  immediate  economic  necessities  of 
the  people  there  in  every  way  for  which  an  opportunity  may 
open.  The  execution  of  this  plan  will  not  be  permitted  to 
embarrass  the  military  assistance  rendered  to  the  Czecho- 
slovaks. It  is  the  hope  and  expectation  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  that  the  Governments  with  which 
it  is  associated  will  wherever  necessary  or  possible  lend  their 
active  aid  in  the  execution  of  these  military  and  economic 
plans." 

The  United  States  sent  seven  thousand  troops — 
the  Japanese  seventy  thousand.     There  in  a  nutshell 


was  the  position  which  was  created:  for  the  only  im- 
portant sentence  in  this  long-winded  declaration  was 
the  statement  that  the  United  States  and  Japan  were 
the  only  two  Powers  which  were  in  a  position  to  act 
in  Siberia  in  sufficient  force.  Nevertheless  there  was 
also  a  British  appeal  which  began  in  the  vein  of 
Napoleon's  manifestoes:  "Your  Allies  have  not  for- 
gotten you!  We  remember  all  the  services  your 
heroic  army  rendered  us  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war;"  and  which  ended  "Peoples  of  Russia,  join  us 
in  the  defence  of  your  liberties.  Our  one  desire  is 
to  see  Russia  strong  and  free,  and  then  to  retire  to 
watch  the  Russian  people  work  out  their  own  des- 
tinies." The  British  document  was  signed  with  a 
single  name — Balfour — not  the  penitent  Balfour  of 
Washington  in  his  Canossa-robes,  but  the  other  Bal- 
four. That  in  the  circumstances  the  heralded  re- 
tirement "to  watch  the  Russian  people  work  out  their 
destinies"  was  somewhat  delayed  and  indeed  varied 
into  an  amazing  set  of  adventures  from  the  White 
Sea  to  the  Black  Sea,  which  will  provoke  the  ridicule 
of  all  future  historians,  need  cause  no  surprise. 

Japan  was  on  the  spot.  Time  was  her  ally — not 
the  peoples  of  the  West.  Pending  the  use  of  the 
loved  instrument — the  knife — she  practised  manipu- 
lative surgery.  Just  as  she  had  done  in  the  case  of 
Shantung  in  1914,  so  now  in  1918  prior  to  every- 
thing else  she  spread  out  her  forces  in  order  to  en- 
velop as  much  country  as  possible.  In  this  way, 
while  the  other  Allies  occupied  themselves  more  or 


MAP  ILLUSTRATING 

CANALIZATION  OF  CHINESE  WABTARE 

BY  THE  RAILWAYS 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  MAIN  ARE  LIMITED  TO  THE  RAILWAYS 
RUNNING  BETWEEN  THE  YANGTZE  VALLEY  AND  PEKING  AND  THE 
RAILWAY  RUNNING  TO  MUKDEN,  IN  MANCHURIA. 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  201 

less  faithfully  in  attaining  their  proclaimed  objective, 
the  trans-Siberian  railway — Japan  set  to  work  to  oc- 
cupy the  Ussuri  railway,  which  runs  up  to  the  Amur 
river;  then  the  Amur  railway  which  runs  for  nearly 
2,000  versts  along  the  banks  of  that  great  boundary 
river;  then  all  strategic  points.  Countless  incidents, 
varying  from  the  arrest  of  Allied  generals  to  the 
burning  of  whole  districts,  marked  her  progress ;  and 
although  the  creation  of  an  Inter-Allied  Technical 
Railway  Board  rendered  it  increasingly  difficult  for 
her  to  tamper  with  communications,  particularly  as 
an  American  was  elected  chairman  and  secured  most 
of  the  new  rolling-stock  from  his  own  country;  the 
detailed  story  reads  like  a  tale  by  Pouschkin. 

Peace  at  Paris  in  the  summer  of  1919  turned  the 
heterogeneous  expeditionary  force,  now  spread  thinly 
to  the  Ural  Mountains,  into  something  very  different. 
It  became  a  question  of  open  warfare,  i.e.,  helping 
White  Russia  to  break  Red  Russia.  Koltchak,  set 
up  at  Omsk,  soon  fell  down  and  fled  and  was  sum- 
marily executed  at  Irkutsk.  It  is  an  interesting  his- 
torical fact  that  he  was  caught  in  Irkutsk  station 
on  the  very  day  and  at  the  very  hour  that  the  first 
Japanese  troop-train  penetrated  as  far  west,  the 
Japanese  battalion-commander  making  a  frantic  at- 
tempt to  save  him  as  he  was  led  away.  Had  the 
Japanese  been  more  honest  in  1919,  Koltchak  would 
not  have  died  in  1920  and  the  whole  Siberian  story 
might  have  been  different. 

Koltchak    dead;    the   White    Russian   movement 


202      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

scotched;  the  Allies  deeply  humiliated — that  was  the 
position  at  the  beginning  of  1920.  The  almost  for- 
gotten Czecho-Slovaks,  still  retreating  in  putrescent 
trains  which  they  had  occupied  for  years,  had  been 
forced  to  make  their  peace  with  Bolshevism  in  order 
to  get  out  at  all. 

Spring  of  1920.  Most  of  the  Allied  troops  had 
long  been  shipped  away  out  of  this  horror.  The 
putrescent  trains  still  crawled  into  Vladivostok,  rail- 
way movement  having  been  kept  up  only  through 
the  amazing  energy  of  American  engineers  who  de- 
fied every  effort  to  check  them  and  pushed  on  with 
their  work  like  so  many  Hercules  working  in  an 
Augean  stable.  The  minutes  of  the  Inter-Allied 
Technical  Board  and  its  inspectors  have  to  be  read 
to  obtain  any  conception  of  the  fearful  internecine 
warfare  raging  endless  beneath  the  surface.  Ani- 
mosities were  so  deep  that  a  complete  break  seemed 
never  more  than  a  day  off.  The  American  Com- 
mand still  clung  doggedly  to  Vladivostok;  but  offi- 
cers and  men  were  sick  of  the  chicanery  and  fraud 
and  dirt  and  confusion,  sick  of  the  things  they  saw 
— sick  of  a  political  debauchery  which  has  had  no 
counterpart  in  the  present  century.  The  agitation 
in  Congress  could  have  one  end  only.  Orders  to 
evacuate  came  at  last. 

On  the  1st  April  the  last  American  transport  dis- 
appeared out  of  the  peerless  bay  of  the  Golden  Horn 
with  the  last  American  troops.  On  the  night  of  the 
4th  April  the  Japanese  struck  as  hard  as  they  could 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  203 

at  every  point  where  the  Russian  Popular  movement, 
a  mixture  of  Bolshevism  and  so-called  Partisan 
bands,  looked  like  succeeding.  In  Vladivostok,  in 
Nikolsk,  in  Havarovsk,  in  Chita,  it  was  much  the 
same  thing — gunfire  and  bayonets  for  all  who  were 
in  a  position  to  resist.  A  sort  of  constituent  as- 
sembly was  in  session  at  Nikolsk — 500  peasant  dep- 
uties talking  only  as  Russians  can  talk.  They  talked 
no  more.  The  Partisan  forces  were  butchered 
wherever  they  refused  to  scatter.  In  Vladivostok 
fire  was  opened  on  the  Zemstvo  building  from  a  Jap- 
anese hotel  across  the  street  where  a  mountain  gun 
and  machine  guns  had  been  placed.  As  germicides 
they  were  eminently  effective.  Such  embryonic 
forms  of  popular  government  as  existed  duly  per- 
ished. 

Was  there  a  close  and  intimate  connection  be- 
tween the  departure  of  the  last  American  troops 
and  the  action  of  the  Japanese?  I  arrived  at  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  after  investigating  matters 
on  the  spot  as  a  member  of  a  Chinese  Government 
Commission  two  months  after  these  events.  The 
buffer  state,  from  which  has  now  emerged  the  so- 
called  Far  Eastern  Republic,  was  about  to  be  born, 
negotiations  going  on  openly  between  the  various 
groups  to  that  end.  The  entire  territory  east  of 
Lake  Baikal  having  for  three  years  been  overrun 
by  all  sorts  of  movements  and  being  economically 
dependent  upon  "bourgeois"  states,  it  had  been  felt 
that  a  non-Bolshevist  buffer  state  was  essential. 


204      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

The  peasant  assembly  at  Nikolsk,  in  the  maritime 
province,  had  its  counterpart  at  Verkhne-Udinsk,  the 
centre  of  the  Zemstvo  government  of  Pribaibalia,  ly- 
ing several  hundred  miles  west  of  the  Japanese  ad- 
vance-lines. There  on  the  6th  April,  before  any 
reliable  news  of  the  Japanese  assaults  had  arrived, 
the  independence  of  the  Russian  Far  East,  and  the 
formation  of  a  Democratic  Republic  had  been  pro- 
claimed and  communicated  to  the  government  of 
Soviet  Russia  and  to  the  governments  of  all  Allied 
countries.  The  Japanese  believed  that  the  United 
States  had  purposely  evacuated  hastily  and  without 
consultation  in  order  to  foster  these  Russian  plans, 
all  Americans  in  Russian  territory  openly  favouring 
the  popular  movement. 

That  the  American  evacuation  was  premature  can- 
not be  contested.  The  official  object  of  the  inter- 
vention, the  salving  of  the  Czecho- Slovak  force,  was 
not  accomplished  until  half  a  year  later — September, 
1920.  On  that  date  the  last  echelons  were  shipped 
home  from  Vladivostok  and  it  was  on  that  date  that 
the  last  Americans  should  have  gone,  too. 


VII 

There  was  another  aspect. 

Just  as  the  American  intervention  of  1918  was 
only  part  of  a  general  policy  towards  Russia,  which 
President  Wilson  tried  to  make  effective  by  avail- 
ing himself  of  the  special  conditions  which  had  arisen 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  205 

in  the  Far  East,  so  were  the  events  round  Vladi- 
vostok and  the  Siberian  railways  but  incidents  in 
the  general  and  permanent  Japanese  policy  of  domi- 
nating the  Asiatic  seaboard.  By  a  lucky  chance  in 
the  winter  of  1920,  the  whole  Japanese  garrison  and 
the  township  of  Nicolaievsk  (the  Amur  port  of 
entry)  was  wiped  out  by  Russian  bands  composed  of 
convicts  and  exiles  of  the  most  desperate  description. 

Here  indeed  was  the  heaven-sent  opportunity.  .  .  . 

Japan  went  to  work  methodically.  The  evacuation 
of  Trans-Baikalia  was  carried  out  in  the  summer  of 
1920  with  a  great  deal  of  display,  and  then  came  the 
occupation  of  Northern  Saghalien,  which  was  an 
absolutely  bare-faced  proceeding  if  there  was  ever 
one;  for  as  a  state  of  war  existed  she  could  hardly 
make  the  loss  of  a  military  force  the  basis  for  a  claim 
for  compensation.  Presently  gunboats  and  light 
craft  re-established  her  power  at  Nicolaievsk  and 
carried  it  along  the  Siberian  coast  up  to  the  rich 
promontory  of  Kamchatka.  This  killed  two  birds 
with  one  stone.  For  the  fisheries  were  just  as  im- 
portant as  the  reversion  of  Soviet  Russia's  other 
rights:  and  so  long  as  Northern  Saghalien  remained 
in  her  hands  she  had  the  fisheries  of  river  and  coast 
bottled  up.  Possiet  Bay — a  marvellous  anchorage 
situated  just  at  the  point  where  Korean,  Chinese, 
and  Russian  territory  meets — was  tightly  held;  so 
was  Castries  Bay.  With  her  troops  concentrated  in 
the  martime  district,  Japan  had  swung  her  policy 
from  participation  with  the  Allies  to  a  purely  selfish 


206      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

one,  bearing  no  relation  to  the  purposes  of  the  inter- 
vention. 

VIII 

Here  now  in  the  pure  atmosphere  of  Washington, 
where  there  was  no  trace  of  this  dismal  background 
of  cross  purposes  and  wrecked  hopes,  the  Japanese 
were  suddenly  asked  by  the  United  States  when  they 
proposed  to  carry  out  their  oft-repeated  pledge  and 
evacuate  their  troops. 

Secretary  Hughes  required  imperturbability  to 
do  that.  The  failure  of  his  predecessors  to  act  in 
concert  with  Japan  had  freed  the  government  of 
Tokyo  from  the  corresponding  liability.  Had  he 
been  a  bolder  man  with  a  bolder  chief  he  would  have 
announced  American  recognition  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic  since  property-rights  and  universal  suf- 
frage were  guaranteed  in  that  State.  But  how 
could  he  do  that  when  his  government  still  accorded 
full  diplomatic  privileges  to  the  ambassador  of  the 
Kerensky  regime  who  was  still  allowed  full  control 
of  whatever  remained  of  the  186  million  gold  dollars 
lent  through  the  instrumentality  of  Messrs.  J.  P. 
Morgan  &  Co.?  Believing  in  1922  (much  as  Sec- 
retary Lansing  had  believed  in  1917)  that  great 
changes  were  imminent  in  Russia  and  that  the  Bol- 
shevik power  was  crumbling,  Secretary  Hughes  was 
really  as  much  tied  to  a  corpse  as  the  Japanese  Del- 
egation. It  was  perhaps  as  well  that  in  such  a 
charnel-house  he  should  have  contented  himself  with 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  207 

a  long  and  platitudinous  restatement  qf  the  Ameri- 
can position  in  Siberian  matters.  And  as  Japan  was 
able  to  declare  in  reply  that  she  made  such  a  clear 
distinction  between  the  Soviet  Government  of  Mos- 
cow and  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  at  Chita  that  she 
was  actually  in  negotiations  with  the  Chita  Govern- 
ment at  Dairen  to  facilitate  evacuation  of  her  troops, 
Secretary  Hughes  suddenly  let  the  whole  matter 
drop. 

Japan  had  made  ample  provision  for  every  possible 
contingency.  Directly  she  had  seen  that  it  would 
be  impossible  for  her  to  refuse  to  attend  the  Wash- 
ington Conference,  and  discuss  every  phase  of  the 
Far  East,  she  had  sent  such  urgent  instruction  to 
her  Minister  in  Peking  that  he  had  gone  in  the  dead 
of  night  to  the  chief  of  the  Chita  Mission  in  Peking, 
pulled  him  out  of  bed,  and  asked  him  to  begin  nego- 
tiations in  his  pyjamas.  The  actual  conversations 
had  commenced  in  Dairen  in  August,  1920,  and  were 
going  on  at  the  moment  of  Secretary  Hughes*  in- 
terrogation. They  were  broken  off  in  April  without 
result  when  they  had  served  their  purpose,  having 
been  prolonged  after  the  Washington  Conference 
so  as  to  serve  as  camouflage  for  the  Genoa  Confer- 
ence. Is  not  diplomacy  amusing? 


IX 

There  was  method   behind   American  tactics  in 
spite  of  the  apparent  feebleness  regarding  Siberia. 


208      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Shantung  had  to  be  solved:  if  Shantung  were  left 
unsolved  the  Harding  Administration  would  suffer 
so  severely  that  its  future  would  be  compromised. 
The  Shantung  question  was  an  issue  that  the  Ameri- 
can people  not  only  clearly  understood  but  were  de- 
termined about,  for  had  they  not  fought  a  Presiden- 
tial campaign  more  or  less  around  it?  Therefore 
Shantung  was  vital  and  the  possibility  of  the  Treaties 
failing  to  secure  Senate  ratification  was  too  near  not 
to  sacrifice  everything  in  favour  of  Shantung. 

On  the  25th  January,  following  a  conference  be- 
tween President  Harding  and  the  senior  Chinese 
Delegate,  complete  agreement  was  reached  on  the 
question  of  the  Shantung  railway,  the  formula 
adopted  being  simply  the  British  practice  in  regard 
to  Chinese  railways,  i.e.,  a  Chinese  Director-General, 
a  Foreign  Chief  Engineer  and  a  Foreign  Chief  Ac- 
countant with  easy  terms  of  redemption  of  Treasury 
Notes  spread  over  5-15  year  periods.  On  the  26th 
January  Secretary  Hughes  let  go  the  Siberian  issue. 
It  was  purely  a  coincidence,  of  course,  that  Shantung 
had  been  settled  the  previous  day.  It  was  a  signifi- 
cant and  ironical  fact  that  the  British  official  ob- 
server who  had  sat  through  these  Shantung  conver- 
sations was  no  other  than  the  self-same  British  Min- 
ister in  Peking  who  in  1914  had  telegraphed  so  ur- 
gently to  his  government  that  action  was  imperative 
to  secure  that  Kiaochow  was  not  transferred  back  to 
China,  and  that  Germany  by  virtue  of  article  V  of 
the  Convention  of  1898  might  not  reserve  for  her- 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  209 

self  more  suitable  territory.  It  had  taken  seven  and 
a  half  years  of  uproar  in  Eastern  Asia,  the  ruin  of 
a  President  of  the  United  States,  the  complete  dis- 
ruption of  China  and  the  poisoning  of  world  opinion 
against  Japan  to  cancel  an  error  of  judgment  arising 
from  ignorance. 

Never  in  modern  history  has  there  been  such  a 
singular  rebuke.  But  the  rebuke,  being  a  purely 
moral  one,  was  not  noticed.  Instead,  Mr.  Balfour 
in  a  felicitous  speech  on  the  1st  February  restored 
the  one  remaining  spot  in  Shantung  that  remained 
in  foreign  control — the  British  leased  territory  of 
Weihaiwei — and  so  blotted  out  the  memory  of  the 
past. 

Then  Manchuria  came  up, — first  in  an  indiiect 
form. 


The  question  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  that 
vital  link  of  the  grand  trans-Siberian  railway  which 
is  locked  to  Chinese  territory,  concerned  every  one 
because  of  the  machinery  set  up  in  1919  during  the 
Allied  intervention.  It  was  impossible  to  take  an 
indifferent  attitude:  yet  this  was  one  of  the  few 
matters  in  which  China  had  the  whip-hand  because 
the  one  Power  with  rights — Russia — was  absent. 

She  developed  her  argument  with  skill.  This  was 
a  railway,  a  concession  for  which  she  had  granted  to 
a  Russo-Chinese  bank,  under  a  complicated  system 
which  left  the  grantee  in  full  possession  of  adminis- 


210      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

trative  duties  of  a  far-reaching  order.  The  collapse 
of  Russia  had  made  it  imperative  for  her  not  only 
to  exercise  all  her  rights  but  to  take  over  functions 
hitherto  exercised  by  the  concessionaires.  There  had 
been  grave  political  disorders  in  and  around  the  ter- 
ritory served  by  the  railway.  Any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  Conference  to  single  out  for  separate 
treatment  this  link  in  the  trans-Siberian  system  would 
be  highly  unfair.  The  original  inter-allied  agree- 
ment provided  for  supervision  over  the  whole  grand 
trunk  line  from  Vladivostok  to  the  Ural  Mountains. 
The  only  portion  where  that  supervision  had  been 
effective  was  in  Chinese  territory  with  Chinese  assist- 
ance. A  good  point,  well-made. 

Finding  that  no  progress  was  possible  with  the 
idea  of  internationalization,  the  following  meaning- 
less resolution  was  introduced  and  passed  unani- 
mously: 

"Resolved  that  the  preservation  of  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway  for  those  in  interest  requires  that  better  protection 
be  given  to  the  railway  and  the  persons  engaged  in  its  oper- 
ation and  use ;  a  more  careful  selection  of  personnel  to  secure 
efficiency  of  service:  and  a  more  economical  use  of  funds  to 
prevent  waste  of  the  property." 

And  because  reservations  have  become  an  essential 
part  of  the  post-war  conference,  the  following  was 
promptly  added: 

"The  powers  other  than  China  in  agreeing  to  the  resolu- 
tion in  regard  to  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  reserve  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  211 

right  to  insist  hereafter  upon  the  responsibilities  of  China 
for  performance  or  non-performance  of  the  obligations  to- 
wards foreign  stockholders,  bondholders,  and  creditors  of 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  Company,  which  the  holders 
deem  to  result  from  the  contracts  under  which  the  railway 
was  built  and  the  action  of  China  thereunder  and  the  obli- 
gations which  they  deem  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  trust  result- 
ing from  the  exercising  of  power  by  the  Chinese  Government 
over  the  possession  and  administration  of  the  railway." 

Russia  had  squandered  500  million  gold  roubles 
in  these  railways  and  Count  Witte  in  his  Memoirs 
declared  that  it  would  cost  700  million  roubles  to 
buy  them  back.  So  when  the  chairman  marked  off 
the  item  in  hlue-pencil  from  his  agenda-paper  the 
question  was  left  exactly  as  before — an  issue  between 
China  and  Russia  to  be  hammered  out  perhaps  in 
ways  no  one  at  this  Conference  dreamed  of. 


XI 

At  last  the  matter  which  had  caused  the  chairman 
so  hastily  to  adjourn  discussion  only  a  month  be- 
fore— Japan's  famous  Twenty-one  Demands.  But 
the  Conference,  after  the  plain  speaking  between 
England  and  France  on  submarines,  was  not  so 
squeamish,  and  as  one  very  important  group  of  the 
Demands — Shantung — was  out  of  the  way,  of  the 
remaining  only  Manchuria  was  vital. 

February  opened  with  some  final  tilts  between 
China  and  Japan  of  a  more  interesting  character 


212      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

than  the  others  had  been.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
the  Japanese  were  defeated:  on  the  contrary  their 
arguments  contained  much  meat.  If  China  asked 
the  Conference  to  cancel  all  the  Treaties  and  Notes 
embodying  the  Twenty-one  Demands  she  was  ac- 
knowledging their  validity:  otherwise  if  they  were 
not  valid,  why  should  she  seek  cancellation? 

It  was  a  shrewd  blow.  China  asked  for  time  to 
prepare  a  reply  which  was  not  so  shrewd.  The  Chi- 
nese argument,  after  a  night  of  cogitation,  produced 
four  points  which  in  the  cold  light  of  a  February 
morning  in  Washington  appeared  by  no  means  con- 
clusive : 

"1.  That  the  treaties,  so  far  as  benefits  derived  from  them 
were  concerned,  were  unilateral. 

"2.  That  they  were  in  certain  respects  in  violation  of 
treaties  between  China  and  the  other  Powers. 

"3.  That  they  were  inconsistent  with  the  principles  relat- 
ing to  China  adopted  at  the  Conference. 

"4.  That  they  had  engendered  misunderstandings  between 
China  and  Japan  and  if  not  abrogated  would  tend 
necessarily  to  disturb  good  relations  between  the 
two  countries  and  thus  would  constitute  an  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  realizing  the  purpose  of  the  Conference." 

Japan,  having  already  long  decided  upon  it,  made 
a  gesture  in  the  form  of  a  declaration  which  was 
solemnly  read  out  in  a  way  which  every  one  ac- 
quainted with  the  facts  knew  she  would  do: 

"Having  in  view  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the 
situation  since  the  conclusion  of  the  Sino-Japanese  treaties 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  213 

and  notes  of  1915,  the  Japanese  delegation  is  happy  to 
avail  itself  of  the  present  occasion  to  make  the  following 
declaration : 

"1.  Japan  is  ready  to  throw  open  to  the  joint  activity 
of  the  international  financial  consortium  recently  or- 
ganized, the  right  of  option  granted  exclusively  in 
favour  of  Japanese  capital,  with  regard,  first,  to 
loans  for  the  construction  of  railways  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  and  second,  to 
loans  to  be  secured  on  taxes  in  that  region,  it  being 
understood  that  nothing  in  the  present  declaration 
shall  be  held  to  imply  any  modification  or  annulment 
of  the  understanding  recorded  in  the  officially  an- 
nounced notes  and  memoranda  which  were  exchanged 
among  the  Governments  of  the  countries  represented 
in  the  consortium,  and  also  among  the  national  finan- 
cial groups  composing  the  consortium,  in  relation  to 
the  scope  of  the  joint  activity  of  that  organization. 

"2.  Japan  has  no  intention  of  insisting  on  her  preferential 
right  under  the  Sino-Japanese  arrangements  in 
questions  concerning  the  engagement  by  China  of 
Japanese  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  finan- 
cial, military  or  police  matters  in  South  Manchuria. 

"8.  Japan  is  further  ready  to  withdraw  the  reservation 
which  she  made  in  proceeding  to  the  signature  of  the 
Sino-Japanese  treaties  and  notes  of  1915,  to  the 
effect  that  Group  V  of  the  original  proposals  of  the 
Japanese  Government  would  be  postponed  for  future 
negotiating." 

It  was  the  end!  Japan  had  conceded  every  non- 
essential.  The  Twenty-one  Demands  could  not  but 
henceforth  wear  a  very  different  complexion.  That 
the  two  essentials,  the  Port  Arthur  lease  and  the 


214      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

South  Manchurian  railway  concession,  the  first  ex- 
tended to  1997  and  the  second  to  the  year  2002,  had 
been  quietly  ignored  was  as  much  due  to  the  tactics 
adopted  as  to  anything  else.  The  delegates,  who 
had  been  booking  and  cancelling  passages  since 
December,  were  absolutely  determined  to  go.  Mon- 
day, the  6th  February,  was  put  down  as  the  closing- 
day. 

Six  treaties  had  resulted,  three  dealing  with  war- 
fare and  the  prevention  thereof  on  the  Pacific  (since 
they  cannot  apply  to  non-signatory  Powers  of  Eu- 
rope) and  three  with  Chinese  affairs.  There  had 
been  an  absolute  balance  between  the  two  issues. 
Had  Secretary  Hughes  realized  this  in  the  begin- 
ning that  attitude  would  have  led  to  a  far  more  bene- 
ficial atmosphere  and  far  more  beneficial  results. 

As  in  the  case  with  the  opening  so  with  the  end- 
ing, President  Harding  blessed  those  present.  There 
was  a  last  tribute  to  his  abundant  good  judgment  in 
the  fact  that  a  supplement  to  the  Pacific  treaty  was 
entered  into  which  expressly  removed  the  islands  of 
Japan  Proper  from  its  scope,  and  left  Japan  as  a 
sovereign  unguaranteed  power. 

It  had  been  a  memorable  conference.  There  was 
only  one  important  omission.  The  convened  Powers 
should  have  repeated  in  a  chorus  that  portion  of  the 
Lord's  Prayer  which  deals  so  eloquently  with  our 
hope  of  forgiveness  for  the  things  which  we  leave 
undone. 


PART  VIII 

THE  RECKONING 


THE  record  in  these  pages  is  the  chronicle  of  the 
first  decisive  intervention  of  North  America  in  world 
politics,  a  totally  new  phenomenon  with  particular 
importance  in  an  era  of  readjustment.  Commenced 
hy  Canada  in  the  historic  debates  in  the  Canadian 
House  of  Commons  of  the  21st  and  26th  April,  the 
action  terminated  appropriately  enough  in  Washing- 
ton with  a  series  of  international  compacts  as  notable 
for  what  they  failed  to  do  as  for  what  they  actually 
accomplished. 

Through  all  these  things  the  same  strong  thread 
runs.  The  dominating  impulse  is  the  common  in- 
terest and  the  fundamental  identity  of  purpose  of 
the  English-speaking  community.  Jealousies  and 
differences  there  are  which  must  grow  as  life  and 
life's  interests  become  more  complex.  Yet  the  strong 
thread  will  grow  stronger  until  in  the  end  it  has 
the  tensile  strength  of  steel.  Canada  is  not  only  a 
guarantee  against  the  kind  of  error  which  is  fatal 
to  a  good  understanding,  but  facilitates  in  countless 
ways  that  transfer  of  power  from  the  western  to 
the  eastern  shores  of  the  Atlantic  which  is  now  actu- 
ally occurring.  A  generation  may  pass  before  the 

215 


216      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

process  is  complete  and  a  proper  balance  established ; 
but  the  first  half  of  the  present  century  will  not  have 
ended  before  it  is  successfully  carried  out  and  a  per- 
manent new  influence  enthroned  in  place  of  the 
old. 

This  new  dispensation  is  supremely  important  for 
the  Pacific  Ocean.  Europe  is  too  far  away  and  too 
immersed  in  its  own  affairs  to  concern  itself  any 
longer  with  the  destinies  of  peoples  on  the  other 
side  of  the  globe  who  are  rapidly  developing  racial 
and  political  consciousness  in  much  the  same  way  as 
occurred  among  Western  nations  a  hundred  years 
ago.  The  United  States  has  been  the  first  power 
to  understand  and  admit  this  fact,  and  to  prepare 
for  its  implications,  as  befits  a  new  nation  grown  so 
rapidly  to  giant  stature.  The  time  is  not  far  off 
when  the  countries  of  the  Pacific  will  be  eager  to 
accept  a  hegemony  based  on  fair  dealing.  Not  only 
Canada  but  Australia  and  New  Zealand  must  ulti- 
mately be  represented  in  the  new  centre  of  gravity 
— Washington — and  by  so  doing  commit  England 
still  further  to  the  North  American  movement.  To- 
day we  are  witnessing  something  very  similar  to 
what  occurred  at  the  end  of  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
when  the  West  Indies  and  the  Caribbean  from  being 
the  very  centre  of  conflict  and  endeavour  dropped 
overnight  to  insignificance  because  the  world  move- 
ment led  men  towards  Asia  and  Africa  and  the  coun- 
tries of  the  sun.  If  now  as  a  result  of  the  new  type 
civilization  which  has  grown  so  rich  in  the  region 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  217 

north  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  the  vast  increase  in 
the  white  population  therein,  we  find  a  similar  dis- 
placement, it  is  only  in  accordance  with  laws  to  which 
all  must  bow. 

What  are  the  immediate  results  likely  to  be?  Can 
so  great  a  modification  take  place  without  violent 
disturbances  ? 

In  the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  still  in  the 
making,  and  that  her  policy  has  not  yet  acquired 
the  steady  drive  and  continuity  which  is  a  feature 
in  older  countries,  there  is  a  certain  danger  to  be 
discerned.  The  mixture  of  altruism  and  innocence 
so  often  shown  by  American  spokesmen  was  saved 
in  the  case  of  the  Washington  Conference  from  lead- 
ing to  openly  bad  results  because  certain  things  were 
pegged  down  in  clear  view  of  all  the  world  and  could 
not  be  made  the  subject  of  bargaining.  Yet  had  not 
the  reduction  of  navies  and  the  termination  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  already  passed  through  the 
necessary  preliminary  stages  in  England,  needing 
only  their  coup  de  grace  in  America,  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  the  performance  of  Paris  would  not 
have  been  repeated.  The  Washington  Conference 
owed  its  principal  success  to  the  fact  that  it  was  a 
continuation,  under  a  wider  horizon  and  with  keener 
public  support,  of  the  British  Imperial  Conference  of 
1921.  There  can  be  no  question  about  that.  Had 
it  come  before  that  Conference  it  would  have  almost 
certainly  failed.  For  whilst  the  government  of  the 
United  States  is  admirably  equipped  under  the  con- 


218      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

stitution  for  regulating  internal  business,  in  the  do- 
main of  foreign  affairs  it  labours  under  handicaps 
which  are  increasingly  evident.  The  weakness  of 
the  State  Department  system,  and  the  constantly 
shifting  nature  of  the  impulse  from  the  chief  execu- 
tive are  grave  faults :  while  the  absence  of  really  great 
vested  interests  outside  the  country  means  the  ab- 
sence of  those  spurs  to  action — and  checks  on  wrong 
action — which  are  the  secret  of  England's  political 
success.  Moreover,  the  faulty  connection  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  makes  the 
machinery  creak  and  groan  whenever  any  strain  is 
imposed  by  the  sudden  introduction  of  weighty  for- 
eign questions  for  which  the  mind  of  the  country 
is  not  ripe.  Under  the  Parliamentary  system,  where 
ministerial  responsibility  is  fixed  and  collective,  and 
where  policy  can  be  examined  from  day  to  day,  there 
is  a  pledge  and  a  guarantee  that  special  interests  or 
special  whims  will  not  predominate.  True  enough 
public  sentiment  can  be  whipped  up  speedily  in  the 
United  States;  but  the  inevitable  tendency  is  for 
newspaper  opinion  to  take  the  place  of  the  voice  of 
the  people's  representatives  and  for  a  wild  storm  to 
arise  in  place  of  a  steady  wind.  It  needs  the  thun- 
der of  independent  Senators  to  obtain  even  minute 
corrections  of  executive  illogicalness  and  the  light- 
ning of  the  Hearst  press  to  show  the  nature  of  the 
prospect;  for  much  as  it  has  been  the  fashion  to  de- 
nounce the  newspapers  controlled  by  William  Ran- 
dolph Hearst,  it  is  fact  amply  evident  to  impartial 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  219 

observers  that  without  that  press  appalling  errors 
would  be  committed  in  the  domain  of  foreign  affairs. 
Overstatement  is  good  and  refreshing  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  compromise  and  indecision,  presided  over 
by  the  Golden  Calf.  .  .  . 

Until  American  overseas  interests  are  far  more 
widely  scattered  than  at  present,  the  tendency  will 
be  for  policy  to  be  far  too  much  under  the  domination 
of  a  "home-guard"  form  of  money-power  that  is  ex- 
cessively timid  and  excessively  provincial.  Way- 
wardness of  foreign  policy  will  be  intensified  by  the 
type  of  mind  which  rules  in  a  country  dominated 
by  standardization.  Standardization  in  a  world  of 
endless  variety  is  a  sin  which  brings  its  own  punish- 
ment. It  creates  a  habit  of  mind  unable  to  deal  with 
complexities  and  tending  to  be  easily  disheartened. 
Standardization  ultimately  leads  to  paralysis  and 
immobility,  for  by  endless  repeating  things  in  the 
same  pattern  a  dead  level  is  reached  destructive  of 
true  progress.  Standardization  is  what  killed  the  old 
civilization  of  China  and  has  left  behind  a  type  of 
mind  which  has  made  it  difficult  to  give  reality  and 
meaning  to  anything  new.  Everything  was  stan- 
dardized in  the  old  China — there  was  a  set  and  for- 
mal scheme  for  all  things  beginning  with  food  and 
clothing  and  ending  with  the  dimensions  and  style 
of  every  type  of  house.  The  mentality  engendered 
by  this  formalism  is  timid  and  halting;  and  even 
though  American  policy,  because  of  its  essential  in- 
nocence and  frankness,  represents  a  limitless  im- 


220      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

provement  on  anything  yet  seen,  it  may  be  deprived 
of  its  just  reward  simply  from  these  causes. 


II 

When  we  examine  the  provisions  made  at  Wash- 
ington for  dealing  with  China  we  see  that  the  real 
struggle  has  yet  to  come. 

The  adjournment  of  a  large  number  of  questions 
until  a  later  day  was  decided  upon  because  imme- 
diate agreement  proved  impossible  after  the  faulty 
start.  The  clause  in  one  treaty  which  declares  that 
in  not  more  than  three  months  after  ratification  a 
special  conference  shall  assemble  at  a  place  to  be 
designated  by  the  Chinese  Government  to  deal  with 
the  consolidation  of  the  tariff  is  one  instance:  an- 
other is  the  resolution  regarding  the  evacuation  of 
foreign  garrisons:  a  third  the  agreement  regarding 
the  despatch  of  an  international  commission  of  jur- 
ists: a  fourth  the  projected  Board  of  Reference 
which  is  to  sit  on  debatable  questions.  As  a  sketch 
these  things  are  laudable,  but  unless  special  pains 
are  to  be  taken  by  the  governments  concerned  to 
follow  up  their  efforts  at  Washington,  adequate  solu- 
tions will  not  be  worked  out,  as  the  state  in  which 
China  finds  herself  is  not  conducive  to  radical  re- 
form. Already  she  has  unofficially  requested  that 
the  despatch  of  the  judicial  commission  be  postponed 
for  one  year  because  it  is  impossible  to  allow  an  ex- 
amination of  the  legal  machinery  at  such  a  moment 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  221 

as  the  present.  The  failure  of  several  Powers,  nota- 
bly France,  promptly  to  ratify  the  Washington  en- 
gagements means  that  it  cannot  be  much  before  1923 
that  the  financial  commissions  meet.  That  the  Tariff 
in  China  must  be  the  central  theme  in  the  same  way 
as  it  is  in  the  United  States,  and  in  all  countries 
where  raw  materials  are  the  important  element,  is 
abundantly  clear  to  those  who  are  able  to  appreciate 
the  significance  of  new  developments:  the  history  of 
China  during  the  next  fifty  years  will  be  written 
round  the  Tariff.  The  introduction  of  machinery 
on  a  wholesale  scale  means  that  mass  production  is 
not  far  off;  and  although  it  will  take  thirty  years  to 
set  up  the  thirty  million  spindles  which  it  is  esti- 
mated are  required  to  deal  with  domestic  trade,  long 
before  that  time  the  question  of  the  Chinese  market 
will  be  a  vital  one  to  all  great  trading  nations  and 
must  lead  to  desperate  rivalries.  Had  there  been 
better  informed  Delegations  at  Washington,  they 
would  have  at  least  insisted  that  export  duties  and 
coast  trade  duties  be  abolished  forthwith  so  as  to 
free  trade  channels  at  once. 

All  these  matters  must  be  taken  up  anew  in  1923 
in  China.  The  men  on  the  spot  are  certainly  not 
of  the  calibre  to  inaugurate  great  constructive  pro- 
grammes ;  nor  have  they  sufficient  imagination  to  see 
that  the  old  era  is  at  end  and  that  the  new  one  re- 
quires a  technique  totally  different  from  the  methods 
practised  in  earlier  days.  Economic  questions  of  a 
highly  complicated  nature  are  bound  up  in  the  Tariff 


222      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

and  in  the  allied  banking  and  currency  problem,  but 
nothing  which  has  so  far  transpired  gives  promise 
that  they  will  be  adequately  dealt  with. 

The  only  nexus  which  binds  China  and  foreign 
countries  together  is  the  cash  nexus.  The  symbol 
of  that  nexus  is  for  the  time  being  the  banking  inter- 
ests which  have  united  in  an  international  group  to 
the  detriment  of  the  real  source  of  profit — viz.,  inter- 
national trade.  A  plan  economically  as  unsound  and 
as  unworkable  as  the  Reparation  Clauses  of  the  Ver- 
sailles Treaty  cannot  conceivably  be  the  instrumen- 
tality which  is  to  gather  up  loose  ends  and  bring 
solutions  in  China,  particularly  when  the  issues  in- 
volved are  of  a  more  complicated  nature  than  the 
issues  in  Germany  or  even  in  Russia.  Fatal  defects 
within  the  Banking  Consortium,  even  if  it  were  offi- 
cially accepted  by  China,  would  after  a  short  inter- 
val wreck  it.  The  people  are  unalterably  opposed 
to  exploitation  by  foreign  capitalists:  and  even  if 
really  necessary  work  such  as  the  construction  of 
trunk  railways  were  taken  in  hand,  the  popular  in- 
stinct would  soon  rebel  against  an  alien  system. 
Without  the  willing  co-operation  of  the  people  the 
whole  machinery  of  life  stops  in  China  as  automati- 
cally as  if  levers  had  been  pulled:  the  very  bases  of 
life  seem  to  vanish  overnight  because  those  under- 
lying bases  are  purely  and  entirely  Chinese.  Within 
the  past  year  the  colony  of  Hongkong  has  been 
taught  this  great  truth  in  a  humiliating  and  crush- 
ing way:  that  the  procedure  adopted  there  will  be 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  223 

repeated  elsewhere,  if  similar  folly  is  shown,  is  clear 
when  the  growth  of  the  modern  labour  movement 
in  China  is  understood. 

The  way  to  obtain  lasting  co-operation  in  China 
is  to  recognize  that  only  in  spheres  removed  from 
contact  with  their  daily  lives  and  in  matters  not  harm- 
ful to  their  own  self-development  can  the  foreigner 
intrude.  In  land  and  city  administration,  in  the  col- 
lection of  taxes  in  the  interior,  in  banking  and  cur- 
rency, the  Chinese  are  jealous  and  suspicious  like  the 
natives  of  other  countries.  Instead  of  attempting 
to  extend  foreign  financial  interference  in  China, 
the  boundary  of  that  interference  should  be  the  coast 
line  and  the  custom-house.  In  other  words,  levies 
on  foreign  importations  are  the  only  levies  which 
can  be  legitimately  touched.  China's  borrowing- 
power  ought  to  be  measured  solely  by  the  Tariff :  with 
what  has  already  been  conceded  at  Washington  there 
will  be  enough  revenue  to  provide  the  service  of  a 
debt  of  one  billion  gold  dollars  (225  millions  ster- 
ling) . 

The  creation  of  a  Permanent  Chinese  National 
Debt,  with  the  funding  of  all  indemnities  and  bor- 
rowings made  both  prior  and  during  the  great  war, 
is  an  essential  preliminary  to  national  financial  re- 
form. If  ever  a  moral  obligation  lay  upon  a  country 
to  take  the  lead  in  this  work,  that  obligation  rests 
with  the  United  States.  For  a  people  with  as  much 
at  stake  on  the  Pacific  as  Americans  to  limit  their 
total  investment  in  China  to  18%  million  gold  dol- 


224      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

lars  as  is  the  case  to-day,  when  the  British  invest- 
ment is  forty  times  as  great,  is  a  satire  on  political 
prudence  which  it  is  difficult  to  surpass.  Secretary 
Hughes  has  recently  said  that  "the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  an  enlightened  public  opinion  with  re- 
spect to  international  matters  is  very  great,  and  it 
has  been  increased  in  this  country  by  the  lack  of 
general  interest,  at  least  until  recently,  in  foreign 
affairs.  We  have  only  begun  to  think  internation- 
ally, and  we  find  the  attitude  of  the  public  mind 
to  be  still  ill-adjusted  to  the  magnitude  of  our  finan- 
cial power  and  to  the  international  interests  which 
we  have  suddenly  accumulated  as  the  results  of  the 
world  war."  But  precisely  the  contrary  is  true — 
at  least  so  far  as  international  interests  are  con- 
cerned. America's  weakness  of  policy  is  due  to  the 
absence  of  international  interests,  to  the  lack  of  per- 
manent stakes  outside  the  country.  The  conversion 
and  consolidation  of  outstanding  Chinese  obligations 
into  Chinese  consols  by  American  help  would  remove 
that  reproach  in  one  quarter  of  the  globe  at  least; 
and  should  not  be  hard  to  work  out  as  the  gold  debt 
of  the  Chinese  people  is  small  and  almost  entirely 
arises  from  four  political  crises — the  Sino-Japanese 
war,  the  Boxer  revolt,  the  founding  of  the  Republic, 
and  the  entry  of  China  into  the  Great  War. 

Of  the  amounts  due  under  the  first  category — £48 
millions — nearly  one  half  has  been  paid  off,  leaving 
about  £25  millions  outstanding.  In  the  second  cate- 
gory— with  the  claims  of  Germany,  Austria  and 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  225 

Russia,  amounting  in  all  to  £74  millions,  cancelled 
— about  £31  millions  has  been  paid  off,  leaving  £43 
millions  outstanding.  In  the  third  category — £33 
millions — repayment  has  not  yet  commenced.  And  in 
the  fourth  category,  including  American  and  Japa- 
nese loans,  £20  millions  sterling,  nothing  has  been 
done  even  in  the  matter  of  securing  interest  service. 
Thus  China's  External  Debt,  excluding  Railway 
Loans,  amounts  to  no  more  than  £121  millions  net, 
or  G.  $550  millions,  mainly  held  in  England.  Though 
funding  would  entail  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
gross  amount  owing  to  the  state  of  the  money-market, 
a  considerable  margin  in  liquid  revenues  would  be 
left  for  further  borrowings.  It  would  be  fatal,  how- 
ever, to  encourage  the  idea  that  borrowing  is  neces- 
sary or  politic  in  China  except  for  specified  construc- 
tive objects  which  can  only  be  attained  by  spreading 
over  a  term  of  years — preferably  a  long  term  of 
years — the  capital  provided.  It  is  an  incontestable 
fact  that  any  money  from  abroad  in  excess  of  gold 
dollars  two  million  a  month  cannot  be  honestly  em- 
ployed in  China  for  governmental  purposes,  and  is 
therefore  wasted  as  was  the  case  with  the  whole 
Reorganization  Loan  of  twenty-five  millions  sterling 
of  1913  which  was  supposed  to  reconstruct  the  coun- 
try. By  strictly  limiting  the  amount  of  new  money, 
and  providing  it  in  the  form  of  silver  bullion  for 
the  new  national  mint  at  Shanghai,  a  reasonable 
opportunity  for  readjustment  and  reform  will  be 
afforded,  and  a  halt  called  in  the  false  policy  of  pre- 


226      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

tending  that  a  balancing  of  books  is  the  salvation 
of  China,  when  the  issue  is  really  an  intricate  socio- 
logical problem,  which  only  two  men  from  abroad 
have  properly  understood  from  study  on  the  spot — 
Dr.  Dewey  and  Professor  Bertrand  Russell.  Quix- 
otic and  illusory  schemes  for  the  disbandment  of  the 
military  forces  will  give  bankers  and  officials  profits 
but  will  not  bring  contentment  to  the  people, 

The  special  Chinese  conference  will  be  dominated 
by  questions  of  money.  Money  is  everything.  The 
fate  of  the  Bank  of  Korea,  the  Bank  of  Formosa 
and  the  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  the  three  semi- 
official Japanese  institutions  which  had  their  entire 
cash  resources  raided  by  the  Terauchi  Government 
in  1917  and  1918,  in  a  desperate  attempt  to  offset 
the  political  effects  of  the  action  of  America  when 
she  entered  the  great  war,  will  prove  an  absorbing 
political  issue.  It  is  plain  from  the  chastened  re- 
marks of  the  chairmen  of  these  institutions  that  the 
pouring  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  million  yen  into 
Peking  has  well-nigh  crippled  them.  The  acid  test 
so  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned  is  the  cor- 
rection of  the  faulty  policy  of  the  Wilson  Adminis- 
tration in  1917  which  has  been  so  fully  dealt  with 
in  these  pages;  but  that  such  a  test  will  be  possible 
only  if  there  is  the  great  public  pressure  is  obvious 
to  those  who  have  watched  the  failure  of  American 
finance  to  play  a  role  in  the  past. 

For  a  bold  and  ingenious  people  the  lack  of  bold- 
ness and  ingenuity  shown  has  been  amazing.  It  is 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  227 

not  too  much  to  declare  that  had  British  finance  had 
the  opportunities  of  American  finance  in  China  dur- 
ing the  last  seven  years  there  would  have  been  no 
opportunities  left  for  any  one  else.  Americans,  with 
their  altruism,  may  be  inclined  to  think  that  such 
a  statement  is  more  of  a  defence  for  their  policy  than 
an  accusation.  But  when  all  is  said  and  done,  good 
intentions  have  the  same  value  in  our  world  as  Dante 
declared  they  had  in  the  nether  world.  For  those 
who  fight  on  the  battleground  for  the  victory  of 
better  things  they  provide  no  foothold  at  all. 


in 

Why,  if  the  problem  approximates  the  analysis 
made,  did  not  China  state  her  case  differently  at 
Washington  and  deal  with  essentials?  Many  things 
conspired  against  such  a  course, — disruption  at  home, 
the  memory  of  the  Paris  Conference,  the  absence  of 
a  plan  on  the  part  of  the  convening  Power.  Had 
the  signatories  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty  been  prop- 
erly led  by  the  United  States  instead  of  occupying 
themselves  with  the  overdiscussed  and  stale  question 
of  the  open  door,  they  would  have  taken  up  and 
carefully  considered  the  practical  question  of  getting 
from  the  open  door  to  every  part  of  the  country 
which  is  to-day  the  real  issue.  The  open  door  is 
eighty  years  old;  it  was  what  was  fought  for  round 
the  Canton  forts  in  the  thirties  and  forties  of  last 
century;  it  stands  enshrined,  with  all  its  crippling 


228      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

limitations  in  the  fifty-odd  Treaty-ports  where  in- 
ternational commerce  may  alone  be  legally  conducted 
and  where  aliens  may  alone  legally  reside.  But  the 
railways,  making  corridors  running  deep  into  the 
country,  have  in  reality  cancelled  and  rendered 
nugatory  the  earlier  conception  of  "points  of  con- 
tact" between  East  and  West.  They  vehemently 
call  for  a  new  definition  which  will  make  partnership 
and  co-operative  effort  elsewhere  than  on  the  fore- 
shore of  coast  and  river  a  legitimate  enterprise. 
Commerce  with  the  real  interior  is  heavily  handi- 
capped by  the  conditions  which  are  permitted  to  per- 
sist. It  is  not  merely  because  transportation  is 
primitive  and  highly  costly  per  ton  mile;  or  be- 
cause there  is  taxation  at  innumerable  points;  but 
because  the  real  revolutionary — the  man  who  has 
overthrown  the  old  civilization  and  brought  in  the  new, 
the  foreigner — is  not  leading  the  fight  as  he  should. 
More  and  more  is  he  needed — particularly  during 
these  few  last  years  of  his  extraterritorialized  exist- 
ence when  he  is  a  privileged  being,  about  to  pro- 
tect and  lead.  Symbol  of  the  revolution  which  has 
come,  but  insulated  so  to  speak  against  the  influences 
which  strike  down  and  drag  back  even  forward-look- 
ing Chinese,  he  is  the  one  person  who  is  essential 
to  the  continued  existence  of  China  as  a  sover- 
eign State.  That  he  represents  what  they  them- 
selves are  trying  to  attain  is  proved  by  all  classes 
of  Chinese  turning  to  him  as  an  asylum  when  in 
distress;  and  thus  we  have  this  paradox — that  the 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  229 

very  man  who  is  most  essential  to  their  progress  is 
the  one  they  must  officially  represent  as  the  violator 
and  the  disturber  of  their  peace.  .  .  . 

The  Washington  Conference  should  have  taken 
note  of  these  facts  and  in  return  for  a  throwing-open 
of  the  railway-zones  to  foreign  factories  and  foreign 
residence  made  immediate  concessions  to  China  in 
the  matter  of  police- jurisdiction  and  taxation  in  such 
zones.  The  wise  policy  to-day  is  the  policy  of  asso- 
ciation ;  of  recognizing  by  measures  of  worth  that  the 
new  outlines  which  are  slowly  but  surely  being  traced 
across  the  country  are  the  permanent  ones  and  not 
merely  transitory  features ;  of  meeting  by  competent 
measures  the  necessary  incompetence  of  a  governing 
class  which  must  face  both  ways  in  order  to  deal 
with  the  antinomy  between  the  old  vanishing  civili- 
zation and  the  new  alien  civilization.  That  ultimately 
the  millions  in  blue  overalls  now  being  slowly  mus- 
tered out  by  the  industrialization  of  the  country  will 
prove  more  formidable  to  the  world  than  the  mil- 
lions in  khaki  who  so  constantly  fire  their  rifles  is  a 
certain  deduction;  but  they  are  necessary  to  increase 
China's  resisting  power  as  well  as  her  purchasing 
power,  and  they  are  a  natural  corollary  to  the  phe- 
nomenal rise  in  the  export  of  many  commodities  which 
is  the  feature  of  the  hour. 

From  the  Chinese  historical  point  of  view  the 
Washington  Conference  was  only  an  incident  in  the 
long  drama  which  commenced  eighty  years  ago,  and 
which  has  many  more  years  to  run.  The  Europeani- 


230      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

zation  of  Chinese  politics,  following  the  Europeani- 
zation  of  trade  and  industry,  has  brought  great  men- 
tal and  physical  confusion  for  which  adequate  for- 
mulas cannot  be  speedily  found.  The  excessive  re- 
liance placed  on  legalistic  argument  and  the  views 
of  professors  is  a  sign  of  this;  for  when  men  are 
confused  they  naturally  turn  to  what  others  have 
written  into  their  code-books  in  the  hope  that  analogy 
will  establish  the  justice  of  their  own  case.  The 
little  originality  shown  year  in  and  year  out  by 
leaders  who  have  been  educated  abroad  is  a  symptom 
attracting  increasingly  unfavourable  attention;  for 
while  they  are  skilful  and  smooth  the  lack  of  initiative 
and  the  absence  of  any  critical  faculties  are  increas- 
ingly evident.  It  is  indeed  a  remarkable  fact  that 
a  race  as  intellectual  as  the  Chinese  should  have  failed 
to  produce  in  the  revolutionary  period  a  single  strong 
personality  with  strong  views  and  executive  capacity 
such  as  even  Soviet  Russia  has  done.  Continually 
to  fall  back  on  principles;  continually  to  invoke  in- 
ternational law  as  an  invincible  palladium ;  continu- 
ally to  request  back  something  which  it  is  the  real 
aim  and  object  of  the  Republic  to  abolish,  is  for  all 
the  world  like  attempting  to  plant  down  in  a  Western 
landscape  the  old  Chinese  walled  city  with  its  crum- 
bling ramparts  which  belongs  to  such  a  hoary  and 
distant  past.  .  .  . 

Had  the  Chinese  Delegation  prepared  themselves 
for  the  diplomatic  duel  and  determined  on  a  plan 
of  battle  in  the  way  that  Count  Witte  did  seventeen 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  281 

years  before  at  Portsmouth  in  far  more  desperate 
circumstances  the  conference  would  have  yielded  very 
different  results.  Count  Witte  says  in  his  Memoirs: 
"I  resolved  to  base  my  tactics  on  the  following  prin- 
ciples: (1)  Not  to  show  that  we  were  in  the  least 
anxious  to  make  peace,  and  to  convey  the  impression 
that  if  His  Majesty  had  consented  to  the  negotia- 
tions, it  was  merely  because  of  the  universal  desire 
on  the  part  of  all  countries  to  see  the  war  terminated ; 
(2)  to  act  as  befitted  the  representatives  of  the  great- 
est empire  on  earth,  undismayed  by  the  fact  that  that 
mighty  empire  had  become  involved  temporarily  in 
a  slight  difficulty;  (3)  in  view  of  the  tremendous  in- 
fluence of  the  press  in  America,  to  show  it  every  at- 
tention and  to  be  accessible  to  all  its  representatives; 
(4)  to  behave  with  democratic  simplicity  and  without 
a  shadow  of  snobbishness,  so  as  to  win  the  sympathy 
of  the  Americans.  .  .  ." 

That  China  was  still  the  greatest  empire  on  earth, 
the  only  nation  throughout  the  ages  that  has  ever 
amassed  a  population  of  over  four  hundred  millions, 
was  a  matter  of  such  vast  future  economic  signifi- 
cance that  the  implications  should  have  been  boldly 
dealt  with.  It  was  cowardice  on  the  part  of  all 
concerned  not  to  have  assaulted  all  along  the  line 
the  issue  of  the  cash  and  credit  system  of  the  West: 
not  to  have  shown  in  precise  and  illuminating  lan- 
guage the  nature  of  the  economic  revolution  which 
is  forever  gathering  strength :  not  once  to  have  drawn 
attention  to  the  great  enemy — the  low  standard  of 


232      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

living  and  to  insist  on  the  taking  of  measures  to 
deal  with  it.  A  new  spirit  should  have  been  shown 
in  which  reticence  had  no  place.  Had  there  been  that 
from  the  beginning,  the  wise  precedent  of  the  Shan- 
tung conversations  might  have  been  applied  to  the 
remaining  items  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands.  Japan 
could  have  been  persuaded  to  yield  much,  had  her 
heroic  sacrifice  in  the  Russian  war  of  twenty  years 
ago  been  eloquently  dealt  with  in  such  a  forum  as 
Washington — had  it  been  admitted  that  her  contri- 
bution to  the  growth  of  wealth  in  Manchuria  has  been 
considerable  and  her  aid  still  required.  I  am  thor- 
oughly convinced  that  the  blood-stained  heights  of 
Port  Arthur  will  never  be  surrendered  and  the  ter- 
ritorial lease  cancelled  until  the  part  they  played 
in  destroying  Russian  imperialism  has  been  fully  and 
adequately  recognized  by  China  in  messages  to 
Japan.  No  impartial  person  making  a  reckoning 
can  avoid  saying  that  China  has  lost  something  of 
the  world's  sympathy  by  failing  to  understand  that 
sacrifice  confers  moral  rights,  and  that  excessive  con- 
centration on  local  issues  excludes  her  from  partici- 
pating in  benefits  which  others  enjoy  because  they 
possess  the  international  mind.  Too  long  has  it  been 
considered  by  the  Chinese  official  class  that  foreign 
affairs  are  the  questions  which  arise  from  the  pres- 
ence of  foreigners  and  foreign  interests  in  Chinese 
territory — not  the  general  question  of  China's  place 
in  the  world  and  the  status  of  her  relations  with  all 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  233 

nations,  great  and  small.    This,  in  a  single  sentence, 
is  the  great  irony  of  the  hour. 

Russia  is  a  case  in  point — Russia  that  has  a  fron- 
tier that  marches  with  the  Chinese  frontier  for  four 
thousand  miles  and  that  has  vainly  attempted  to  re- 
new some  kind  of  relations  for  three  or  four  years. 
China's  failure  to  adopt  a  positive  policy  must  ulti- 
mately bring  a  punishment.  For  Japan  is  at  last 
reversing  her  Siberian  policy  and  admitting  estab- 
lished facts;  and  the  prospect  to-day  seems  to  be 
that  her  crudities  and  roughnesses  will  be  forgotten 
when  China's  indifference  will  still  be  rankling.  At 
any  time  during  the  past  two  years  it  would  have 
been  easy  and  feasible  for  China  to  recognize  the 
Far  Eastern  Republic  and  thereby  win  the  eternal 
friendship  of  the  Russian  people.  Russian  action  in 
Mongolia  and  elsewhere  along  the  common  frontier 
has  been  the  inevitable  result.  China's  loss  will  be 
Japan's  gain — and  there  is  every  indication  that  that 
gain  will  not  be  small. 

rv 

And  what  of  Japan?  . 

The  disappearance  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
has  already  exercised  a  beneficent  influence.  To-day 
she  stands  by  her  own  unaided  efforts,  owing  no  one 
a  qualified  and  dangerous  allegiance.  Yet  precisely 
how  the  partial  correction  of  the  great  series  of 
errors  made  in  the  period  of  the  world  war  will 
ultimately  be  accepted  by  the  new  generation  it  is 


234      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

too  soon  to  see.1  Most  educated  Japanese  are  to-day 
aware  of  the  political  folly  of  attempting  to  erect 
half  a  century  too  late  an  old-type  continental  em- 
pire: but  the  victory  won  at  Washington  would  have 
a  far  greater  repercussion  were  it  not  for  the  sus- 
picion that  money-power  will  ultimately  stultify  the 
compacts  entered  into.  That  the  Japanese,  whose 
resources  are  far  inferior  to  the  resources  of  Western 
nations,  should  await  on  the  real  battle-ground — 

1  In  this  connection  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  a  prominent  Japanese 
newspaper  in  Tokyo  has  recently  published  military  information  which, 
though  officially  denied,  is  substantially  correct. 

A  capital  contention  in  the  pages  of  the  present  volume,  that  to  the 
Japanese  Army  and  Navy  China  is  merely  a  base  of  supplies  and  that 
her  neutrality,  although  now  guaranteed,  would  be  treated  as  of  no 
consequence,  is  amply  borne  out  by  this  curious  revelation  which  runs 
as  follows: — 

"Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Washington  Conference,  the  offices  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  General  Staffs  have  been  busy  in  the  readjustment 
of  the  plans  for  national  defence.  This  programme  was  completed  at  the 
end  of  February,  and  the  chiefs  of  staff,  General  Uyehara  and  Admiral 
Yamashita,  have  submitted  it  to  the  throne  to  secure  the  sanction  of 
the  Emperor.  The  Board  of  Field  Marshals  has  already  given  its 
approval. 

"The  position  of  Japan  in  international  affairs  is  now  quite  different 
from  what  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  Eusso-Japanese  War,  and  this 
nation  can  not  expect  to  receive  any  assistance  from  England  or  the 
United  States.  In  the  event  of  war,  therefore,  Japan  must  be  prepared 
to  sustain  the  brunt  of  war  for  at  least  four  or  five  years  unaided 
except  by  the  hope  of  ultimate  victory.  The  Japanese  Army  and  Navy 
must  co-operate  and  exert  supreme  efforts  to  secure  connections  with 
our  western  neighbour. 

"In  order  to  accomplish  this  end,  the  lines  of  defence  will  be  in  the 
following  order:  The  first  line  of  defence  is  to  be  at  sea,  extending 
from  the  Kurile  Islands  on  the  north  through  the  Bonin  and  Loochoo 
Islands  to  Formosa.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  secure  command  of 
the  adjacent  Pacific,  the  Sea  of  China,  the  Yellow  Sea  and  the  Sea  of 
Japan. 

"By  land  the  first  line  of  defence  will  be  from  Hankow  through  Shan- 
tung and  Harbin  to  Saghalien,  which  must  be  in  close  touch  with  the 
main  islands  of  Japan.  The  Straits  of  Tsushima  would  also  be  made 
a  second  line  of  defence  in  order  to  carry  on  warfare  over  a  long  period 
of  time. 

"As  a  result  of  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  principal  battleships, 
it  has  become  disadvantageous  for  us  to  carry  on  an  offensive  battle 
on  distant  waters.  For  this  reason  the  first  line  of  defence  must  be 
held  at  all  costs.  Night  attacks  will  be  the  main  tactical  principle." 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  285 

China — further  concrete  proofs  of  the  proclaimed 
altruism  of  the  West  before  they  reverse  in  every 
particular  the  policy  they  developed  since  the  Rus- 
sian war  of  two  decades  ago  is  natural.  Quick  to 
realize  new  tendencies,  they  will  model  their  activi- 
ties on  the  actions  of  others.  They  are  an  imitative 
people,  who  have  been  taught  to  be  distrustful  by 
the  evidence  of  the  superior  power  which  the  white 
races  possess  from  their  control  of  the  world's  natural 
resources  and  the  world's  empty  areas  and  from  their 
superior  scientific  and  mechanical  ability;  but  they 
will  never  be  a  timid  people.  At  the  present  mo- 
ment Japanese  policy  is  plainly  in  a  quandary  be- 
cause it  is  beyond  the  resources  of  the  country  to 
deal  simultaneously  with  China  and  Russia;  and  also 
because  the  raw  materials  they  need  are  so  scattered 
in  these  two  domains  that  it  is  impossible  to  concen- 
trate effort  in  a  single  direction.  One  thing  of  im- 
portance they  discovered  during  the  world-war — that 
the  potential  riches  of  China,  which  have  been  the 
theme  of  every  writer  for  half  a  century,  are  above 
the  earth  and  not  below  it.  In  other  words  that  apart 
from  agricultural  wealth,  which  is  in  the  hands  of 
an  industrious  peasantry,  China  is  inferior  in  min- 
eral resources.  Asiatic  Russia — and  particularly  the 
territory  of  the  Republic  of  the  Far  East — gives 
evidence  of  vast  mineral  wealth ;  but  the  greatest  ore 
reserves  in  the  Far  East  are  in  the  Philippine  Islands, 
where  there  is  one  deposit  of  a  thousand  million  tons ; 
whilst  the  oils  they  need  lie  even  further  south  in 


236      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

Borneo  and  the  Netherlands  Indies,  unless  the  bor- 
ings now  being  made  in  Saghalien  prove  unexpect- 
edly successful. 

There  is  thus  already  a  certain  conflict  in  Japan 
between  "navalism"  and  "continentalism"  which  the 
decisions  of  the  Washington  Conference  have  tended 
to  accentuate.  The  symbol  of  Japanese  navalism  are 
the  German  islands  north  of  the  equator,  and  the 
possibility  of  later  including  in  the  zone  yet  other 
groups.  If  the  doctrine  of  the  Mandates  could  be 
scrapped  and  Germany  reinstated  as  in  colonial 
power  the  waters  of  the  Pacific  would  appear  less 
enigmatic  than  they  do  to-day;  for  it  is  folly  to  im- 
agine that  many  issues  have  been  more  than  post- 
poned. If  the  men  of  the  Satsuma  Clan  four  and 
five  hundred  years  ago  were  able  not  only  to  raid 
the  Chinese  coasts  but  to  establish  themselves  in 
North  Luzon  in  their  Malay o-Chinese  junks,  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  time  has  made  them  less 
daring  with  the  submarine  and  the  auxiliary  ship. 
Navalism  or  continentalism — both  have  their  advo- 
cates. An  organized  China  will  alone  supply  the 
corrective  which  is  now  lacking. 

But  an  organized  China,  looking  upon  foreign 
affairs  and  foreign  policy  not  as  the  endless  series 
of  incidents  arising  in  her  territory  from  the  activi- 
ties of  foreigners,  but  as  the  working-out  of  her  or- 
dered place  in  the  world,  is  still  far  off.  Even  under 
the  most  favourable  auspices  a  generation  or  two 
may  elapse  before  that  organization  is  reasonably 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  237 

advanced ;  and  it  is  during  this  vital  period  that  many 
developments  may  come. 

Is  it  possible  for  Japan  to  be  really  frank  and 
friendly  with  China  and  to  assist  her  rise  as  a  mod- 
ern state  if  that  is  insisted  upon  by  Anglo-American 
agreement?  Her  action  in  Shantung  seems  an  an- 
swer in  the  affirmative.  But  Japan  went  into  Shan- 
tung as  a  result  of  a  fatal  error  of  British  policy 
and  Japan  goes  out  to  correct  it.  The  Manchurian 
question  and  the  doctrine  of  geographical  propinquity 
are  bound  up  with  the  Russian  question.  Japanese 
even  of  liberal  tendencies  are  apprehensive  of  what 
that  question  may  mean  for  them.  The  great  fortress 
of  Vladivostok,  with  the  military  possibilities  it  shel- 
ters, stands  ever  before  their  eyes  as  something  re- 
quiring sleepless  vigilance.  No  doubt  Japan's  Rus- 
sian policy  will  be  dictated  by  the  requirements  of  her 
China  policy  and  vice  versa ;  there  is  every  likelihood 
to  be  in  the  future,  as  there  has  been  in  the  past, 
an  elaborate  triangular  play  in  which  in  measure  as 
pressure  increases  in  one  direction  it  will  be  dimin- 
ished in  another,  but  yielding  at  all  times  to  the  in- 
fluences from  the  distant  West. 

Other  considerations  will  enter  increasingly  into 
the  problem — notably  economic  considerations.  Com- 
merce must  soon  become  everything  for  Japan  as  it 
is  everything  for  England.  If  she  is  to  survive  as 
a  great  Power  and  develop  as  others  will  develop 
(particularly  China  with  her  contemplated  30  million 
spindles)  the  burdens  of  militarism  must  be  slowly 


238      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

dropped.  There  is  an  increasing  tendency  to  be 
seen  among  her  industrial  leaders  to  utilize  cheap  la- 
bour and  Japan's  proximity  to  the  source  of  raw 
materials,  by  putting  up  factories  in  China.  How 
far  this  movement  will  go,  and  whether  it  will  in 
the  end  dominate  policy,  it  is  too  soon  to  say. 

Japan's  trials  are  not  over;  they  are  just  begin- 
ning. The  next  thirty  years  will  prove  what  she  is 
made  of.  For  centuries  the  race  has  been  trained 
to  conceal  and  repress,  and  no  man  at  the  present 
moment — not  even  Japanese — can  say  what  will  be 
the  state  of  the  nation  even  five  years  from  now. 

The  experiment  of  adopting  Western  machinery 
without  the  Western  spirit  has  yet  to  be  proved  a 
success.  But  clever  men  direct  the  destinies  of  Ja- 
pan :  she  has  never  lacked  of  men  of  character.  They 
will  pick  out  with  intelligence  the  main  issue  in  each 
succeeding  crisis  and  bend  all  their  energies  to  sur- 
mounting it.  Cut  off  from  British  support  by  the 
collapse  of  the  Alliance,  the  natural  tendency  of  their 
policy  will  be  to  incline  towards  the  United  States, 
where  lies  their  major  trading  interest  and  their  great- 
est market.  The  influence  of  America  must  tend  to 
make  them  less  precise  in  their  objectives,  and  more 
inclined  to  hesitate.  .  .  . 

VI 

British  policy,  if  it  would  frankly  accept  this  very 
changed  situation,  could  exert  untold  influence 
through  constructive  action.  Her  practical  measures 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  239 

are  still  superior  (at  least  in  China)  to  those  of  other 
nations  because  they  are  based  on  sound  commercial 
precedents.  But  the  official  survival  of  the  mercan- 
tilist ideal  which  has  lived  for  eighty  years  ought 
no  longer  to  be  countenanced  even  as  a  theory.  A 
new  gesture  is  required.  I  believe  that  just  as  Eng- 
land took  the  lead  in  the  establishment  of  the  treaty- 
port  as  the  symbol  of  the  open  door  so  now  should 
she  take  the  lead  in  the  establishment  of  the  railway 
as  the  new  symbol.  A  rejection  of  the  policy  of 
the  internationalization  and  the  taking  of  the  neces- 
sary steps  to  assist  the  nationalization  of  railway- 
building  agencies  is  the  most  pressing  matter  to-day. 

In  simple  language,  the  creation  of  an  adequate 
iron  and  steel  industry  to  build  up  the  railway  net- 
work at  the  lowest  possible  cost  with  the  fullest  pos- 
sible use  of  native  resources. 

Admitting  the  restricted  nature  of  Chinese  iron 
ore  resources,  it  would  require  no  vast  sums  of  money 
to  modernize  and  reorganize  the  great  Hanyehping 
concessions  which  formed  Group  III  of  the  Japanese 
Twenty-one  Demands,  and  equip  them  to  serve  as 
the  driving-force  in  the  general  railway  scheme.  For 
the  nations  assembled  at  Washington  to  record  their 
hope  by  formal  resolution  that  "the  future  develop- 
ment of  railways  in  China  shall  be  so  conducted  as 
to  enable  the  Chinese  Government  to  effect  the  uni- 
fication of  railways  into  a  system  under  Chinese  con- 
trol," and  then  not  to  take  feasible  steps  would  be 
a  mockery.  The  conversion  of  the  Hanyehping  en- 


240      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

terprises  into  a  National  Railway  enterprise,  adding 
thereto  the  necessary  subsidiaries,  would  at  once  elim- 
inate a  source  of  friction  between  China  and  Japan 
and  at  the  same  time  encourage  the  mining  of  ore 
on  the  scale  that  Japanese  industry  requires.  Euro- 
peans and  Americans  in  China  are  continually  sigh- 
ing for  the  strong  men  who  will  evolve  order  out 
of  chaos;  but  what  are  needed  are  not  human  giants 
whose  day  is  over,  but  giant  systematic  enterprises 
which  will  stabilize  the  new  forces  and  sound  the 
doom  of  the  system  of  loan-mongering  and  traffick- 
ing in  important  monopolies  still  going  on.  The  na- 
tions of  the  world  must  reach  out  and  strengthen  the 
government  underneath  the  government  in  China, 
i.e.  the  people:  for  the  true  secret  of  the  order  be- 
neath the  surface  chaos  is  the  vast  old-world  strength 
of  the  Chinese  commune  and  the  fact  that  business 
is  still  very  largely  conducted  on  the  old  basis  of  hard 
cash.  Whilst  Europe  is  languishing  under  an  ava- 
lanche of  paper  money,  China,  in  spite  of  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  the  government,  runs  on  hard  cash.  The 
silver  coinage  of  seven  hundred  million  dollars  and 
the  three  hundred  million  ounces  of  bullion  in  circu- 
lation by  no  means  exhausts  the  metallic  currency; 
there  is  in  addition  a  copper  coinage  amounting  to 
160  units  per  head  of  population  (or  64,000,000,000 
coppers)  which  though  debased  and  falling  in  value 
represents  a  very  large  sum.  With  a  superabundance 
of  cheap  foodstuffs,  making  the  cost  of  living  infini- 
tesimal compared  with  elsewhere  in  the  world,  no 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  241 

matter  whether  government  totally  disappears  or  not, 
the  inherent  conditions  will  remain  superior  to  what 
they  are  elsewhere  and  give  greater  promise  of  good 
returns. 

Still  Chinese  society  requires  to  be  iron-bound  if 
it  is  to  remain  permanently  effective.  By  national- 
izing railways  in  the  only  effective  way,  i.e.  by  mak- 
ing them  the  product  of  Chinese  mines  and  Chinese 
workshops,  as  far  as  is  humanly  possible,  they  will 
become  identified  with  the  people  and  solidify  their 
power.  No  system  of  foreign  controllers  can  ever 
be  as  effective  as  a  system  which  makes  the  whole 
four  hundred  millions  the  Watch  Committee  of  their 
Government.  That  the  plan  will  have  to  be  resorted 
to  is  certain  from  the  way  in  which  provincial  mili- 
tarism has  now  openly  settled  on  the  existing  railway 
network  as  the  most  powerful  political  instrumen- 
tality and  is  using  it  both  as  a  weapon  of  offence 
and  defence. 

The  problem  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry  of 
China  should  have  been  brought  up  at  Washington 
and  a  formal  scheme  presented;  for  the  Open-door 
Treaty  requires  the  examination  and  elucidation  of 
such  language  as  is  found  in  Group  III  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands:  namely, 

"Article  1.  The  two  contracting  Parties  mutually  agree 
that  when  the  opportune  moment  arrives  the  Hanyehping 
Company  shall  be  made  a  joint  concern  of  the  two  nations 
and  they  further  agree  that  without  the  previous  consent 
of  Japan,  China  shall  not  by  her  own  act  dispose  of  the 


242      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

rights  and  property  of  whatsoever  nature  of  the  said  Com- 
pany nor  cause  the  said  Company  to  dispose  freely  of  the 
same. 

"Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  all  mines 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping 
Company  shall  not  be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the 
said  Company,  to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the 
said  Company;  and  further  agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to 
carry  out  any  undertaking  which,  it  is  apprehended,  may 
directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  interest  of  the  said  Com- 
pany, the  consent  of  the  said  Company  shall  first  be  ob- 
tained—" 

Although  the  clash  of  1915  ended  in  the  compro- 
mise contained  in  the  Declaration  below  which  is 
binding  on  both  governments,  it  has  become  mean- 
ingless and  harmful  in  view  of  the  changed  condi- 
tions. 

"If  in  future  the  Hanyehping  Company  and  the  Japanese 
capitalists  agree  upon  co-operation,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, in  view  of  the  intimate  relations  subsisting  between 
the  Japanese  capitalists  and  the  said  Company,  will  forth- 
with give  its  permission.  The  Chinese  Government  further 
agrees  not  to  confiscate  the  said  Company,  nor,  without  the 
consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists,  to  convert  it  into  a 
state  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign 
capital  other  than  Japanese." 

Here  then  is  the  first  matter  which  should  be 
brought  before  the  Board  of  Reference;  for  the  con- 
version of  the  Company  owing  to  its  enormous  debt 
into  a  state  enterprise,  and  its  absorption  of  other 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  243 

Chinese  semi-government  iron  companies  is  a  first 
step  to  consummate  the  railway  programme. 

VII 

Indirectly  due  to  the  Washington  decisions  a  new 
storm  has  burst  over  China  and  is  spending  itself 
in  the  Chinese  way.  The  Parliament  of  1913,  de- 
stroyed twice,  is  back  in  the  capital.  The  same  men 
find  that  the  same  problems  are  no  longer  there. 
The  popular  conception  of  1912  of  a  unified,  cen- 
tralized Republic  has  been  replaced  by  the  ideal  of 
local  autonomy  and  federated  provinces.  Provin- 
cial militarism,  canalized  by  the  railways  and  des- 
tined to  be  still  further  restricted — and  therefore 
quickly  explosive — as  more  railways  are  built,  has 
likewise  changed  its  aspect:  control  of  rolling-stock 
and  railway  revenues  has  become  more  important 
than  control  of  provincial  capitals.  The  relationship 
of  the  provinces  to  the  Central  Government  has  thus 
been  vastly  complicated  by  Western  instrumentalities 
which  are  stronger  than  the  men  who  attempt  to  con- 
trol them  and  which  are  tearing  down  things  with- 
out number.  No  matter  what  may  be  embodied  in 
the  Constitution — or  what  federal  scheme  adopted — 
there  is  this  strange  phenomenon  which  eludes  treat- 
ment. Force  could  cure  it  if  that  force  were  wielded 
by  competent  hands.  But  in  a  country  the  size  of 
China — a  Europe  in  itself — military  genius  is  only 
one  necessity:  courage  is  the  second  and  third  and 
fourth  necessity  and  money  makes  up  the  rest — 


244      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

and  of  these  there  is  just  now  lamentably  little.  .  .  . 
The  abolition  of  injurious  trade  taxation  by  the 
Constitution — which    is    another    proposal — will    do 
little  to  cure  another  real  and  increasing  ill,  which 
is  that  even  moderate  taxation  in  the  treaty-ports, 
where  most  of  the  wealth  of  the  country  is  now  con- 
centrated, cannot  be  enforced  owing  to  extraterri- 
toriality.    The  disorder  which  wealthy  Chinese,  as 
well  as  all  foreigners  in  the  country,  denounce  so 
bitterly  is  indeed  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  nearly 
all  wealth  is  tax-free  and  the  revenue  almost  entirely 
taken  from  the  poor.     If  elsewhere  in  the  world  a 
similar  immunity  prevailed  there  would  be  similar 
results.     The  collapse  of  England  and  the  United 
States  would  be  more  marked  than  the  collapse  of 
China  were  London  and  New  York  and  the  fifty 
largest  municipalities  in  each   country  exempt   by 
Treaty  from  contributing  to  the  national  Treasury. 
Yet  a  Sales-tax  of  1%  would  produce  not  less 
than  $100  millions  gross,  mainly  in  these  foreign 
settlements,   and   seems  wholly  feasible,   as   it   has 
proved  a  complete  and  remarkable  success  in  the 
Philippines.1    If  the  proceeds  were  entirely  applied 

1  The  Canadian  Sales-Tax,  which  produces  not  far  short  of  100 
million  dollars,  is  thus  defined: 

"Placing  of  a  tax  at  a  rate  of  not  more  than  1  per  cent  on  the 
gross  sales  of  real  property,  the  gross  rents  and  royalties  of  all  kinds, 
on  gross  receipts  of  all  public  utilities,  such  as  railways,  steamships, 
street-railways,  water,  power,  and  light  companies;  on  the  gross  receipts 
of  places  of  amusement  and  clubs;  on  the  gross  receipts  by  banks  and 
bankers  of  interest  and  commissions;  on  the  gross  commissions 
earned  by  brokers;  on  the  gross  receipts  of  insurance  companies,  hotels, 
restaurants,  barber-shops,  liverymen,  architects,  accountants,  lawyers, 
physicians,  advertising  agents,  etc.;  on  the  gross  receipts  from  personal 
services,  but  not  on  salaries  or  wages." 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  245 

to  productive  works  such  as  national  roads  under 
local  mixed  committees,  with  sole  and  undisputed 
powers  to  control  collection  and  expenditure,  they 
would  so  augment  the  earning-powers  of  the  popu- 
lation as  to  revolutionize  business.  The  real  prob- 
lem cannot  be  attacked  until  the  true  opening  of 
the  country  is  carried  out  by  such  co-operative  effort 
between  foreigners  and  Chinese.  That  sentence  is 
a  complete  summary  of  the  crisis  of  the  present  gen- 
eration. China  must  be  made  willing  to  concede 
something  in  return  for  wealth-making  concessions. 
A  different  class  of  negotiators  is  required,  both  on 
the  foreign  and  the  Chinese  side,  who  will  deal  with 
things  precisely  as  they  are.  Real  life  and  real  prob- 
lems must  be  attacked.  China,  who  has  most  of  her 
clever  men  proscribed  or  living  in  the  retirement  of 
the  extraterritorialized  areas,  urgently  needs  the  help 
of  all  her  sons.  A  general  amnesty  is  a  necessary 
measure  to-day — something  which  will  re-establish 
confidence  and  bring  men  out  of  retirement.  Fer- 
rero,  in  his  monumental  "Greatness  and  Decline  of 
Rome,"  might  have  been  writing  of  this  other  great- 
ness which  has  declined  because  jealousy  and  re- 
vengefulness  have  disintegrated  the  old  order.  The 
army  in  China  is  not  the  chief  enemy:  nor  is  disband- 
ment  the  principal  problem.  Immaturity  of  judg- 
ment and  a  refusal  to  face  facts  will  bring  the  coun- 
try far  lower  than  the  acts  of  an  undisciplined  sol- 
diery, which  in  any  case  spring  from  immaturity  of 
judgment  and  a  refusal  to  face  facts.  The  paeans  of 


246      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

praise  regarding  what  was  registered  at  Washington 
must  cease ;  for  in  the  matter  of  the  chief  problem — 
China — the  failure  is  greater  than  the  success. 


VIII 

Is  it  right  to  conclude  on  a  note  of  pessimism? 
Not  if  there  is  a  full  realization  of  the  difficulty,  tardy 
though  that  realization  be,  in  the  two  countries  which 
alone  can  bring  adjustment.  The  United  States  and 
England  must  view  matters  differently  from  what 
they  have  done  even  during  the  past  year.  They 
must  be  prepared  for  a  far-reaching  effort  and  radi- 
cal changes.  They  must  attack  the  essential  things 
and  on  a  basis  of  association  push  forward  the  build- 
ing-up of  the  new  edifice. 

The  organization  of  credit  in  China  must  be  as- 
sisted,— the  government  and  people  need  to  be  taught 
how  to  help  themselves.  National  stock  exchanges 
and  co-operation  between  foreign  and  Chinese  bank- 
ers are  required  at  the  chief  centres  in  the  country: 
local  credit-creations  are  far  more  important  than 
borrowing  from  abroad.  A  unique  opportunity  will 
be  provided  by  the  Special  International  Conference 
to  secure  a  special  national  conference  to  sit  at  the 
same  time  and  at  the  same  place;  to  decide  overlap- 
ping questions;  and  to  enter  into  definite  compacts 
binding  on  all  the  provinces  alike.  If  it  can  be  laid 
down  by  solemn  compact,  that  the  invasion  of  one 
province  by  the  troops  of  another  province  is  an  overt 


FROM  THE  PACIFIC  247 

act  of  rebellion  which  will  automatically  start  certain 
machinery  working,  it  will  be  possible  to  break  up  the 
system  of  railway  warfare  which  is  the  biggest  po- 
tential menace  of  the  hour,  and  is  apt  to  burst  forth 
at  any  moment.  The  disbandment  of  all  forces  in 
excess  of  legal  establishment  is  not  so  urgent  as  the 
return  of  troops  to  their  own  provinces.  The  loss 
from  desertions  and  sickness  is  in  any  case  so  high 
— between  50  and  60  men  per  division  per  month — 
that  if  recruiting  were  stopped,  the  army  would  vir- 
tually disappear  in  twelve  years.  But  no  command- 
ing officer  will  stop  recruiting  until  he  is  sure  that 
his  reward  will  not  merely  be  elimination  by  a  more 
powerful  rival. 

Chinese  will  not  agree  among  themselves  in  any 
single  issue  for  at  least  a  generation  unless  there  is 
a  binding  compact  involving  foreign  nations  as  well 
as  themselves,  with  admittedly  just  means  of  deal- 
ing with  infractions.  They  are  too  numerous,  their 
territory  too  vast,  and  their  society  too  upset  for 
anything  else  to  be  possible.  It  will  be  as  interesting 
to  watch  the  wriggling,  the  backing  and  filling  of  the 
nations  to  avoid  this  uncomfortable  fact  as  it  has  been 
interesting  to  watch  the  wriggling,  the  backing  and 
the  filling  in  the  case  of  communist  Russia.  China 
is  not  communist  and  never  will  be.  But  she  is  a  vast 
series  of  agricultural  communes,  with  endless  cheap 
foodstuffs,  where  men  can  retire  for  a  generation  or 
two,  and  wait — wait  until  the  English-speaking  peo- 
ples, with  their  prime  commercial  needs  on  the  seas 


248      AN  INDISCREET  CHRONICLE 

and  in  the  cities  of  the  coast,  agree  to  apply  common 
sense  in  a  wholesale  form  and  lead  others  to  do  the 
same;  for  economic  laws  with  their  inexorable  logic 
are  bound  in  the  long  run  to  prove  supreme  and  bring 
justice  to  the  people. 


APPENDIX 

THE  DECISIONS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  CONFER- 
ENCE 

A:  ARMS  TREATIES: 

1.  Four-Power  Treaty  and  Annex. 

2.  The  Five-Power  Naval  Treaty. 

3.  Submarines  and  Poison  Gas  Treaty. 

B :  TREATIES  AND  RESOLUTIONS  AFFECTING  CHINA  : 

1.  The  Nine-Power  Treaty. 

2.  Chinese  Tariff  Treaty. 

3.  The  Shantung  Treaty. 

4.  Resolution  regarding  a  Board  of  Reference  to  se- 
cure the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  in  China. 

5.  Resolutions  regarding  Chinese  railways. 

6.  Resolution  regarding  reduction  of  Chinese  armies. 

7.  Resolution  regarding  publication  of  all  international 
commitments  affecting  China. 

8.  Resolutions  banishing  spheres  of  influence. 

9.  Resolution  regarding  Radio  Stations  in  China. 
The  nine  commissions,  conferences,  or  boards  established, 

were : — 

1.  A  five-power  conference  (created  by  the  naval  limi- 
tation treaty),  to  meet  eight  years  hence  to  discuss  the 
question  of  naval  armament  anew. 

NOTE: — In  addition  to  the  above  resolutions,  decisions  were  registered 
to  abolish  foreign  post  offices  in  China  as  from  1st  January,  1923;  to 
appoint  a  foreign  judicial  commission  to  visit  China  and  investigate  on 
the  spot  the  question  of  the  abolition  of  extraterritoriality;  and  to 
summon  a  conference  of  Chinese  officials  and  foreign  diplomats  in 
Peking,  to  meet  subject  to  China's  request,  in  order  to  determine  the 
procedure  under  which  foreign  military  or  police  troops  shall  be  with- 
drawn from  China. 

249 


250  APPENDIX 

2.  A  five-power  commission  to  revise  the  rules  of  warfare 
in  the  light  of  the  World  War. 

3.  A  board  of  reference  to  consider  economic  and  railway 
questions  in  China — what  may  be  called  the  Open  Door 
Commission.  - 

4.  A    nine-power    commission    on    "extraterritoriality" 
rights  in  China. 

5.  A  special  conference  to  prepare  the  way  for  Chinese 
tariff  revision. 

6.  A  separate  commission  to  revise  the  existing  Chinese 
tariff. 

7.  A  conference  of  Chinese  officials  and  foreign  diplomats 
at  Peking,  to  meet  subject  to  China's  request,  in  order 
to  determine  the  procedure  under  which  foreign  mili- 
tary or  police  troops  shall  be  withdrawn  from  China. 

8.  A  conference  of  the  managers  of  foreign  wireless  sta- 
tions in  China  and  the  Chinese  Communications  Min- 
ister, to  work  out  the  details  of  radio  regulation. 

9.  A  joint  Sino- Japanese  Shantung  Commission  to  de- 
termine the  procedure  under  which  Japan  shall  restore 
Kiaochow  and  Shantung  rights  to  China. 

A 
1.  THE  FOUR-POWER  TREATY  AND  ANNEX 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE, 
FRANCE  AND  JAPAN, 

With  a  view  to  the  preservation  of  the  general  peace  and 
the  maintenance  of  their  rights  in  relation  to  their  insular 
possessions  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean, 

Have  determined  to  conclude  a  treaty  to  this  effect,  and 
have  appointed  as  their  plenipotentiaries: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Charles  Evans  Hughes,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Oscar  W. 
Underwood  and  Elihu  Root,  citizens  of  the  United  States. 


APPENDIX  251 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  and  of  the  British  Dominions  Beyond 
the  Seas,  Emperor  of  India. 

The  Right  Hon.  Arthur  James  Balfour,  O.M.,  M.P.,  Lord 
President  of  his  Privy  Council. 

The  Right  Hon.  Baron  Lee  of  Fareham,  G.E.E.,  K.C.B., 
First  Lord  of  his  Admiralty. 

The  Right  Hon.  Sir  Auckland  Campbell  Geddes,  K.C.B., 
his  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  to  the 
United  States  of  America. 

And  for  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  the  Right  Hon.  Robert 
Laird  Borden,  G.C.M.G.,  K.C. 

For  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia,  the  Hon.  Georges 
Foster  Pearce,  Minister  of  Defence. 

For  the  Dominion  of  New  Zealand,  Sir  John  William  Sal- 
mond,  K.C.,  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Zealand. 

For  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  the  Right  Hon.  Arthur 
James  Balfour,  O.M.,  M.P. 

For  India,  the  Right  Hon.  Valingman  Sankaranarayana 
Srinivasa  Sastri,  member  of  the  Indian  Council  of  State. 

The  President  of  the  French  Republic. 

Mr.  Rene  Viviani,  Deputy,  former  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers. 

Mr.  Albert  Sarraut,  Deputy,  Minister  of  the  Colonies. 

Mr.  Jules  J.  Jusserand,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States  of  America,  Grand 
Cross  of  the  National  Order  of  the  Legion  of  Honor. 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan. 

Baron  Tomosahuro  Kato,  Minister  for  the  Navy,  Junti, 
a  member  of  the  first  class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of 
the  Grand  Cordon  of  the  Rising  Sun  with  the  Paulownia 
Flowers. 

Baron  Kijuro  Shidehara,  his  Ambassador  Extraordinary 
and  Plenipotentiary  at  Washington,  Jusjii,  a  member  of  the 
first  class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Rising  Sun. 


252  APPENDIX 

Prince  Ivesato  Tokugawa,  Junii,  a  member  of  the  first 
class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Rising  Sun. 

Mr.  Masanao  Hanihara,  Vice  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Jushii,  a  member  of  the  second  class  of  the  Imperial 
Order  of  the  Rising  Sun. 

Who  having  communicated  their  full  powers,  found  in 
good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows: 

I  The  high  Contracting  parties  agree  as  between  them- 
selves to  respect  their  rights  in  relation  to  their  in- 
sular dominions  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

If  there  should  develop  between  any  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  a  controversy  arising  out  of  any  Pa- 
cific question  and  involving  their  said  rights  which  is 
not  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy  and  is  likely 
to  affect  the  harmonious  accord  now  happily  subsist- 
ing between  them,  they  shall  invite  the  other  high  con- 
tracting parties  to  a  joint  conference  to  which  the 
whole  subject  will  be  referred  for  consideration  and 
adjustment. 

II  If  the  said  rights  are  threatened  by  the  aggressive  ac- 
tion of  any  other  power,  the  high  contracting  parties 
shall  communicate  with  one  another  fully  and  frankly 
in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  the  most 
efficient  measures  to  be  taken,  jointly  or  separately,  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  the  particular  situation. 

III  This  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from 
the  time  it  shall  take  effect,  and  after  the  expiration 
of  said  period  it  shall  continue  to  be  in  force,  subject 
to  the  right  of  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to 
terminate  it  upon  twelve  months*  notice. 

IV  This  treaty  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as  possible  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  constitutional  methods  of  .the  high 
contracting  parties,  and   shall  take  effect  on  the  de- 
posit of  ratification,  which  shall  take  place  at  Wash- 


APPENDIX  253 

ington,  and  thereupon  the  agreement  between  Great 
Britain  and  Japan,  which  was  concluded  in  London 
on  July  13,  1911,  shall  terminate. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  will  transmit  to  all 
the  signatory  powers  a  certified  copy  of  the  proceg  verbal  of 
the  deposit  of  ratifications. 

The  present  treaty,  in  French  and  in  English,  shall  be 
deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  duly  certified  copies  thereof  will  be  transmitted 
by  that  Government  to  each  of  the  signatory  powers. 

In  faith  whereof  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  treaty. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  the  thirteenth  day  of 
December,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-one. 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  reservation  note,  prepared 
by  the  American  delegates  and  accepted  by  the  other  powers : 

In  signing  the  treaty  this  day  between  the  United  States 
of  America,  the  British  Empire,  France  and  Japan,  it  is 
declared  to  be  the  understanding  and  intent  of  the  signatory 
powers : 

1.  That  the  treaty  shall  apply  to  the  mandated  islands 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  provided,  however,  that  the  mak- 
ing of  the  treaty  >shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  an  assent 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  the 
mandates  and  shall  not  preclude  agreements  between 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  mandatory  pow- 
ers, respectively,  in  relation  to  the  mandated  islands. 

2.  That  the  controversies  to  which  the  second  paragraph 
of  Article  I  refers  shall  not  be  taken  to  embrace  ques- 
tions which  according  to  principles  of  international  law 
lie  exclusively  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the 
respective  powers. 

Washington,  D.  C.,  Dec.  13,  1921. 


254  APPENDIX 

ANNEX  TO  PACIFIC  TREATY 

ADOPTED  ON  4)TH  FEBRUARY,  1922,  AND  SIGNED  ON  THE  6TH 

FEBRUARY 

The  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire,  France 
and  Japan  have,  through  their  respective  plenipotentiaries, 
agreed  upon  the  following  stipulations  supplementary  to  the 
quadruple  treaty  signed  at  Washington  on  Dec.  13,  1921 : 

The  term  "insular  possessions  and  insular  dominions" 
used  in  the  aforesaid  treaty  shall,  in  its  application  to  Japan, 
include  only  Karafuto  (or  the  southern  portion  of  the  island 
of  Saghalin),  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores  and  the  islands 
under  the  mandate  of  Japan. 

The  present  agreement  shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect 
as  the  said  treaty,  to  which  it  is  supplementary. 

The  provision  of  Article  IV  of  the  aforesaid  treaty  of 
Dec.  13,  1921,  relating  to  ratification,  shall  be  applicable 
to  the  present  agreement,  which,  in  French  and  English,  shall 
remain  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  and  duly  certified  copies  thereof  shall  be 
transmitted  by  that  Government  to  each  of  the  other  con- 
tracting Powers. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  Agreement.  Done  at  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington, 6th  February,  1922. 

2.    THE  FIVE-POWER  NAVAL  TREATY 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE, 
FRANCE,  ITALY  AND  JAPAN, 

Desiring  to  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  the  general 
peace,  and  to  reduce  the  burdens  of  competition  in  armament, 

Have  resolved,  "with  a  view  to  accomplishing  these  pur- 

NOTE: — For  the  text  of  the  United  States  Senate  reservation  to  the 
Four-Power  Treaty,  see  footnote  in  Part  VII. 


APPENDIX  255 

poses,  to  conclude  a  treaty  to  limit  their  respective  naval 
armament,  and  to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  plenipo- 
tentiaries: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America: 
Charles  Evans  Hughes, 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge, 
Oscar  W.  Underwood, 
Elihu  Root, 

Citizens  of  the  United  States; 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  and  of  the  British  Dominions 
beyond  the  Seas,  Emperor  of  India ; 
The  Right  Hon.  Arthur  James  Balfour,  O.M.,  M.P., 

Lord  President  of  his  Privy  Council; 
The  Right  Hon.  Baron  Lee  of  Fareham,  G.B.E.,  K.C.B., 

First  Lord  of  his  Admiralty; 

The  Right  Hon.  Sir  Auckland  Campbell  Geddes,  K.C.B., 
his  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary 
to  the  United  States  of  America; 
and  for  the  Dominion  of  Canada : 

The  Right  Hon.  Sir  Robert  Laird  Borden,  G.C.M.G., 

K.C.; 
for  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia: 

Senator  the  Right  Hon.  George  Foster  Pearce,  Minis- 
ter for  Home  and  Territories ; 
for  the  Dominion  of  New  Zealand: 

The  Hon.  Sir  John  William  Salmond,  K.C.,  Judge  of 

the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Zealand; 
for  the  Union  of  South  Africa: 

The  Right  Hon.  Arthur  James  Balfour,  O.M.,  M.P.; 
for  India: 

The  Right  Hon.  Valingman  Sankaranarayana  Srinivasa 
Sastri,  member  of  the  Indian  Council  of  State ; 


256  APPENDIX 

The  President  of  the  French  Republic: 

M.  Albert  Sarraut,  Deputy,  Minister  of  the  Colonies; 

M.  Jules  J.  Jusserand,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States  of  America, 
Grand  Cross  of  the  National  Order  of  the  Legion  of 
Honour ; 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  Italy: 

The  Hon.  Carlo  Schanzer,  Senator  of  the  Kingdom; 

The  Hon.  Vittorio  Rolandi  Ricci,  Senator  of  the  King- 
dom, his  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipoten- 
tiary at  Washington; 

The  Hon.  Luigi  Albertini,  Senator  of  the  Kingdom ; 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan: 

Baron  Tomosaburo  Kato,  Minister  .for  the  Navy,  Junii, 
a  member  of  the  first  class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of 
the  Grand  Cordon  of  the  Rising  Sun  with  the  Paul- 
ownia  Flower; 

Baron  Kijuro  Shidehara,  his  Ambassador  Extraordi- 
nary and  Plenipotentiary  at  Washington,  Joshii,  a 
member  of  the  first  class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of 
the  Rising  Sun; 

Mr.  Masanao  Hanihara,  Vice  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Jushii,  a  member  of  the  second  class  of  the 
Imperial  Order  of  the  Rising  Sun, 

who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective  full 
powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as 
follows: 

CHAPTEE  I 

General  Provisions  Relating  to   the  Limitation  of  Naval 

Armament 

Article  1.    The  contracting  powers  agree  to  limit  their 
respective  naval  armament  as  provided  in  the  present  treaty. 


APPENDIX  257 

Article  2.  The  contracting  powers  may  retain  respectively 
the  capital  ships  which  are  specified  in  Chapter  II,  Part  1. 
On  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty,  but  subject 
to  the  following  provisions  of  this  article,  all  other  capital 
ships,  built  or  building,  of  the  United  States,  the  British 
Empire  and  Japan  shall  be  disposed  of  as  prescribed  in 
Chapter  II,  Part  2. 

In  addition  to  the  capital  ships  specified  in  Chapter  II, 
Part  1,  the  United  States  may  complete  and  retain  two 
ships  of  the  West  Virginia  class  now  under  construction. 
On  the  completion  of  these  two  ships  the  North  Dakota  and 
Delaware  shall  be  disposed  of  as  prescribed  in  Chapter  II, 
Part  2. 

The  British  Empire  may,  in  accordance  with  the  replace- 
ment table  in  Chapter  II,  Part  3,  construct  two  new  capital 
ships  not  exceeding  35,000  tons  (35,560  metric  tons)  stan- 
dard displacement  each.  On  the  completion  of  the  said 
two  ships,  the  Thunderer,  King  George  V.,  Ajax  and  Cen- 
turion shall  be  disposed  of  as  prescribed  in  Chapter  II, 
Part  2. 

Article  3.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  2,  the 
contracting  powers  shall  abandon  their  respective  capital 
ship  building  programmes,  and  no  new  capital  ships  shall  be 
constructed  or  acquired  by  any  of  the  contracting  powers 
except  replacement  tonnage  which  may  be  constructed  or 
acquired  as  specified  in  Capter  II,  Part  3. 

Ships  which  are  replaced  in  accordance  with  Chapter  II, 
Part  3,  shall  be  disposed  of  as  prescribed  in  Part  2  of  that 
chapter. 

Article  4-  The  total  capital  ship  replacement  tonnage 
of  each  of  the  contracting  powers  shall  not  exceed  in  stan- 
dard displacement,  for  the  United  States  525,000  tons  (533,- 
400  metric  tons)  ;  for  the  British  Empire  525,000  tons 
(533,400  metric  tons);  for  France  175,000  tons  (177,800 


258  APPENDIX 

metric  tons)  ;  for  Italy  175,000  tons  (177,800  metric  tons)  ; 
for  Japan  315,000  tons  (320,040  metric  tons). 

Article  5.  No  capital. ship  exceeding  35,000  tons  (35,560 
metric  tons)  standard  displacement  shall  be  acquired  by, 
or  constructed  by,  for,  or  within  the  jurisdiction  of,  any  of 
the  contracting  powers. 

Article  6.  No  capital  ship  of  any  of  the  contracting  pow- 
ers shall  carry  a  gun  with  a  calibre  in  excess  of  16  inches 
(406  millimetres). 

Article  7.  The  total  tonnage  for  aircraft  carriers  of 
each  of  the  contracting  powers  shall  not  exceed  in  standard 
displacement,  for  the  United  States  135,000  tons  (137,160 
metric  tons)  ;  for  the  British  Empire  135,000  tons  (137,160 
metric  tons)  ;  for  France  60,000  tons  (60,960  metric  tons)  ; 
for  Italy  60,000  tons  (60,960  metric  tons) ;  for  Japan  81,- 
000  tons  (82,296  metric  tons). 

Article  8.  The  replacement  of  aircraft  carriers  shall 
be  affected  only  as  prescribed  in  Chapter  II,  Part  3,  pro- 
vided, however,  that  all  aircraft  carrier  tonnage  in  existence 
or  building  on  Nov.  12,  1921,  shall  be  considered  experimen- 
tal, and  may  be  replaced,  within  the  total  tonnage  limit  pre- 
scribed in  Article  7,  without  regard  to  its  age. 

Article  9.  No  aircraft  carrier  exceeding  27,000  tons  (27,- 
432  metric  tons)  standard  displacement  shall  be  acquired 
by  or  constructed  by,  for  or  within  the  jurisdiction  of, 
any  of  the  contracting  powers. 

However,  any  of  the  contracting  powers  may,  provided 
that  its  total  tonnage  allowance  of  aircraft  carriers  is  not 
thereby  exceeded,  build  not  more  than  two  aircraft  carriers, 
each  of  a  tonnage  of  not  more  than  33,000  tons  (33,528 
metric  tons)  standard  displacement,  and  in  order  to  effect 
economy  any  of  the  contracting  powers  may  use  for  this 
purpose  any  two  of  their  ships,  whether  constructed  or  in 
course  of  construction,  which  would  otherwise  be  scrapped 
under  the  provisions  of  Article  2.  The  armament  of  any 


APPENDIX  259 

aircraft  carriers  exceeding  27,000  tons  (27,432  metric  tons) 
standard  displacement  shall  be  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  Article  10,  except  that  the  total  number  of 
guns  to  be  carried  in  case  any  of  such  guns  be  of  a  calibre 
exceeding  6  inches  (152  millimetres),  except  anti-aircraft 
guns  and  guns  not  exceeding  5  inches  (126.7  millimetres), 
shall  not  exceed  eight. 

Article  10.  No  aircraft  carrier  of  any  of  the  contracting 
powers  shall  carry  a  gun  with  a  calibre  in  excess  of  8  inches 
(203  millimetres).  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of 
Article  9,  if  the  armament  carried  includes  guns  exceeding 
6  inches  (152  millimetres)  in  calibre,  .the  total  number  of 
guns  carried,  except  anti-aircraft  guns  and  guns  not  ex- 
ceeding 5  inches  (126.7  millimetres),  shall  not  exceed  ten. 
If  alternatively  the  armament  contains  no  guns  exceeding 
6  inches  (152  millimetres)  in  calibre,  the  number  of  guns  is 
not  limited.  In  either  case,  the  number  of  anti-aircraft 
guns  and  of  guns  not  exceeding  5  inches  (126.7  millimetres) 
is  not  limited. 

Article  11.  No  vessel  of  war  exceeding  10,000  tons  (10,- 
160  metric  tons)  standard  displacement,  other  than  a  cap- 
ital ship  or  aircraft  carrier,  shall  be  acquired  by  or  con- 
structed by,  for  or  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  of  the 
contracting  powers.  Vessels  not  specifically  built  as  fighting 
ships,  nor  taken  in  time  of  peace  under  Government  control 
for  fighting  purposes,  which  are  employed  on  fleet  duties  or 
as  troop  transports  or  in  some  other  way  for  the  purpose 
of  assisting  in  the  prosecution  of  hostilities  otherwise  than 
as  fighting  ships,  shall  not  be  within  the  limitations  of  this 
article. 

Article  12.  No  vessel  of  war  of  any  of  the  contracting 
powers  hereafter  laid  down,  other  than  a  capital  ship,  shall 
carry  a  gun  with  a  calibre  in  excess  of  8  inches  (203  milli- 
metres). 

Article  13.    Except  as  provided  in  Article  9,  no  ship  desig- 


260  APPENDIX 

nated  in  the  present  treaty  to  be  scrapped  may  be  recon- 
verted into  a  vessel  of  war. 

Article  14>  No  preparations  shall  be  made  in  merchant 
ships  in  time  of  peace  for  the  installation  of  warlike  arma- 
ments for  the  purpose  of  converting  such  ships  into  vessels  of 
war,  other  than  the  necessary  stiffening  of  decks  for  the 
mounting  of  guns  not  exceeding  6-inch  (152  millimetres) 
calibre. 

Article  15*  No  vessel  of  war  constructed  within  the  juris- 
diction of  any  of  the  contracting  powers  for  a  non-contract- 
ing power  shall  exceed  the  limitations  as  to  displacement 
and  armament  prescribed  by  the  present  treaty  for  vessels 
of  a  similar  type  which  may  be  constructed  by  or  for  any 
of  the  contracting  powers ;  provided,  however,  that  the  dis- 
placement for  aircraft  carriers  constructed  for  a  non-con- 
tracting power  shall  in  no  case  exceed  27,000  tons  (27,432 
metric  tons)  standard  displacement. 

Article  16.  If  the  construction  of  any  vessel  of  war  for  a 
non-contracting  power  is  undertaken  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  any  of  the  contracting  powers,  such  power  shall  promptly 
inform  the  other  contracting  powers  of  the  date  of  the  sign- 
ing the  contract  and  the  date  on  which  the  keel  of  the  ship 
is  laid;  and  shall  also  communicate  to  them  the  particulars 
relating  to  the  ship  prescribed  in  Chapter  II,  Part  3,  Section 
1,  (b)  (4)  and  (5). 

Article  17.  In  the  event  of  a  contracting  power  being 
engaged  in  war,  such  power  shall  not  use  as  a  vessel  of 
war  any  vessel  of  war  which  may  be  under  construction  within 
its  jurisdiction  for  any  other  power,  or  which  may  have 
been  constructed  within  its  jurisdiction  for  another  power 
and  not  delivered. 

Article  18.  Each  of  the  contracting  powers  undertakes 
not  to  dispose  by  gift,  sale  or  any  mode  of  transfer  of  any 
vessel  of  war  in  such  a  manner  that  such  vessel  may  become 
a  vessel  of  war  in  the  navy  of  any  foreign  power. 


APPENDIX  261 

Article  19.  The  United  States,  the  British  Empire  and 
Japan  agree  that  the  status  quo  at  the  time  of  the  signing 
of  the  present  treaty,  with  regard  to  fortifications  and  naval 
bases,  shall  be  maintained  in  their  respective  territories  and 
possessions  specified  hereunder: 

(1)  The  insular  possessions  which  the  United  States  now 
holds  or  may  hereafter  acquire  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  except 
(a)  those  adjacent  to  the  coast  of  the  United  States,  Alaska 
and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  not  including  the  Aleutian 
Islands,  and  (b)  the  Hawaiian  Islands ; 

(£)  Hongkong  and  the  insular  possessions  which  the  Brit- 
ish Empire  now  holds  or  may  hereafter  acquire  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  east  of  the  meridian  of  110  degrees  east  longitude, 
except  (a)  those  adjacent  to  the  coast  of  Canada,  (b)  the 
Commonwealth  of  Australia  and  its  territories,  and  (c)  New 
Zealand ; 

(3)  The  following  insular  territories  and  possessions  of 
Japan  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  to  wit:  the  Kurile  Islands,  the 
Bonin  Islands,  Amami-Oshima,  the  Loochoo  Islands,  For- 
mosa and  the  Pescadores,  and  any  insular  territories  or  pos- 
sesions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  which  Japan  may  hereafter  ac- 
quire. 

The  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  under  the  foregoing 
provisions  implies  that  no  new  fortifications  or  naval  bases 
shall  be  established  in  the  territories  and  possessions  specified ; 
that  no  measures  shall  be  taken  to  increase  the  existing  naval 
facilities  for  the  repair  and  maintenance  of  naval  forces,  and 
that  no  increase  shall  be  made  in  the  coast  defences  of  the 
territories  and  possessions  above  specified.  This  restriction, 
however,  does  not  preclude  such  repair  and  replacement  of 
worn-out  weapons  and  equipment  as  is  customary  in  naval 
and  military  establishments  in  time  of  peace. 

Article  20.  The  rules  for  determining  tonnage  displace- 
ment prescribed  in  Chapter  II,  Part  4,  shall  apply  to  the 
ships  of  each  of  the  contracting  powers. 


262  APPENDIX 

CHAPTER  II 

RULES  RELATING  TO   THE  EXECUTION    OF   THE  TEEATY DEFI- 
NITION OF  TERMS 

PART  I 

Capital  Ships  Which  May  Be  Retained  by  the  Contracting 

Powers 

In  accordance  with  Article  2,  ships  may  be  retained  by 
each  of  the  contracting  powers  as  specified  in  this  part. 

Ships  which  may  be  retained  by  the  United  States: 

Name                                 Tonnage  Name  Tonnage 

Maryland    32,600      Nevada    27,500 

California    32,300      New  York 27,000 

Tennessee    32,300      Texas    27,000 

Idaho    32,000      Arkansas    26,000 

New  Mexico 32,000      Wyoming    26,000 

Mississippi   32,000      Florida    21,825 

Arizona   31,400      Utah    21,825 

Pennsylvania    31,400      North  Dakota 20,000 

Oklahoma   27,500      Delaware    20,000 


Total  tonnage    500,650 

On  the  completion  of  the  two  ships  of  the  West  Virginia 
class  and  the  scrapping  of  the  North  Dakota  and  Delaware, 
as  provided  in  Article  2,  the  total  tonnage  to  be  retained 
by  the  United  States  will  be  525,850. 

Ships  which  may  be  retained  by  the  British  Empire: 

Name                                 Tonnage  Name                                 Tonnage 

Royal  Sovereign  25,750      Emperor  of  India 25,000 

Royal  Oak    25,750      Iron  Duke    25,000 

Revenge    25,750     Marlborough    25,000 

Resolution   25,750     Hood 41,200 

Ramillies   25,750     Renown    26,500 

Malaya    27,500      Repulse    26,500 

Valiant    27,500     Tiger    28,500 

Barham    27,500     Thunderer    22,500 

Queen  Elizabeth  27,500     King  George  V  23,000 

Warspite    27,500     Ajax   23,000 

Benbow   25,000     Centurion    23,000 

Total  tonnage   580,450 


APPENDIX  263 

On  the  completion  of  the  two  new  ships  to  be  constructed 
and  the  scrapping  of  the  Thunderer,  King  George  V.,  Ajax 
and  Centurion,  as  provided  in  Article  2,  the  total  tonnage  to 
be  retained  by  the  British  Empire  will  be  558,950  tons. 

Ships  which  may  be  retained  by  France: 

Tonnage  Tonnage 

Name                      (Metric  Tons)  Name                      (Metric  Tons) 

Bretagne    23,500      Jean  Bart    23,500 

Lorraine    23,500      Courbet  23,500 

Provence    23,500     Condorcet   18,890 

Paris    23,500      Diderot    18,890 

France    23,500      Voltaire   18,890 

Total  tonnage   221,170 

France  may  lay  down  new  tonnage  in  the  years  1927,  1929 
and  1931,  as  provided  in  Part  3,  Section  2. 

Ships  which  may  be  retained  by  Italy: 

Tonnage  Tonnage 

Name                      (Metric  Tons)  Name                      (Metric  Tons) 

Andrea  Doria  22,700      Dante  Aligliieri 19,500 

Cai   Duillio    22,700      Eoma    12,600 

Conte  di  Cavour  22,500     Napoli    12,600 

Giulio   Cesare    22,500      Vittorio  Emanuele 12,600 

Leonardo  da  Vinci 22,500      Regina  Elena 12,600 

Total  tonnage    182,800 

Italy  may  lay  down  new  tonnage  in  the  years  1927,  1929 
and  1931,  as  provided  in  Part  3,  Section  2. 

Ships  which  may  be  retained  by  Japan: 

Name                                 Tonnage  Name                                Tonnage 

Mutsu    .  33,800      Fu-So    30,600 

'NTagato    .  33,800      Kirishima    27,500 

Hiuga 31,260      Haruna   27,500 

Ise    31,260      Hiyei   27,500 

Yamashiro    30,600      Kongo    27,500 

Total  tonnage   301,320 


264  APPENDIX 

PABT  II 

Rides  for  Scrapping  Vessels  of  War 

The  following  rules  shall  be  observed  for  the  scrapping 
of  vessels  of  war  which  are  to  be  disposed  of  in  accordance 
with  Articles  2  and  3: 

1.  A  vessel  to  be  scrapped  must  be  placed  in  such  condi- 
tion that  it  cannot  be  put  to  combatant  use. 

2.  This  result  must  be  finally  effected  in  any  one  of  the 
following  ways: 

(a)  Permanent  sinking  of  the  vessel. 

(b)  Breaking  the  vessel  up.     This  shall  always  involve 
the  destruction  or  removal  of  all  machinery,  boilers  and  ar- 
mour, and  all  deck,  side  and  bottom  plating. 

(c)  Converting  the  vessel  to  target  use  exclusively.     In 
such  case  all  the  provisions  of  Paragraph  3  of  this  part,  ex- 
cept Subparagraph  6,  in  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable 
the  ship  to  be  used  as  a  mobile  target,  and  except  Subpara- 
graph 7,  must  be  previously  complied  with.     Not  more  than 
one  capital  ship  may  be  retained  for  this  purpose  at  one 
time  by  any  of  the  contracting  powers. 

(d)  Of  the  capital  ships  which  would  otherwise  be  scrapped 
under  the  present  treaty  in  or  after  the  year  1931,  France 
and  Italy  may  each  retain  two  seagoing  vessels  for  training 
purposes  exclusively ;  that  is,  as  gunnery  or  torpedo  schools. 
The  two  vessels  retained  by  France  shall  be  of  the  Jean  Bart 
class,  and  of  those  retained  by  Italy  one  shall  be  the  Dante 
Alighieri,  the  other  of  the  Giulio  Cesare  class.     On  retaining 
these  ships  for  the  purpose  above  stated,  France  and  Italy 
respectively  undertake  to  remove  and  destroy  their  conning 
towers,  and  not  to  use  the  said  ships  as  vessels  of  war. 

3.  (a)   Subject   to   the   special   exceptions   contained   in 
Article  9,  when  a  vessel  is  due  for  scrapping,  the  first  stage 
of  scrapping,  which  consists  in  rendering  a  ship  incapable 
of  further  warlike  service,  shall  be  immediately  undertaken. 


APPENDIX  265 

(b)  A  vessel  shall  be  considered  incapable  of  further  war- 
like service  when  there  shall  have  been  removed  and  landed, 
or  else  destroyed  in  the  ship: 

(1)  All  guns  and  essential  portions  of  guns,  fire-control 
tops  and  revolving  parts  of  all  barbettes  and  turrets ; 

(2)  All    machinery    for   working    hydraulic    or    electric 
mountings ; 

(3)  All  fire-control  instruments  and  range-finders; 

(4)  All  ammunition,  explosives  and  mines; 

(5)  All  torpedoes,  warheads  and  torpedo  tubes; 

(6)  All  wireless  telegraphy  installations; 

(7)  The  conning  tower  and  all  side  armour,  or  alterna- 
tively all  main  propelling  machinery;  and 

(8)  All  landing  and  flying-off  platforms  and  all  other 
aviation   accessories. 

4.  The  periods  in  which  scrapping  of  vessels  is  to  be 
effected  are  as  follows: 

(a)  In  the  case  of  vessels  to  be  scrapped  under  the  first 
paragraph  of  Article  2,  the  work  of  rendering  the  vessels  in- 
capable of  further  warlike  service,  in  accordance  with  Para- 
graph 3  of  this  part,  shall  be  completed  within  six  months 
from  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty,  and  the 
scrapping  shall  be  finally  effected  within  eighteen  months 
from  such  coming  into  force. 

(b)  In  the  case  of  the  vessels  to  be  scrapped  under  the 
second  and  third  paragraphs  of  Article  2,  or  under  Article 
3,  the  work  of  rendering  the  vessel  incapable  of  further  war- 
like service  in  accordance  with  Paragraph  3  of  this  part  shall 
be  commenced  at  later  than  the  date  of  completion  of  its 
successor,  and  shall  be  finished  within  six  months  from  the 
date  of  such  completion.     The  vessel  shall  be  finally  scrapped 
in  accordance  with  Paragraph  2  of  this  part,  within  eighteen 
months  from  the  date  of  completion  of  its  successor.     If, 
however,  the  completion  of  the  new  vessel  be  delayed,  then 
the  work  of  rendering  the  old  vessel  incapable  of  further 


266  APPENDIX 

REPLACEMENT  AND  SCBAPPINO  OF  CAPITAL  SHIPS — 

UNITED  STATES 

Ships  Retained 
Summary 

Ships  Pre-   Post- 

Laid         Ships  Ships  Scrapped  Jut-    Jut- 

Tear         Down   Completed        (Age  in  Parentheses)  land    land 

Maine  (20),  Missouri  (20),  Vir- 
ginia (17),  Nebraska  (17), 
Georgia  (17),  New  Jersey 
(17),  Rhode  Island  (17),  Con- 
necticut  (17),  Louisiana  (17), 
Vermont  (16),  Kansas  (16), 
Minnesota  (16),  New  Hamp- 
shire (15),  South  Carolina 
(13),  Michigan  (13),  Wash- 
ington (0),  South  Dakota  (0), 
Indiana  (0),  Montana  (0), 
North  Carolina  (0),  Iowa  (0), 
Massachusetts  ( 0 ) ,  Lexington 
(0),  Constitution  (0),  Constel- 
lation (0),  Saratoga  (0), 
Ranger  (0),  United  States 

(0)»    17         1 

Delaware  (12),  North  Dakota 

1922  A.Bf...  (12)  15    3 

1923  15  3 

1924  15  3 

1925  15  3 

1926  15  3 

1927 15  3 

1928  15  3 

1929  15  3 

1930 15  3 

1931  C,  D 15    3 

1932  ....E,  F 15  3 

1933  .  ...G  15  3 

1934 H,  I C,  D Florida  (23),  Utah  (23),  Wyo- 
ming (22)  12  5 

1935  J  E,  F Arkansas  (23),  Texas  (21),  New 

York  (21)  9  7 

1936   K,  L G Nevada   (20),  Oklahoma   (20)...  7  8 

1937   M H,  I Arizona  (21),  Pennsylvania  (21)  5  10 

1938....  N,  O J Mississippi  (21)    4  11 

1939   P,  Q K,  L New  Mexico   (21),  Idaho  (20)..     2       13 

1940    M Tennessee   (20)    1       14 

1941   N,  O California  (20),  Maryland  (20)  .     0       15 

1942  P,Q 2  ehips  West  Virginia  class 0       15 

*  The  United  States  may  retain  the  Oregon  and  Illinois  for  non-com- 
batant purposes,  after  complying  with  the  provisions  of  Part  2,  III.  (b). 

t  Two  West  Virginia  class. 

NOTE. — A,  B,  C,  D,  &c.,  represent  individual  capital  ships  of  35,000 
tons  standard  displacement,  laid  down  and  completed  in  the  years 
specified. 


APPENDIX  267 

warlike  service  in  accordance  with  Paragraph  3  of  this  part 
shall  be  commenced  within  four  years  from  the  laying  of  the 
keel  of  the  new  vessel,  and  shall  be  finished  within  six  months 
from  the  date  on  which  such  work  was  commenced,  and  the 
old  vessel  shall  be  finally  scrapped  in  accordance  with  Para- 
graph 2  of  this  part  within  eighteen  months  from  the  date 
when  the  work  of  rendering  it  incapable  of  further  warlike 
service  was  commenced. 

PART  HI 

Replacement 

The  replacement  of  capital  ships  and  aircraft  carriers 
shall  take  place  according  to  the  rules  in  Section  I  and  the 
tables  in  Section  II  of  this  part. 
SECTION  I — Rules  for  Replacement 

(a)  Capital  ships  and  aircraft  carriers  twenty  years  after 
the  date  of  their  completion  may,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided in  Article  8  and  in  the  tables  in  Section  II  of  this 
part,  be  replaced  by  new  construction,  but  within  the  limits 
prescribed  in  Article  4  and  Article  7.     The  keels  of  such 
'new    construction    may,   except    as    otherwise    provided  in 
Article  8  and  in  the  tables  in  Section  II  of  this  part,  be  laid 
down  not  earlier  than  seventeen  years  from  the  date  of  com- 
pletion of  the  tonnage  to  be  replaced,  provided,  however, 
that  no   capital   ship  tonnage,  with  the  exception  of  the 
ships  referred  to  in  the  third  paragraph  of  Article  2,  and 
the  replacement  tonnage  specifically  mentioned  in  Section 
II  of  this  part,  shall  be  laid  down  until  ten  years  from  Nov. 
12,  1921. 

(b)  Each  of  the  contracting  powers  shall  communicate 
promptly  to  each  of  the  other  contracting  powers  the  follow- 
ing information : 

(1)   The  names  of  the  capital  ships  and  aircraft  carriers 
to  be  replaced  by  new  construction; 


268  APPENDIX 

(2)  The  date  of  governmental  authorization  of  replace- 
ment tonnage; 

(S)  The  date  of  laying  the  keels  of  replacement  ton- 
nage; 

(4)  The  standard  displacement  in  tons  and  metric  tons 
of  each  new  ship  to  be  laid  down,  and  the  principal  dimensions, 
namely,  length  at  waterline,  extreme  beam  at  or  below  water- 
line,  mean  draught  at  standard  displacement; 

(5)  The  date  of  completion  of  each  new  ship  and  its  stand- 
ard displacement  in  tons  and  metric  tons,  and  the  principal 
dimensions,  namely,  length  at  waterline,  extreme  beam  at  or 
below  waterline,  mean  draught  at  standard  displacement,  at 
time  of  completion. 

(c)  In  case  of  loss  or  accidental  destruction  of  capital 
ships  or  aircraft  carriers,  they  may  immediately  be  replaced 
by  new  construction  subject  to  the  tonnage  limits  prescribed 
in  Articles  4  and  7,  and  in  conformity  with  the  other  pro- 
visions of  the  present  treaty,  the  regular  replacement  pro- 
gramme being  deemed  to  be  advanced  to  that  extent. 

(d)  No  retained  capital  ships  or  aircraft  carriers  shall 
be  reconstructed  except  for  the  purpose  of  providing  means 
of  defence  against  air  and  submarine  attack,  and  subject 
to  the  following  rules:  The  contracting  powers  may,  for 
that  purpose,  equip  existing  tonnage  with  bulge  or  blister 
or  anti-air  attack  deck  protection,  providing  the  increase 
of  displacement  thus  effected  does   not  exceed  3,000  tons 
(8,048  metric  tons)  displacement  for  each  ship.     No  alter- 
ations in  side  armour,  in  calibre,  number  or  general  type 
of  mounting  of  main  armament  shall  be  permitted,  except: 

(1)  In  the  case  of  France  and  Italy,  which  countries  with- 
in the  limits  allowed  for  bulge  may  increase  their  armour 
protection  and  the  calibre  of  the  guns  now  carried  on  their 
existing  capital  ships  so  as  to  exceed  sixteen  inches  (406 
millimetres),  and  (2)  the  British  Empire  shall  be  permitted 
to  complete,  in  the  case  of  the  Renown,  the  alterations  to 


APPENDIX  269 

REPLACEMENT  AND  SCBAPPING  OF  CAPITAL  SHIPS — 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

Ships  Retained 
Summary 

Ships  Pre-   Post- 
Laid         Ships                     Ships  Scrapped               Jut-    Jut- 
Year         Down   Completed            (Age  in  Parentheses)           land    land 
Commonwealth     (16),    Agamem- 
non   (13),  Dreadnought    (15), 
Bellerophon    (12),  St.  Vincent 
(11),  Inflexible    (13),   Superb 
(12),  Neptune    (10),  Hercules 
(10),  Indomitable   (13),  Tem- 
eraire  (12),  New  Zealand  (9), 
Lion  (9),  Princess  Royal  (9), 
Conqueror    (9),  Monarch    (9), 
Orion  ( 9 ) ,  Australia  ( 8 ) ,  Agin- 
court  (7),  Erin   (7),  4  build- 
ing or  projected  *    

1922  ....A,   Bf 21         1 

1923    21         1 

1924    21         1 

1925    A,B King  George  V.  (13),  Ajax  (12), 

Centurion      ( 12 ) ,     Thunderer 

(13)    17  3 

1926    17  3 

1927    17  3 

1928    17  3 

1929    17  3 

1930    17  3 

1931  ....C,D 17         3 

1932  ....E,F 17         3 

1933  ....G    17        3 

1934   H,    I C,D Iron    Duke     (20),    Marlborough 

(20),  Emperor  of  India  (20), 
Benbow  (20)  13  5 

1935 J  E,F.... Tiger  (21),  Queen  Elizabeth 

(20),  Warspite  (20),  Barham 

(20)  9  7 

1936 K,  L G Malaya  (20),  Royal  Sovereign 

(20)  7  8 

1937   M    H,I Revenge   (21),  Resolution   (21).     5       10 

1938   N,  O J Royal  Oak   (22) 4       11 

1939   P,  Q K,L.... Valiant  (23),  Repulse   (23)....     2       13 

1940  M Renown  (24)    1       14 

1941   N,O....Ramillies   (24),  Hood   (21) 0      15 

1942  P,Q....A  (17),  B   (17) 0       15 

*  The  British  Empire  may  retain  the  Colossus  and  Cpllingwood  for 
non-combatant  purposes,  after  complying  with  the  provisions  of  Part  2, 
III.  (b). 

t  Two  35,000-ton  ships,  standard  displacement. 

NOTE. — A,  B,  C,  D,  &c.,  represent  individual  capital  ships  of  35,000 
tons  standard  displacement  laid  down  and  completed  in  the  years 
specified. 


270  APPENDIX 

armour  that  have  already  been  commenced  but  temporarily 
suspended. 

(Here  follows  Section  II  of  Part  III,  giving  the  replace- 
ment and  scrapping  schedules  of  all  five  countries — the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  Japan. 
These  tables  are  printed  separately  at  the  tops  of  pages  1021- 
1024.) 

PART   IV 

Definitions 

For  the  purposes  of  the  present  treaty  the  following  ex- 
pressions are  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  defined  in  this 
part: 

Capital  Ship 

A  capital  ship,  in  the  case  of  ships  hereafter  built,  is  de- 
fined as  a  vessel  of  war,  not  an  aircraft  carrier,  whose  dis- 
placement exceeds  10,000  tons  (10,150  metric  tons)  stand- 
ard displacement  or  which  carries  a  gun  with  a  calibre 
exceeding  8 -inches  (203  millimetres). 

Aircraft  Carrier 

An  aircraft  carrier  is  defined  as  a  vessel  of  war  .rith  a 
displacement  in  excess  of  10,000  tons  (10,160  metric  tons) 
standard  displacement  designed  for  the  specific  and  exclusive 
purpose  of  carrying  aircraft.  It  must  be  so  constructed 
that  aircraft  can  be  launched  therefrom  and  landed  thereon, 
and  not  designed  and  constructed  for  carrying  a  more  power- 
ful armament  than  that  allowed  to  it  under  Article  9  or 
Article  10,  as  the  case  may  be. 

Standard  Displacement 

The  standard  displacement  of  a  ship  is  the  displacement 
of  the  ship  complete,  fully  manned,  engined  and  equipped 


APPENDIX  271 

ready  for  sea,  including  all  armament  and  ammunition,  equip- 
ment, outfit,  provisions  and  fresh  water  for  crew,  miscellane- 
ous stores  and  implements  of  every  description  that  are 
intended  to  be  carried  in  war,  but  without  fuel  or  reserve  feed 
water  on  board. 

The  word  "ton"  in  the  present  treaty,  except  in  the  ex- 
pression "metric  tons,"  shall  be  understood  to  mean  the  ton 
of  2,240  pounds  (1,016  kilos).  Vessels  now  completed  shall 
retain -their  present  ratings  of  displacement  tonnage  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  national  system  of  measurement.  How- 
ever, a  power  expressing  displacement  in  metric  tons  shall 

REPLACEMENT  AND  SCRAPPING  OF  CAPITAL  SHIPS — 

FRANCE 

Ships  Retained 
Summary 
Pre-   Post- 
Ships  Ships  Ships  Scrapped  Jut-    Jut- 
Tear       Laid  Down      Completed    (Age  in  Parentheses)            land    land 

1922    7        0 

1923    7        0 

1924    7        0 

1925    7        0 

1926    7 

1927  ..35,000  tons 7        0 

1928    7 

1929  ..35,000  tons 7        0 

Jean   Bart    (17),   Courbet 

1930    35,000  tons..      (17)     5 

1931  ..35,000  tons 5 

1932  ..35,000  tons..  35,000  tons..  France  (18)    4 

1933  ..35,000  tons 4 

1934    35,000  tons.  .Paris  (20),  Bretagne  (20)     2 

1935    35,000  tons.. Provence   (20)    1 

1936    35,000 tons.. Lorraine   (20)    0 

1937    J 

1938    ( 

1939    ' 

1940  .  9 


1941 
1942 


*  Within  tonnage  limitations ;  number  not  fixed. 

NOTE. — France  expressly  reserves  the  right  of  employing  the  capital 
ship  tonnage  allotment  as  she  may  consider  advisable,  subject  solely  to 
the  limitations  that  the  displacement  of  individual  ships  should  not 
surpass  35,000  tons,  and  that  the  total  capital  ship  tonnage  should 
keep  within  the  limits  imposed  by  the  present  treaty. 


272  APPENDIX 

be  considered  for  the  application  of  the  present  treaty  as 
owning  only  the  equivalent  displacement  in  tons  of  2,240 
pounds.  A  vessel  completed  hereafter  shall  be  rated  at  its 
displacement  tonnage  when  in  the  standard  condition  defined 
herein. 

CHAPTER  III 

MISCELLANEOUS  PROVISIONS 

Article  21.  If,  during  the  term  of  the  present  treaty,  the 
requirements  of  the  national  security  of  any  contracting 
power  in  respect  of  naval  defence  are,  in  the  opinion  of  that 
power,  materially  affected  by  any  change  of  circumstances, 
the  contracting  powers  will,  at  the  request  of  such  power, 
meet  in  conference  with  a  view  to  the  reconsideration  of  the 

REPLACEMENT  AND  SCRAPPING  OP  CAPITAL  SHIPS — 

ITALY 

Ships  Retained 
Summary 
Pro-  Post- 
Ships  Ships  Ships  Scrapped  Jut-    Jut- 
Year       Laid  Down     Completed  (Age  in  Parentheses)            land    land 

1922  6  0 

1923  6  0 

1924  6  0 

1925  6  0 

1926  6  0 

1927  ..35,000  tons 6        0 

1928    6         0 

1929  ..35,000  tons 6        0 

1930    6         0 

1931  ..25,000  tons.. 35,000  tons.. Dante  Alighieri   (19) 5 

1932  ..45,000  tons 5 

1933  .  .25,000  tons.  .35,000  tons.  .Leonardo  da  Vinci   (19)  . .     4 

1934    4 

1935    35,000  tons.  .Giulio  Cesare  (21) 3 

Conte     di     Cavour     (21), 

1936    45,000  tons. .     Duilio    (21 )    1 

1937    25,000  tons.. Andrea  Doria    (21) 0 

*  Within  tonnage  limitations ;  number  not  fixed. 

NOTE. — Italy  expressly  reserves  the  right  of  employing  the  capital 
ship  tonnage  allotment  as  she  may  consider  advisable,  subject  solely  to 
the  limitations  that  the  displacement  of  individual  ships  should  not 
surpass  35,000  tons,  and  the  total  capital  ship  tonnage  should  keep 
within  the  limits  imposed  by  the  present  treaty. 


APPENDIX  273 

REPLACEMENT  AND  SCEAPPING  OF  CAPITAL  SHIPS 

JAPAN 

Ships  Retained 
Summon/ 

BTht??  Pre-   Post. 

Laid          Ships  Ships  Scrapped  Jut-     Jut- 

Down    Completed  (Age  in  Parentheses)  land    land 

Hizen    (20),   Mikasa    (20),   Ka- 
shima      (16),     Katori      (16), 
Satsuma      (12),     Aki      (11), 
Settsu      (10),     Ikoma      (14), 
Ibuki     (12),     Kurama     (11), 
Amagi    (0),  Akagi   (0),  Kaga 
(0),    Tosa     (0),    Takao     (0), 
Atago      (0),     Projected     pro- 
gramme 8  ships  not  laid  down.* 

1922 8        2 

1923    g        o 

1924    8 

1925    8         2 

1926 8         2 

1927    8         2 

1928 8 

1929    8 

1930    8 

1931  A ' 8 

1932  B 8 

1933  C 8  2 

1934  D A .Kongo  (21)    7  3 

1935  E B Hiyei  (21),  Haruna  (20) 5  4 

1936  F C Kirishima  (21)    4  5 

1937  G D Fuso    (22)    3  6 

1938  H E Yamashiro   (21)    2  7 

1939  1 F Ise  (22)    1  8 

1940    G, Hiuga   (22)    0        9 

1941    H Nagato  (21)    0        9 

1942    1 ..Mutsu  (21)    0        9 

*  Japan  may  retain  the  Shikishima  and  Asahi  for  non-combatant  pur- 
poses, after  complying  with  the  provisions  of  Part  2,  III.  (b). 

NOTE. — A,  B,  C,  D,  &c.,  represent  individual  capital  ships  of  35,000 
tons  standard  displacement,  laid  down  and  completed  in  the  years 
specified. 

NOTE  APPLICABLE  TO  ALL  THE  TABLES  IN  SECTION  II 

The  order  above  prescribed  in  which  ships  are  to  be  scrapped  is  in 
accordance  with  their  age.  It  is  understood  that  when  replacement 
begins  according  to  the  above  tables  the  order  of  scrapping  in  the  case 
of  the  ships  of  each  of  the  contracting  powers  may  be  varied  at  its 
option;  provided,  however,  that  such  power  shall  scrap  in  each  year 
the  number  of  ships  above  stated. 


\ 


274  APPENDIX 

provisions  of  the  treaty  and  its  amendment  by  mutual  agree- 
ment. 

In  view  of  possible  technical  and  scientific  developments, 
the  United  States,  after  consultation  with  the  other  con- 
tracting powers,  shall  arrange  for  a  conference  of  all  the 
contracting  powers,  which  shall  convene  as  soon  as  possible 
after  the  expiration  of  eight  years  from  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  treaty  to  consider  what  changes,  if  any,  in 
the  treaty  may  be  necessary  to  meet  such  developments. 

Article  22.  Whenever  any  contracting  power  shall  become 
engaged  in  a  war  which,  in  its  opinion,  affects  the  naval 
defence  of  its  national  security,  such  power  may,  after  no- 
tice to  the  other  contracting  powers,  suspend  for  the  period 
of  hostilities  its  obligations  under  the  present  treaty,  other 
than  those  under  Articles  13  and  17,  provided  that  such 
power  shall  notify  the  other  contracting  powers  that  the 
emergency  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  require  such  suspen- 
sion. 

The  remaining  contracting  powers  shall,  in  such  case, 
consult  together  with  a  view  to  agreement  as  to  what  tem- 
porary modifications,  if  any,  should  be  made  in  the  treaty 
as  between  themselves.  Should  such  consultation  not  pro- 
duce agreement,  duly  made  in  accordance  with  the  constitu- 
tional methods  of  the  respective  powers,  any  one  of  said 
contracting  powers  may  by  giving  notice  to  the  other  con- 
tracting powers,  suspend  for  the  period  of  hostilities  its 
obligations  under  the  present  treaty,  other  than  those  under 
Articles  13  and  17. 

On  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  the  contracting  powers  will 
meet  in  conference  to  consider  what  modifications,  if  any, 
should  be  made  in  the  provisions  of  the  present  treaty. 

Article  23.  The  present  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  until 
Dec.  31,  1936,  and  in  case  none  of  the  contracting  powers 
shall  have  given  notice  two  years  before  that  date  of  its  in- 
tention to  terminate  the  treaty,  it  shall  continue  in  force 


APPENDIX  275 

until  the  expiration  of  two  years  from  the  date  on  which 
notice  of  termination  shall  be  given  by  one  of  the  contracting 
powers,  whereupon  the  treaty  shall  terminate  as  regards  all 
the  contracting  powers.  Such  notice  shall  be  communicated 
in  writing  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  which 
shall  immediately  transmit  a  certified  copy  of  the  notification 
to  the  other  powers  and  inform  them  of  the  date  on  which 
it  was  received.  The  notice  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been 
given  and  shall  take  effect  on  that  date.  In  the  event  of 
notice  of  termination  being  given  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  such  notice  shall  be  given  to  the  diplomatic 
representatives  at  Washington  of  the  other  contracting 
powers,  and  the  notice  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  given 
and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  communication  made 
to  the  said  diplomatic  representatives. 

Within  one  year  of  the  date  on  which  a  notice  of  termina- 
tion by  any  power  has  taken  effect  all  the  contracting  powers 
shall  meet  in  conference. 

Article  24>  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the 
contracting  powers  in  accordance  with  their  respective  con- 
stitutional methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the 
deposit  of  all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at 
Washington  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  transmit  to  the  other  contracting  powers 
a  certified  copy  of  the  proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  rati- 
fications. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified 
copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to 
the  other  contracting  powers. 

IN  FAITH  WHEREOF  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  present  treaty. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  the  first  day  of  Feb- 
ruary, one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-two. 


276  APPENDIX 

To  the  naval  treaty  was  added  a  supplementary  resolution, 
adopted  at  the  plenary  session  of  Feb.  4.  This  addition  was 
an  amplification  of  Article  18  of  the  treaty,  which  binds 
the  signatory  powers  not  to  dispose  of  war  craft — in  such 
condition  that  the  vessels  might  be  utilized  as  warships — 
"by  gift,  sale  or  transfer."  The  new  resolution,  which  is  to 
be  taken  as  a  part  of  the  treaty,  reads  thus : 

It  should,  therefore,  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the  sub- 
committee (on  naval  limitation)  and  before  the  full  con- 
ference that  the  powers  signatory  to  the  treaty  of  naval 
limitation  regard  themselves  in  honour  bound  not  to  sell  any 
ships  between  the  present  date  and  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
when  such  a  sale  would  be  a  breach  of  Article  18. 

3.    SUBMARINES  AND  POISON  GAS  TREATY 

TEXT  OP  THE  FIVE-POWER  COMPACT  TINDER  WHICH  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  GREAT  BRITAIN,  JAPAN,  FRANCE  AND  ITALY  BIND 
THEMSELVES  TO  REFRAIN  FROM  THE  USE  OF  SUBMARINES  AS 
COMMERCE  DESTROYERS,  AND  OF  POISON  GAS  IN  WARFARE 

The  treaty  embodying  the  resolutions  passed  by  the  confer- 
ence against  the  use  of  submarines  as  commerce  destroyers, 
and  also  against  the  employment  of  poison  gas  in  warfare, 
the  text  of  which  is  given  herewith,  was  presented  by  Mr. 
Root  at  the  fifth  plenary  session  of  Feb.  1,  and  signed  at 
the  seventh  and  last  plenary  session  on  Feb.  6,  1922.  Both 
subjects  had  been  debated  at  length  in  previous  sessions, 
and  the  decisions  here  translated  into  treaty  terms  were 
not  reached  without  considerable  discussion.  (See  February 
Current  History.)  Mr.  Root  was  sponsor  for  both  of  the 
original  resolutions  prohibiting  these  agencies  of  warfare. 
The  text  of  this  double  treaty  is  as  follows: 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE, 
FRANCE,  ITALY  AND  JAPAN, 


APPENDIX  277 

Hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  signatory  powers,  desiring 
to  make  more  effective  the  rules  adopted  by  civilized  nations 
for  the  protection  of  the  lives  of  neutrals  and  noncombatants 
at  sea  in  time  of  war,  and  to  prevent  the  use  in  war  of  nox- 
ious gases  and  chemicals,  have  determined  to  conclude  a 
treaty  to  this  effect,  and  have  appointed  as  their  plenipo- 
tentiaries (here  follows  the  list  of  names),  who,  having  com- 
municated their  full  powers  found  in  good  and  due  form,  have 
agreed  as  follows : 

Article  1.  The  signatory  powers  declare  that  among  the 
rules  adopted  by  civilized  nations  for  the  protection  of  the 
lives  of  neutrals  and  noncombatants  at  sea  in  time  of  war, 
the  following  are  to  be  deemed  an  established  part  of  inter- 
national law:  (1)  A  merchant  vessel  must  be  ordered  to  sub- 
mit to  visit  and  search  to  determine  its  character  before  it 
can  be  seized.  A  merchant  vessel  must  not  be  attacked  unless 
it  refuse  to  submit  to  visit  and  search  after  warning  or 
to  proceed  as  directed  after  seizure.  A  merchant  vessel  must 
not  be  destroyed  unless  the  crew  and  passengers  have  been 
first  placed  in  safety.  (2)  Belligerent  submarines  are  not 
under  any  circumstances  exempt  from  the  universal  rules 
above  stated ;  and  if  a  submarine  cannot  capture  a  merchant 
vessel  in  conformity  with  these  rules,  the  existing  law  of  na- 
tions requires  it  to  desist  from  attack  and  from  seizure  and  to 
permit  the  merchant  vessel  to  proceed  unmolested. 

Article  2.  The  signatory  powers  invite  all  other  civilized 
powers  to  express  their  assent  to  the  foregoing  statement 
of  established  law,  so  that  there  may  be  a  clear  public  under- 
standing throughout  the  world  of  the  standards  of  conduct 
by  which  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  is  to  pass  judgment 
upon  future  belligerents. 

Article  3.  The  signatory  powers,  desiring  to  insure  the 
enforcement  of  the  humane  rules  of  existing  law  declared 
by  them  with  respect  to  attacks  upon  and  seizure  and  de- 
struction of  merchant  ships,  further  declare  that  any  per- 


278  APPENDIX 

son  in  the  service  of  any  power  who  shall  violate  any  of 
those  rules,  whether  or  not  such  person  is  under  orders  of  a 
governmental  superior,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  violated  the 
laws  of  war  and  shall  be  liable  to  trial  and  punishment  as  if 
for  an  act  of  piracy,  and  may  be  brought  to  trial  before  the 
civil  or  military  authorities  of  any  power  within  the  juris- 
diction of  which  he  may  be  found. 

Article  4-  The  signatory  powers  recognize  the  practical 
impossibility  of  using  submarines  as  commerce  destroyers 
without  violating,  as  they  were  violated  in  the  recent  war  of 
1914-1918,  the  requirements  universally  accepted  by  civilized 
nations  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  of  neutrals  and  non- 
combatants,  and  to  the  end  that  the  prohibition  of  the  use 
of  submarines  as  commerce  destroyers  shall  be  universally 
accepted  as  a  part  of  the  law  of  nations  they  now  accept  that 
prohibition  as  henceforth  binding  as  between  themselves,  and 
they  invite  all  other  nations  to  adhere  thereto. 

Article  5.  The  use  in  war  of  asphyxiating,  poisonous  or 
other  gases,  and  all  analogous  liquids,  materials  and  devices 
having  been  justly  condemned  by  the  general  opinion  of  the 
civilized  world,  and  a  prohibition  of  such  use  having  been 
declared  in  treaties  to  which  a  majority  of  the  civilized 
powers  are  parties,  the  signatory  powers,  to  the  end  that  this 
prohibition  shall  be  universally  accepted  as  a  part  of  in- 
ternational law,  binding  alike  the  conscience  and  practice 
of  nations,  declare  their  assent  to  such  prohibition,  agree 
to  be  bound  thereby  as  between  themselves  and  invite  all  other 
civilized  nations  to  adhere  thereto. 

Article  6.  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  as  soon  as 
possible  in  accordance  with  the  constitutional  methods  of 
the  signatory  powers  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  deposit  of 
all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Washington. 
The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  will  trans- 
mit to  all  the  signatory  powers  a  certified  copy  of  the  proces- 
verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifications.  The  present  treaty, 


4PPENDIX  279 

in  French  and  English,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
duly  certified  copies  thereof  will  be  transmitted  by  that  Gov- 
ernment to  each  of  the  signatory  powers. 

Article  7.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica will  further  transmit  to  each  of  the  non-signatory  powers 
a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  present  treaty  and  invite  its 
adherence  thereto.  Any  non-signatory  power  may  adhere 
to  the  present  treaty  by  communicating  an  instrument  of 
adherence  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, which  will  thereupon  transmit  to  each  of  the  signatory 
and  adhering  powers  a  certified  copy  of  each  instrument  of 
adherence. 

IN  FAITH  WHEREOF  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  present  treaty.  Done  at  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington, the  sixth  day  of  January,  One  Thousand  Nine 
Hundred  and  Twenty-two. 


B 

4.    TREATIES  AND   RESOLUTIONS  AFFECTING 

CHINA 

(1)  THE  "OPEN-DOOR"  TREATY 

Nine-Power  Pact  Declaring  for  Integrity  of  Chinese  Sover- 
eignty and  for  Equal  Opportunity  in  Trade  Intercourse 

The  Treaty  on  Chinese  Integrity,  as  it  was  entitled  in  the 
official  version,  or  the  treaty  on  the  "Open  Door,"  the  text 
of  which  is  given  below,  was  presented  by  Secretary  Hughes 
at  the  sixth  plenary  session  of  the  arms  conference  on  Feb.  4. 
This  nine-power  agreement,  signed  by  the  American,  British, 
Chinese,  Japanese,  French,  Belgian,  Italian,  Dutch  and 
Portuguese  delegations  for  their  respective  Governments, 
was  based  on  the  original  Root  resolutions  and  embodies 


280  APPENDIX. 

further  a  number  of  resolutions  passed  by  the  Far  Eastern 
Committee  at  various  sessions.  It  was  formally  approved 
by  the  conference  after  Secretary  Hughes  had  read  the  "sub- 
stantive portions"  and  was  signed,  together  with  other 
treaties,  at  the  seventh  plenary  session  held  on  Feb.  6 — 
the  last  meeting  of  the  conference.  All  the  delegations  also 
unanimously  approved  a  supplementary  resolution,  which 
had  been  adopted  by  the  Far  Eastern  Committee  on  Feb.  3, 
and  which  provided  for  the  establishment  in  China  of  a  board 
of  reference  charged  with  the  maintenance  of  the  "open-door" 
principle,  as  well  as  a  special  declaration  by  China  binding 
her  not  to  alienate  any  of  her  territory. 

The  main  treaty  pledges  the  nine  signatory  powers  to 
help  China  to  get  on  her  feet,  and  not  to  seek  for  themselves 
any  unfair  or  special  advantages,  and  also  to  respect  Chinese 
neutrality;  it  further  authorizes  all  or  any  of  them,  includ- 
ing China  herself,  to  call  a  conference  of  all  the  signatories 
in  case  a  situation  arises  which  involves  the  application  of 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  The  official  text  is  as  follows : 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  BELGIUM,  THE  BRITISH 
EMPIRE,  CHINA,  FRANCE,  ITALY,  JAPAN,  THE  NETHERLANDS 
AND  PORTUGAL, 

Desiring  to  adopt  a  policy  designed  to  stabilize  conditions 
in  the  Far  East,  to  safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of 
China,  and  to  promote  intercourse  between  China  and  the 
other  powers  upon  the  basis  of  equality  of  opportunity; 

Have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  for  that  purpose,  and 
to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  respective  plenipoten- 
tiaries (here  follow  the  names  of  the  plenipotentiaries),  who 
having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers,  found 
to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  1.  The  contracting  powers,  other  than  China, 
agree : 

1.  To  respect  the  sovereignty,  the  independence,  and  the 
territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China. 


APPENDIX  281 

2.  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unembarrassed  oppor- 
tunity to  China  to  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  an  ef- 
fective and  stable  Government. 

3.  To  use  their  influence  for  the  purpose  of  effectually 
establishing  and  maintaining  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  through- 
out the  territory  of  China.  -^ 

4.  To  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of  conditions  in 
China  in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or  privileges   which 
would  abridge  the  rights  of  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly 
States,  and  from  countenancing  action  inimical  to  the  secur- 
ity of  such  States. 

Article  2.  The  contracting  powers  agree  not  to  enter 
into  any  treaty,  agreement,  arrangement  or  understanding, 
either  with  one  another,  or  individually  or  collectively  with 
any  power  or  powers,  which  would  infringe  or  impair  the 
principles  stated  in  Article  1. 

Article  3.  With  a  view  to  applying  more  effectually  the 
principles  of  the  open  door,  or  equality  of  opportunity,  in 
China  for  the  trade  and  industry  of  all  nations,  the  contract- 
ing powers,  other  than  China,  agree  not  to  seek  or  to  sup- 
port their  respective  nations  in  seeking: 

(A)  Any  arrangement  which  might  purport  to  establish 
in  favour  of  their  interests  any  general  superiority  of  rights 
with  respect  to  commercial  or  economic  development  in  any 
designated  region  in  China; 

(B)  Any  such  monopoly  or  preference  as  would  deprive 
the  nationals  of  any  other  power  of  the  right  of  undertaking 
any  legitimate  trade  or  industry  in  China,  or  of  participat- 
ing with  the  Chinese  Government,  or  with  any  local  authority, 
in  any  category  of  public  enterprise,  or  which  by  reason 
of  its  scope,  duration  or  geographical  extent  is  calculated 
to  frustrate  the  practical  application  of  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity. 

It  is  understood  that  the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this 


282  APPENDIX^ 

article  are  not  to  be  so  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  acquisi- 
tion of  such  properties  or  rights  as  may  be  necessary  to  the 
conduct  of  a  particular  commercial,  industrial  or  financial 
undertaking  or  to  the  encouragement  of  invention  and 
research. 

China  undertakes  to  be  guided  by  the  principles  stated  in 
the  foregoing  stipulations  of  this  article  in  dealing  with 
applications  for  economic  rights  and  privileges  from  Govern- 
ments and  nationals  of  all  foreign  countries,  whether  parties 
to  the  present  treaty  or  not. 

Article  4>  The  contracting  powers  agree  not  to  support 
any  agreements  by  their  respective  nationals  with  each  other 
designed  to  create  spheres  of  influence  or  to  provide  for  the 
enjoyment  of  mutually  exclusive  opportunities  in  designated 
parts  of  Chinese  territory. 

Article  5.  China  agrees  that,  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
railways  in  China,  she  will  not  exercise  or  permit  unfair  dis- 
criminations of  any  kind.  In  particular  there  shall  be  no 
discrimination  whatever,  direct  or  indirect,  in  respect  of 
charges  or  of  facilities  on  the  ground  of  the  nationality  of 
passengers  or  the  countries  from,  which  or  to  which  they  are 
proceeding,  or  the  origin  or  ownership  of  goods  or  the  coun- 
try from  which  or  to  which  they  are  proceeding,  or  the 
nationality  or  ownership  of  the  ship  or  other  means  of  con- 
veying such  passengers  or  goods  before  or  after  their  trans- 
port on  the  Chinese  railways. 

The  contracting  powers,  other  than  China,  assume  a  cor- 
responding obligation  in  respect  of  any  of  the  aforesaid  rail- 
ways over  which  they  or  their  nationals  are  in  a  position  to 
exercise  any  control  in  virtue  of  any  concession,  special  agree- 
ment or  otherwise. 

Article  6.  The  contracting  parties,  other  than  China, 
agree  fully  to  respect  China's  rights  as  a  neutral  in  time  of 
war  to  which  China  is  not  a  party ;  and  China  declares  that 


APPENDIX  283 

when  she  is  a  neutral  she  will  observe  the  obligations  of  neu- 
trality. 

Article  7.  The  contracting  powers  agree  that,  whenever 
a  situation  arises  which,  in  the  opinion  of  any  one  of  them, 
involves  the  application  of  the  stipulations  of  the  present 
treaty,  and  renders  desirable  discussion  of  such  application, 
there  shall  be  full  and  frank  communication  between  the 
contracting  powers  concerned. 

Article  8.  Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  treaty 
which  have  governments  recognized  by  the  signatory  powers 
and  which  have  treaty  relations  with  China  shall  be  invited 
to  adhere  to  the  present  treaty.  To  this  end  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  will  make  the  necessary  communi- 
cations to  non-signatory  powers  and  will  inform  the  con- 
tracting powers  of  the  replies  received.  Adherence  by  any 
power  shall  become  effective  on  receipt  of  notice  thereof  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

Article  9.  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the 
contracting  powers  in  accordance  with  their  respective  con- 
stitutional methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the 
deposit  of  all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at 
Washington  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  transmit  to  the  other  contracting  powers 
a  certified  copy  of  the  proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifi- 
cations. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  duly  certified 
copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to 
the  other  contracting  powers. 

IN  FAITH  WHEREOF  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  present  treaty.  Done  at  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington the  sixth  day  of  February,  one  thousand  nine  hun- 
dred and  twenty-two. 


284  APPENDIX 

THE  SUPPLEMENTARY  RESOLUTION 

The  supplementary  resolution  adopted  by  the  conference 
at  this  same  session  read  thus : 

The  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British  Em- 
pire, China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and 
Portugal, 

Desiring  to  provide  a  procedure  for  dealing  with  ques- 
tions that  may  arise  in  connection  with  the  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  Articles  &  and  5  of  the  treaty  to  be  signed  at 
Washington  on  Feb.  6,  1922,  with  reference  to  their  general 
policy,  designed  to  stabilize  conditions  in  the  Far  East,  to 
safeguard  the  rights  and  interests  of  China,  and  to  promote 
intercourse  between  China  and  the  other  powers  upon  the 
basis  of  equality  of  opportunity, 

Resolve,  That  there  shall  be  established  in  China  a  board 
of  reference  to  which  any  questions  arising  in  connection  with 
the  execution  of  the  aforesaid  articles  may  be  referred 
for  investigation  and  report. 

The  special  conference,  provided  in  Article  2  of  the  treaty 
to  be  signed  at  Washington  Feb.  6,  1922,  with  reference 
to  the  Chinese  customs  tariff  shall  formulate  for  the  appro- 
val of  the  powers  concerned  a  detailed  plan  for  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  board. 

DECLARATION    BY    CHINA 

The  Chinese  declaration  regarding  alienation  of  territory, 
also  added  to  the  Far  Eastern  treaty,  was  stated  thus : 

China  upon  her  part  is  prepared  to  give  an  undertaking 
not  to  alienate  or  lease  any  portion  of  her  territory  or  lit- 
toral to  any  power. 


APPENDIX  285 

(2)  TREATY  ON  THE  CHINESE  TAEIPF 

Text  of  the  Nine-Power  Agreement  Raising  China's  Customs 
Revenue  to  5  Per  Cent.,  and  Appointing  a  Revision  Com- 
mission to  Meet  at  Shanghai 

The   nine-power   treaty   on   the  Chinese   tariff,   like   the 
treaty  on  the  "open  door,"  was  presented  to  the  arms  con- 
ference at  the  sixth  plenary  session  of  Feb.  4,  and  was  un- 
animously approved  at  that  session.     The  reporter  for  the 
compact  was  Senator  Underwood,  who  traced  the  series  of 
events  that  had  created  the  existing  situation — a  situation 
under  which  China  received  a  quota  of  customs  revenue  far 
below  the  nominal  5  per  cent,  to  which  she  was  entitled.     Mr. 
Sze  asked  that  China's  various  statements  on  this  subject 
— made  at  the  sessions  of  Jan.  5,  Jan.  16  and  Feb.  3 — 
be  spread  upon  the  record,  and  this  was  done.     The  treaty, 
which  embodied  the  resolutions  adopted  Jan.  16,  provides 
for  the  assembling  at  Shanghai  as  soon  as  possible  of  a 
special   commission,  whose  duty  it   shall  be  to  revive  the 
Chinese  tariff  so  as  to  make  it  equivalent  to  5  per  cent,  ad 
valorem,  instead  of  about  3.5  per  cent.,  as  at  present.     The 
treaty  also  provides  for  a  special  conference  to  take  steps 
toward  the  abolition  of  the  "likin"  or  internal  customs  in 
China,  and  authorizes  the  levying  of  a  surtax,  in  most  in- 
stances 2.5  per  cent.,  on  Chinese  imports  as  soon  as  this 
is   found  advisable.     A  further  revision  is  to  be  made  in 
four  years  to  adjust  the  specific  duties  fixed  by  the  revising 
commission  to  the  ad  valorem  rates,  and  thereafter  revisions 
are  to  take  place  every  seven  years  instead  of  every  ten  years, 
as  heretofore.     Senator  Underwood,  in  reporting  the  treaty, 
said  that  it  might  be  expected  to  double  the  maritime  cus- 
toms revenue  of  China.     A  full  account  of  the  presenting 
address  made  by  Senator  Underwood,  and  the  reply  of  the 
Chinese    delegation,    will    be    found    in    the    records.      The 


286  APPENDIX 

text  of  the  treaty,  which  was  signed  at  the  last  session  of  the 
conference  on  Feb.  6,  reads  as  follows: 


THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  BELGIUM,  BRITISH  EM- 
PIRE, CHINA,  FRANCE,  ITALY,  JAPAN,  THE  NETHERLANDS  AND 
PORTUGAL, 

With  a  view  to  increasing  the  revenues  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  relating  to  the 
revision  of  the  Chinese  customs  tariff  and  cognate  matters, 
and  to  that  end  have  appointed  as  their  plenipotentiaries 
(here  follow  the  names  of  the  plenipotentiaries),  who,  having 
communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers,  found  to  be  in 
good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  1.  The  representatives  of  the  contracting  powers 
having  adopted,  on  the  4th  day  of  February,  1922,  in  the 
City  of  Washington,  a  resolution,  which  is  appended  as  an 
annex  to  this  article,  with  respect  to  the  revision  of  Chinese 
customs  duties,  for  the  purpose  of  making  such  duties  equiv- 
alent to  an  effective  5  per  centum  ad  valorem,  in  accordance 
with  existing  treaties,  concluded  by  China  with  other  nations, 
the  contracting  powers  hereby  confirm  the  said  resolution 
and  undertake  to  accept  the  tariff  rates  fixed  as  a  result  of 
such  revision.  The  said  tariff  rates  shall  become  effective 
as  soon  as  possible,  but  not  earlier  than  two  months  after 
publication  thereof. 

Annex — With  a  view  to  providing  additional  revenue  to 
meet  the  needs  of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  powers  rep- 
resented at  this  conference,  namely,  the  United  States  of 
America,  Belgium,  the  British  Empire,  China,  France,  Italy, 
Japan,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal,  agree: 

That  the  customs  schedule  of  duties  on  imports  into  China, 
adopted  by  the  Tariff  Revision  Commission  at  Shanghai  on 
Dec.  19, 1918,  shall  forthwith  be  revised  so  that  rates  of  duty 
shall  be  equivalent  to  5  per  cent,  effective,  as  provided  for 
in  the  several  commercial  treaties  to  which  China  is  a  part. 


APPENDIX  287 

A  revision  commission  shall  meet  at  Shanghai,  at  the  ear- 
liest practicable  date,  to  effect  this  revision  forthwith  and  on 
the  general  lines  of  the  last  revision. 

This  commission  shall  be  composed  of  representatives  of 
the  powers  above  named  and  of  representatives  of  any  addi- 
tional powers  having  governments  at  present  recognized  by 
the  powers  represented  at  this  conference  and  who  have 
treaties  with  China  providing  for  a  tariff  on  imports  and 
exports  not  to  exceed  5  per  cent,  ad  valorem  and  who  desire 
to  participate  therein. 

The  revision  shall  proceed  as  rapidly  as  possible,  with 
a  view  to  its  completion  within  four  months  from  the  date  of 
the  adoption  of  this  resolution  by  the  Conference  on  Limi- 
tation of  Armament  and  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions. 

The  revised  tariff  shall  become  effective  as  soon  as  possible, 
but  not  earlier  than  two  months  after  its  publication  by  the 
Revision  Commission. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  as  convener  of  the 
present  conference,  is  requested  forthwith  to  communicate  the 
terms  of  this  resolution  to  the  Governments  of  powers  not 
represented  at  this  conference,  but  who  participated  in  the 
revision  of  1918  aforesaid. 

Article  2.  Immediate  steps  shall  be  taken  through  a  spe- 
cial conference  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  speedy  abolition 
of  likin  and  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  other  conditions  laid 
down  in  Article  8  of  the  treaty  of  Sept.  5,  1902,  between 
Great  Britain  and  China ;  in  Articles  4  and  5  of  the  treaty 
of  Oct.  8,  1903,  between  the  United  States  and  China,  and 
in  Article  1  of  the  supplementary  treaty  of  Oct.  8,  1903, 
between  Japan  and  China,  with  a  view  to  levying  the  surtaxes 
provided  for  in  these  articles. 

The  special  conference  shall  be  composed  of  representa- 
tives of  the  signatory  powers,  and  of  such  other  powers  as 
may  desire  to  participate  and  may  adhere  to  the  present 
treaty,  in  accord  with  the  provisions  of  Article  8  in  suffi- 


288  APPENDIX 

cient  time  to  allow  their  representatives  to  take  part.  It 
shall  meet  in  China  within  three  months  after  the  coming 
into  force  of  the  present  treaty  on  a  day  and  at  a  place 
to  be  designated  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

Article  3.  The  special  conference  provided  for  in  Article 
2  shall  consider  the  interim  provisions  to  be  applied  prior 
to  the  abolition  of  likin  and  the  fulfilment  of  the  other 
conditions  laid  down  in  the  articles  of  the  treaties  mentioned 
in  Article  2 ;  and  it  shall  authorize  the  levying  of  a  surtax 
on  dutiable  imports  as  from  such  date,  for  such  purposes 
and  subject  to  such  conditions  as  it  may  determine. 

The  surtax  shall  be  at  a  uniform  rate  of  91/2  per  centum 
ad  valorem,  provided  that  in  case  of  certain  articles  of  lux- 
ury which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  special  conference,  can 
bear  a  greater  increase  without  unduly  impeding  trade,  the 
total  surtax  may  be  increased,  but  may  not  exceed  5  per 
centum  ad  valorem. 

Article  4-  Following  the  immediate  revision  of  the  cus- 
toms schedule  of  duties  on  imports  into  China,  mentioned 
in  Article  1,  there  shall  be  a  further  revision  thereof,  to  take 
effect  at  the  expiration  of  four  years  following  the  comple- 
tion of  the  aforesaid  immediate  revision,  in  order  to  insure 
that  the  customs  duties  shall  correspond  to  the  ad  valorem 
rates  fixed  by  the  special  conference  provided  in  Article  2. 

Following  this  further  revision  there  shall  be,  for  the  same 
purpose,  periodical  revisions  of  the  customs  schedule  of 
duties  on  imports  into  China  every  seven  years,  in  lieu  of 
the  decennial  revision  authorized  by  existing  treaties  with 
China. 

In  order  to  prevent  delay,   any   revision  made  in  pur- 
suance of  this  article  shall  be  effected  in  accord  with  rules 
to  be  prescribed  by  the  special  conference  provided  for  in 
Article  3. 
X.  Article  5.    In  all  matters  relating  to  customs  duties  there 


APPENDIX:  289 

shall  be  effective  equality  of  treatment  and  of  opportunity 
for  all  the  contracting  powers. 

Article  6.  The  principle  of  uniformity  in  the  rates  of 
customs  duties  levied  at  all  the  land  and  maritime  frontiers 
of  China  is  hereby  recognized.  The  special  conference  pro- 
vided for  in  Article  2  shall  make  arrangements  to  give  prac- 
tical effect  to  this  principle,  and  it  is  authorized  to  make 
equitable  adjustments  in  those  cases  in  which  a  customs  priv- 
ilege to  be  abolished  was  granted  in  return  for  some  local 
economic  advantage. 

In  the  meantime,  any  increase  in  the  rate  of  customs  duties 
resulting  from  tariff  revision  or  any  surtax  hereafter  im- 
posed in  pursuance  of  the  present  treaty  shall  be  levied  at  a 
uniform  rate  ad  valorem  at  all  land  and  maritime  frontiers 
of  China. 

Article  7.  The  charge  for  transit  passes  shall  be  at  the 
rate  of  %y2  per  centum  ad  valorem  until  the  arrangements 
provided  for  by  Article  2  come  into  force. 

Article  8.  Powers  not  signatory  to  the  present  treaty, 
whose  Governments  are  at  present  recognized  by  the  signa- 
tory powers  and  whose  present  treaties  with  China  provide 
for  a  tariff  on  imports  and  exports  not  to  exceed  5  per 
centum  ad  valorem,  shall  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  present 
treaty. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes  to  make 
the  necessary  communications  for  this  purpose  and  to  in- 
form the  Governments  of  the  contracting  powers  of  the  re- 
plies received.  Adherence  by  any  power  shall  become  effec- 
tive on  receipt  of  notice  thereof  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

Article  9.  The  provisions  of  the  present  treaty  shall  over- 
ride all  stipulations  of  treaties  between  China  and  the  re- 
spective contracting  powers  which  are  inconsistent  therewith, 
other  than  stipulations  according  most  favoured  nation 
treatment. 


290  APPENDIX 

Article  10.  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the 
contracting  powers  in  accord  with  their  respective  consti- 
tutional methods  and  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  of  the  de- 
posit of  all  the  ratifications,  which  shall  take  place  at  Wash- 
ington as  soon  as  possible.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  will  transmit  to  the  other  contracting  powers  a  cer- 
tified copy  of  the  proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifica- 
tions. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  English  and  French  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  remain  deposited  in  the  archives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  duly  certified 
copies  thereof  shall  be  transmitted  by  that  Government  to 
the  other  contracting  powers. 

IN  FAITH  WHEREOF  the  above-named  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  present  treaty.  Done  at  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington the  sixth  day  of  February,  one  thousand  nine  hundred 
and  twenty-two. 

In  connection  with  the  tariff  treaty,  the  Chinese  delegation 
presented  and  caused  to  be  spread  upon  the  record  a  resolu- 
tion which  states  that  "the  Chinese  Government  have  no 
intention  to  effect  any  change  which  may  disturb  the  pres- 
ent administration  of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs." 


(3)    THE    SHANTUNG    TREATY 

Text  of  the  Separate  Treaty  Between  China  and  Japan 
WHch  Settled  the  Long  and  Bitter  Dispute  Over  Shantung. 

The  treaty  between  China  and  Japan  embodying  the  terms 
of  transfer  to  China  of  Kiao-Chau  and  the  Shantung  Rail- 
way, together  with  all  rights  to  public  property,  maritime 
customs,  mining,  port  and  other  rights  formerly  held  by 
Germany,  was  presented  to  the  conference  at  its  fifth  plenary 
session  on  Feb.  1.  The  history  of  this  whole  episode,  and 
of  the  conditions  under  which  a  final  settlement  was  reached 


APPENDIX  291 

after  two  months'  discussion  outside  the  conference  proper, 
has  been  told  in  the  main  article  on  the  conference.  The 
two  Asiatic  delegations  attributed  the  final  success  of  these 
long  negotiations  to  the  good  offices  of  Mr.  Hughes  and  Mr. 
Balfour.  The  text  of  the  treaty,  which  was  signed  at  the 
seventh  and  last  plenary  session,  Feb.  6,  follows  herewith: 

CHINA  AND  JAPAN,  being  equally  animated  by  a  sincere 
desire  to  settle  amicably  and  in  accordance  with  their  com- 
mon interest  outstanding  questions  relative  to  Shantung, 
have  resolved  to  conclude  a  treaty  for  the  settlement  of  such, 
and  have  to  that  end  named  as  their  plenipotentiaries,  that 
is  ta  say: 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic ; 

Soa  Ke  Alfred  Sze,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary ; 

Vi  Kvuin  Wellington  Koo,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary;  and 
Chung-Hui  Wang,  former  Minister  of  Justice; 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan; 
Baron  Tomosaburo  Kato,  Minister  of  the  Navy ; 

Baron  Kijuro  Shidehara,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary ;  and 

Masanao  Hanihara,  Vice  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs ; 
Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective 
full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed 
upon  the  following  articles: 

I. -THE  FORMER  GERMAN-LEASED  TERRITORY  OF  KIAO-CHAU 

1.  Japan  shall  restore  to  China  the  former  German  leased 
territory  of  Kiao-Chau. 

2.  The  Governments  of  Japan  and  China  shall  each  ap- 
point a  commission  with  powers  to  make  and  carry  out  de- 
tailed arrangements  relating  to  the  transfer  of  the  adminis- 
tration and  of  public  property  in  the  said  territory  and  to 


292  APPENDIX 

settle  other  matters  equally  requiring  adjustment.  For 
such  purposes  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  commissions  shall 
meet  immediately  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
agreement. 

3.  The  said  transfer  and  adjustment  shall  be  completed 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  any  case  not  later  than  six  months 
from,  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  this  agreement. 

4.  The  Japanese  Government  agrees  to  hand  over  to  the 
Chinese   Government,  upon  the  transfer  to   China   of  the 
administration  of  the  former  German  leased  territory   of 
Kiao-Chau,  such  archives,  registers,  plans,  title-deeds  and 
other  documents,  in  the  possession  of  Japan   or  certified 
copies  thereof,  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  said  transfer, 
as  well  as  those  that  may  be  useful  for  the  administration 
by  China,  after  such  transfer,  of  that  territory,  and  of  the 
fifty-kilometre  zone  around  Kiao-Chau  Bay. 

H. PUBLIC   PROPERTIES 

1.  The  Government  of  Japan  undertakes  to  transfer  to 
the  Government  of  China  all  public  properties,  including 
land,  buildings,  works  or  establishments  in  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-Chau,  whether  formerly  possessed  by  the  Ger- 
man authorities  or  purchased  or  constructed  by  the  Japanese 
authorities  during  the  Japanese  administration  of  the  said 
territory,  save  those  indicated  in  this  article  (Paragraph  3) 
of  this  treaty. 

2.  In  the  transfer  of  such  public  properties  no  compensa- 
tion will  be  claimied  from  the  Government  of  China  except  (1) 
for  those  purchased  or  constructed  by  the  Japanese  author- 
ities and  also  (2)  for  the  improvement  on  or  additions  to 
those  formerly  possessed  by  the  German  authorities.     With 
regard  to  cases  under  these  two  categories,  the  Government 
of  China  shall  refund  a  fair  and  equitable  proportion  of 
the  expenses  actually  incurred  by  the  Government  of  Japan 


APPENDIX  293 

for  such  properties  specified  in  (1)  or  such  improvements  or 
addition  specified  in  (2),  having  regard  to  the  principle  of 
depreciation. 

3.  It  is  agreed  that  such  public  properties  in  the  leased 
territory  of  Itiao-Chau  as  are  required  for  the  Japanese 
Consulate  to  be  established  in  Tsing-tao  shall  be  retained  by 
the  Government  of  Japan,  and  that  those  required  more 
especially  for  the  benefit  of  the  Japanese  community,  includ- 
ing public  schools,  shrines  and  cemeteries,  shall  be  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  said  community. 

Details  of  such  matters  shall  be  arranged  by  the  joint 
commission  provided  for  in  an  article  of  this  treaty. 


HI. JAPANESE   TROOPS 

The  Japanese  troops,  including  gendarmes  now  stationed 
along  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway  and  its  branches, 
shall  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  Chinese  police  or  military 
force  shall  have  been  sent  to  take  over  the  protection  of  the 
railway. 

The  disposition  of  the  Chinese  police  or  military  force  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese  troops  under  the  foregoing 
provisions  may  be  effected  in  sections.  The  date  of  the  com- 
pletion of  such  process  for  each  section  shall  be  arranged  in 
advance  between  the  competent  authorities  of  Japan  and 
China.  The  entire  withdrawal  of  such  Japanese  troops  shall 
be  effected  if  possible  within  three  months,  and,  in  any  case, 
not  later  than  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  signature 
of  the  present  agreement. 

The  Japanese  garrison  at  Tsing-tao  shall  be  completely 
withdrawn,  simultaneously,  if  possible,  with  the  transfer  of 
the  administration  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau  to 
China,  and  in  any  case  not  later  than  thirty  days  from  the 
date  of  such  transfer. 


294  APPENDIX 

IV. THE  MAKITIME  CUSTOMS 

1.  It  is  agreed  that  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
present   treaty   the   Custom  House   of   Tsing-tao   shall  be 
made  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  maritime  customs. 

2.  It   is  understood  that  the  provisional   agreement  of 
Aug.   6,  1915,  between  Japan  and   China   relative  to   the 
maritime  customs  office  at  Tsing-tao  will  cease  to  be  effec- 
tive upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty. 

V. THE  TSING-TAO-TSINANFU  BATLWAY 

1.  Japan  shall  transfer  to  China  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu 
Railway  and  its  branches,  together  with  all  the  properties 
appurtenant  thereto,  including  wharves,  warehouses  and  other 
similar  properties. 

2.  China,  on  her  part,  undertakes  to  reimburse  to  Japan 
the  actual  value  of  the  railway  properties  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  paragraph.     The  actual  value  to  be  so  reimbursed 
shall  consist  of  the  sum  of  53,406,141  gold  marks  (which 
is  the  assessed  value  of  such  portion  of  the  said  properties 
as  was  left  behind  by  the  Germans),  or  its  equivalent,  plus 
the  amount  which  Japan,  during  her  administration  of  the 
railway,  has  actually  expended  for  permanent  improvements 
on  or  additions  to  the  said  properties,  less  a  suitable  allow- 
ance  for  depreciation.     It   is   understood   that   no   charge 
will  be  made  with  respect  to  the  wharves,  warehouses  and 
other  similar  properties  mentioned  in  Paragraph  1  of  this 
article,  except  for  such  permanent  improvements  on  or  addi- 
tions to  them  as  may  have  been  made  by  Japan  during  her 
administration  of  the  railway,  less  a  suitable  allowance  for 
depreciation. 

3.  The  Government  of   Japan  and  the  Government   of 
China  shall  each  appoint  three  commissioners  to  form   a 
joint  railway  commission,  with  powers  to  appraise  the  actual 


APPENDIX  295 

value  of  the  railway  properties  on  the  basis  defined  in  the 
preceding  paragraph,  and  to  arrange  the  transfer  of  the 
said  properties. 

4.  Such  transfer  shall  be  completed  as  soon  as  possible, 
and,  in  any  case,  not  later  than  nine  months  from  the  date 
of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  agreement. 

5.  To  effect  the   reimbursement   under  Paragraph  2  of 
this  article,  China  shall  simultaneously  with  the  completion 
of  the  transfer  of  the  railway  properties,  deliver  to  Japan 
Chinese  Government  Treasury  notes,  secured  on  the  proper- 
ties and  revenues  of  the  railway,  and  running  for  a  period 
of  fifteen  years,  but  redeemable  at  the  option  of  China  at 
the  end  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  delivery  of  the 
Treasury  notes,  or  at  any  time  thereafter  upon  six  months' 
previous  notice. 

6.  Pending  the  redemption  of  the  said  Treasury  notes, 
the  Chinese  Government  will  select  and  appoint,  for  so  long 
a  period  as  the  said  notes  remain  unredeemed,  a  Japanese 
subject  to  the  post  of  traffic  manager  and  another  Japanese 
subject  to  be  chief  accountant  jointly  with  the  Chinese  chief 
accountant  with  co-ordinate  functions.     These  officials  shall 
all  be  under  the  direction,  control  and  supervision  of  the 
Chinese  managing  director,  and  removable  for  cause. 

7.  Financial    details    of   a    technical   character    relating 
to  the  said  Treasury  notes,  not  provided  for  in  this  article, 
shall  be  determined  in  mutual  accord  between  the  Japanese 
and  Chinese  authorities  as  soon  as  possible,  and,  in  any  case, 
not  later  than  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  agreement. 

VI. THE  EXTENSIONS  OF   THE    TSING-TAO-TSINANFF  RAILWAY 

It  is  agreed  that  the  concessions  relating  to  the  two  ex- 
tensions of  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway,  namely,  the 
Tsinanfu-Shunteh  and  the  Kaomi-Hsuchowfu  lines,  will  be 


296  APPENDIX 

thrown  open  for  the  common  activity  of  an  international 
financial  group,  on  terms  to  be  arranged  between  the  Chinese 
Government  and  the  said  group. 

vn. — MIXES 

The  mines  of  Tsechuan,  Fangtse  and  Chinlingchen,  for 
which  the  mining  rights  were  formerly  granted  by  China  to 
Germany,  shall  be  handed  to  a  company  to  be  formed  by  a 
special  charter  of  the  Chinese  Government,  in  which  the 
Japanese  capital  may  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the  Chinese 
capital.  The  mode  and  terms  of  such  arrangement  shall 
be  determined  by  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  commissions 
which  are  to  be  appointed  for  that  purpose  and  which  shall 
meet  immediately  upon  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
agreement. 

Vm. OPENING   OF    THE    FORMER   GERMAN    LEASED    TERRITORY 

The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  it  has  no  intention 
of  seeking  the  establishment  of  an  exclusive  Japanese  set- 
tlement or  of  an  international  settlement  in  Tsing-tao. 

The  Chinese  Government,  on  its  part,  declares  that  the 
entire  area  of  the  former  German  leased  territory  of  Kiao- 
Chau  will  be  opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  that  foreigners 
will  be  permitted  freely  to  reside  and  carry  on  commerce, 
industry,  and  other  lawful  pursuits  within  such  area. 

The  vested  rights  lawfully  and  equitably  acquired  by  for- 
eign nationals  in  said  area,  whether  under  the  German  regime 
or  during  the  Japanese  military  occupation,  will  be  re- 
spected. 

All  questions  relating  to  the  status  or  validity  of  such 
vested  rights  acquired  by  Japanese  nationals  shall  be  ar- 
ranged by  the  Sino-Japanese  Joint  Commission. 


APPENDIX  297 

DC. SALT  INDUSTRY 

Whereas,  the  salt  industry  is  a  Government  monopoly  in 
China,  it  is  agreed  that  the  interests  of  Japanese  companies 
of  Japanese  nationals  actually  engaged  in  the  said  industry 
along  the  coast  of  Kiao-Chau  Bay  are  to  be  purchased  by 
the  Chinese  Government  on  payment  of  fair  compensation, 
and  that  exportation  to  Japan  of  a  quantity  of  salt  pro- 
duced'by  the  said  industry  along  the  said  coast  is  to  be  per- 
mitted on  reasonable  terms.  Arrangements  for  the  above 
purposes,  including  the  transfer  of  said  interests  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  shall  be  completed  by  the  Chinese 
and  Japanese  commissions  as  soon  as  possible,  and  in 
any  case  not  later  than  six  months  from  date  of  the  com- 
ing into  force  of  the  present  agreement. 

X. SUBMARINE   CABLES 

Japan  declarer,  that  all  the  rights,  titles  and  privileges 
concerning  former  German  submarine  cables  between  Tsing- 
tao  and  Chefoo,  and  between  Tsing-tao  and  Shanghai,  are 
vested  in  China,  with  the  exception  of  those  portions  of  the 
said  two  cables  which  have  been  utilized  by  the  Japanese 
Government  for  the  laying  of  a  cable  between  Tsing-tao  and 
Sasebo — it  being  understood  that  the  question  relating  to 
the  landing  and  operation  at  Tsing-tao  and  the  said  Tsing- 
tao-Sasebo  cable  shall  be  arranged  by  the  Chinese  and  Japa- 
nese commissions  as  subject  to  the  terms  of  the  existing  con- 
tracts to  which  China  is  a  party. 

XI. WIRELESS   STATIONS 

The  Japanese  wireless  stations  at  Tsing-tao  and  Tsinanfu 
shall  be  transferred  to  China  upon  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Japanese  troops  at  those  two  places,  respectively,  with  fair 


298  APPENDIX 

compensation  for  the  value  of  these  stations.  The  details 
of  such  transfer  and  compensation  shall  be  arranged  by 
the  Chinese  and  Japanese  commissions. 

ANNEXES 

1.  Preferential    Rights — Japan    declares    that    she    re- 
nounces all  preferential  rights  with  regard  to  foreign  assist- 
ance in  persons,  capital  and  material,  stipulated  in  the  Sino- 
German  Treaty  of  March  6,  1898. 

//.  Public  Enterprises — Enterprises  relating  to  electric 
light,  telephone,  stock  yards,  &c.,  shall  be  handed  over  to 
the  Chinese  Government,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
stock  yard,  electric  light  and  laundry  enterprises  are,  in  turn, 
to  be  handed  over  to  the  municipal  government  of  Tsing-tao, 
which  will  form  Chinese  corporations  in  conformity  with  the 
Chinese  Company  law  to  manage  them,  under  municipal  super- 
vision and  regulations. 

///.  Telephones — 1.  The  Japanese  Government  agrees  to 
turn  over  to  the  Chinese  Government  the  telephone  enter- 
prise in  the  former  German  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau. 

2.  As  regards  such  telephone  enterprise,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment will  give  due  consideration  to  requests  from  the  for- 
eign community  at  Tsing-tao  for  such  extensions  and  im- 
provements as  may  be  reasonably  required  by  the  general 
interests  of  the  public. 

IV.  PubUc    Works — The    Chinese   Government    declares 
that  in  the  management  and  maintenance  of  the  public  works 
in  Tsing-tao,  such  as  roads,  waterworks,  parks,  drainage, 
sanitary  equipment,  &c.,  handed  over  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment by  the  Japanese  Government,  the  foreign  community 
in  Tsing-tao  shall  have  fair  representation. 

V.  Maritime  Customs — The  Chinese  Government  declares 
that  it  will  move  the  Inspector  General  of  the  Chinese  mari- 
time customs  to  permit  the  Japanese  traders  at  Tsing-tao  to 


APPENDIX  299 

communicate  with  the  said  customs  in  the  Japanese  language, 
and,  in  the  selection  of  a  suitable  staff  for  the  Tsing-tao 
customs,  to  give  consideration  within  the  limits  of  its  estab- 
lished service  regulations  to  the  diverse  needs  of  the  trade 
of  Tsing-tao. 

VI.  The  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway — Should  the  Joint 
Railway  Commission  fail  to  reach  an  agreement  on  any  of 
the  matter  entrusted  to  its  charge,  the  points  at  issue  shall 
be  taken  up  by  the  two  Governments  for  discussion  and  ad- 
justment by  means  of  diplomacy.     In  the  determination  of 
such  points  the  two  Governments  shall,  if  necessary,  obtain 
recommendations  of  an  expert  or  experts  of  a  third  power  or 
powers  who  shall  be  designated  in  mutual  agreement  with 
each  other. 

VII.  Extension  of  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu  Railway. — The 
Japanese  Government  has  no  intention  of  claiming  that  the 
option  for  the  construction  of  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  Railway 
should  be  thrown  open  for  the  common  activity  of  the  inter- 
national financial  consortium  if  that  railway  is  to  be  con- 
structed with  Chinese  capital. 

VIII.  Opening  of  the  Former  Leased  Territory — The  Chi- 
nese Government  declares  that,  pending  the  enactment  and 
general  application  of  laws  regulating  the  system  of  local 
self-government  in  China,  the  Chinese  local  authorities  will 
ascertain  the  views  of  the  foreign  residents  in  the  former 
German  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau  in  such  municipal 
matters  as  may  directly  affect  their  welfare  and  interests. 

SPECIAL  UNDERSTANDINGS 

The  four  following  special  understandings,  as  recorded  in 
the  minutes  of  the  conversations,  and  as  explained  by  Secre- 
tary Hughes  at  the  plenary  session  of  Feb.  1,  form  a  part 
of  the  conclusions  reached: 

1.    It  is  understood  that  on  taking  over  the  railway,  the 


300  APPENDIX 

Chinese  authorities  shall  have  full  power  and  discretion  to 
continue  to  remove  the  present  employes  of  Japanese  nation- 
ality in  the  service  of  the  railway  and  that  reasonable  notice 
may  be  given  before  the  date  of  the  transfer  of  the  railway. 
Detailed  arrangements  regarding  the  replacement  to  take 
effect  immediately  on  the  transfer  of  the  railway  to  China  are 
to  be  made  by  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  authorities. 

2.  It  is  understood  (1)  that  the  entire  subordinate  staff 
of  the  Japanese  traffic  manager  and  of  the  Japanese  chief 
accountant  is  to  be  appointed  by   the  Chinese  Managing 
Director;  and  (2)  that  after  two  years  and  a  half  from  the 
date  of  the  transfer  of  the  railway,  the  Chinese  Government 
may  appoint  an  assistant  traffic  manager  of  Chinese  nation- 
ality, for  the  period  of  two  years  and  a  half,  and  that  such 
assistant  Chinese  traffic  manager  may  also  be  appointed  at 
any  time  after  six  months'  notice  for  the  redempion  of  the 
Treasury  notes  is  given. 

3.  The  Japanese  delegation  declares  that  Japan  has  no 
intention  to  claim  that  China  is  under  any  obligation  to 
appoint  Japanese  nationals  as  members  of  the  said  subordi- 
nate staff. 

4.  It  is  understood  that  the  redemption  of  the  said  Treas- 
ury notes  will  not  be  effected  with  funds  raised  from  any 
source  other  than  Chinese. 


(4)  RESOLUTION 

Regarding  a  Board  of  Reference  to  Serve  the  Principle  of 
the  Open  Door  in  China. 

I.  With  a  view  to  applying  more  effectually  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  open  door  or  equality  of  opportunity  in  China 
for  the  trade  and  industry  of  all  nations,  the  powers  other 
than  China  represented  at  this  conference  agree: 

(a)  Not  to  seek  or  to  support  their  nationals  in  seeking 


APPENDIX  301 

any  arrangement  which  might  purport  to  establish  in  favour 
of  their  interests  any  general  superiority  of  right  with  re- 
spect to  commercial  or  economic  development  in  any  desig- 
nated region  of  China ; 

(b)  Not  to  seek  or  to  support  their  nationals  in  seeking 
any  such  monopoly  or  preferences  as  would  deprive  other 
nationals  of  the  right  of  undertaking  any  legitimate  trade 
or  industry  in  China  or  of  participating  with  the  Chinese 
Government  or  with  any  local  authority  in  any  category  or 
public  enterprise  which  by  reason  of  its  scope,  duration  or 
geographical  extent  is  calculated  to  frustrate  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunity. 

It  is  understood  that  this  agreement  is  not  to  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  prohibit  the  acquisition  of  such  properties  or 
rights  as  may  be  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  a  particular 
commercial,  industrial  or  financial  undertaking  or  to  the  en- 
couragement of  invention  and  research. 

II.  The   Chinese   Government  takes   note  of  the   above 
agreement  and  declares  its  intention  of  being  guided  by  the 
same  principles  in  dealing  with  applications   for  economic 
right  and  privileges  from  Governments  and  nationals  of  all 
foreign  countries  whether  parties  to  that  agreement  or  not. 

III.  The   powers,   including   China,    represented    at    this 
conference  agree  in  principle  to  the  establishment  in  China 
of  a  Board  of  Reference  to  which  any  question  arising  on  the 
above  agreement  and  declaration  may  be  referred  for  inves- 
tigation and  report.      (A  detailed  scheme  for  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  board  shall  be  formed  by  the  special  conference 
referred  to  in  Article  I  of  the  convention  on  Chinese  customs 
duties.) 

(5)  RAILWAY  RESOLUTIONS  OF  19-TH  JANUARY 

(a)  The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  throughout 
the  whole  of  the  railways  in  China  it  will  not  exercise  or 


302  APPENDIX 

permit  any  unfair  discrimination  of  any  kind.  In  particular 
there  shall  be  no  discrimination  whatever,  direct  or  in- 
direct, in  respect  of  charges  or  of  facilities  on  the  ground 
of  the  nationality  of  passengers  or  the  countries  from  which 
or  to  which  they  are  proceeding,  or  the  origin  or  ownership 
of  goods  or  the  country  from  which  or  to  which  they  are 
consigned,  or  the  nationality  or  ownership  of  the  ship  or 
other  means  of  conveying  such  passengers  or  goods  before  or 
after  their  transport  on  the  Chinese  railways. 

The  other  powers  represented  at  this  conference  take 
note  of  the  above  declaration  and  make  a  corresponding  dec- 
laration in  respect  of  any  of  the  aforesaid  railways  over 
which  they  or  their  nationals  are  in  a  position  to  exercise 
any  control  in  virtue  of  any  concession,  special  agreement 
or  otherwise. 

Any  question  arising  under  this  declaration  may  be  re- 
ferred by  any  of  the  powers  concerned  to  the  Board  of 
Reference,  when  established,  for  consideration  and  report. 

(b)  The  resolution  for  railway  unification,  as  finally 
adopted,  read  thus: 

The  powers  represented  in  this  conference  record  their 
hope  that,  to  the  utmost  degree  consistent  with  legitimate 
existing  rights,  the  future  development  of  railways  in  China 
shall  be  so  conducted  as  to  enable  the  Chinese  Government 
to  effect  the  unification  of  the  railways  into  a  railway  sys- 
tem under  Chinese  control,  with  such  foreign  financial  and 
technical  assistance  as  may  prove  necessary  in  the  interests 
of  that  system. 

(6)  RESOLUTION  REGARDING  REDUCTION  OF  CHINA'S  ARMIES 

Whereas  the  powers  attending  this  conference  have  been 
deeply  impressed  with  the  severe  drain  on  the  public  revenue 
of  China  through  the  maintenance  in  various  parts  of  the 
country  of  military  forces,  excessive  in  number  and  con- 


APPENDIX  303 

trolled  by  the  military  chiefs  of  the  provinces  without  co- 
ordination ;  and 

Whereas  the  continued  maintenance  of  these  forces  appears 
to  be  mainly  responsible  for  China's  present  unsettled  politi- 
cal conditions;  and 

Whereas  it  is  felt  that  large  and  prompt  reductions  of 
these  forces  will  not  only  advance  the  cause  of  China's 
political  unity  and  economic  development,  but  will  hasten  her 
financial  rehabilitation ; 

Therefore,  without  any  intention  to  interfere  in  the  inter- 
nal problems  of  China,  but  animated  by  the  sincere  desire  to 
see  China  develop  and  maintain  for  herself  an  effective  and 
stable  Government,  alike  in  her  own  interest  and  in  the 
general  interest  of  trade ;  and  being  inspired  by  the  spirit  of 
this  conference,  whose  aim  is  to  reduce,  through  the  limi- 
tation of  armaments,  the  enormous  disbursements  which  man- 
ifestly constitute  the  greater  part  of  the  encumbrance  upon 
enterprise  and  national  prosperity;  it  is 

Resolved,  That  this  conference  express  to  China  the  ear- 
nest hope  that  immediate  and  effective  steps  may  be  taken 
by  the  Chinese  Government  to  reduce  the  aforesaid  military 
forces  and  expenditures. 

(7)  RESOLUTION  REGARDING  PUBLICATION  or  ALL  INTER- 
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS 

The  powers  represented  in  this  conference,  considering  it 
desirable  that  there  should  hereafter  be  full  publicity  with 
respect  to  all  matters  affecting  the  political  and  other  inter- 
national obligations  of  China  and  of  the  several  powers  in 
relation  to  China,  are  agreed  as  follows : 


The  seven  powers  other  than  China  will,  at  their  earliest 
convenience,  file  with  the  Secretariat  General  of  the  confer- 


304  APPENDIX 

ence  for  transmission  to  the  participating  powers  a  list  of  all 
treaties,  conventions,  exchange  of  notes  or  other  inter- 
national agreements  which  they  may  have  with  China,  or  with 
any  other  power  or  powers  in  relation  to  China,  which  they 
deem  to  be  still  in  force  and  upon  which  they  may  desire 
to  rely.  In  each  ca«e  citations  will  be  given  to  any  official  or 
other  publication  in  which  an  authoritative  text  of  the  docu- 
ments may  be  found.  In  any  case  in  which  the  document 
may  not  have  been  published,  a  copy  of  the  text  (in  its  orig- 
inal language  or  languages)  will  be  filed  with  the  Secre- 
tariat General  of  the  conference. 

Every  treaty  or  other  international  agreement  of  the  char- 
acter described  which  may  be  concluded  hereafter  shall  be 
notified  by  the  Governments  concerned  within  sixty  days  of 
its  conclusion  to  the  powers  who  are  signatories  of  or  adher- 
ents to  this  agreement. 


The  several  powers  other  than  China  will  file  with  the  Sec- 
retariat General  of  the  conference  at  their  earliest  conveni- 
ence for  transmission  to  the  participating  powers  a  list, 
as  nearly  complete  as  may  be  possible,  of  all  those  contracts 
between  their  nationals,  of  the  one  part,  and  the  Chinese 
Government  or  any  of  its  administrative  subdivisions  or  local 
authorities,  of  the  other  part,  which  involve  any  conces- 
sion, franchise,  option  or  preference  with  regard  to  rail- 
way construction,  mining,  forestry,  navigation,  river  con- 
servancy, harbour  works,  reclamation,  electrical  communica- 
tions, or  other  public  works  or  public  services,  or  for  the 
sale  of  arms  or  ammunition,  or  which  involve  a  lien  upon 
any  of  the  purviews  or  properties  of  the  Chinese  Government 
or  of  any  of  its  administrative  subdivisions.  There  shall  be, 
in  the  case  of  each  document  so  listed,  either  a  citation  to  a 
published  text  or  copy  of  the  text  itself. 

Every  contract  of  the  public  character  described  which 


APPENDIX  305 

may  be  concluded  hereafter  shall  be  notified  by  the  Govern- 
ments concerned  within  sixty  days  after  the  receipt  of  in- 
formation of  its  conclusion  to  the  powers  who  are  signa- 
tories of  or  adherents  to  this  agreement. 

in 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  notify,  in  the  condi- 
tion laid  down  in  this  agreement,  every  treaty,  agreement 
or  contract  of  the  character  indicated  herein  which  has  been 
or  may  hereafter  fee  concluded  by  that  Government  or  by 
any  local  authority  in  China  with  any  foreign  power  or 
the  nationals  of  any  foreign  power,  whether  party  to  this 
agreement  or  not,  so  far  as  the  information  is  in  its  posses- 
sion. 

IV 

The  Governments  of  powers  having  treaty  relations  with 
China,  which  are  not  represented  at  the  present  conference, 
shall  be  invited  to  adhere  to  this  agreement.  The  United 
States  Government,  as  convener  of  the  conference,  under- 
takes to  communicate  this  agreement  to  the  Governments  of 
the  said  powers,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  their  adherence 
thereto  as  soon  as  possible. 

(8)  RESOLUTION  BANISHING  SPHEEES  OF  INFLUENCE 

Resolved,  That  the  signatory  powers  will  not  support  any 
agreement  by  their  respective  nationals  with  each  other  de- 
signed to  create  spheres  of  influence  or  to  provide  for  the 
enjoyment  of  exclusive  opportunity  in  designated,  parts  of 
Chinese  territory. 

(9)  RESOLUTION  REGARDING  RADIO  STATIONS  IN  CHINA 

The  representatives  of  the  powers  hereinafter  named  par- 
ticipating in  the  discussion  of  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  ques- 


306  APPENDIX 

tions  in  the  conference  on  the  limitation  of  armament,  to 
wit,  the  United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  the  British 
Empire,  China,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands  and 
Portugal,  have  resolved: 

1.  That  all  radio  stations  in  China,  whether  maintained 
under  the  provisions  of  the  International  Protocol  of  Sept. 
7,  1901,  or  in  fact  maintained  in  the  grounds  of  any  of 
the  foreign  legations  in  China,  shall  be  limited  in  their  use 
to  sending  and  receiving  Government  messages  and  shall  not 
receive  or  send  commercial  or  personal  or  unofficial  messages, 
including  press  matters;  provided,  however,  that  in  case  all 
other  telegraphic  communication  is  interrupted,  then,  upon 
official  notification  accompanied  by  proof  of  such  interrup- 
tion to  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Communications,  such  sta- 
tions may  afford  temporary  facilities  for  commercial,  per- 
sonal or  unofficial  messages,  including  press  matter,  until 
the  Chinese  Government  has  given  notice  of  the  termination 
of  the  interruption. 

2.  All  radio   stations   operated  within  the  territory   of 
China  by  a  foreign  Government  or  the  citizens  or  subjects 
thereof,   under  treaties   or   concessions  of   the   Government 
of   China,  shall  limit   the  messages   sent   and   received  by 
the  terms  of  the  treaties  or  concessions  under  which  the  re- 
spective stations  are  maintained. 

3.  In  case  there  be  any  radio  station  maintained  in  the 
territory  of  China  by  a  foreign  Government  or  citizens  or 
subjects  thereof  without  the  authority  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment  such   station   and   all   the  plant,   apparatus    and 
material  thereof  shall  be  transferred  to  and  taken  over  by 
the  Government  of  China,  to  be  operated  under  the  direction 
of  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Communications  upon  fair  and 
full  compensation  to  the  owners  for  the  value  of  the  installa- 
tion, as  soon  as  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Communications  is 
prepared  to  operate  the  same  effectively  for  the  general  pub- 
lic benefit. 


APPENDIX  307 

4.  If  any  question  shall  arise  as  to  the  radio  stations 
in  leased  territories,  in  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  zone 
or    in   the   French   concession   at   Shanghai,   they   shall   be 
regarded  as  matters  for  discussion  between  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Government  concerned. 

5.  The  owners  or  managers  of  all  radio  stations  main- 
tained in  the  territory  of  China  by  foreign  powers  or  citi- 
zens or  subjects  thereof  shall  confer  with  the  Chinese  Min- 
istry of  Communications  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  a  com- 
mon arrangement  to  avoid  interference  in  the  use  of  wave 
lengths  by  wireless  stations  in  China,  subject  to  such  gen- 
eral arrangements  as  may  be  made  by  an  international  con- 
ference convened  for  the  revision  of  the  rules  established  by 
the  International   Radio   Telegraph  Convention   signed   at 
London,  July  5,  1912. 

The  reservations,  as  approved  by  the  Committee  and 
•spread  upon  the  record,  read  thus: 

"The  powers  other  than  China  declare  that  nothing  in 
paragraphs  3  or  4  of  the  resolution  of  Dec.  7,  1921,  is  to 
be  deemed  to  be  an  expression  of  opinion  by  the  conference 
as  to  whether  the  stations  referred  to  therein  are  or  are 
not  authorized  by  China. 

"They  further  give  notice  that  the  result  of  any  discus- 
sion arising  under  Paragraph  4  must,  if  it  is  not  to  be  sub- 
ject to  objection  by  them,  conform  with  the  principles  of 
the  open  door,  or  equality  of  opportunity,  approved  by 
the  conference." 

In  addition,  Mr.  Alfred  Sze  for  China  similarly  spread 
upon  the  record  the  following  declaration  by  China: 

"The  Chinese  delegation  takes  this  occasion  formally  to 
declare  that  the  Chinese  Government  does  not  recognize 
or  concede  the  right  of  any  foreign  power  or  of  the  nationals 
thereof  to  instal  or  operate,  without  its  express  consent,  radio 
stations  in  legation  grounds,  settlements,  concessions,  leased 
territories,  railway  areas  or  other  similar  areas." 


APPENDIX  TO  PART  VI 

It  may  be  held  pertinent  at  this  hour  to  disclose  the  fol- 
lowing from  official  notebooks.  After  Japan  had  attacked 
and  captured  Kiaochow  (Nov.,  1914),  the  Chinese  Minister 
in  Tokyo,  through  the  secret  service,  obtained  information 
that  a  series  of  drastic  demands  were  being  formulated.  He 
therefore  secretly  visited  the  Elder  Statesman,  Marquis 
Matsukata,  who  was  friendly  to  China,  to  intercede  with 
him.  Marquis  Matsukata  disclaimed  all  knowledge  saying 
that  Marquis  Okuma,  the  Premier,  was  not  on  good  terms 
with  any  of  the  Genro,  or  Elder  Statesmen,  and  did  not 
consult  them,  but  he  advised  a  warning  to  be  conveyed  to 
President  Yuan  Shih-kai  to  exercise  extreme  care.  Unfor- 
tunately the  agitation  over  the  continued  presence  of  Japa- 
nese troops  in  Shantung  had  already  reached  boiling-point, 
and  in  spite  of  the  warning  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  was 
forced  by  the  Shantung  people  to  issue  a  strong  protest  to 
Japan  on  the  4th  January.  This  was  precisely  what  Mar- 
quis Okuma  and  Baron  Kato  (Foreign  Minister)  were  wait- 
ing for.  On  the  19th  January  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
were  secretly  filed  on  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  personally. 
It  was  Count  Inouye,  Japanese  Ambassador  in  London,  and 
adopted  heir  of  Marquis  Inouye,  the  Elder  Statesman,  who 
later  forced  action  by  the  Genro.  Count  Inouye  had  per- 
sistently denied  the  existence  of  Group  V  to  Viscount  Grey, 
then  British  Foreign  Secretary.  When  it  transpired  that 
there  was  really  such  a  group  of  which  he  had  been  kept  in 
ignorance,  he  telegraphed  confidentially  over  the  heads  of 
the  Cabinet  asking  that  the  Emperor  recall  him  as  his 
honour  had  been  compromised  by  Baron  Kato,  forcing  him 

to  prevaricate  in  his  dealings  with  Viscount  Grey. 

308 


APPENDIX  309 

When  the  Peking  negotiations  approached  their  inevitable 
crisis  at  the  end  of  April,  there  was  a  mounting  storm  of 
indignation  among  the  Elder  Statesmen.  China  in  her  last 
reply  having  rebutted  the  final  Japanese  proposals,  on  the 
4th  May  the  Cabinet  and  the  Genro  held  a  joint  meeting 
which  lasted  four  hours  without  coming  to  any  definite  con- 
clusion. Owing,  however,  to  the  open  opposition  of  the 
Elder  Statesmen  there  was  an  increasing  tendency  to  with- 
draw the  two  articles  of  Group  V.,  dealing  with  the  employ- 
ment of  Japanese  advisers  and  the  proposed  monopoly  in 
the  supply  of  Japanese  arms  and  ammunition.  In  order  to 
come  to  a  definite  decision  the  Cabinet  called  a  second  meet- 
ing next  day.  This  was  also  inconclusive :  hence  an  arrange- 
ment was  made  for  an  Imperial  audience  on  the  6th  May. 

At  this  meeting  before  the  Throne  it  was  declared  that 
the  fundamental  causes  of  disagreement  between  the  Genro 
and  the  Cabinet  were: 

(1)  That  the  Japanese  Government  in  drawing  up  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  did  not  consult  the  Elder  Statesmen 
whose  opinion  is  usually  solicited  in  matters  of  importance. 

(2)  That  without  the  approval  of  the  Genro  the  Govern- 
ment had  declared  martial  Law  in  Manchuria  and  the  Port 
Arthur   Leased   Territory    and    mobilized   troops   in   these 
areas. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Audience  the  Genro  Marquis 
Matsukata  inquired  about  Japan's  financial  standing  in  the 
event  of  war.  The  Finance  Minister  answered  that  four 
months'  expenditure  had  been  prepared.  Marquis  Matsu- 
kata (who  was  the  principal  financial  authority  in  Japan 
having  established  the  gold  standard)  replied  that  to  bring 
down  a  big  country  like  China,  four  months  was  an  entirely 
inadequate  preparation.  Prince  Yamagata  then  asked 
whether  it  would  be  necessary  to  consult  England  and 
America  prior  to  the  taking  of  final  steps ;  if  an  ultimatum 
were  issued  leading  to  the  intervention  of  other  Powers  how 


310  APPENDIX 

would  Japan  meet  the  contingency?  Baron  Kato,  Foreign 
Minister,  answered  that  the  filing  of  an  ultimatum  would 
cause  China  to  accept  all  the  Demands.  If  not,  war  would 
be  declared  which  would  automatically  overthrow  the  gov- 
ernment of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  Prince  Yamagata  answered 
that  even  if  Yuan  Shih-kai  were  so  easily  overthrown  it 
would  be  much  harder  to  restore  the  status  quo  ante  bellum, 
and  that  unless  Japan  were  prepared  for  a  ten  years'  strug- 
gle he  feared  the  desired  results  would  not  be  accomplished. 
Marquis  Matsukata  urged  once  more  that  the  clauses  deal- 
ing with  Japanese  advisers  and  Japanese  arms  and  the  like 
should  be  left  for  mutual  consideration  and  no  force  threat- 
ened in  their  regard.  To  this  Baron  Kato  objected  strenu- 
ously. In  consequence  of  his  brusque  manner  in  the  Impe- 
rial presence  he  was  ordered  to  leave  the  meeting,  which 
proceeded  without  him  and  ended  by  the  general  acceptance 
of  the  contentions  of  the  Genro. 

It  was  in  consequence  of  these  developments  that  in  the 
ultimatum  delivered  to  China  the  next  day,  7th  May,  Japan 
agreed  to  detach  Group  V  from  immediate  consideration, 
reserving  it  for  a  later  date.  The  Japanese  Legation  in 
Peking,  only  apprised  of  these  events  at  a  much  later  date, 
was  telegraphing  all  that  day  (7th  May)  and  the  next, 
after  filing  the  ultimatum  that  better  terms  were  obtainable. 
These  are  the  true  facts  which  have  hitherto  been  closely 
guarded. 


°°0  537  634 


SOUTHERN  BRANCH, 

UNIVERSITY  UP  CALIFORNIA, 

LIBRARY, 

'LOS  ANGELES.  CALIF. 


